Patrick Henry Part 12

His Excellency, GENL. WAs.h.i.+NGTON.

On the following day Congress adjourned. As soon as possible after its adjournment, the Virginia delegates seem to have departed for home, to take their places in the convention then in session at Richmond; for the journal of that convention mentions that on Wednesday, August the 9th, "Patrick Henry, Edmund Pendleton, Benjamin Harrison, and Thomas Jefferson, Esquires, appeared in convention, and took their seats."[207] On the next day an incident occurred in the convention implying that Patrick Henry, during his absence in Congress, had been able to serve his colony by other gifts as well as by those of "bold and splendid eloquence:" it was resolved that "the powder purchased by Patrick Henry, Esquire, for the use of this colony, be immediately sent for."[208] On the day following that, the convention resolved unanimously that "the thanks of this convention are justly due to his excellency, George Was.h.i.+ngton, Esquire, Patrick Henry, and Edmund Pendleton, Esquires, three of the worthy delegates who represented this colony in the late Continental Congress, for their faithful discharge of that important trust; and this body are only induced to dispense with their future services of the like kind, by the appointment of the two former to other offices in the public service, incompatible with their attendance on this, and the infirm state of health of the latter."[209]

Of course, the two appointments here referred to are of Was.h.i.+ngton as commander-in-chief of the forces of the United Colonies, and of Patrick Henry as commander-in-chief of the forces of Virginia,--the latter appointment having been made by the Virginia convention on the 5th of August. The commission, which pa.s.sed the convention on the 28th of that month, const.i.tuted Patrick Henry "colonel of the first regiment of regulars, and commander-in-chief of all the forces to be raised for the protection and defence of this colony;" and while it required "all officers and soldiers, and every person whatsoever, in any way concerned, to be obedient" to him, "in all things touching the due execution of this commission," it also required him to be obedient to "all orders and instructions which, from time to time," he might "receive from the convention or Committee of Safety."[210]

Accordingly, Patrick Henry's control of military proceedings in Virginia was, as it proved, nothing more than nominal: it was a supreme command on paper, tempered in actual experience by the incessant and distrustful interference of an ever-present body of civilians, who had all power over him.

A newspaper of Williamsburg for the 23d of September announces the arrival there, two days before, of "Patrick Henry, Esquire, commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces. He was met and escorted to town by the whole body of volunteers, who paid him every mark of respect and distinction in their power."[211] Thereupon he inspected the grounds about the city; and as a place suitable for the encampment, he fixed upon a site in the rear of the College of William and Mary. Soon troops began to arrive in considerable numbers, and to prepare themselves for whatever service might be required of them.[212] There was, however, a sad lack of arms and ammunition. On the 15th of October, Pendleton, who was at the head of the Committee of Safety, gave this account of the situation in a letter to Richard Henry Lee, then in Congress at Philadelphia:--

"Had we arms and ammunition, it would give vigor to our measures.... Nine companies of regulars are here, and seem very clever men; others, we hear, are ready, and only wait to collect arms. Lord Dunmore's forces are only one hundred and sixty as yet, intrenched at Gosport, and supported by the s.h.i.+ps drawn up before that and Norfolk."[213]

On the 30th of November, Lord Dunmore, who had been compelled by the smallness of his land force to take refuge upon his armed vessels off the coast, thus described the situation, in a letter to General Sir William Howe, then in command at Boston:--

"I must inform you that with our little corps, I think we have done wonders. We have taken and destroyed above four score pieces of ordnance, and, by landing in different parts of the country, we keep them in continual hot water....

Having heard that a thousand chosen men belonging to the rebels, great part of whom were riflemen, were on their march to attack us here, or to cut off our provisions, I determined to take possession of the pa.s.s at the Great Bridge, which secures us the greatest part of two counties to supply us with provisions. I accordingly ordered a stockade fort to be erected there, which was done in a few days; and I put an officer and twenty-five men to garrison it, with some volunteers and negroes, who have defended it against all the efforts of the rebels for these eight days.

