Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post - LightNovelsOnl.com
You're reading novel online at LightNovelsOnl.com. Please use the follow button to get notifications about your favorite novels and its latest chapters so you can come back anytime and won't miss anything.
Solid Contents, 2,688,000 --------- = 8 to 1. Increase as the cubes.
Solid Contents, 336,000
Thus, the mids.h.i.+p resistance has increased as four to one, or as the square, while the solid contents, representing the tonnage, have increased as eight to one, or as the cube. It is evident that the s.h.i.+p has but four times the mid-section resistance, while she has eight times the carrying capacity. Therefore the engine power, and the coal and weight necessary to propel a s.h.i.+p of twice the lineal dimensions, or eight times the capacity, would have to be only four times that of the smaller vessel, speaking in general terms; and as a consequence, the price of freight, considering the vessels to run at equal speed, would be but half as much in the larger as in the smaller vessel.
The attempt has been made to seize the evident advantages thus offered by increasing the size of the hull, until our clippers now reach an enormous size, and our steamers are stopping but little short of 30,000 tons. The splendid steamer "Leviathan" was built on this idea, and must prove a splendid triumph in comparative cheapness if she can only get business so as to run full, and keep herself constantly employed in her legitimate business, running. But it is hardly possible that she should be always filled with either freight or pa.s.sengers. Some of our large clipper s.h.i.+ps have experienced this difficulty. The time necessary to load and unload is too great for short routes, although they are well calculated for long pa.s.sages. If one of these large steamers fail to get plenty of business the losses become exceedingly severe. The prime cost is immense; the interest on the capital and the insurance are very large; and the current expenses are even beyond those necessary for the government of some cities.
These hazards all taken together more than neutralize the benefits which arise from extra size and extra proportional cheapness; so that notwithstanding all of the hopes which some have entertained for the cheapening of transport in this way, they are probably doomed to disappointment in the end; and ocean steaming continues as expensive as ever, and is growing even more expensive than it has ever been known since its first introduction. (_See Coal Tables, pp. 71 and 75._)
It is clear that, notwithstanding all of the advantages to be gained from increased size, steamers can not support themselves upon the ocean. Let us examine further the case of such a s.h.i.+p as the "Leviathan." I can not see that there is any normal trade in which she can run successfully. She may transport 6,000 tons of measurement goods to Australia; but it will be at the expense of fourteen to sixteen thousand tons of coals if the pa.s.sage is made in fair time. If not, sailing vessels will subserve all purposes except travel quite as well. And certainly there is no cla.s.s of freight for Australia or any other portion of the world, which will pay such an enormous coal-bill, and so many other expenses, and the interest and insurance on three and a half to four millions of dollars, just to save a few days in so long a voyage. And if the steamer is to do a freighting as well as pa.s.senger business, then a long voyage is essential to her.
Running is the legitimate business of a steamer. Her costly engines are put in her for locomotion. Her large corps of engineers, firemen, and coal-pa.s.sers, are employed for running her, and are of no use when she is lying still, although necessarily on full pay. Her condition is abnormal and unnatural every day that she is lying at the docks, and taking or discharging freight; and hence, every day that she is thus employed she is not performing her proper functions. A sailing s.h.i.+p can better afford to lie still for weeks and await a freight, or slowly receive or discharge cargo; as she must pay only the interest on her investment, her dockage, the captain, and watchmen, and perhaps her depreciation. The prime investment is much less. She has no costly engines and boilers. So are her current expenses. She has none of the costly _employees_ that I have named, and who can never leave a steamer for a day. But eternal motion, flush freights, flush business, good prices, and constant employment, are everywhere essential to the steamer.
Suppose the "Leviathan" steamer running between Liverpool and New-York. She would be occupied ten days at least in receiving her freight, ten days in running and making port or docks, and ten days in discharging. Then, she would be employed only one third of her time in the business for which she was constructed, running; while during two thirds of it she would be acting simply as a pier or dock, over which freight would be handled. Now, with her costly engines, and costly and necessarily idle _employees_, she can not afford to be a dock; neither can she afford to lie still so long. Nor can she on such conditions get the freight necessary to her support. The community on neither side of the water would wish fifteen thousand tons of any cla.s.s of freights which she could transport dumped down upon the docks at one time. They wish it to arrive a little and a little every day, as it is wanted, just enough to supply the market; and will not lie out of the money which they pay for it, and have it nearly a month in market before they need it, just to have it come on the "Leviathan." It must come along in small lots, just as they need it, and it must be s.h.i.+pped the day that it is bought, and delivered as soon as the s.h.i.+p is in, without being the last lot of fifteen thousand tons, and without keeping the owners so long out of their money. Suppose that A. puts the first lot of freight in at London: he will be the last to receive, it in New-York. A smaller steamer taking another lot two days after, will deliver it before the large s.h.i.+p gets half way over. Or, again, the small steamer may leave London with it when the large steamer has nearly arrived at New-York, and deliver the lot here to the owner in advance. Beside not wis.h.i.+ng so large a lot at once, they do not wish it all in one place. The double advantage of a great number of small vessels is, that they bring cargo along as it is wanted, and at the same time distribute it at all of the hundreds of large and small ports, without first delivering it at some great mammoth terminus, and then res.h.i.+pping and distributing it to its final destination.
