Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals Part 9

CHAPTER III

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE STATE

First, then, let us try to enumerate whatever worthy utterances have proceeded from men of the past upon any aspect of the subject, and then, referring to our collections of _Const.i.tutional Histories_, let us seek to arrive at a theory as to what sorts of things preserve and destroy each particular form of government, and see for what reasons some are well, some ill, managed. Succeeding in this, we may, perhaps, the better learn both what is the best form of government, and what arrangements, laws, and customs are best suited to each form.--Aristotle.

Man is a political animal.--_Id._

The State is prior to the individual.--_Id._

Without friends no one would choose to live, although he possessed all other blessings.--_Id._

If happiness be self-determination in accordance with worth, we must conclude that it will be in accordance with the supreme worth, which will be the worth of the n.o.blest part of us. This part, whatever it may be, whether intellect (????) or something else, that which by nature evidently rules and guides us and has insight into things beautiful and divine, whether it be itself divine, or the divinest part of us, is that whose self-determination, in accordance with its proper worth, will be the perfect happiness. That this consists in the vision of divine things has already been said.... This, indeed, is the supreme self-determination, for the reason that intellect is the highest part of us, and that with which it deals is the highest of the knowable.... But a life of this sort would be something higher than the human; for he who lived it would not be living as man, but as the subject of something divine.... If, then, intellect is something divine in relation to man, the life lived according to it must be divine in relation to human life. Instead, then, of following those who advise us, as being human, to set our thoughts upon human things, and, as being mortals, to set them on mortal things, it is our duty, as far as may be, to act as immortal beings, and do all we can to live in accordance with the supreme part of us.--Aristotle.

Man alone, among all beings, occupies a middle place between things corruptible and things incorruptible.... Two ends, therefore, Ineffable Providence has ordained for man: Blessedness in this life, which consists in the exercise of native faculty, and is figured by the Earthly Paradise, and blessedness in the eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of the vision of G.o.d, a thing not to be achieved by any native faculty, unless aided by divine light, and which is to be understood by the Heavenly Paradise.... These ends and means would be disregarded by human pa.s.sion, if men were not restrained in their course by bit and bridle.... For this reason man required a double directive, corresponding to this double end. He required the Supreme Pontiff to guide the human race to life eternal, and the Emperor to guide the human race to temporal felicity, in accordance with the teachings of philosophy.... The truth with regard to the question whether the authority of the Emperor is derived directly from G.o.d or from another, must not be taken so strictly as to mean that the Roman Prince is not, in some respects, subject to the Roman Pontiff, the fact being that this mortal felicity of ours is, in some sense, ordained with a view to immortal felicity. Let Caesar, therefore, display that reverence for Peter which the first-born son ought to display for his father, so that, being illuminated by his father's grace, he may with greater virtue enlighten the world, which he has been called to govern by Him who is governor of all things, spiritual and temporal.--Dante.

O Grace abounding, whence I did presume To fix my gaze upon the eternal light So far that I consumed my sight therein!

Within its deeps I saw internalized Into one volume, bound with love, That which is outered in the universe;-- Substance and accident, and all their modes, As 'twere, together merged in such a sort That what I mean is but a simple light.

The universal form of this same knot I think I saw, because, when thus I speak, I feel that I rejoice with larger joy.--_Id._

Man's chief end is to glorify G.o.d, and to enjoy him forever.--_Westminster Shorter Catechism_.

Plato's chief purpose, in writing upon education, had been to suggest a remedy for the social and moral conditions of his native Athens.

Aristotle has no such purpose. He is, in a very deep sense, a cosmopolitan, and writes in the interest of science and universal utility. His range of vision is not confined to Athens, or even to Greece (though he is very proud of being a Greek), but ranges over the whole known world in time and s.p.a.ce. Unlike Plato, too, who had been familiar mainly with inst.i.tutions of the past in Egypt and Greece, Aristotle is deeply affected by the tendencies of the future, and, though no one lays greater stress than he upon the necessity of a knowledge of the past for him who would construct a sound social theory, he nevertheless declares that the whole of the past is shaped by something which is in the future, by the ultimate realization. This view comes out in a paradoxical way in his famous saying that "the State is prior to the individual," by which he means that it is man's political nature working in him that makes him an individual, and at the same time realizes itself in a State. And this brings us to Aristotle's conception of the State, which we must consider before taking up his theory of education, for the reason that to him, as to all the ancient world, education is a function of the State, and is conducted, primarily at least, for the ends of the State.

