Influence Science and Practice Part 8

There is a man in Detroit, Joe Girard, who specialized in using the liking rule to sell Chevrolets. He became wealthy in the process, making hundreds of thousands dollars a year. With such a salary, we might guess that he was a high-level GM executive or perhaps the owner of a Chevrolet dealers.h.i.+p. But no. He made his money as a salesman on the showroom floor. He was phenomenal at what he did. For twelve years straight, he won the t.i.tle of "Number One Car Salesman"; he averaged more than five cars and trucks sold every day he worked; and he has been called the world's "greatest car salesman" by the Guinness Book of World Records Guinness Book of World Records.

For all his success, the formula he employed was surprisingly simple. It consisted of offering people just two things: a fair price and someone they liked to buy from. "And that's it," he claimed in an interview. "Finding the salesman you like, plus the price. Put them both together, and you get a deal."

Fine. The Joe Girard formula tells us how vital the liking rule is to his business, but it doesn't tell us nearly enough. For one thing, it doesn't tell us why customers liked him more than some other salesperson who offered a fair price. There is a crucial-and fascinating-general question that Joe's formula leaves unanswered. What are the factors that cause one person to like another? If we knew that that answer, we would be a long way toward understanding how people such as Joe can so successfully arrange to have us like them and, conversely, how we might successfully arrange to have others like us. Fortunately, social scientists have been asking this question for decades. Their acc.u.mulated evidence has allowed them to identify a number of factors that reliably cause liking. As we will see, each is cleverly used by compliance professionals to urge us along the road to "yes." answer, we would be a long way toward understanding how people such as Joe can so successfully arrange to have us like them and, conversely, how we might successfully arrange to have others like us. Fortunately, social scientists have been asking this question for decades. Their acc.u.mulated evidence has allowed them to identify a number of factors that reliably cause liking. As we will see, each is cleverly used by compliance professionals to urge us along the road to "yes."

Why Do I Like You? Let Me List the Reasons Physical Attractiveness Although it is generally acknowledged that good-looking people have an advantage in social interaction, recent findings indicate that we may have sorely underestimated the size and reach of that advantage. There seems to be a click click, whirr whirr response to attractive people (Olson & Marshuetz, 2005). Like all response to attractive people (Olson & Marshuetz, 2005). Like all click click, whirr whirr reactions, it happens automatically, without forethought. The response itself falls into a category that social scientists call reactions, it happens automatically, without forethought. The response itself falls into a category that social scientists call halo effects halo effects. A halo effect occurs when one positive characteristic of a person dominates the way that person is viewed by others. The evidence is now clear that physical attractiveness is often such a characteristic.

Research has shown that we automatically a.s.sign to good-looking individuals such favorable traits as talent, kindness, honesty, and intelligence (for a review of this evidence, see Langlois et al., 2000). Furthermore, we make these judgments without being aware that physical attractiveness plays a role in the process. Some consequences of this unconscious a.s.sumption that "good-looking equals good" scare me. For example, a study of the 1974 Canadian federal elections found that attractive candidates received more than two and a half times as many votes as unattractive candidates (Efran & Patterson, 1976). Despite such evidence of favoritism toward handsome politicians, follow-up research demonstrated that voters did not realize their bias. In fact, 73 percent of Canadian voters surveyed denied in the strongest possible terms that their votes had been influenced by physical appearance; only 14 percent even allowed for the possibility of such influence (Efran & Patterson, 1976). Voters can deny the impact of attractiveness on electability all they want, but evidence has continued to confirm its troubling presence (Budesheim & DePaola, 1994).

A similar effect has been found in hiring situations. In one study, good grooming of applicants in a simulated employment interview accounted for more favorable hiring decisions than did job qualifications-this, even though the interviewers claimed that appearance played a small role in their choices (Mack & Rainey, 1990). The advantage given to attractive workers extends past hiring day to payday. Economists examining U.S. and Canadian samples have found that attractive individuals get paid an average of 1214 percent more than their unattractive coworkers (Hammermesh & Biddle, 1994).

Equally unsettling research indicates that our judicial process is similarly susceptible to the influences of body dimensions and bone structure. It now appears that good-looking people are likely to receive highly favorable treatment in the legal system (see Castellow, Wuensch, & Moore, 1991; and Downs & Lyons, 1990, for reviews). For example, in a Pennsylvania study (Stewart, 1980), researchers rated the physical attractiveness of 74 separate male defendants at the start of their criminal trials. When, much later, the researchers checked court records for the results of these cases, they found that the handsome men had received significantly lighter sentences. In fact, attractive defendants were twice as likely to avoid jail as unattractive defendants.1 In another study-this one on the damages awarded in a staged negligence trial-a defendant who was better looking than his victim was a.s.sessed an average amount of $5,623; but when the victim was the more attractive of the two, the average compensation was $10,051. What's more, both male and female jurors exhibited the attractiveness-based favoritism (Kulka & Kessler, 1978). In another study-this one on the damages awarded in a staged negligence trial-a defendant who was better looking than his victim was a.s.sessed an average amount of $5,623; but when the victim was the more attractive of the two, the average compensation was $10,051. What's more, both male and female jurors exhibited the attractiveness-based favoritism (Kulka & Kessler, 1978).

1This finding-that attractive defendants, even when they are found guilty, are less likely to be sentenced to prison-helps explain one fascinating experiment in criminology (Kurtzburg, Safar, & Cavior, 1968). Some New York City jail inmates with facial disfigurements underwent plastic surgery while incarcerated; other inmates with similar disfigurements did not. Furthermore, some members of each group received services (such as counseling, training, etc.) designed to rehabilitate them to society. One year after the inmates had been released from jail, a check of the records revealed that (except for heroin addicts) criminals given the cosmetic surgery were significantly less likely to have returned to jail. The most interesting feature of this finding was that it was equally true for those inmates who had not received the traditional rehabilitative services and for those who had. Apparently, some criminologists then argued that when it comes to ugly inmates, prisons would be better off to abandon the costly rehabilitation services they typically provide and offer plastic surgery instead; the surgery seems to be at least as effective and decidedly less expensive.

The importance of the Pennsylvania data (Stewart, 1980) is that it suggests that the argument for surgery as a means of rehabilitation may be faulty. Making ugly criminals more attractive may not reduce the chances that they will commit another crime; it may only reduce their chances of being sent to jail for it.