We have killed several of their men; and I make no doubt we shall now be able to maintain our ground there; but should we be obliged to abandon it, we have thrown up an intrenchment on the land side of Norfolk, which I hope they will never be able to force. Here we are, with only the small part of a regiment contending against the extensive colony of Virginia."[214]

But who were these "thousand chosen men belonging to the rebels," who, on their march to attack Lord Dunmore at Norfolk, had thus been held in check by his little fort at the Great Bridge? We are told by Dunmore himself that they were Virginia troops. But why was not Patrick Henry in immediate command of them? Why was Patrick Henry held back from this service,--the only active service then to be had in the field? And why was the direction of this important enterprise given to his subordinate, Colonel William Woodford, of the second regiment?

There is abundant evidence that Patrick Henry had eagerly desired to conduct this expedition; that he had even solicited the Committee of Safety to permit him to do so; but that they, distrusting his military capacity, overruled his wishes, and gave this fine opportunity for military distinction to the officer next below him in command.

Moreover, no sooner had Colonel Woodford departed upon the service, than he began to ignore altogether the commander-in-chief, and to make his communications directly to the Committee of Safety,--a course in which he was virtually sustained by that body, on appeal being made to them. Furthermore, on the 9th of December, Colonel Woodford won a brilliant victory over the enemy at the Great Bridge,[215] thus apparently justifying to the public the wisdom of the committee in a.s.signing the work to him, and also throwing still more into the background the commander-in-chief, who was then chafing in camp over his enforced retirement from this duty. But this was not the only cup of humiliation which was pressed to his lips. Not long afterward, there arrived at the seat of war a few hundred North Carolina troops, under command of Colonel Robert Howe; and the latter, with the full consent of Woodford, at once took command of their united forces, and thenceforward addressed his official letters solely to the convention of Virginia, or to the Committee of Safety, paying not the slightest attention to the commander-in-chief.[216] Finally, on the 28th of December, Congress decided to raise in Virginia six battalions to be taken into continental pay;[217] and, by a subsequent vote, it likewise resolved to include within these six battalions the first and the second Virginia regiments already raised.[218] A commission was accordingly sent to Patrick Henry as colonel of the first Virginia battalion,[219]--an official intimation that the expected commission of a brigadier-general for Virginia was to be given to some one else.

On receiving this last affront, Patrick Henry determined to lay down his military appointments, which he did on the 28th of February, 1776, and at once prepared to leave the camp. As soon as this news got abroad among the troops, they all, according to a contemporary account,[220] "went into mourning, and, under arms, waited on him at his lodgings," when his officers presented to him an affectionate address:--

TO PATRICK HENRY, JUNIOR, ESQUIRE:

Deeply impressed with a grateful sense of the obligations we lie under to you for the polite, humane, and tender treatment manifested to us throughout the whole of your conduct, while we have had the honor of being under your command, permit us to offer to you our sincere thanks, as the only tribute we have in our power to pay to your real merits. Notwithstanding your withdrawing yourself from service fills us with the most poignant sorrow, as it at once deprives us of our father and general, yet, as gentlemen, we are compelled to applaud your spirited resentment to the most glaring indignity. May your merit s.h.i.+ne as conspicuous to the world in general as it hath done to us, and may Heaven shower its choicest blessings upon you.

WILLIAMSBURG, February 29, 1776.

His reply to this warm-hearted message was in the following words:--

GENTLEMEN,--I am extremely obliged to you for your approbation of my conduct. Your address does me the highest honor. This kind testimony of your regard to me would have been an ample reward for services much greater than I have had the power to perform. I return you, and each of you, gentlemen, my best acknowledgments for the spirit, alacrity, and zeal you have constantly shown in your several stations.