A gentleman, who is a prominent statesman, recently seriously advised me not to think of establis.h.i.+ng a line of mail steamers between the United States and Brazil, for the accommodation of the hundreds of sailing vessels engaged in that trade, but to get up a mammoth company and run five or six thirty thousand ton steamers, like the Leviathan, between Norfolk and Rio de Janeiro. He said that the increased size of the steamer would enable me to carry freight cheaper than sailing vessels. The reasoning was neither very clear nor convincing to me on behalf of the mysterious capacities which he attributed to large steamers. I suggested that, in the first place, there was no cargo pa.s.sing either way between the United States and Brazil which could afford to pay steam transportation under any circ.u.mstances; that so large a cargo could never be obtained at once in Rio de Janeiro or elsewhere; that the merchants of this country did not wish it all landed at one place; that it would cost as much to remove it from Norfolk to the place of consumption, as it would from Rio de Janeiro to its final destination; that they did not wish it delivered all at once, but in small lots at a time, and distributed where it was needed; and that, even if it were at all practicable, which no business man could for a moment believe, the people would not be willing to have a fruitful field of industry in s.h.i.+pping occupied by some great overgrown company, with a great coffee monopoly, which would surely follow. Too much has been expected of large s.h.i.+ps. The clipper "Great Republic" is not freighted half of her time. The "Leviathan" can not pay in freighting unless she runs to Australia and the East-Indies, and runs slowly, on very little coal. She may do very well with a voluntary cargo, which will load and unload itself in a hurry, such as a cargo of emigrants, and not steaming at too a high a speed. But it would require a dozen steamers as tenders to bring these emigrants from Ireland, Bremen, Havre, Hamburgh, Amsterdam, and other European cities, to her central depot in England. She would, however, become a most useful if not indispensable transport vessel for the British Government.
If the large cla.s.s of steamers can not live on their own receipts, much less can the small. An adequate speed for the mails leaves no available s.p.a.ce for cargo. The s.h.i.+p may carry two or three hundred tons of freight; but it pays perhaps but little more than the handling and the extra coal necessary to transport its extra weight. As a general thing, it may be safely said that when a vessel is well adapted to the mails and pa.s.sengers she is filled with her own power, that is, with heavy engines, large boilers, and a large quant.i.ty of fuel, as also with her provisions and baggage. We have already seen how the size and weight of engines and boilers must increase, as well as the bulk and cost of the fuel, to gain a little speed. But it is not generally known how large a quant.i.ty of consumable stores and baggage go in a well-supported mail packet. The greater the postal efficiency of a steamer the less is it able to carry freight; and the time will doubtless soon come when the fast mail packets will take nothing except a few express packages. The Persia now takes scarcely any freight, and the Vanderbilt can not think of doing it when she makes fast trips. It is very probable that the whole system of the ocean will be materially changed; and that while clippers and slow propellers carry the fine freights, fast vessels filled with their own power will carry the mails and pa.s.sengers. And in doing this, they can not, of course, support themselves; neither will they conflict with private enterprise in freight transport. It is now the case to a large extent on most of our American lines.