Other experiments have demonstrated that attractive people are more likely to obtain help when in need (Benson, Karabenic, & Lerner, 1976) and are more persuasive in changing the opinions of an audience (Chaiken, 1979). Here, too, both s.e.xes respond in the same way. In the Benson et al. study on helping, for instance, the better-looking men and women received aid more often, even from members of their own s.e.x. A major exception to this rule might be expected to occur, of course, if the attractive person is viewed as a direct compet.i.tor, especially a romantic rival. Short of this qualification, though, it is apparent that good-looking people enjoy an enormous social advantage in our culture. They are better liked, more persuasive, more frequently helped, and seen as possessing more desirable personality traits and greater intellectual capacities. It appears that the social benefits of good looks begin to acc.u.mulate quite early. Research on elementary school children shows that adults view aggressive acts as less naughty when performed by an attractive child (Dion, 1972) and that teachers presume good-looking children to be more intelligent than their less attractive cla.s.smates (Ritts, Patterson, & Tubbs, 1992).

It is hardly any wonder, then, that the halo of physical attractiveness is regularly exploited by compliance professionals. Because we like attractive people, and because we tend to comply with those we like, it makes sense that sales training programs include grooming hints, fas.h.i.+onable clothiers select their floor staffs from among the good-looking candidates, and con men and women are attractive.2 2Have you ever noticed that despite their good looks, many attractive people don't seem to share the positive impressions of their personalities and abilities that observers have? Research has not only confirmed the tenuous and inconsistent relations.h.i.+p between attractiveness and self-esteem (see Adams, 1977), it has also offered a possible explanation. One set of authors has produced evidence suggesting that good-looking people are aware that other people's positive evaluations of them are not based on their actual traits and abilities but are often caused by an attractiveness "halo" (Major, Carrington, & Carnevale, 1984). Consequently, many attractive people who are exposed to this confusing information may be left with an uncertain self-concept.

Similarity What if physical appearance is not much at issue? After all, most people possess average looks. Are there other factors that can be used to produce liking? As both researchers and compliance professionals know, there are several, and one of the most influential is similarity.

We like people who are similar to us (Burger et al., 2004). This fact seems to hold true whether the similarity is in the area of opinions, personality traits, background, or lifestyle. Consequently, those who want us to like them so that we will comply with them can accomplish that purpose by appearing similar to us in a wide variety of ways. (Burger et al., 2004). This fact seems to hold true whether the similarity is in the area of opinions, personality traits, background, or lifestyle. Consequently, those who want us to like them so that we will comply with them can accomplish that purpose by appearing similar to us in a wide variety of ways.

Dress is a good example. Several studies have demonstrated that we are more likely to help those who dress like us. In one study, done in the early 1970s when young people tended to dress in either "hippie" or "straight" fas.h.i.+on, experimenters donned hippie or straight attire and asked college students on campus for a dime to make a phone call. When the experimenter was dressed in the same way as the student, the request was granted in more than two-thirds of the instances; when the student and requester were dissimilarly dressed, the dime was provided less than half the time (Emswiller, Deaux, & Willits, 1971). Another experiment showed how automatic our positive response to similar others can be. Marchers in an antiwar demonstration were found to be more likely to sign the pet.i.tion of a similarly dressed requester and and to do so without bothering to read it first (Suedfeld, Bochner, & Matas, 1971). to do so without bothering to read it first (Suedfeld, Bochner, & Matas, 1971). Click Click, whirr whirr.

Another way requesters can manipulate similarity to increase liking and compliance is to claim that they have backgrounds and interests similar to ours. Car salespeople, for example, are trained to look for evidence of such things while examining a customer's trade-in. If there is camping gear in the trunk, the salespeople might mention, later on, how they love to get away from the city whenever they can; if there are golf b.a.l.l.s on the back seat, they might remark that they hope the rain will hold off until they can play the eighteen holes they scheduled for later in the day; if they notice that the car was purchased out of state, they might ask where a customer is from and report-with surprise-that they (or their spouse) were born there, too.

As trivial as these similarities may seem, they appear to work (Burger et al., 2004). One researcher who examined the sales records of insurance companies found that customers were more likely to buy insurance when a salesperson was like them in age, religion, politics, and cigarette-smoking habits (Evans, 1963). Another researcher was able to significantly increase the percentage of people who responded to a mailed survey by changing one small feature of the request: On a cover letter, he modified the name of the survey-taker to be similar to that of the survey recipient. Thus, Robert Greer received the survey from a survey center official named Bob Gregar while Cynthia Johnston received hers from a survey center official named Cindy Johanson. In two separate studies, adding this little bit of similarity to the exchange nearly doubled survey compliance (Garner, 2005). These seemingly minor commonalties can affect decisions that go well beyond whose insurance to purchase or whose survey to complete, reaching all the way to the choice of a marriage partner (Jones et al., 2004). They can even affect the decision of whose life to save. When asked to rank-order a waiting list of patients suffering from kidney disorder as to their deservingness for the next available treatment, people chose those whose political party preference matched their own (Furnham, 1996).

Because even small similarities can be effective in producing a positive response to another and because a veneer of similarity can be so easily manufactured, I would advise special caution in the presence of requesters who claim to be "just like you."3 Indeed, it would be wise these days to be careful around salespeople who just Indeed, it would be wise these days to be careful around salespeople who just seem seem to be just like you. Many sales training programs now urge trainees to "mirror and match" the customer's body posture, mood, and verbal style, as similarities along each of these dimensions have been shown to lead to positive results (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Locke & Horowitz, 1990; van Baaren et al., 2003). to be just like you. Many sales training programs now urge trainees to "mirror and match" the customer's body posture, mood, and verbal style, as similarities along each of these dimensions have been shown to lead to positive results (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Locke & Horowitz, 1990; van Baaren et al., 2003).

3Additional work suggests yet another reason for caution when dealing with similar requesters: we typically underestimate the degree to which similarity affects our liking for another (Gonzales, Davis, Loney, Lukens, & Junghans, 1983).

Compliments Actor McLean Stevenson once described how his wife tricked him into marriage: "She said she liked me." Although designed for a laugh, the remark is as instructive as it is humorous. The information that someone fancies us can be a bewitchingly effective device for producing return liking and willing compliance (Berscheid & Walster, 1978; Howard, Gengler, & Jain, 1995, 1997). So, often when people flatter us or claim affinity for us, they want something from us.

