The Works of Mr. George Gillespie Part 17

_Sect._ 1. We have proved that the ceremonies cannot be warranted by the law of G.o.d. It followeth to examine whether any law of man, or power upon earth, can make them lawful or warrantable unto us.

We will begin with laws ecclesiastical, where, first of all, it must be considered well what power the church hath to make laws about things pertaining to religion and the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, and how far the same doth extend itself. Dr Field's resolution touching this question is as followeth: "Thus (saith he(876)) we see our adversaries cannot prove that the church hath power to annex unto such ceremonies and observations as she deviseth, the remission of sins, and the working of other spiritual and supernatural effects, which is the only thing questioned between them and us about the power of the church. So that all the power the church hath, more than by her power to publish the commandments of Christ the Son of G.o.d, and by her censures to punish the offenders against the same, is only in prescribing things that pertain to comeliness and order.

Comeliness requireth that not only that gravity and modesty do appear in the performance of the works of G.o.d's service that beseemeth actions of that nature, but also that such rites and ceremonies be used as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the things performed, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion."

And after: Order requireth that there be set hours for prayer, preaching, and ministering the sacraments; that there be silence and attention when the things are performed; that women be silent in the church; that all things be administered according to the rules of discipline.

This his discourse is but a bundle of incongruities. For, 1. He saith, that the church's power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects, is the only thing questioned between our adversaries and us about the power of the church.

Now, our adversaries contend with us also about the power of the church to make new articles of faith, and her power to make laws binding the conscience, both which controversies are touched by himself.(877)

2. He saith, that comeliness requireth the use of such ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of G.o.d's service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion. But it hath been already showed(878) that the comeliness which the Apostle requireth in the church and service of G.o.d cannot comprehend such ceremonies under it, and that it is no other than that very common external decency which is beseeming for all the a.s.semblies of men, as well civil as sacred.

3. Whilst he is discoursing of the church's power to prescribe things pertaining to order, contra-distinguished from her power which she hath to publish the commandments of Christ, he reckons forth among his other examples, women's silence in the church, as if the church did prescribe this as a matter of order left to her determination, and not publish it as the commandment of Christ in his word.

4. Whereas he saith that the church hath power to prescribe such rites and ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of G.o.d's service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion, by his own words shall he be condemned: for a little before he reprehendeth the Romanists for maintaining that the church hath power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects. And a little after he saith, that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify, a.s.sure, and convey unto men such benefits of saving grace as G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to cause a regard of, and a respect unto the works of G.o.d's service, and thereby to stir up men to fervour and devotion, what is it but the working of a spiritual and supernatural effect, and the conveying unto men such a benefit of saving grace as G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them? In like manner, whereas he holdeth that the church hath power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to express those spiritual and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, which are or should be in men, in the very same place he confuteth himself, whilst he affirmeth that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify unto men those benefits of saving grace which G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to express such heavenly and spiritual affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, is (I suppose) to signify unto men such benefits of saving grace, as G.o.d in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Who dare deny it?

_Sect._ 2. Bishop Lindsey's opinion touching the power of the church,(879) whereof we dispute, is, that power is given unto her to "determine the circ.u.mstances which are in the general necessary to be used in divine wors.h.i.+p, but not defined particularly in the word."

I know the church can determine nothing which is not of this kind and quality. But the Prelate's meaning (as may be seen in that same epistle of his) is, that whatsoever the church determineth, if it be such a circ.u.mstance as is in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, then we cannot say that the church had no power to determine and enjoin the same, nor be led by the judgment of our own consciences, judging it not expedient, but that in this case we must take the church's law to be the rule of our consciences. Now, by this ground which the Prelate holdeth, the church may prescribe to the ministers of the gospel the whole habit and apparel of the Levitical high-priest (which were to Judaize). For apparel is a circ.u.mstance in the general necessary, yet it is not particularly defined in the word. By this ground, the church may determine that I should ever pray with my face to the east, preach kneeling on my knees, sing the psalms lying on my back, and hear sermons standing only upon one foot. For in all these actions a gesture is necessary; but there is no gesture particularly defined in the word to which we are adstricted in any of these exercises.