Before venturing upon a theory of the State, Aristotle, true to his inductive principles, wrote the Const.i.tutional Histories of over two hundred and fifty different states. One of these, the _Const.i.tutional History of Athens_, has recently been discovered and published (see p.

96). He held that it was only by means of a broad induction, thus rendered possible, that he could discover the idea of the State, that is, its self-realizing form. Employing this method, then, he came to the conclusion that the State is that highest social inst.i.tution which secures the highest good or happiness of man. Having, in a previous treatise, satisfied himself that this good is Worth (??et?), and worth being in every case the full exercise of characteristic or differentiating faculty, he concludes that, since man's distinguis.h.i.+ng faculty is reason, the State is the inst.i.tution which secures to man the fullest and freest exercise of this. It follows directly that the State is, simply and solely, the supreme educational inst.i.tution, the university to which all other inst.i.tutions are but preparatory. And two more conclusions follow: (1) that states will differ in const.i.tution with the different educational needs of the peoples among whom they exist, and (2) that, since all education is but a preparation for some worthy activity, political education, the life of man as a citizen, is but a preparation for the highest activity, which, because it is highest, must necessarily be an end in itself. This activity, Aristotle argues, can be none other than contemplation, the Vision of the Divine (?e???a).

Results which have moved the world followed logically from this doctrine. Whereas Plato had made provision for a small and select body of super-civic men, and so paved the way for religious monasticism and asceticism, Aristotle maintains that in every civilized man, as such, there is a super-civic part, in fact, a superhuman and divine part, for the complete realization of which all the other parts, and the State wherein they find expression, are but means. Here we have, in embryo, the whole of Dante's theory of the relation of Church and State, a theory which lies at the basis of all modern political effort, however little the fact may be recognized. Here, indeed, we have the whole framework of the _Divine Comedy_; here too we have the doctrine of the Beatific Vision, which for ages shaped and, to a large extent, still shapes, the life of Christendom. Well might Dante claim Aristotle as his master (see p. 153)! Well might the great doctors of the Church speak of him as "_The_ Philosopher," and as the "Forerunner of Christ in Things Natural." In vain did Peter Ramus and Luther and Bruno and Bacon depreciate or anathematize him! He is more powerful to-day in thought and life than at any time for the last twenty-two centuries.

It may be asked how far, and in what form, Aristotle conceives the divine life to be possible for man on earth. He answers that, though it cannot be perfectly or continuously realized here, it is in some degree and for certain times attainable (see p. 161). In so far as it is a social life, it is the life of friends.h.i.+p or spiritual love (f???a), to which he has devoted almost two books of his _Ethics_, books which give us a loftier idea of his personal purity and worth than any other of his extant writings. He insists that friends.h.i.+p is the supreme blessing (see p. 166), and that "whatever a man's being is, or whatever he chooses to live for, in that he wishes to spend his life in the company of his friends." It is even said that Aristotle, while teaching in the Lyceum, gathered about him a knot of n.o.ble youths and earnest students, and formed them into a kind of community, with a view to leading a truly spiritual social life.

CHAPTER IV

ARISTOTLE'S PEDAGOGICAL STATE

Nature is the beginning of everything.--Aristotle.

Life is more than meat, and the body than raiment.--Jesus.

The forces of the human pa.s.sions in us, when completely repressed, become more vehement; but when they are called into action for short time and in the right degree, they enjoy a measured delight, are soothed, and, thence being purged away, cease in a kindly, instead of a violent, way. For this reason, in tragedy and comedy, through being spectators of the pa.s.sions of others, we still our own pa.s.sions, render them more moderate, and purge them away; and so, likewise, in the temples, by seeing and hearing base things, we are freed from the injury that would come from the actual practice of them.--Jamblichus.

Care for the body must precede care for the soul; next to care for the body must come care for the appet.i.tes; and, last of all, care for the intelligence. We train the appet.i.tes for the sake of the intelligence, and the body for the sake of the soul.--Aristotle.

The practice of abortion was one to which few persons in antiquity attached any deep feeling of condemnation.... The physiological theory that the ftus did not become a living creature till the hour of birth had some influence on the judgments pa.s.sed upon this practice. The death of an unborn child does not appeal very powerfully to the feeling of compa.s.sion, and men who had not yet attained any strong sense of the sanct.i.ty of human life, who believed that they might regulate their conduct on these matters by utilitarian views, according to the general interest of the community, might very readily conclude that prevention of birth was in many cases an act of mercy. In Greece, Aristotle not only countenanced the practice, but even desired that it should be enforced by law, when population had exceeded certain a.s.signed limits. No law in Greece, or in the Roman Republic, or during the greater part of the Empire, condemned it.... The language of the Christians from the very beginning was very different. With unwavering consistency and with the strongest emphasis, they denounced the practice, not simply as inhuman, but as definitely murder.--Lecky, _European Morals_.