Remember Joe Girard, the world's "greatest car salesman," who says the secret of his success was getting customers to like him? He did something that, on the face of it, seems foolish and costly. Each month he sent every one of his more than 13,000 former customers a holiday greeting card containing a printed message. The holiday greeting card changed from month to month (Happy New Year, Happy Valentine's Day, Happy Thanksgiving, and so on), but the message printed on the face of the card never varied. It read, "I like you." As Joe explained it, "There's nothing else on the card, nothin' but my name. I'm just telling 'em that I like 'em."

"I like you." It came in the mail every year, 12 times a year, like clockwork. "I like you," on a printed card that went to 13,000 other people, too. Could a statement of liking so impersonal, obviously designed to sell cars, really work?: Joe Girard thought so, and a man as successful as he was at what he did deserves our attention. Joe understood an important fact about human nature: we are phenomenal suckers for flattery. Although there are limits to our gullibility-especially when we can be sure that the flatterer is trying to manipulate us-we tend, as a rule, to believe praise and to like those who provide it.

Cheep Real Estate The potent influence of similarity on sales is something compliance professionals have long understood.

The Penguin Leunig, 1983, by Michael Leunig, published by Penguin Books Australia Ltd.

READER'S REPORT 5.2 From an MBA Student in Arizona

While I was working in Boston, one of my coworkers, Chris, was always trying to push work onto my overcrowded desk. I'm normally pretty good at resisting these types of attempts. But Chris was fantastic at complimenting me before he'd request my a.s.sistance. He'd start by saying, "I heard you did a fantastic job with the such-and-such project, and I have a similar one I am hoping you can help me with." Or, "Since you are so expert in X, could you help me out by putting together this a.s.signment?" I never really cared much for Chris. However, in those few seconds, I always changed my mind, thinking that maybe he was a nice guy after all; and, then, I'd usually give in to his request for help.

Author's note: Chris was more than just a flatterer. He structured his praise to give the reader a reputation to live up to. In so doing, he combined a potent element of the Liking principle with the force of the Consistency principle. Chris was more than just a flatterer. He structured his praise to give the reader a reputation to live up to. In so doing, he combined a potent element of the Liking principle with the force of the Consistency principle.

An experiment done on a group of men in North Carolina shows how helpless we can be in the face of praise. The men in the study received comments about themselves from another person who needed a favor from them. Some of the men got only positive comments, some got only negative comments, and some got a mixture of good and bad. There were three interesting findings. First, the evaluator who provided only praise was liked best by the men. Second, this tendency held true even when the men fully realized that the flatterer stood to gain from their liking him. Finally, unlike the other types of comments, pure praise did not have to be accurate to work. Positive comments produced just as much liking for the flatterer when they were untrue as when they were true (Drachman, deCarufel, & Insko, 1978).

Apparently we have such an automatically positive reaction to compliments that we can fall victim to someone who uses them in an obvious attempt to win our favor. Click Click, whirr whirr. When seen in this light, the expense of printing and mailing well over 150,000 "I like you" cards each year seems neither as foolish nor as costly as before.

Contact and Cooperation For the most part, we like things that are familiar to us (Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000). To prove the point to yourself, try a little experiment. Get the negative of an old photograph that shows a front view of your face and have it developed into a pair of pictures-one that shows you as you actually look and one that shows a reverse image (so that the right and left sides of your face are interchanged). Now decide which version of your face you like better and ask a good friend to make the choice, too. If you are at all like the group of Milwaukee women on whom this procedure was tried, you should notice something odd: Your friend will prefer the true print, but you will prefer the reverse image. Why? Because you both both will be responding favorably to the more familiar face-your friend to the one the world sees and you to the transposed one you find in the mirror every day (Mita, Dermer, & Knight, 1977). will be responding favorably to the more familiar face-your friend to the one the world sees and you to the transposed one you find in the mirror every day (Mita, Dermer, & Knight, 1977).

Because of its effect on liking, familiarity plays a role in decisions about all sorts of things, including the politicians we elect (Grush, 1980; Grush, McKeough, & Ahlering, 1978). It appears that in an election booth voters often choose a candidate merely because the name seems familiar. In one controversial Ohio election a few years ago, a man given little chance of winning the state attorney-general race swept to victory when, shortly before the election, he changed his name to Brown-a family name of much Ohio political tradition.

How could such a thing happen? The answer lies partially in the unconscious way that familiarity affects liking. Often we don't realize that our att.i.tude toward something has been influenced by the number of times we have been exposed to it in the past. For example, in one experiment, the faces of several individuals were flashed on a screen so quickly that, later on, the subjects who were exposed to the faces in this manner couldn't recall having seen any of them before. Yet, the more frequently a person's face was flashed on the screen, the more these subjects came to like that person when they met in a subsequent interaction. And because greater liking leads to greater social influence, these subjects were also more persuaded by the opinion statements of the individuals whose faces had appeared on the screen most frequently (Bornstein, Leone, & Galley, 1987). A similar effect occurred in a study of online advertising. Banner ads for a camera were flashed five times, twenty times, or not at all at the top of an article partic.i.p.ants read. The more frequently the ad appeared, the more the partic.i.p.ants came to like the camera, even though they were not aware of seeing the ads for it (Fang, 2007).

On the basis of evidence that we are more favorably disposed toward the things we have had contact with, some people have recommended a "contact" approach to improving race relations. They argue that, simply by providing individuals of different ethnic backgrounds with more exposure to one another as equals, those individuals will naturally come to like each other better. However, when scientists have examined school integration-the area offering the single best test of the contact approach-they have discovered quite the opposite pattern. School desegregation is more likely to increase prejudice between blacks and whites than to decrease it (Stephan, 1978).

Let's stay with the issue of school desegregation for a while. However well intentioned the proponents of interracial harmony through simple contact are, their approach is unlikely to bear fruit because the argument on which it is based is terribly misinformed. First of all, research has shown that the school setting is not a melting pot where children interact as readily with members of other ethnic groups as they do with their own. Years after formal school integration, there is little social integration. The students clot together ethnically, separating themselves, for the most part, from other groups (Dixon et al., 2005; Oskamp & Schultz, 1998). Second, even if there were much more interethnic interaction, research shows that becoming familiar with something through repeated contact doesn't necessarily cause greater liking (Gaertner et al., 1999). In fact, continued exposure to a person or object under unpleasant conditions such as frustration, conflict, or compet.i.tion leads to less liking (Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Swap, 1977; Zajonc, Markus, & Wilson, 1974). The typical American cla.s.sroom fosters precisely these unpleasant conditions.