While the ocean mail steamer must be fast and costly, for the better acceleration of correspondence and the accommodation of pa.s.sengers, she must also go at the appointed hour, whether she is repaired or not, and wholly irrespective of her freight and pa.s.senger list. There must be no delays for a lot of freight, or for a company of fifty pa.s.sengers who have been delayed by the train. She has the mails, and must go at the hour appointed, whatever it may cost the company, and however large a lot of costly stores may have to be thrown away. This punctuality, while it is the means of securing small lots of freight, prevents also the accommodation of the s.h.i.+p's day of sailing to arrangements which might otherwise be profitable. This punctuality in sailing always necessitates large extra expense in repairs. It frequently happens that companies of men work through the nights and on Sundays; getting much increased prices for such untimely labor, and being far less efficient in the night than in the day. If the steamer has had a long pa.s.sage from whatever causes, she discharges whatever she has and takes in her coal in a hurried and costly way, frequently at fifty per cent. advance on the cost necessary for it if she had ample time. The only means of avoiding these exigencies is by having spare s.h.i.+ps, which cost as much as any others, but which add nothing whatsoever to the company's income. It may be safe to say that in every mail company it is necessary to have one spare, and consequently unproductive, s.h.i.+p for every three engaged in active service. This thirty-three per cent. additional outlay would not be necessary except on a mail line, where punctuality was positively demanded. Yet, it is one of the heavy items of expense to be incurred by every company carrying the mails, and with which they can not in any wise dispense, however well their s.h.i.+ps may be built. The "Pacific Mail Steams.h.i.+p Company" in running their semi-monthly line from Panama to California and Oregon, keep constantly at their docks eight unemployed steamers and one tow-boat, ready for all exigencies and accidents, and could keep their mails going if nearly their whole moving fleet should be sunk at once. No wonder that they have never missed a single trip, or lost a single pa.s.senger by marine accident since they first started in 1850. But there is another cla.s.s of costs in running ocean steamers, which amount to large sums in the aggregate, and of which the people are generally wholly ignorant. I allude to the items, and what may be called "odds and ends." It is easily imaginable that a company has to pay only the bills for wages, for fuel, and for provisions, and that then the cash-drawer may be locked for the voyage. Indeed, it is difficult for those accustomed to the marine steam service to sit down and enumerate by memory in one day the thousand little treasury leaks, the many wastages, the formidable bill of extras, and the items which are necessary to keep every thing in its place, and to pay every body for what he does. The oil-bill of a large steamer would be astonis.h.i.+ng to a novice, until he saw the urns and oil-cans which cling to every journal, and jet a constant lubricating stream. The tools employed about a steamer are legion in number, and cost cash. We hear a couple of cannon fired two or three times as we enter and leave port, or pa.s.s a steamer upon the ocean, and consider it all very fine and inspiring; but we do not reflect that the guns cost money, and that pound after pound of powder is not given to the company by the Government or the public. The steamer carries many fine flags and signals, which cost cash. An anchor with the chain is lost; another costs cash. Heavy weather may be on, and it takes some hours to get into the dock. The extra coal and the tow-boat cost cash. The wheel-house is torn to pieces against the corner of the pier, and the bulwarks are carried away by heavy seas; but no one will repair the damage for any thing short of cash. A large number of lights are by law required to be kept burning on the wheel-houses and in the rigging all night; but no one reflects that it took money first to purchase them, and a constant outlay to keep them trimmed and burning. People suppose that the captain, or steward, or some body else can take a match and set the lamp off, and have it burn very nicely; but there are only a few who know that it takes one man all of his time to clean, fill, adjust, light, and keep these lamps going, as well as have them extinguished at the proper time.
I saw to-day a case in point as regards accidental expenses. The splendid steams.h.i.+p Adriatic sailed at 12. The wind was very high from the south, and almost blowing a gale. She was lying on the southern side of the dock, while the Atlantic was lying with her stern at the end of the dock, near where the Adriatic had to pa.s.s in going out. At the moment of starting, three strong tow-boats were attached to her bow, and endeavored as she went out to draw her head against the wind, down stream. But they proved insufficient to the task. The vessel crushed down the corner of the dock, ran into the Atlantic, and carried away her stern bulwarks, crushed one of her own large and costly iron life-boats, and damaged one of her wheel-houses. Now, who of the two hundred thousand spectators that lined the docks, would pay the two thousand dollars for the life-boat, a thousand for repairing the dock and vessels, and the bill for the three tug-boats for two hours each?
Moreover, we see a pilot get on the steamer at New-York, another at Southampton, and a third at Havre; but we seldom reflect that the steamer has to pay a large price to each one of them, both going and coming. Take the coasting steamers, running between New-York and Savannah, or Charleston. It appears singular that the New-York pilot goes all the way to Savannah, that the Savannah pilot comes all the way to New-York, and that the steamer pays for both of these men all the time, and feeds them on board all of the time. Yet it is so. Such is the law; and it amounts to a good many thousands during the year.
And all this, the company must pay, as a part of those items which take cash, but for which the company never gets any credit from the public or the Government. Whenever a little accident occurs to the steamer, it must be towed a few miles at a high price by a tug-boat.