Aristotle clearly saw that the strong tendency of the human race to increase, unless corrected by strict and positive laws, was absolutely fatal to every system founded on equality of property; and there cannot surely be a stronger argument against any system of this kind than the necessity of such laws as Aristotle himself proposes.... He seems to be fully aware that to encourage the birth of children, without providing properly for their support, is to obtain a very small accession to the population of a country, at the expense of a very great accession of misery.--Malthus, _Essay on Population_.

Considering Aristotle's views with regard to man, his end, and the function of the State, we can have little difficulty in divining the character and method of his educational system. Man is a being endowed with reason; his end is the full realization of this, his sovereign and distinguis.h.i.+ng faculty; the State is the means whereby this is accomplished.

Readers of Goethe's _Wilhelm Meister_ will remember the description, in the second part, of the Pedagogical Province. Now, Aristotle's State might with entire propriety be called a Pedagogical Province. In trying to describe this State, and the manner in which it discharges its function, it is difficult to know where to begin, for the reason that, taken as a whole, the State is both teacher and pupil. It arranges the whole scheme of education, and is therefore related to it as cause; it is built up by this scheme, and is therefore related to it as effect. It comes, accordingly, both at the beginning and at the end. It is a university which arranges the entire scheme of education, and is itself its highest grade. I shall try to surmount this difficulty by distinguis.h.i.+ng what the State is from what it does, beginning with the former, and ending with the latter.

With regard to what the State is, we have to consider (1) its natural, (2) its social, conditions. The former are climate, and extent, nature, and situation of territory; the latter, number and character of inhabitants, property regulations, distinction of cla.s.ses, city architecture, mode of life, government, and relations to other states.

Aristotle demands for his State a temperate climate, on the ground that a cold one renders men strong and bold, but dull and stupid, while a hot one renders them intellectual but effeminate. The best climate is one that makes them at once brave and intelligent. The territory must be extensive enough, and fertile enough, to supply its inhabitants with all the material conditions of life in answer to labor which shall rouse, without exhausting, their energies. It must face east or south, and be healthy, well-watered, accessible from land and sea, and easily defensible.

As to the social conditions, Aristotle finds the most important to be the number of citizens. And here two things must be carefully borne in mind. (1) He means by "State" a city with a small territory. This is not, as has been erroneously supposed, his highest social unity. He recognizes clearly the nation (?????) and the confederacy (s?a??a); but he holds that they exist merely for material ends, whereas the end of the State is spiritual. (2) He means by "citizen" a politician. A man is a citizen, not because he is born or domiciled in a State, but because he is a sharer in its functions. A State made up of mechanics, no matter how great their number, would be a small State, and one composed of slaves would be no State at all. Thus, in estimating the size of a State, we are to consider the character of its inhabitants, their fitness for political functions, rather than their number. Little Athens was a much larger State than gigantic Persia on the field of Marathon. Aristotle lays down that the number of citizens must be large enough to insure independence, this being essential to a Culture-State, and not too large to be manageable. Besides the citizens, there will necessarily be in the State a very large number of other human beings, slaves, agriculturists, mechanics, sailors--for all these he excludes from citizens.h.i.+p on the ground that they do not make virtue, that is, the realization of reason, the end of their lives. Women, in a sense, are citizens, if they belong to the families of citizens; but their sphere is the family.

With regard to property, Aristotle begins by considering what things it is necessary for. These he finds to be six, three private and three public. The former are food (including clothing and shelter), instruments of production, and arms; the latter are public enterprises (civil and military), religion, and law. These are the "necessaries"

(??a??a?a) of a State, for which it must duly provide. The most important of all is religion, on which he everywhere lays great stress.

As to the distribution of property, he propounds a scheme which is half socialistic. All the land is to belong to the State, that is, to the body of the free citizens. It is to be divided into two equal portions, and one set apart for public, the other for private, uses. The revenue from the public part is to go for the support of religion (and law?) and of the public tables, from which no citizen is excluded by poverty. The private part is to be so divided that each citizen shall have one lot near the city, and one near the frontier. This will give him an interest in defending the whole territory. Both parts are to be cultivated by serfs or slaves, part of whom will necessarily belong to the State, and part to private individuals. Land-owning is to be a condition of citizens.h.i.+p, and all citizens are to be forbidden to exercise any form of productive industry. This last rule, it is hoped, will prevent grievous inequalities of wealth, and the evils that flow from them. A modest competency, derived from his estate, is all that any citizen should aim at. Only degraded people, incapable of virtue, will crave for more.