Consider the illuminating report of psychologist Elliot Aronson, called in to consult with school authorities on problems in the Austin, Texas, schools. His description of the way he found education proceeding in the standard cla.s.sroom could apply to nearly any public school in the United States:

In general, here is how it works: The teacher stands in front of the cla.s.s and asks a question. Six to ten children strain in their seats and wave their hands in the teacher's face, eager to be called on and show how smart they are. Several others sit quietly with eyes averted, trying to become invisible. When the teacher calls on one child, you see looks of disappointment and dismay on the faces of the eager students, who missed a chance to get the teacher's approval; and you will see relief on the faces of the others who didn't know the answer. . . . This game is fiercely compet.i.tive and the stakes are high, because the kids are competing for the love and approval of one of the two or three most important people in their world.

Further, this teaching process guarantees that the children will not learn to like and understand each other. Conjure up your own experience. If you knew the right answer and the teacher called on someone else, you probably hoped that he or she would make a mistake so that you would have a chance to display your knowledge. If you were called on and failed, or if you didn't even raise your hand to compete, you probably envied and resented your cla.s.smates who knew the answer. Children who fail in this system become jealous and resentful of the successes, putting them down as teacher's pets or even resorting to violence against them in the school yard. The successful students, for their part, often hold the unsuccessful children in contempt, calling them "dumb" or "stupid." (Aronson, 1975, pp. 44, 47) Should we wonder, then, why strict school desegregation-whether by enforced busing, district rezoning, or school closures-so frequently produces increased rather than decreased prejudice? When our children find their pleasant social and friends.h.i.+p contacts within their ethnic boundaries and get repeated exposure to other groups only in the compet.i.tive cauldron of the cla.s.sroom, we might expect as much.

Are there available solutions to this problem? One possibility might be to end our attempts at school integration, but that hardly seems workable. Even if we were to ignore the inevitable legal and const.i.tutional challenges and the disruptive societal wrangle such a retreat would provide, there are solid reasons for pursuing cla.s.sroom integration. For instance, although white students' achievement levels remain steady, it is 10 times more likely that the academic performance of minority students will significantly increase rather than significantly decline after desegregation (Stephan, 1978).

We must be cautious in our approach to school desegregation so that we do not throw out the baby with the bath water. The idea, of course, is to jettison just the water, leaving the baby s.h.i.+ning from the bath. Right now, though, our baby is soaking in the Schmutzwa.s.ser Schmutzwa.s.ser of increased racial hostility. Fortunately, real hope for draining away that hostility is emerging from the research of education specialists into the concept of "cooperative learning." Because much of the heightened prejudice from cla.s.sroom desegregation seems to stem from increased exposure to outside group members as rivals, these educators have experimented with forms of learning in which cooperation rather than compet.i.tion with cla.s.smates is central. of increased racial hostility. Fortunately, real hope for draining away that hostility is emerging from the research of education specialists into the concept of "cooperative learning." Because much of the heightened prejudice from cla.s.sroom desegregation seems to stem from increased exposure to outside group members as rivals, these educators have experimented with forms of learning in which cooperation rather than compet.i.tion with cla.s.smates is central.

Off to Camp To understand the logic of the cooperative approach, it helps to reexamine the fascinating, four-decade-old research program of Turkish-born social scientist Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Intrigued with the issue of intergroup conflict, the research team decided to investigate the process as it developed in boys' summer camps. Although the boys never realized that they were partic.i.p.ants in an experiment, Sherif and his a.s.sociates consistently engaged in artful manipulations of the camp's social environment to observe the effects on group relations.

What the researchers learned is that it didn't take much to bring on certain kinds of ill will. Simply separating the boys into two residence cabins was enough to stimulate a "we versus they" feeling between the groups; letting the boys a.s.sign names to the two groups (the Eagles and the Rattlers) accelerated the sense of rivalry. The boys soon began to demean the qualities and accomplishments of the other group; however, these forms of hostility were minor compared to what occurred when the experimenters purposely introduced compet.i.tive activities into the groups' meetings with one another. Cabin-against-cabin treasure hunts, tugs-of-war, and athletic contests produced name-calling and confrontations. During the compet.i.tions, members of the opposing team were labeled "cheaters," "sneaks," and "stinkers." Afterward, cabins were raided, rival banners were stolen and burned, threatening signs were posted, and lunchroom scuffles were commonplace.

At this point, it was evident to Sherif that the recipe for disharmony was quick and easy: just separate the partic.i.p.ants into groups and let them sit for a while in their own juices. Then mix together over the flame of continued compet.i.tion. And there you have it: Cross-group hatred at a rolling boil.

A more challenging issue then faced the experimenters: how to remove the now entrenched hostility. They first tried the contact approach of bringing the bands together more often. Even when the joint activities were pleasant, such as movies and social events, the results were disastrous. Picnics produced food fights, entertainment programs gave way to shouting contests, dining-hall lines degenerated into shoving matches. Sherif and his research team began to worry that, in Dr. Frankenstein fas.h.i.+on, they might have created a monster they could no longer control. Then, at the height of the strife, they tried a strategy that was at once simple and effective.

They constructed a series of situations in which compet.i.tion between the groups would have harmed everyone's interest; instead, cooperation was necessary for mutual benefit. On a day-long outing, the single truck available to go into town for food was "found" to be stuck. The boys were a.s.sembled and all pulled and pushed together until the vehicle was on its way. In another instance, the researchers arranged for an interruption of the camp's water supply, which came through pipes from a distant tank. Presented with the common crisis and realizing the need for unified action, the boys organized themselves harmoniously to find and fix the problem before day's end. In yet another circ.u.mstance requiring cooperation, the campers were informed that a desirable movie was available for rental but that the camp could not afford it. Aware that the only solution was to combine resources, the boys pooled their money for the film and spent a very congenial evening together enjoying it.

