Memoirs of the Private Life, Return, and Reign of Napoleon in 1815 Volume I Part 22

"5th. The Emperor had stipulated (Art. 3 of the treaty) in favour of his brave soldiers the preservation of their salaries from the Napoleon fund (_sur le mont Napoleon_); he had reserved out of the extraordinary domain, and the funds remaining of the civil list, the means of recompensing his servants, and of paying the soldiers, that attached themselves to his fate. The whole was taken away and kept back by the ministers of the Bourbons. An agent of the French soldiers went in vain to Vienna, to claim for them the most sacred of all property, the price of their valour and their blood.

"6th. The preservation of the property, movable and immovable, of the Emperor's family, is stipulated by the same treaty (Art. 6); yet it has been despoiled of both: in France, with force of arms, by commissioned brigands; in Italy, by the violence of military commanders; in both countries by seizures and sequestrations solemnly appointed.

"7th. The Emperor Napoleon was to receive two millions of francs a year, and his family two millions and a half, agreeably to the distribution fixed by Art. 6 of the treaty: but the French government has constantly refused to fulfil these engagements, and Napoleon would have soon seen himself reduced to the necessity of dismissing his faithful guard, for want of the means of ensuring its pay, if he had not found in the grateful remembrances of the bankers and merchants of Genoa and Italy the honourable resource of a loan of twelve millions, which was offered him.

"8th. In fine, it was not without a motive, that certain persons were desirous of separating from Napoleon, by any means, the companions of his glory, models of attachment and constancy, unshaken guaranties of his life and safety. The island of Elba was secured to him in full property (Art. 3 of the treaty): yet the resolution to deprive him of it, desired by the Bourbons, and solicited by their agents, had been taken at the Congress.

"And if Providence in its justice had not interposed, Europe would have seen attempts made against the person, the liberty of Napoleon, banished for ever at the mercy of his enemies, far from his family, separated from his servants, either to St. Lucie, or to St. Helena, which was a.s.signed him as a prison.

"And when the allied powers, yielding to the imprudent wishes, or cruel instigations, of the agents of the house of Bourbon, have stooped to violate a solemn contract, on the faith of which Napoleon had absolved the French nation from its oaths; when himself, and all the members of his family, saw themselves menaced and attacked in their persons, in their property, in their affections, in all the rights stipulated in their favour as princes, and even in those secured by the laws to simple citizens; how ought Napoleon to act?

"Ought he, after having endured so many insults, and suffered so many acts of injustice, to consent to the complete violation of the engagements entered into with him; and, resigning himself to the fate prepared for him, abandon also to their fearful destiny, his wife, his son, his relations, and his faithful servants?

"Such a resolution seems to require more than human strength of mind: yet Napoleon was capable of taking it, if the peace and happiness of France could have been purchased by this new sacrifice. He would again have devoted himself for the French people, from whom, as he wishes to declare in the face of all Europe, he makes it his glory to hold every thing, to whom he refers every thing, and to whom alone he will hold himself responsible for his actions and devote his life.

"It was for France alone, and to save her from the calamities of an intestine war, that he abdicated the crown in 1814. He restored to the French people the rights he held from them; he left them free to choose a new master, and to found their liberty and happiness on inst.i.tutions, that would protect both.

"He hoped, that the nation would preserve all it had acquired by five and twenty years of glorious fighting; and the exercise of its sovereignty in the choice of a dynasty, and in stipulating the conditions, on which it should be called to the throne.

"He expected from the new government respect for the glory of the armies, and for the rights of the brave; the guaranty of all the new interests, interests generated and maintained during a quarter of a century, resulting from all the civil and political laws, observed and revered during that time, because they are identified with the manners, habits, and wants of the nation.

"Far from all this, every idea of the sovereignty of the people has been discarded.

"The principle, on which all public and civil legislation has been founded since the revolution, has been equally discarded.

"France has been treated as a revolted country, reconquered by the armies of its ancient masters, and subjugated anew to a feudal domination.

"A const.i.tutional law has been imposed on France, as easy to be eluded as revoked; and in the form of royal ordinances simply, without consulting the nation, without even hearing those bodies, become illegal, the phantoms of national representation.

"The violation of this charter has been checked only by the timidity of the government; the extent of the abuses of its authority has been limited only by its weakness.

"The disjointing of the army, the dispersion of its officers, the exile of several, the debas.e.m.e.nt of the soldiers, the suppression of their endowments, the privation of their pay or pensions; the reduction of the pay of the legionaries, the despoiling them of their honours, the pre-eminence given to the decorations of the feudal monarchy, the contempt of the citizens, designated anew under the name of _tiers-etat_ (third estate); the spoliation of the purchasers of national property, prepared and already begun, the actual diminution of value of such as was obliged to be sold; the return of the feudal system in its t.i.tles, privileges, and useful rights, the re-establishment of tramontane principles, the abolition of the liberties of the Gallican church, the annihilation of the Concordat, the re-establishment of t.i.thes, the reviving intolerance of an exclusive form of wors.h.i.+p; the domination of a handful of n.o.bles over a people accustomed to equality: are what the ministers of the Bourbons have done, or wished to do, for the people of France.

