Elements of Morals Part 5

6. _Duties relating to friends.h.i.+p._--All the preceding duties are the same towards all men. There are others which concern more particularly certain men, those, for example, to whom we are attached either by congeniality of disposition or uniformity of occupation, or a common education, etc., those, namely, whom we call _friends_. The duties relating to friends.h.i.+p are: 1, to choose well one's friends; to choose the honest, and enlightened, in order to find in their society encouragement to right-doing. Nothing more dangerous than pleasure-friends or interested friends, united by vices and pa.s.sions, instead of being united by wisdom and virtue; 2, the friends once chosen, the reciprocal duty is _fidelity_.

They should treat each other with perfect _equality_ and with _confidence_. They owe each other _secrecy_ when they mutually entrust their dearest interests; they owe each other _self-devotion_ when they need each other's help. Finally, they owe to each other in a more strict and rigorous a sense, all they generally owe to other men, for the faults or crimes against humanity in general a.s.sume a still more odious character when against friends.

=21. Professional duties and civic duties.=--Such are the general duties of men in relation to each other, when simply viewed as men. But these duties become diversified and specialized according as we view man either in the light of the private functions he fills in society, which are his _professional_ duties, or in the light of the particular society of which he is a member, and which is called the _State_ or the country, and these are the _civic_ duties. (See chapters xii. and xiii.)

=22. Distinction between the duties of justice and the duties of charity.=--We have said above that all the social duties could be reduced to these two maxims: "Do not do unto others what you do not wish they should do to you. Do to others as you wish to be done by." These two maxims correspond with what is called: 1, the duties of _justice_; 2, the duties of _charity_.

The first consists in not doing wrong, or at least in repairing the wrong already done. Charity consists in doing good, or at least in giving to others what is not really their due. A celebrated writer[13] has made a very subtle and forcible distinction between these two virtues:

"The respect for the rights of others is called justice. All violation of any right whatsoever is an injustice. The greatest of injustices, since it comprises all, is slavery. Slavery is the subjugation of all the faculties of a man for the benefit of another. Moral personality should be respected in you as well as in me, and for the same reason. In regard to myself it has imposed a duty on me; in you it becomes the foundation of a right, and imposes thereby, relatively to you, a new duty on me. I owe you the truth as I owe it to myself, and it is my strict duty to respect the development of your intelligence and not arrest its progress towards the truth. I must also respect your liberty; perhaps even I owe it to you more than I do to myself, for I have not always the right to prevent you from making a mistake.

"I must respect you in your affections, which are a part of yourself; and of all the affections none are more holy than those of the family. To violate the conjugal and paternal right is to violate what a person holds most sacred.

"I owe respect to your body, inasmuch as belonging to you, it is the instrument of your personality. I have neither the right to kill you nor to wound you, unless in self-defense.

"I owe respect to your property, for it is the product of your labor; I owe respect to your labor, which is your very liberty in action; and if your property comes from inheritance, I owe respect to the free will which has transmitted it to you.

"Justice, that is, the respect for the person in all that const.i.tutes his personality, is the first duty of man towards his fellow-man. Is this duty the only one?

"When we have respected the person of others, when we have neither put a restraint upon their liberty, nor smothered their intelligence, nor maltreated their body, nor interfered with their family rights nor their property, can we say that we have fulfilled towards them all moral duties?

A wretch is here suffering before us. Is our conscience satisfied if we can a.s.sure ourselves that we have not contributed to his sufferings? No; something tells us that it would be well if we should give him bread, help, consolation; and yet this man in pain, who, perhaps, is going to die, has not the least right to the least part of our fortune, were this fortune ever so great; and if he were to use violence to take a farthing from us, he would commit a crime. We shall meet here a new order of duties which do not correspond to rights. Man, we have seen, may resort to force to have his rights respected, but he cannot impose on another a sacrifice, whatever that may be. Justice _respects_ or _restores_: charity _gives_.

"One cannot say that to be charitable is not obligatory; but this obligation is by no means as precise and as inflexible as justice. Charity implies sacrifice. Now, who will furnish the rule for sacrifice, the formula for self-renunciation? For justice, the formula is clear: to respect the rights of others. But charity knows neither rule nor limits.

It is above all obligation. Its beauty is precisely in its liberty."

It follows from these considerations that justice is absolute, without restriction, without exception. Charity, whilst it is as obligatory as justice, is more independent in its applications; it chooses its place and its time, considers its objects and means. In a word, as Victor Cousin says, "its beauty is in its liberty."

Let us not hesitate to borrow from the Apostle St. Paul his admirable exaltation of charity:

"Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding bra.s.s or a tinkling cymbal."

"And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing."[14]

"And though I bestowed all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

"Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself; is not puffed up."

"Doth not behave itself unseemely; seeketh not her own; is not easily provoked; thinketh no evil."

"Beareth all things; believeth all things; endureth all things."[15]

CHAPTER III.

DUTIES OF JUSTICE--DUTIES TOWARDS HUMAN LIFE.

SUMMARY.

=Division of the duties of justice.=--Four kinds of duties: 1, towards the life of others; 2, towards the liberty of others; 3, towards the honor of others; 4, towards the property of others.