The consequences of these cooperative ventures though not instantaneous, were nonetheless striking. Successful joint efforts toward common goals steadily bridged the rift between the two groups. Before long, the verbal baiting had died, the jostling in lines had ended, and the boys had begun to intermix at the meal tables. Further, when asked to list their best friends, significant numbers changed from an earlier exclusive naming of in-group chums to a listing that included boys in the other group. Some even thanked the researchers for the opportunity to rate their friends again because they had changed their minds since the earlier evaluation. In one revealing episode, the boys were returning from a campfire on a single bus-something that would have produced bedlam before but, at that point, was specifically requested by the boys. When the bus stopped at a refreshment stand, the boys of one group, with $5 left in their treasury, decided to treat their former bitter adversaries to milkshakes!

We can trace the roots of this surprising turnabout to those times when the boys had to view one another as allies instead of opponents. The crucial procedure was the experimenters' imposition of common goals on the groups. It was the cooperation required to achieve these goals that finally allowed the rival group members to experience one another as reasonable fellows, valued helpers, friends, and friends of friends (Paolini et al., 2004; Wright, Aaron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). When success resulted from the mutual efforts, it became especially difficult to maintain feelings of hostility toward those who had been teammates in the triumph. 4 4 4You should not a.s.sume from these descriptions that successful cooperation works to reduce intergroup hostility only among school-age children. Subsequent research has found similar results of similar procedures in college groups (Worchel, 1979) and business organizations (Blake & Mouton, 1979). In these and most all groups, cooperation not only leads to greater liking but to greater group success (Stanne, D. W. Johnson, & R. T. Johnson, 1999).

Back to School In the welter of racial tensions that followed school desegregation, certain educational psychologists began to see the relevance to the cla.s.sroom in Sherif et al.'s findings. If only the learning experience there could be modified to include at least occasional interethnic cooperation toward mutual successes, perhaps cross-group friends.h.i.+ps would have a place to grow. Although similar projects have been under way in various states (Johnson, 2003; Oskamp & Schultz, 1998), an especially interesting approach in this direction-termed the jigsaw cla.s.sroom-was developed by Elliot Aronson and his colleagues in Texas and California (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978).

The essence of the jigsaw route to learning is to require that students work together to master the material to be tested on an upcoming examination. This end is accomplished by grouping students into cooperating teams and giving each student only part of the information-one piece of the puzzle-necessary to pa.s.s the test. Under this system the students must take turns teaching and helping one another. Everyone needs everyone else to do well. Like Sherif's campers working on tasks that could be successfully accomplished only jointly, the students become allies rather than enemies.

When tried in newly desegregated cla.s.srooms, the jigsaw approach has generated impressive results. Studies have shown that, compared to other cla.s.srooms in the same school using the traditional compet.i.tive method, jigsaw learning stimulated significantly more friends.h.i.+p and less prejudice among ethnic groups. Besides this vital reduction in hostility, there were other advantages: minority students' self-esteem, liking for school, and test scores improved. The white students benefited, too. Their self-esteem and liking for school went up, and their test performance was at least as high as that of whites in traditional cla.s.ses (Aronson, Bridgeman, & Geffner, 1978a, 1978b).

There is a tendency when faced with positive results like those from the jigsaw cla.s.sroom to become overly enthusiastic about a single, simple solution to a difficult problem. Experience should tell us that such problems rarely yield to a simple remedy. That is no doubt true in this case as well. Even within the boundaries of cooperative learning procedures, the issues are complex (Rosenfield & Stephan, 1981; Slavin, 1983). Before we can feel truly comfortable with the jigsaw, or any similar approach to learning and liking, much more research is needed to determine how frequently, in what size doses, at which ages, and in which sorts of groups cooperative strategies will work. We also need to know the best way for teachers to inst.i.tute new methods-provided they will inst.i.tute them at all. After all, not only are cooperative learning techniques a radical departure from the traditional, familiar routine of most teachers, but they may also threaten a teacher's sense of importance in the cla.s.sroom by turning over much of the instruction to the students. Finally, we must realize that compet.i.tion has its place, too. It can serve as a valuable motivator of desirable action and an important builder of self-concept. The task, then, is not to eliminate academic compet.i.tion but to break its monopoly in the cla.s.sroom by introducing regular cooperative techniques that include members of all ethnic groups and lead to successful outcomes.

As studies reveal, the jigsaw cla.s.sroom is not only an effective way to bring about friends.h.i.+p and cooperation among ethnic groups but it increases minority students' self-esteem, liking for school, and test scores as well.

Despite these qualifications, I cannot help but be encouraged by the evidence to date. When I talk to my students, or even my neighbors and friends, about the prospects for cooperative learning approaches, I can feel the optimism rise in me. The public schools have for so long been sources of discouraging news-sinking test scores, teacher burnout, increasing crime, and of course, racial conflict. Now there is at least one crack in the gloom, and I find myself genuinely excited about it.

What's the point of this digression into the effects of school desegregation in race relations? The point is to make two points. First, although the familiarity produced by contact usually leads to greater liking, the opposite occurs if the contact carries distasteful experiences with it. Therefore, when children of different racial groups are thrown into the incessant, harsh compet.i.tion of the standard American cla.s.sroom, we ought to-and do-see hostilities worsen. Second, the evidence that team-oriented learning is an antidote to this disorder tells us about the heavy impact of cooperation on the liking process.

Before we a.s.sume that cooperation is a powerful cause of liking, we should first pa.s.s it through what, to my mind, is the acid test: Do compliance pract.i.tioners systematically use cooperation to get us to like them so that we will say yes to their requests? Do they point it out when it exists naturally in a situation? Do they try to amplify it when it exists only weakly? And, most instructive of all, do they manufacture it when it isn't there at all?

As it turns out, cooperation pa.s.ses the test with flying colors. Compliance professionals are forever attempting to establish that we and they are working for the same goals, that we must "pull together" for mutual benefit, that they are, in essence, our teammates teammates. A host of examples is possible. Most are familiar, such as the new-car salespeople who take our side and "do battle" with their bosses to secure us a good deal.5 One rather spectacular ill.u.s.tration occurs in a setting few of us would recognize firsthand, because the professionals are police interrogators whose job is to induce suspects to confess to crime. One rather spectacular ill.u.s.tration occurs in a setting few of us would recognize firsthand, because the professionals are police interrogators whose job is to induce suspects to confess to crime.