And further, because _uno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur_, by this ground the Prelate must say, that the church hath power to ordain three or four holidays every week (which ordinance, as he himself hath told us, could not stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety), for time is a circ.u.mstance in the general necessary in divine wors.h.i.+p, yet in his judgment we are not bound by the word to any particular time for the performance of the duties of G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p.

By this ground we were to say, that Pope Innocent III. held him within the bounds of ecclesiastical power, when in the great _Lateran_ council, anno 1215, he made a decree, that all the faithful of both s.e.xes should once in the year at least, to wit, upon Easter-day, receive the sacrament of the eucharist. From whence it hath come to pa.s.s, that the common people in the church of Rome receive the sacrament only upon Easter. Now, the time of receiving the sacrament is a circ.u.mstance in the general necessary, for a time it must have, but it is not particularly defined in the word. It is left indefinite, 1 Cor. xi. 26, yet the church hath no power to determine Easter-day, either as the only time, or as the fittest time, for all the faithful of both s.e.xes to receive the eucharist. What if faithful men and women cannot have time to prepare themselves as becometh, being avocated and distracted by the no less necessary than honest adoes of their particular callings?

What if they cannot have the sacrament upon that day administered according to our Lord's inst.i.tution? What if they see Papists confirming themselves in their Easter superst.i.tion by our unnecessary practice? Shall they swallow these and such-like soul-destroying camels, and all for straining out the gnat of communicating precisely upon Easter-day? But since time is a necessary circ.u.mstance, and no time is particularly defined, the Bishop must say more also, that the church may determine Easter-day for the only day whereupon we may receive the Lord's supper.

Last of all, if the church have power to determine all circ.u.mstances in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, what could be said against that ancient order of solemn baptizing only at the holidays of Easter and Pentecost (whereby it came to pa.s.s that very many died unbaptized, as Socrates writeth(880))? Or, what shall be said against Tertullian's opinion,(881) which alloweth lay men, yea, women, to baptize.

May the church's determination make all this good, forasmuch as these circ.u.mstances of the time when, and the persons by whom, baptism should be ministered, are in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word? _Ite leves nugae._

_Sect._ 3. Camero,(882) as learned a Formalist as any of the former, expresseth his judgment copiously touching our present question. He saith, that there are two sorts of things which the church commandeth, to wit, either such as belong to faith and manners, or such as conduce to faith and manners; that both are in G.o.d's word prescribed _exserte_, plainly, but not one way, because such things that pertain unto faith and manners, are in the word of G.o.d particularly commanded, whereas those things which conduce to faith and manners are but generally commended unto us. Of things that pertain to faith and manners, he saith, that they are most constant and certain, and such as can admit no change; but as for things conducing to faith and manners, he saith, that they depend upon the circ.u.mstances of persons, place, and time, which being almost infinite, there could not be particular precepts delivered unto us concerning such things. Only this is from G.o.d commended unto the church, that whatsoever is done publicly be done with order, and what privately be decent.

These things he so applieth to his purpose, that he determineth, in neither of these kinds the church hath power to make laws, because in things pertaining to faith and manners the law of our Lord Jesus Christ is plainly expressed; and in those things, wherein neither faith nor manners are placed, but which conduce to faith and manners, we have indeed a general law, not having further any particular law, for that reason alleged, namely, because this depends upon the circ.u.mstances.

Thereafter he addeth, _Quid sit fides, quid sit pietas, quid sit charitas, verbo Dei demonstratur. Quid ad haec conducat, seu reputando rem in universum, seu reputando rem quatenus singulis compet.i.t, pendet ex cognitione circ.u.mstantiarum. Jam id definire Deus voluit esse penes ecclesiam, hae tamen lege, ut quod definit ecclesia, conveniat generali definitioni Dei._

The matter he ill.u.s.trates with this one example: G.o.d's word doth define in the general that we are to fast, and that publicly; but, in the particular, we could not have the definition of the word, because there are infinite occasions of a public fast, as it is said in the schools, _individua esse infinita_; so that it is the church's part to look to the occasion, and this depends upon the consideration of the circ.u.mstances.

This discourse of his cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserveth certain animadversions.

_Sect_. 4. First, then, it is to be observed how he is drawn into a manifest contradiction; for whereas he saith, that G.o.d's word doth _exserte_ and _diserte_ commend unto us _generatim_, such things as conduce to faith and manners, and that concerning things of this nature we have a general law in Scripture, how can this stand with that which he addeth, namely, that it is in the church's power to define what things conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even _reputando rem in universum_?