=Duties towards human life.=--Avoid homicide, acts of violence, and mutilation. Pascal and the _Provinciales_.

=The right of self-defense.=--Right to oppose force to force. Limits of this right.

=Problems.=--Four very grave problems are bound up in the question of self-defense: 1, the penalty of death; 2, political a.s.sa.s.sination; 3, the duel; 4, war.

=The penalty of death.=--The penalty of death is the right of self-defense exercised by society: it is just so far as it is efficacious.

=Political a.s.sa.s.sination.=--Murder is always a crime, under whatever pretext it may conceal itself.

=The duel.=--The duel is at the same time a _homicide_ and a _suicide_; it is falsely considered justice, since it appeals to chance and skill.

=War.=--War is the only mode of self-defense existing among nations; it is desirable for the sake of humanity that it may some day disappear; but humanity cannot now exact this sacrifice of the country.

=23. Division of social duties.=--According to the foregoing distinctions, we will first divide duties into _duties of justice_ and _duties of charity_.

Let us begin by expounding the duties of justice.

These duties may be summed up in a general manner in _the respect for the person of others_, and for all that is necessary for the preservation and development of that person. Hence four kinds of duties:

1. Towards the life of other men.

2. Towards their liberty.

3. Towards their honor.

4. Towards their property.

Besides these duties, purely negative, which consist only in doing others no harm, there are also the duties of justice, which may be called _positive_; and which consist not only in not injuring others, but also in granting each what he has a right to. This is called _distributive_ or _remunerative_ justice, and is the duty of all those who have others under them, and who are commissioned to distribute rewards, t.i.tles, or functions.

=24. Duties towards the life of men.=--We have seen above that self-preservation is the duty of every one, and that one should not attempt one's own life, nor mutilate one's self, nor injure one's health.

Now, all these obligations which we have towards ourselves, we have equally towards others; for that which each owes to himself, he owes it to his quality, as _man_, to his quality as a free and reasonable being, a _moral person_. It is, as Kant says, humanity itself that each one must respect in his own person; and it is also humanity which each must respect in others. We should not do to others what we do not wish that they should do to us, or what we should not wish to do to ourselves. Now, no one wishes others to attempt his life; no one should wish to attempt it himself. For the same reason he should not wish to attempt the life of others.

These are such self-evident considerations that it is useless to insist on them. Let us add that this duty rests, besides, on one of the most powerful instincts of humanity, the instinct of sympathy for other men, the horror of their sufferings, the horror of spilt blood. Those who are wanting in this sentiment are like monsters in the midst of humanity.

One of the corollaries of this principle is to avoid the blows and wounds which might, through imprudence and unexpectedly, cause death, and which, besides, are in themselves to be condemned, inasmuch as they contribute, if not towards destroying, at least towards mutilating, the person and rendering it unfitted to fulfil its duties and functions. In a word, to avoid scuffles, bodily quarrels, which are unworthy, moreover, from their very brutality, of a reasonable being; all this is comprised in the duty of avoiding homicide. All may be summed up in these words of the Decalogue: "_Thou shalt not kill_."

Pascal, in his letter on homicide (xiv. _Provinciale_), expressed most eloquently the duty concerning the respect for human life:

"Everybody knows, my fathers, that individuals are never permitted to seek the death of any person, and that, even if a man should have ruined us, maimed us, burnt our houses, killed our parents, and was preparing to murder us, to rob us of our honor, that our seeking his death would not be listened to in a court of justice. So that it was necessary to establish public functionaries who seek it in the name of the king, or rather in the name of G.o.d. Suppose, then, these public functionaries should seek the death of him who has committed all these crimes, how would they proceed? Would they plunge the dagger in his breast at once? No; the life of man is too important; they would proceed with more consideration; the law has not left it subject to the decision of all sorts of people; but only to that of the judges, whose integrity and sufficiency have been ascertained. And think you that one alone is enough to condemn a man to death? No; there are at least seven required; and among these seven there must not be any one whom the criminal has in any way offended, for fear that his judgment be affected, or corrupted by anger. In short, they can judge him only upon the testimony of witnesses, and according to the other forms prescribed to them; in consequence of which they can conscientiously p.r.o.nounce upon him only according to law, or judge worthy of death only those whom the law condemns."

After having thus expounded the innumerable precautions which society has taken, out of respect for human life, touching the persons of criminals, Pascal continues as follows:

"Behold in what way, in the order of justice, the life of man is disposed of; let us see now how _you_ dispose of it.[16] In your new laws there is but one judge, and this judge is the offended party. He is at the same time judge, accuser, and executioner. He seeks himself the death of his enemy; he commands it, he executes him on the spot; and, without respect for either the body or soul of his brother, he kills and d.a.m.ns him for whom Christ died; and all this to avenge an affront, or slander, or an insulting word, or other similar offences for which a judge, although clothed with legal authority, would be considered a criminal if he should condemn to death those who had committed them, because the laws themselves are very far from condemning them."

Finally, gathering into one word all the evils which homicide comprises, Pascal ends by saying "homicide is the only crime which at the same time destroys the State, the Church, nature, and piety."