5In truth, little in the way of combat takes place when the salesman enters the manager's office under such circ.u.mstances. Often, because the salesman knows exactly the price below which he cannot go, he and the boss don't even speak. In one car dealers.h.i.+p I infiltrated while researching this book, it was common for a salesman to have a soft drink or cigarette in silence while the boss continued working. After a seemly time, the salesman would loosen his tie and return to his customers, looking weary but carrying the deal he had just "hammered out" for them-the same deal he had in mind before entering the boss' office.

In recent years, the courts have imposed a variety of restrictions on the way police must behave in handling suspected criminals, especially in seeking confessions. Many procedures that, in the past, led to admissions of guilt can no longer be employed for fear that they will result in cases being dismissed. As yet, however, the courts have found nothing illegal in the police's use of subtle psychology. For this reason, criminal interrogations have taken increasingly to the use of such ploys as the one they call Good Cop/Bad Cop.

Good Cop/Bad Cop works as follows: A young robbery suspect, for example, who has been advised of his rights and is maintaining his innocence, is brought to a room to be questioned by a pair of officers. One of the officers, either because the part suits him or because it is merely his turn, plays the role of Bad Cop. Before the suspect even sits down, Bad Cop curses "the-son-of-a-b.i.t.c.h" for the robbery. For the rest of the session his words come only with snarls and growls. He kicks the prisoner's chair to emphasize his points. When he looks at the suspect, he seems to see a mound of garbage. If the suspect challenges Bad Cop's accusations or just refuses to answer them, Bad Cop becomes livid. His rage soars. He swears he will do everything possible to a.s.sure a maximum sentence. He says he has friends in the district attorney's office who will hear from him of the suspect's noncooperative att.i.tude and will prosecute the case hard.

At the outset of Bad Cop's performance, his partner, Good Cop, sits in the background. Then, slowly, Good Cop starts to chip in. First he speaks only to Bad Cop, trying to temper the burgeoning anger. "Calm down, Frank, calm down." But Bad Cop shouts back, "Don't tell me to calm down when he's lying right to my face! I hate these lying b.a.s.t.a.r.ds!" A bit later, Good Cop actually says something in the suspect's behalf. "Take it easy, Frank, he's only a kid." Not much in the way of support, but compared to the rantings of Bad Cop, the words fall like music on the prisoner's ears. Still, Bad Cop is unconvinced. "Kid? He's no kid. He's a punk. That's what he is, a punk. And I'll tell you something else. He's over 18, and that's all I need to get his a.s.s sent so far behind bars they'll need a flashlight to find him."

Now Good Cop begins to speak directly to the suspect, calling him by his first name and pointing out any positive details of the case. "I'll tell you, Kenny, you're lucky that n.o.body was hurt and you weren't armed. When you come up for sentencing, that'll look good." If the suspect persists in claiming innocence, Bad Cop launches into another tirade of curses and threats. This time Good Cop stops him, "Okay, Frank," handing Bad Cop some money, "I think we could all use some coffee. How about getting us three cups?"

When Bad Cop is gone, it's time for Good Cop's big scene: "Look, man, I don't know why, but my partner doesn't like you, and he's gonna try to get you. And he's gonna be able to do it, because we've got enough evidence right now. And he's right about the D.A.'s office going hard on guys who don't cooperate. You're looking at five years, man, five years! Now, I don't want to see that happen to you. So if you admit you robbed that place right now, before he gets back, I'll take charge of your case and put in a good word for you to the D.A. If we work together on this, we can cut that five years down to two, maybe one. Do us both a favor, Kenny. Just tell me how you did it, and let's start working on getting you through this." A full confession frequently follows.

Good Cop/Bad Cop works as well as it does for several reasons: The fear of long incarceration is quickly instilled by Bad Cop's threats; the perceptual contrast principle (see Chapter 1 Chapter 1) ensures that compared to the raving, venomous Bad Cop, the interrogator playing Good Cop will seem like an especially especially reasonable and kind person (Kamisar, 1980); and because Good Cop has intervened repeatedly on the suspect's behalf-has even spent his own money for a cup of coffee-the reciprocity rule pressures for a return favor (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). The main reason that the technique is effective, though, is that it gives the suspect the idea that there is someone on his side, someone with his welfare in mind, someone working together with him, for him. In most situations, such a person would be viewed very favorably, but in the deep trouble our robbery suspect finds himself, that person takes on the character of a savior. And from savior, it is but a short step to trusted father confessor. reasonable and kind person (Kamisar, 1980); and because Good Cop has intervened repeatedly on the suspect's behalf-has even spent his own money for a cup of coffee-the reciprocity rule pressures for a return favor (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). The main reason that the technique is effective, though, is that it gives the suspect the idea that there is someone on his side, someone with his welfare in mind, someone working together with him, for him. In most situations, such a person would be viewed very favorably, but in the deep trouble our robbery suspect finds himself, that person takes on the character of a savior. And from savior, it is but a short step to trusted father confessor.

Conditioning and a.s.sociation "Why do they blame me me, Doc?" It was the shaky telephone voice of a local TV weatherman. He had been given my number when he called the psychology department at my university to find someone who could answer his question-a question that had always puzzled him but had recently begun to bother and depress him.

"I mean, it's crazy, isn't it? Everybody knows that I just report the weather, that I don't order it, right? So how come I get so much flak when the weather's bad? During the floods last year, I got hate mail! One guy threatened to shoot me if it didn't stop raining. Christ, I'm still looking over my shoulder from that one. And the people I work with at the station do it, too! Sometimes, right on the air, they'll zing me about a heat wave or something. They have to know that I'm not responsible, but that doesn't seem to stop them. Can you help me understand this, Doc? It's really getting me down."

We made an appointment to talk in my office, where I tried to explain that he was the victim of an ages-old click click, whirr whirr response that people have to things they perceive as merely connected to one another. Instances of this response abound in modern life. I felt that the example most likely to help the distressed weatherman would require a bit of ancient history. I asked him to consider the precarious fate of the imperial messengers of old Persia. Any such messenger a.s.signed the role of military courier had special cause to hope mightily for Persian battlefield successes. With news of victory in his pouch, he would be treated as a hero upon his arrival at the palace. The food and drink of his choice were provided gladly and sumptuously. Should his message tell of military disaster, though, the reception would be quite different: He was summarily slain. response that people have to things they perceive as merely connected to one another. Instances of this response abound in modern life. I felt that the example most likely to help the distressed weatherman would require a bit of ancient history. I asked him to consider the precarious fate of the imperial messengers of old Persia. Any such messenger a.s.signed the role of military courier had special cause to hope mightily for Persian battlefield successes. With news of victory in his pouch, he would be treated as a hero upon his arrival at the palace. The food and drink of his choice were provided gladly and sumptuously. Should his message tell of military disaster, though, the reception would be quite different: He was summarily slain.