2. Whereas he saith that the church hath no power to make laws, neither in things belonging to faith and manners, nor in things conducing to the same; I would also see how this agreeth with that other position, namely, that it is in the power of the church to define what things do conduce to faith, piety and charity.

3. What means he by his application of order to public, and decency to private actions, as if the Apostle did not require both these in the public words of G.o.d's service performed in the church?

4. Whereas he saith that such things as conduce to faith and manners do depend upon the circ.u.mstances, and so could not be particularly defined in the word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the general, or as they are defined in the particular. Not the first; for as they are defined in the general, they cannot depend upon changeable circ.u.mstances, and that because, according to his own tenet, the word defines them in the general, and this definition of the word is most certain and constant, neither can any change happen unto it. Wherefore (without doubt) he must p.r.o.nounce this of the definition of such things in the particular. Now, to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as they are particularly defined, do depend upon circ.u.mstances, is as much as to say that circ.u.mstances depend upon circ.u.mstances. For things conducing to faith and manners, which the church hath power to determine particularly, what are they other than circ.u.mstances? Surely he who taketh not Camero's judgment to be, that the church hath power to determine somewhat more than the circ.u.mstances (and by consequence a part of the substance) of G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p, shall give no sense to his words. Yet, if one would take his meaning so, I see not how he can be saved from contradicting himself; forasmuch as he holdeth that such things as pertain to faith and manners are particularly defined in the word. To say no more, I smell such things in Camero's opinion as can neither stand with reason nor with himself.

5. G.o.d's word doth not only define things pertaining to faith and manners, but also things conducing to the same, and that not only generally, but in some respects, and sometimes, particularly. And we take for example his own instance of fasting. For the Scripture defineth very many occasions of fasting; Ezra viii. 21; 2 Chron. xx.; Jonah iii.; Joel ii.; Acts xiii. 3; Josh. vii. 6; Judg. xx. 16; Esth. iv. 16; Ezra ix. x.; Zech. vii. From which places we gather that the Scripture defineth fasting to be used,

1. For supplication, when we want some necessary or expedient good thing.

2. For deprecation, when we fear some evil.

3. For humiliation, when, by our sins, we have provoked G.o.d's wrath.

Neither can there be any occasion of fasting whereof I may not say that either it is particularly designed in Scripture, or else that it may be by necessary consequence defined out of Scripture; or, lastly, that it is of that sort of things which were not determinable by Scripture, because circ.u.mstances are infinite, as Camero hath told us.

_Sect._ 5. Thus having failed by those rocks of offence, I direct my course straight to the dissecting of the true limits, within which the church's power of enacting laws about things pertaining to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d is bounded and confined, and which it may not overleap nor transgress.

Three conditions I find necessarily requisite in such a thing as the church hath power to prescribe by her laws:

1st. It must be only a circ.u.mstance of divine wors.h.i.+p; no substantial part of it; no sacred significant and efficacious ceremony. For the order and decency left to the definition of the church, as concerning the particulars of it, comprehendeth no more but mere circ.u.mstances. Bishop Lindsey(883) doth but unskilfully confound things different when he talketh of "the ceremonies and circ.u.mstances left to the determination of the church." Now, by his leave, though circ.u.mstances be left to the determination of the church, yet ceremonies, if we speak properly, are not.