Upon the distinction of cla.s.ses some light has been already thrown. They are two; the ruling and the ruled. Aristotle holds that this distinction runs through the whole of nature and spirit, that it is fundamental in being itself. It holds between G.o.d and the universe, form and matter, soul and body, object and subject, husband and wife, parent and child, master and slave, etc., etc. The ruling cla.s.s again is sub-divided into two parts, one that thinks and determines (legislators and judges), and one that executes (officials, officers, soldiers); while the ruled is sub-divided into husbandmen, mechanics, and seamen (sailors, fishermen, etc.). All the members of the ruled cla.s.s are serfs or public slaves, working, not for themselves, but for their masters. Aristotle holds that they ought to be barbarians of different races, and not Greeks.

The architecture of the city will in some degree correspond to this social division. It will naturally fall into three divisions, military, religious, and civil. First of all, a city must have walls. These should have towers and bastions at proper distances, and be made as attractive as possible. The temples of the G.o.ds and the offices of the chief magistrates should, if possible, stand together on a fortified citadel, conspicuously dominating the entire city. Adjoining this ought to be the Freemen's Square, reserved entirely for the ruling cla.s.s, and unenc.u.mbered by business or wares of any sort. Here ought to stand the gymnasium for the older citizens, who will thus be brought into contact with the magistrates and inspired with "true reverence and freemen's fear." The market-square must be placed so as to be convenient for the reception of goods both from sea and land. This comprehends all the civil architecture except the mess-halls, of which we shall better speak in the next paragraph.

The mode of life of the ruling cla.s.s will necessarily differ widely from that of the ruled. About the latter Aristotle has nothing to say. He hopes for little from that cla.s.s beyond the possibility of being held in contented subordination. As it has no political life, all that is left to it is the life of the family. The ruling cla.s.s, on the contrary, live to a large extent in public, and on public funds. They exercise in public gymnasia and eat at public tables. The chief magistrates have their mess-hall in the citadel; the priests have theirs close to the temples; the magistrates, who preside over business matters, streets, and markets, have theirs near the market-square, while those who attend to the defences of the city have tables in the towers. When not engaged in public business, the citizens may meet in the Freemen's Square and enjoy an open-air _conversazione_, with music, poetry, and philosophy, in a word, d?a????, for which our language has no even approximate equivalent (see p. 33). In proportion as they advance in years, the citizens enjoy more and more d?a????, which, indeed, is regarded as the end of life, here and hereafter.

The government is entirely in the hands of the free citizens, the legislative and deliberative power being in those of the elders; the executive power, civil and military, in those of the younger portion. It is curious that, though Aristotle regards this as the best possible arrangement under ordinary circ.u.mstances, he nevertheless believes that the happiest condition for a State would be to be governed by some divine or heroic man, far superior to all the others in wisdom and goodness. He plainly considers Pisistratus to have been one such man, and he perhaps hoped that Alexander might be another.

The relations of the pedagogical State to other States are, as far as possible, to be peaceful. Just as all labor is for the sake of rest and d?a????, so all war is for the sake of peace; and that State is to be envied which can maintain an honorable independence without war. A cultured State will eschew all attempts at conquest, and be as unwilling to tyrannize over another State as to be tyrannized over by one. At the same time, it will always be prepared for war, possessing an army of well-trained, well-armed soldiers, and a well-manned, well-equipped fleet.

Such are the chief features of Aristotle's ideal State, based, as he believes, on man's political nature and the history of the past. Like all social ideals, like heaven itself, as ordinarily conceived, it is a static condition. Its inst.i.tutions are fixed once for all, and every effort is made to preserve them. It is curious to note in how many points it coincides with Xenophon's ideal.

The purpose of the State is to educate its citizens, to make them virtuous. Virtue is the very life-principle of the State, and it does not depend, as other conditions do, upon nature or chance, but upon free will. The ideal State, like every other, must educate with a view to its own inst.i.tutions, since only in this way can these be preserved. "And, since the State, as a whole, has but one aim, it is evident that the political education of all the citizens ought to be the same, and that this is a matter for the State to attend to, and not one to be left to individual caprice, as is now almost universally done, when every parent attends to the education of his own children, and gives them whatever schooling suits his own fancy." For the education of those members of the State who are not citizens the State makes no provision. They learn their practical duties by performing them, and are completely under the control of the citizens. Aristotle makes the most vigorous efforts to prove that slavery has its justification in nature, which has established between Greek and barbarian the relation of master and slave (see p. 12). As woman belongs to the family, and is only indirectly a citizen of the State, her education is entrusted to the former inst.i.tution. The daughter is to be educated by the parents, and the wife by the husband, exactly as recommended by Xenophon.