"It was under such circ.u.mstances, that the Emperor Napoleon quitted the island of Elba: such were the motives of the resolution he took, and not the consideration of his own personal interests, so trivial in his opinion compared with the interests of the nation, to which he has devoted his existence.

"He has not brought war into the bosom of France: on the contrary, he has extinguished the war, which the possessors of national property, const.i.tuting four fifths of the landholders throughout France, would have been compelled to make upon their despoilers; the war, which the citizens, oppressed, degraded, humiliated by the n.o.bles, would have been forced to declare against their oppressors; the war, which the Protestants, the Jews, and the people of different sects, would have been obliged to maintain against their persecutors.

"He came to deliver France; and as a deliverer he has been received.

"He arrived almost alone; he travelled two hundred and twenty leagues, without meeting any obstacle, without a battle; and has resumed without resistance, in the midst of the capital, and of the acclamations of an immense majority of the citizens, the throne relinquished by the Bourbons; who, from among the army, their own household, the national guards, or the people, could not raise a single person in arms, to endeavour to maintain them in it.

"Yet, replaced at the head of the nation, which had already chosen him three times, and has just elected him a fourth time by the reception it gave him on his march, and his triumphant arrival; of that nation, by which, and for the interest of which, he wishes to reign;

"What is the desire of Napoleon? What the French people desire, the independence of France, peace within, peace with all nations, the execution of the treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814.

"What is there, then, changed in the future state of Europe, and in the hope of repose promised it? What voice is raised, to demand those succours, which, according to the declaration, are to be granted only when claimed?

"There is nothing changed, if the allied powers recur, as we have a right to expect from them, to just and temperate sentiments; if they acknowledge, that the existence of France in a respectable and independent state, as far from conquering as from being conquered, from domineering as from being held in subjection, is necessary to the balance of great realms, as well as to the guaranty of smaller states.

"There is nothing changed, if, not attempting to compel France to resume with a dynasty, which she can no longer desire, the feudal chains she has broken, and to submit to the seigneurial or ecclesiastical pretensions, from which it has emanc.i.p.ated itself, those powers do not attempt to impose on her laws, to interfere in her internal concerns, to a.s.sign her a particular form of government, to give her masters suited to the interests and pa.s.sions of her neighbours.

"There is nothing changed, if, while France is occupied in preparing the new social compact, that shall guaranty the liberty of her citizens, and the triumph of those generous ideas, that prevail in Europe, and can no longer be stifled; she be not compelled, to call off her attention from these pacific ideas, and from the means of domestic prosperity, to which the people and their chief are desirous of devoting themselves in happy concord, in order to prepare for battle.

"There is nothing changed, if, while the French nation demands nothing, but to remain at peace with all Europe, an unjust coalition do not oblige her to defend, as it did in 1792, her will, and her rights, and her independence, and the sovereign of her choice."

This eloquent refutation, full of irrefragable facts, and reasonings not to be refuted, was no longer necessary. French honour had judged and condemned the Congress of Vienna and its Declaration.

When this declaration appeared, France grew pale: she was astonished, affrighted at the calamities, which the future boded; and groaned at the idea of being exposed to a war for the sake of one single man.

This first impression over, her pride, her virtue, felt indignant, that the allies should dare to conceive the thought, that she would yield to their menaces, and cowardly consent, to give Napoleon up to them.

Had Napoleon been no more than a simple citizen, the attempt to violate by authority the rights of men and nations in his person would have been sufficient, to induce the French, or at least all worthy of the name, to think themselves obliged to protect and defend him.

But Napoleon was not merely a simple citizen, he was the head of the French nation: it was for having aggrandized it by his conquests, and enn.o.bled it by his victories, that he was proscribed by foreigners; and the most timid as well as the most generous made it their sacred duty to place him under the safeguard of the nation, and of French honour.

Thus the declaration of the Congress, instead of intimidating France, heightened its courage; instead of separating Napoleon from the French, drew still more close the bands that united them; instead of calling down on his head the public vengeance, rendered him more estimable and more dear in the eyes of the people.

If Napoleon, availing himself of these generous sentiments, had said to the French: "You have restored to me the crown, foreigners are desirous of tearing it from me; I am ready, either to defend it, or to lay it down; say which I shall do:" the whole nation would have understood Napoleon, and would have risen in a body, to cause the sovereign of its heart and its choice to be respected.

But Napoleon had other ideas: he considered the declaration of the Congress merely as a paper adapted to the circ.u.mstances of the day, the object of which was, at the time when it was subscribed by the allies, to support the courage of the royalists, and to restore to the Bourbons the confidence and moral strength they had lost.

He thought, that his entrance into Paris, and the entire pacification of the South, would have completely changed the state of things; and he hoped, that foreign nations would ultimately acknowledge him, when they were convinced, that he had been re-established on the throne by the unanimous consent of the French, and that his ideas of conquest and dominion had given place to the real desire of respecting the tranquillity and independence of his neighbours, and of living in harmony with them.