I hoped that the point of this story would not be lost on the weatherman. I wanted him to be aware of a fact that is as true today as it was in the time of ancient Persia: The nature of bad news infects the teller. There is a natural human tendency to dislike a person who brings us unpleasant information, even when that person did not cause the bad news. The simple a.s.sociation with it is enough to stimulate our dislike (Manis, Cornell, & Moore, 1974). (See Figure 5.1 Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Weather-Beaten Weather-Beaten Note the similarities between the account of the weatherman who came to my office and those of other TV weather reporters.

There was something else I hoped the weatherman would get from the historical example. Not only was he joined in his predicament by centuries of other "tellers," but also, compared to some (such as the Persian messengers), he was very well-off. At the end of our session, he said something to convince me that he appreciated this point quite clearly. "Doc," he said on his way out, "I feel a lot better about my job now. I mean, I'm in Phoenix where the sun s.h.i.+nes 300 days a year, right? Thank G.o.d I don't do the weather in Buffalo."

The weatherman's parting comment reveals that he understood more than I had told him about the principle that was influencing his viewers' liking for him. Being connected with bad weather does have a negative effect, but being connected with suns.h.i.+ne should do wonders for his popularity. And he was right. The principle of a.s.sociation is a general one, governing both negative and positive connections. An innocent a.s.sociation with either bad things or good things will influence how people feel about us An innocent a.s.sociation with either bad things or good things will influence how people feel about us (Lott & Lott, 1965). (Lott & Lott, 1965).

Our instruction about the way negative a.s.sociation works seems to have been primarily undertaken by our parents. Remember how they are always warning us against playing with the bad kids down the street? Remember how they said it didn't matter if we did nothing bad ourselves because, in the eyes of the neighborhood, we would be "known by the company we kept." Our parents were teaching us about guilt by a.s.sociation-and they were giving us a lesson in the negative side of the principle of a.s.sociation. And they were right. People do a.s.sume that we have the same personality traits as our friends (Miller, Campbell, Twedt, & O'Connell, 1966).

As for the positive a.s.sociations, it is the compliance professionals who teach the lesson. They are incessantly trying to connect themselves or their products with the things we like. Did you ever wonder what all those good-looking models are doing standing around in the automobile ads? What the advertiser hopes they are doing is lending their positive traits-beauty and desirability-to the cars. The advertiser is betting that we will respond to the product in the same ways we respond to the attractive models merely a.s.sociated with it-and we do.

In one study, men who saw a new-car ad that included a seductive female model rated the car car as faster, more appealing, more expensive-looking, and better-designed than did men who viewed the same ad without the model. Yet when asked later, the men refused to believe that the presence of the young woman had influenced their judgments (Smith & Engel, 1968). as faster, more appealing, more expensive-looking, and better-designed than did men who viewed the same ad without the model. Yet when asked later, the men refused to believe that the presence of the young woman had influenced their judgments (Smith & Engel, 1968).

Although there are other examples (Bierley, McSweeney, & Vannieuwkerk, 1985; Gorn, 1982), perhaps the most intriguing evidence of the way the a.s.sociation principle can unconsciously stimulate us to part with our money comes from a series of investigations on credit cards and spending (Feinberg, 1986). Within modern life, credit cards are a device with a psychologically noteworthy characteristic: They allow us to get the immediate benefits of goods and services while deferring the costs weeks into the future. Consequently, we are more likely to a.s.sociate credit cards and the insignias, symbols, and logos that represent them with the positive rather than the negative aspects of spending.

Consumer researcher Richard Feinberg wondered what effects the presence of such credit cards and credit card materials had on our tendencies to spend. In a set of studies done in West Lafayette, Indiana, he got some fascinating-and disturbing-results. First, restaurant patrons gave larger tips when paying with a credit card instead of cash. In a second study, college students were willing to spend an average of 29 percent more money for mail-order catalog items when they examined the items in a room that contained some MasterCard insignias; moreover, they had no awareness that the credit card insignias were part of the experiment. A final study showed that when asked to contribute to charity (the United Way), college students were markedly more likely to give money if the room they were in contained MasterCard insignias than if it did not (87 percent versus 33 percent). This last finding is simultaneously the most unsettling and instructive concerning the power of the a.s.sociation principle to generate compliance. Even though credit cards themselves were not used for the charity donation, the mere presence of their symbol (with its attendant positive a.s.sociations) spurred people to spend more cash cash. This last phenomenon has been replicated in a pair of restaurant studies in which patrons received their bills on tip trays that either did or did not contain a credit card insignia. The diners tipped significantly more in the presence of the insignia, even when they paid with cash (McCall and Belmont, 1996).6 6Subsequent research by Feinberg (1990) strengthens the a.s.sociation explanation for his results. He has found that the presence of credit card insignias in a room only facilitates spending by people who have had a positive history with credit cards. Those who have had a negative history with credit cards-because they've paid an above-average number of interest charges in the previous year-do not show the facilitation effect. In fact, these individuals are more conservative in their spending tendencies when in the mere presence of credit card logos.