Having concluded that education ought to be a matter of State legislation, and the same for all the citizens, he continues: "It remains to inquire what shall be the nature of the education, and the method of imparting it.... The present state of education leaves this question in a perfect muddle, no one seeming to know whether we ought to teach those subjects which enable people to make a living, or those which foster worth, or, finally, accomplishments. All have had their advocates. In regard to those studies which have worth for their aim, there is no general agreement, owing to the fact that different people have different views as to what kinds of worth are admirable, and consequently differ in regard to the means to be employed for the cultivation of them. One point, however, is perfectly clear, viz. that those useful things which are necessary ought to be taught. But it is equally clear that a distinction ought to be made between liberal and illiberal studies, and that only those useful subjects ought to be taught which do not turn those learning them into craftsmen. We ought to look upon every employment, art, or study which contributes to render the bodies, souls, or intellects of free men unfit for the uses and practices of virtue, as a craft. For this reason it is that we call all those arts which lower the condition of the body crafts, and extend the term to the money-making trades, because they preoccupy and degrade the intelligence. As to the liberal arts, to cultivate an acquaintance with them up to a certain point is not illiberal; but any over-devotion to them, with a view to attaining professional skill, is liable to the objections mentioned. It also makes a great difference for what purpose we do or learn a thing. If a man does a thing for his own, for his friends', or for worth's sake, it is not illiberal, whereas if he does it often for the sake of anybody else, he will be held to be doing something mercenary or slavish."

The next and all-important question is, For what end shall the State educate,--for business or for leisure? In answering this, Aristotle breaks entirely away from the old Greek traditions, as well as from Plato, and maintains that, while it must educate for both, yet education for leisure is far more important than education for business, and cites Nature as his authority. "Nature itself demands," he says, "not only that we should pursue business properly, but that we should be able to employ our leisure elegantly. If we must have both, we must; but leisure is preferable to business, and our final inquiry must be, in what sort of employment we shall spend our leisure. It is useless to say that we are to spend it in play, and that play is the end and aim of our life.

If this is impossible, and the truth is that the proper place for play is in the midst of business (it is the man who is toiling that requires recreation, which is the aim of play, business being accompanied with exertion and tension), then, in having recourse to play, we must select the proper seasons for administering it, just as if it were a medicine.

Indeed, all such movement of the soul is relaxation, and becomes recreation on account of the pleasure which it affords. Leisure, on the contrary, is considered, in and by itself, to involve pleasure, happiness, and a blessed life. These fall to the lot of those who have leisure, not of those who are engaged in business. Those who engage in business do so for some ulterior end not realized in it, whereas happiness is itself an end and, according to universal belief, brings, not pain but pleasure. Of course, as to the nature of this pleasure, there is at present a variety of opinions, every one having his own preferences due to his character and habits, and the highest type of man preferring the highest type of pleasure and that which arises from the n.o.blest things. We need no further argument to show that we should receive instruction and education in certain things with a view to _otium c.u.m dignitate_ (or cultured leisure), and that these should be ends in themselves, in contradistinction to the instruction given for business, which is necessary and has an ulterior aim."

Three principles Aristotle lays down as valid for all education: (1) that the training of the body ought to take precedence in time over that of the mind; (2) that pupils should be taught to do things before they are taught the reasons and principles of them; (3) that learning is never playing, or for the sake of playing.

The periods of education distinguished by Aristotle are: (1) Childhood, extending from birth to the end of the seventh year, and spent in healthy growing and, latterly, in preparation for discipline; (2) Boyhood, from the beginning of the eighth year to the advent of p.u.b.erty, devoted to the lighter forms of discipline, bodily and mental; (3) Youth, from the age of p.u.b.erty to the end of the twenty-first year, occupied with the severer forms of discipline; (4) Manhood, devoted to State duties. All these are but preparations for the divine life of the soul. We shall treat these in order, including the second and third under one head.

CHAPTER V

EDUCATION DURING THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS

Suffer no lewdness or indecent speech The apartment of tender youth to reach.--Juvenal.