In fine, he considered, that prudence would induce the allies, as it was their interest, not to engage in a war, the results of which could not be favourable to them: "They will feel, that they will not this time have to do with the France of 1814; and that their successes, if they gain any, will be no longer decisive, but will merely serve to render the war more obstinate and b.l.o.o.d.y; while, if victory favour me, I may become as formidable as ever. I have for me Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, and with a tricoloured flag and a proclamation I could revolutionize them in four-and-twenty hours."

The treaty of the 25th of March, by which the great powers, renewing the arrangements of the treaty of Chaumont, engaged themselves anew not to lay down their arms, as long as Napoleon should be on the throne, appeared to him merely the natural consequence of the act of the 13th of March, and of the erroneous opinions the allies had formed of France. He thought, that it would not alter the state of the question; and resolved, notwithstanding this treaty, and the affronting manner in which his first overtures were received, to endeavour repeatedly to make the voice of truth, of reason, and of peace, heard at Vienna.

Baron de Sta.s.sart, late auditor to the council of state and prefect, had been made chamberlain of Austria, or of Bavaria, since the restoration. He was at Paris. The Emperor, hoping he might be able to reach Vienna under favour of his quality of chamberlain, charged him with a mission for the Empress Marie Louise, and fresh despatches for the Emperor of Austria. Napoleon at the same time had recourse to other means: he was aware of the intimacy and connexions of MM. D. de St. L** and de Mont** with Prince Talleyrand; and persuaded, that M.

de Talleyrand would procure for them authority to repair to Vienna, he resolved, to send them thither. He did not deceive himself with the idea, that they would accept their mission for any other purpose than that of more easily serving the royal cause; but he paid little regard to their intrigues with the King, provided they delivered and brought back with exactness the despatches, that should be entrusted to them[95].

[Footnote 95: It was a laughable singularity, that, of all the double-faced men employed by the Emperor, there was no one, in whom he had more confidence, than he had in M. de Mont**. He had formerly ill-treated, persecuted, and banished him: he knew, that he detested him, and was the most intimate, the most devoted friend of M. de Talleyrand: but he knew also the bent of M. de Mont**'s mind; and he thought, that he would feel an infinite pleasure, in executing his mission well, and _humming_ [_rouer_] M. de Talleyrand, who flattered himself, that he had never been hummed by any person. I know not whether M. de Mont** found it pleasant, or not, to take in M. de Talleyrand; what I know is, that he justified the expectations of Napoleon, and brought back to him intact the letters, that were delivered to him by M. de Mont**.]

About the King, however, and what pa.s.sed at Ghent, he took little concern: his anxious eyes were turned to Vienna; and convinced of the influence, that M. de Talleyrand might exert there, he particularly directed M. ****, to offer him his favour, and money also, if he would abandon the Bourbons, and employ his talents and experience for the benefit of the imperial cause.

The Emperor, who did not cease to hope, that his exertions, time, and reflection, might effect some changes in the resolutions of the allies, heard with extreme displeasure, that the King of Naples had commenced hostilities.

This prince had long been dissatisfied with the complaisance, with which the allied sovereigns listened to the protests of France, Savoy, and Spain: and, though his crown had been guarantied to him by a solemn compact with Austria, and by the formal declarations of Russia and England, he foresaw, that the doctrine of legitimacy would carry the point against the faith of treaties, and that Austria, though interested in not allowing another crown to be transferred to the house of Bourbon, would be obliged to submit to the unanimous will of the other powers.

Thus the fear of being driven from the throne, and the resolution to maintain himself in it, possessed Joachim, when the news of the successful landing of Napoleon reached Naples.

The horror with which the Austrian sway inspired the Italians, the attachment they retained to Napoleon, and the joy they displayed on hearing of his departure from the island of Elba, persuaded the King, that he should find no difficulty in raising Italy; and he flattered himself with bringing the allies, either by force of arms, or by way of negotiation, to guaranty to him irrevocably the possession of his kingdom.

Desirous on the other hand of securing the protection of Napoleon, in case of failure of success, he secretly despatched an emissary to congratulate him; and announce, that, with a view of seconding his operations, he was about to attack the Austrians, and, if his wishes were answered by victory, he would soon join him with a formidable army: "in fine," he wrote, "the moment of atoning for the wrong I have done your Majesty, and of proving my attachment, is now arrived; I will not let it escape."

This letter, which I deciphered, reached the Emperor at Auxerre; and he immediately enjoined the King, to continue his preparations, but wait for his giving him the signal, before he commenced hostilities.

The natural impetuosity and impatience of this Prince did not allow him, to wait for the answer of Napoleon, and when his despatches arrived, the gauntlet had been thrown down.

The better to disguise his intentions, Joachim had summoned the amba.s.sadors of Austria and England, immediately on hearing of the landing of Napoleon, and had a.s.sured them, that he would remain faithful to his engagements. When he had a.s.sembled his army (put in motion under pretence of reinforcing his troops in the March of Ancona), he fell unexpectedly on the Austrians; and announced to the Italians, by a proclamation dated at Rimini the 31st of March, that he had taken up arms to liberate Italy from a foreign yoke, and restore its ancient freedom and independence.