Because the a.s.sociation principle works so well-and so unconsciously-manufacturers regularly rush to connect their products with the current cultural rage. During the days of the first American moon shot, everything from breakfast drink to deodorant was sold with allusions to the American s.p.a.ce program. In Olympiad years, we are told precisely the official hair sprays and facial tissue of our Olympic teams.7 During the 1970s, when the magic cultural concept appeared to be "naturalness," the "natural" bandwagon was crowded to capacity. Sometimes the connections to naturalness didn't even make sense: "Change your hair color naturally" urged one popular TV commercial. Similarly, although it made great sense that sales of Mars Rover toys would jump after a U.S. Pathfinder rocket landed the real thing on the red planet in 1997, it made little sense that the same would happen for the sales of Mars Candy Bars, which have nothing to do with the s.p.a.ce project but are named after the candy company's founder, Franklin Mars (White, 1997). Most recently, researchers have found that promotional signs proclaiming SALE increase purchases (even when there is no actual savings), not simply because shoppers consciously think, "Oh, I can save money here." In addition, buying becomes more likely because such signs have been repeatedly a.s.sociated with good prices in the shoppers' pasts. Consequently, any product connected to a SALE sign becomes automatically evaluated more favorably (Naylor et al., 2006). During the 1970s, when the magic cultural concept appeared to be "naturalness," the "natural" bandwagon was crowded to capacity. Sometimes the connections to naturalness didn't even make sense: "Change your hair color naturally" urged one popular TV commercial. Similarly, although it made great sense that sales of Mars Rover toys would jump after a U.S. Pathfinder rocket landed the real thing on the red planet in 1997, it made little sense that the same would happen for the sales of Mars Candy Bars, which have nothing to do with the s.p.a.ce project but are named after the candy company's founder, Franklin Mars (White, 1997). Most recently, researchers have found that promotional signs proclaiming SALE increase purchases (even when there is no actual savings), not simply because shoppers consciously think, "Oh, I can save money here." In addition, buying becomes more likely because such signs have been repeatedly a.s.sociated with good prices in the shoppers' pasts. Consequently, any product connected to a SALE sign becomes automatically evaluated more favorably (Naylor et al., 2006).

7The rights to such a.s.sociations do not come cheaply. Corporate contributors spend millions to win sponsors.h.i.+ps for the Olympics. But this amount pales in comparison to the many millions more these companies then spend to advertise their connection to the event. Yet it may be that the largest dollar figure of all for the corporate sponsors is the one on the profit line. A survey by Advertising Age Advertising Age magazine found that one-third of all consumers interviewed said they would be more likely to purchase an item if it were linked to the Olympics. magazine found that one-third of all consumers interviewed said they would be more likely to purchase an item if it were linked to the Olympics.

The linking of celebrities to products is another way advertisers cash in on the a.s.sociation principle. Professional athletes are paid to connect themselves to things that can be directly relevant to their roles (sports shoes, tennis racquets, golf b.a.l.l.s) or wholly irrelevant (soft drinks, popcorn poppers, panty hose). The important thing for the advertiser is to establish the connection; it doesn't have to be a logical one, just a positive one. What does Tiger Woods really know about Buicks after all?

Of course, popular entertainers provide another form of desirability that manufacturers have always paid dearly to tie to their goods. Recently, politicians have recognized the ability of a celebrity linkage to sway voters. Presidential candidates a.s.semble stables of well-known nonpolitical figures who either actively partic.i.p.ate in, or merely lend their names to, a campaign. Even at state and local levels, a similar game is played. Take as evidence the comment of a Los Angeles woman I heard expressing her conflicting feelings over a California referendum to limit smoking in public places. "It's a real tough decision. They've got big stars speaking for it, and big stars speaking against it. You don't know how to vote."

Does the Name Pavlov Ring a Bell?

While politicians have long strained to a.s.sociate themselves with the values of motherhood, country, and apple pie, it may be in the last of these connections-to food-that they have been most clever. For instance, it is White House tradition to try to sway the votes of balking legislators over a meal. It can be a picnic lunch, a sumptuous breakfast, or an elegant dinner; but when an important bill is up for grabs, out comes the silverware. Political fund-raising these days regularly involves the presentation of food. Notice, too, that at the typical fund-raising dinner the speeches and the appeals for further contributions and heightened effort never come before the meal is served, only during or after. There are several advantages to this technique. For example, time is saved and the reciprocity rule is engaged. The least recognized benefit, however, may be the one uncovered in research conducted in the 1930s by the distinguished psychologist Gregory Razran (1938).

Obamprah When Oprah Winfrey joined presidential candidate Barack Obama on the campaign trail, his approval ratings jumped in the polls.

Using what he termed the "luncheon technique," he found that his subjects become fonder of the people and things they experienced while they were eating. In the example most relevant for our purposes (Razran, 1940), subjects were presented with some political statements they had rated once before. At the end of the experiment, after all the political statements had been presented, Razran found that only certain of them had gained in approval-those that had been shown while food was being eaten. These changes in liking seem to have occurred unconsciously, since the subjects could not remember which of the statements they had seen while the food was being served.8 8To demonstrate that the principle of a.s.sociation also works for unpleasant experiences, Razran (1940) included in his experiment a condition in which certain partic.i.p.ants had putrid odors piped into the room while they were shown the political slogans. In this case, approval ratings for the slogans declined. More recent research indicates that odors so slight that they escape conscious awareness can still be influential. People judged photographed faces as more versus less likable depending on whether they rated the faces while experiencing subliminal pleasant or unpleasant odors (Li et al., 2007).

How did Razran come up with the luncheon technique? What made him think it would work? The answer may lie in the dual scholarly roles he played during his career. Not only was he a respected independent researcher, he was also one of the earliest translators into English of the pioneering psychological literature of Russia. It was a literature dedicated to the study of the a.s.sociation principle and dominated by the thinking of a brilliant man, Ivan Pavlov.

Although a scientist of broad and varied talent-he had, for instance, won a n.o.bel Prize years earlier for his work on the digestive system-Pavlov's most important experimental demonstration was simplicity itself. He showed that he could get an animal's typical response to food (salivation) to be directed toward something irrelevant to food (a bell) merely by connecting the two things in the animal's experience. If the presentation of food to a dog was always accompanied by the sound of a bell, soon the dog would salivate to the bell alone, even when there was no food to be had.

It is not a long step from Pavlov's cla.s.sic demonstration to Razran's luncheon technique. Obviously, a normal reaction to food can be transferred to some other thing through the process of raw a.s.sociation. Razran's insight was that there are many normal responses to food besides salivation, one of them being a good and favorable feeling. Therefore, it is possible to attach this pleasant feeling, this positive att.i.tude, to anything (political statements being only an example) that is closely a.s.sociated with good food.

Nor is there a long step from the luncheon technique to the compliance professionals' realization that all kinds of desirable things can subst.i.tute for food in lending their likable qualities to the ideas, products, and people artificially linked to them. In the final a.n.a.lysis, then, that is why those good-looking models stand around in the magazine ads. That is why radio programmers are instructed to insert the station's call-letters jingle immediately before a big hit song is played. And that is even why the women playing Barnyard Bingo at a Tupperware party must yell