I am unhappy to part with you. I leave the service, but I leave my heart with you. May G.o.d bless you, and give you success and safety, and make you the glorious instruments of saving our country.[221]

The grief and indignation thus exhibited by the officers who had served under Patrick Henry soon showed itself in a somewhat violent manner among the men. The "Virginia Gazette" for that time states that, "after the officers had received Colonel Henry's kind answer to their address, they insisted upon his dining with them at the Raleigh Tavern, before his departure; and after the dinner, a number of them proposed escorting him out of town, but were prevented by some uneasiness getting among the soldiery, who a.s.sembled in a tumultuous manner and demanded their discharge, and declared their unwillingness to serve under any other commander. Upon which Colonel Henry found it necessary to stay a night longer in town, which he spent in visiting the several barracks; and used every argument in his power with the soldiery to lay aside their imprudent resolution, and to continue in the service, which he had quitted from motives in which his honor alone was concerned."[222] Moreover, several days after he had left the camp altogether and had returned to his home, he was followed by an address signed by ninety officers belonging not only to his own regiment, but to that of Colonel Woodford,--a doc.u.ment which has no little value as presenting strongly one side of contemporary military opinion respecting Patrick Henry's career as a soldier, and the treatment to which he had been subjected.

SIR,--Deeply concerned for the good of our country, we sincerely lament the unhappy necessity of your resignation, and with all the warmth of affection a.s.sure you that, whatever may have given rise to the indignity lately offered to you, we join with the general voice of the people, and think it our duty to make this public declaration of our high respect for your distinguished merit. To your vigilance and judgment, as a senator, this United Continent bears ample testimony, while she prosecutes her steady opposition to those destructive ministerial measures which your eloquence first pointed out and taught to resent, and your resolution led forward to resist. To your extensive popularity the service, also, is greatly indebted for the expedition with which the troops were raised; and while they were continued under your command, the firmness, candor, and politeness, which formed the complexion of your conduct towards them, obtained the signal approbation of the wise and virtuous, and will leave upon our minds the most grateful impression.

Although retired from the immediate concerns of war, we solicit the continuance of your kindly attention. We know your attachment to the best of causes; we have the fullest confidence in your abilities, and in the rect.i.tude of your views; and, however willing the envious may be to undermine an established reputation, we trust the day will come when justice shall prevail, and thereby secure you an honorable and happy return to the glorious employment of conducting our councils and hazarding your life in the defence of your country.[223]

The public agitation over the alleged wrong which had thus been done to Patrick Henry during his brief military career, and which had brought that career to its abrupt and painful close, seems to have continued for a considerable time. Throughout the colony the blame was openly and bluntly laid upon the Committee of Safety, who, on account of envy, it was said, had tried "to bury in obscurity his martial talents."[224] On the other hand, the course pursued by that committee was ably defended by many, on the ground that Patrick Henry, with all his great gifts for civil life, really had no fitness for a leading military position. One writer a.s.serted that even in the convention which had elected Patrick Henry as commander-in-chief, it was objected that "his studies had been directed to civil and not to military pursuits; that he was totally unacquainted with the art of war, and had no knowledge of military discipline; and that such a person was very unfit to be at the head of troops who were likely to be engaged with a well-disciplined army, commanded by experienced and able generals."[225] In the very middle of the period of his nominal military service, this opinion of his unfitness was still more strongly urged by the chairman of the Committee of Safety, who, on the 24th of December, 1775, said in a letter to Colonel Woodford:--

"Believe me, sir, the unlucky step of calling that gentleman from our councils, where he was useful, into the field, in an important station, the duties of which he must, in the nature of things, be an entire stranger to, has given me many an anxious and uneasy moment. In consequence of this mistaken step, which can't now be retracted or remedied,--for he has done nothing worthy of degradation, and must keep his rank,--we must be deprived of the service of some able officers, whose honor and former ranks will not suffer them to act under him in this juncture, when we so much need their services."[226]

This seems to have been, in substance, the impression concerning Patrick Henry held at that time by at least two friendly and most competent observers, who were then looking on from a distance, and who, of course, were beyond the range of any personal or partisan prejudice upon the subject. Writing from Cambridge, on the 7th of March, 1776, before he had received the news of Henry's resignation, Was.h.i.+ngton said to Joseph Reed, then at Philadelphia: "I think my countrymen made a capital mistake when they took Henry out of the senate to place him in the field; and pity it is that he does not see this, and remove every difficulty by a voluntary resignation."[227] On the 15th of that month, Reed, in reply, gave to Was.h.i.+ngton this bit of news: "We have some accounts from Virginia that Colonel Henry has resigned in disgust at not being made a general officer; but it rather gives satisfaction than otherwise, as his abilities seem better calculated for the senate than the field."[228]