Bishop Andrews avoucheth(884) that ceremonies pertain to the church only, and to the service of G.o.d, not to civil solemnities. But so much, I trust, he would not have said of circ.u.mstances which have place in all moral actions, and that to the same end and purpose for which they serve in religious actions, namely, for beautifying them with that decent demeanour which the very light and law of natural reason requireth as a thing beseeming all human actions. For the church of Christ being a society of men and women, must either observe order and decency in all the circ.u.mstances of their holy actions, time, place, person, form, &c., or also be deformed with that disorder and confusion which common reason and civility abhorreth. Ceremonies, therefore, which are sacred observances, and serve only to a religious and holy use, and which may not, without sacrilege, be applied to another use, must be sorted with things of another nature than circ.u.mstances. _Ceremonioe_, "ceremonies (saith Dr Field(885)) are so named, as Livy thinketh, from a town called Caere, in the which the Romans did hide their sacred things when the Gauls invaded Rome. Others think that ceremonies are so named _a carendo_, of abstaining from certain things, as the Jews abstained from swine's flesh, and sundry other things forbidden by G.o.d as unclean. Ceremonies are outward acts of religion," &c. _Quapropter etiam_, saith Junius,(886) _ritus et ceremonias inter se distincimus, quia in jure politico sunt imperati et solennes ritus; ceremonioe vero non nisi sacroe observationes in cultu divino appellantur. Ceremonia_, saith Bellarmine,(887) _proprie et simpliciter sic vocata, est externa actio quoe non aliunde est bona et laudabilis, nisi quia fit ad Deum colendum._ From which words Amesius(888) concludeth against him, that he, and others with him, do absurdly confound order, decency, and the like, which have the same use and praise in civil things which they have in the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, with religious and sacred ceremonies. Yet Dr Burges(889) rejecteth this distinction betwixt circ.u.mstances and ceremonies, as a mere nicety or fiction. And would you know his reason? "For that (saith he) all circ.u.mstances (I mean extrinsical) which incur not the substance of the action, when they are once designed or observed purposely in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, they are then ceremonies." If this be not a nicety or fiction, I know not what is. For what means he here by a matter?

An action sure, or else a nicety. Well, then, we shall have now a world of ceremonies. When I appoint to meet with another man at Berwick, upon the 10th day of May, because the place and the day are purposely designed in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, namely, to my meeting with the other man, for talking of our business, therefore the town of Berwick, and the 10th day of May, must be accounted ceremonies. To me it is nice, that the Doctor made it not nice, to let such a nicety fall from his pen.

When I put on my shoos in reference to walking, or wash my hands in reference to eating, am I using ceremonies all the while? The Doctor could not choose but say so, forasmuch as these circ.u.mstances are purposely designed and observed in reference to such matters, of whose substance they are not.

_Sect._ 6. 2d. That which the church may lawfully prescribe by her laws and ordinances, as a thing left to her determination, must be one of such things as were not determinable by Scripture, on that reason which Camero hath given us, namely, because _individua_ are _infinita_. We mean not in any wise to circ.u.mscribe the infinite power and wisdom of G.o.d, only we speak upon supposition of the bounds and limits which G.o.d did set to his written word, within which he would have it contained, and over which he thought fit that it should not exceed. The case being thus put, as it is, we say truly of those several and changeable circ.u.mstances which are left to the determination of the church, that, being almost infinite, they were not particularly determinable in Scripture; for the particular definition of those occurring circ.u.mstances which were to be rightly ordered in the works of G.o.d's service to the end of the world, and that ever according to the exigency of every present occasion and different case, should have filled the whole world with books. But as for other things pertaining to G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p, which are not to be reckoned among the circ.u.mstances of it, they being in number neither many, nor in change various, were most easily and conveniently determinable in Scripture. Now, since G.o.d would have his word (which is our rule in the works of his service) not to be delivered by tradition, but to be written and sealed unto us, that by this means, for obviating Satanical subtility, and succouring human imbecility, we might have a more certain way for conservation of true religion, and for the instauration of it when it faileth among men,-how can we but a.s.sure ourselves that every such acceptable thing pertaining any way to religion, which was particularly and conveniently determinable in Scripture, is indeed determined in it; and consequently, that no such thing as is not a mere alterable circ.u.mstance is left to the determination of the church?

_Sect._ 7. 3d. If the church prescribe anything lawfully, so that she prescribe no more than she hath power given her to prescribe, her ordinance must be accompanied with some good reason and warrant given for the satisfaction of tender consciences. This condition is, alas! too seldom looked unto by law-makers, of whom one fitly complaineth thus:-

Lex quamvis ratio Ciceroni summa vocetur, Et bene laudetur lex que ratione probatur, Invenies inter legistas raro logistas: Moris et exempli leges sunt juraque templi.

But this fas.h.i.+on we leave to them who will have all their anomalies taken for a.n.a.logies. It becometh not the spouse of Christ, endued with the spirit of meekness, to command anything imperiously, and without a reason given.