Nevertheless, in all these contemporary judgments upon the alleged military defects of Patrick Henry, no reader can now fail to note an embarra.s.sing lack of definiteness, and a tendency to infer that, because that great man was so great in civil life, as a matter of course, he could not be great, also, in military life,--a proposition that could be overthrown by numberless historical examples to the contrary. It would greatly aid us if we could know precisely what, in actual experience, were the defects found in Patrick Henry as a military man, and precisely how these defects were exhibited by him in the camp at Williamsburg. In the writings of that period, no satisfaction upon this point seems thus far to have been obtained.

There is, however, a piece of later testimony, derived by authentic tradition from a prominent member of the Virginia Committee of Safety, which really helps one to understand what may have been the exact difficulty with the military character of Patrick Henry, and just why, also, it could not be more plainly stated at the time. Clement Carrington, a son of Paul Carrington, told Hugh Blair Grigsby that the real ground of the action of the Committee of Safety "was the want of discipline in the regiment under the command of Colonel Henry. None doubted his courage, or his alacrity to hasten to the field; but it was plain that he did not seem to be conscious of the importance of strict discipline in the army, but regarded his soldiers as so many gentlemen who had met to defend their country, and exacted from them little more than the courtesy that was proper among equals. To have marched to the sea-board at that time with a regiment of such men, would have been to insure their destruction; and it was a thorough conviction of this truth that prompted the decision of the committee."[229]

Yet, even with this explanation, the truth remains that Patrick Henry, as commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces, never was permitted to take command, or to see any real service in the field, or to look upon the face of an armed enemy, or to show, in the only way in which it could be shown, whether or not he had the gifts of a military leader in action. As an accomplished and n.o.ble-minded Virginian of our own time has said:--

"It may be doubted whether he possessed those qualities which make a wary partisan, and which are so often possessed in an eminent degree by uneducated men. Regular fighting there was none in the colony, until near the close of the war.... The most skilful partisan in the Virginia of that day, covered as it was with forests, cut up by streams, and beset by predatory bands, would have been the Indian warrior; and as a soldier approached that model, would he have possessed the proper tactics for the time. That Henry would not have made a better Indian fighter than Jay, or Livingston, or the Adamses, that he might not have made as das.h.i.+ng a partisan as Tarleton or Simcoe, his friends might readily afford to concede; but that he evinced, what neither Jay, nor Livingston, nor the Adamses did evince, a determined resolution to stake his reputation and his life on the issue of arms, and that he resigned his commission when the post of imminent danger was refused him, exhibit a lucid proof that, whatever may have been his ultimate fortune, he was not deficient in two grand elements of military success,--personal enterprise, and unquestioned courage."[230]

FOOTNOTES:

[195] _Hist. Mag._ for Aug. 1867, 92.

[196] 4 _Am. Arch._ iii. 375.

[197] 4 _Am. Arch._ ii. 1902.

[198] 4 _Am. Arch._ ii. 1834.

[199] 4 _Am. Arch._ ii. 1849.

[200] 4 _Am. Arch._ ii. 1850, 1851.

[201] _Ibid._ ii. 1852.

[202] _Ibid._ ii. 1878.

[203] 4 _Am. Arch._ ii. 1879, 1883.

[204] _Ibid._ ii. 1884, 1885.

[205] 4 _Am. Arch._ ii. 1902.

[206] MS.

[207] 4 _Am. Arch._ iii. 377.

[208] _Ibid._ iii. 377, 378.

[209] _Ibid._ iii. 378.

[210] 4 _Am. Arch._ iii. 393. See, also, his oath of office, _ibid._ iii. 411.

[211] 4 _Am. Arch._ iii. 776.

[212] Wirt, 159.

[213] 4 _Am. Arch._ iii. 1067.

[214] 4 _Am. Arch._ iii. 1713-1715.

[215] Graphic contemporary accounts of this battle may be found in 4 _Am. Arch._ iv. 224, 228, 229.

[216] Wirt, 178.