_Ecclesioe enim est docere primum, tuin proescribere_, saith Camero.(890) And again: _Non enim dominatur cleris, nec agit c.u.m iis quos Christus redemit, ac si non possent capere quod sit religiosum, quid minus._

Tertullian's testimony(891) is known: _Nulla lex_, &c. "No law (saith he) owes to itself alone the conscience of its equity, but to those from whom it expects obedience. Moreover, it is a suspected law which will not have itself to be proved, but a wicked law, which not being proved, yet beareth rule."

It is well said by our divines,(892) that in rites and ceremonies the church hath no power "to destruction, but to edification;" and that the observation of our ecclesiastical canons "must carry before them a manifest utility."(893) _Piis vero fratribus durum est, subjicere se rebus illis quas nec rectas esse nec utiles animadvertunt_.(894) If here it be objected, that some things are convenient to be done, therefore, because they are prescribed by the church, and for no other reason. For example, in two things which are alike lawful and convenient in themselves, I am bound to do the one and not the other, because of the church's prescription. So that, in such cases, it seemeth there can be no other reason given for the ordinance of the church but only her own power and authority to put to order things of this nature.

I answer, that even in such a case as this, the conveniency of the thing itself is anterior to the church's determination; anterior, I say, _de congruo_, though not _de facto_, that is to say, before ever the church prescribe it, it is such a thing as (when it falleth out to be done at all) may be done conveniently, though it be not (before the church's prescribing of it) such a thing as should and ought to be done as convenient. Which being so, we do still hold that the conveniency of a thing must always go before the church's prescribing of it; go before, I mean, at least _de congruo_. Neither can the church prescribe anything lawfully which she showeth not to have been convenient, even before her determination.

_Sect._ 8. These things being permitted, I come to extract my projection, and to make it evident that the lawfulness of the controverted ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law; and this I prove by three arguments:-

1st. Those conditions which I have showed to be required in that thing which the church may lawfully prescribe by a law, are not quadrant nor competent to the cross, kneeling, surplice, holidays, &c.

For, 1. They are not mere circ.u.mstances, such as have place in all moral actions, but sacred, mystical, significant, efficacious ceremonies, as hath been abundantly shown in this dispute already. For example, Dr Burges(895) calleth the surplice a religious or sacred ceremony. And again,(896) he placeth in it a mystical signification of the pureness of the minister of G.o.d. Wherefore the replier(897) to Dr Mortoune's _Particular Defence_ saith well, that there is a great difference betwixt a grave civil habit and a mystical garment.

2. It cannot be said that these ceremonies are of that kind of thing which were not determinable by Scripture; neither will our opposites, for very shame, adventure to say that things of this kind, to which cross, kneeling, &c., do belong, viz., sacred significant ceremonies, left (in their judgment) to the definition of the church, are almost infinite, and therefore could not well and easily be determined in Scripture.

Since, then, such things as are not mere circ.u.mstances of wors.h.i.+p can neither be many nor various (as I said before), it is manifest that all such things were easily determinable in Scripture.

3. Our ceremonial laws are not backed with such grounds and reasons as might be for the satisfying and quieting of tender consciences, but we are borne down with Will and authority; whereof I have said enough elsewhere.(898)

_Sect._ 9. 2d. If the ceremonies be lawful to us because the law and ordinance of the church prescribes them, then either the bare and naked prescription of the church, having no other warrant than the church's own authority, makes them to be thus lawful; or else the law of the church, as grounded upon and warranted by the law of G.o.d and nature. Not the first; for divines hold,(899) _legem humanum ferri ab hominibus, c.u.m ratione procedunt ab illis aliis antegressis legibus. Nam legis humanae regula proxima est duplex. Una innata quam legem naturalem dicimus, altera inspirata, quam divinam_, &c. _Ex his ergo fontibus lex humana procedit: hoec incunabila illius a quibus si aberrat, lex degener est, indigna legis nomine._ We have also the testimony of an adversary; for saith not Paybody himself,(900) "I grant it is unlawful to do in G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p anything upon the mere pleasure of man?"

If they take them (as needs they must) to the latter part, then let them either say that the ceremonies are lawful unto us, because the church judgeth them to be agreeable to the law of G.o.d and nature, or because the church proveth unto us, by evident reasons, that they are indeed agreeable to these laws. If they yield us the latter, then it is not the church's law, but the church's reasons given for her law, which can warrant the lawfulness of them unto us, which doth elude and elide all that which they allege for the lawfulness of them from the power and authority of the church.