Whenever the Government or friends and visitors come on board, they expect to be liberally entertained; yet the company must pay for it, or be considered mean and unworthy of the Government's patronage. Each s.h.i.+p must have an experienced surgeon, whose wages must be paid like those of other persons employed, and an apothecary's room and outfit.
The s.h.i.+p must be painted and varnished, and overhauled at every trip; the upholstering and furnis.h.i.+ng must be often renewed; stolen articles must be replaced; and the breakages of table-wares constantly renewed.
All of this costs cash.
The steamer also has to pay light dues and port charges wherever she goes. Many of these are exorbitant and unreasonable. In Havre the "Fulton" and "Arago" must pay nearly twenty-four hundred dollars each on every departure, or they will not be permitted to leave the docks.
This is no small item for each steamer on every pa.s.sage that she makes. At New-York she pays wharf.a.ge again. It is not so high, but it is a large item, and requires the cash. Again, there is the great sh.o.r.e establishment which every steam company must maintain. Large docks, and warehouses, and coaling arrangements, staging, watchmen, porters, and messengers, and a sh.o.r.e-captain equal to those on board, must all be maintained. The Havre Company pays to the city $4,000 per year for its dock, $1,200 for its annual repairs, and also for sheds, fixtures, etc., extra. They keep also two watchmen at $40 each per month, and other persons in the dock service. The Collins Company have a necessarily very costly dock both in New-York and Liverpool. That in New-York would rent for $15,000 per annum. The one in Liverpool is far more costly. On each they keep a large number of men, with watchmen, gatekeepers, runners, porters, and clerks, and always keep an office open. Beside this, is the whole paraphernalia of the office of the company. There must be offices, clerks, bookkeepers, porters, runners, etc.; a president, treasurer, and secretary; an attorney, agents, and agencies; and newspaper advertising, and a hundred little things which no man can mention. I do not pretend to be able to give an adequate conception of the innumerable items which so swell the large actual working expenses of regularly running steamers. Even the charities of a decently managed company are large. Firemen and engineers become disabled and must be supported; or they are killed in the service of the s.h.i.+p, leaving families which no decent company can disregard. The amount which the West-India Royal Mail Company pays in this way, and which our n.o.ble American lines advance to the deserving, are beyond all conception of the mere theorist.
There is another source of loss which prevents, mail packets especially, from paying their expenses on their freight and pa.s.senger earnings. The table on all of our steams.h.i.+ps has become exceedingly expensive, as it has in our hotels. Perhaps there is more necessity for it on steamers than in the hotels, as pa.s.sengers are generally sea-sick, and need every delicacy of life to keep them up. The supplies which our fine mail packets carry for this purpose are of almost incredible extent and costliness. No vegetable, fruit, game, or other rarity that can be kept fifteen days in large ma.s.ses of ice, is neglected; so that the table of every steamer is necessarily both luxurious and expensive. Indeed, it has become so much so, and the price of pa.s.sage fare has been reduced so low on all of the prominent lines, that as a general rule the steamers are not now making much clear money on their pa.s.sengers. The expense of keeping pa.s.sengers was not half so great six years ago, as it is now; and there appears to be no safe means of permanent retrenchment. Nothing has been said of Insurance. This is a most costly item. The Havre Company pay on their two s.h.i.+ps, which are worth about $900,000, nine and a half per cent.
per annum; and Mr. Collins pays on his three s.h.i.+ps, which are worth about $2,200,000, nine per cent. per annum. On the Havre steamers this amounts to $85,500 per year, which is nearly as much as the mail pay; and on the Collins, to $198,000 per annum. And these are among what we call the items of mail steams.h.i.+p expenditure. I do not know the sums paid by the United States Mail, or by the Pacific Mail Companies.
I will here give the views of Messrs. Murray and Atherton on the cost of steam, as they replied to letters of inquiry, which I addressed them Sept. 14, 1857. Mr. Murray says in answer to
_Query 2_. "It is certainly my impression that ocean steamers of sufficient speed to carry the mails with any thing like regularity, will not pay upon any route with which I am acquainted, without a.s.sistance from Government."
_Query 5_: Can Parliament do better in economy than in her present mail contracts, all things considered? Mr. Murray replies:
"I do not see how Parliament can avoid paying the large subsidies she does for the mail contracts under present circ.u.mstances."
_Query 4_: Is the steams.h.i.+p stock of Great Britain, subsidized or unsubsidized, paying stock, and is there much disposition among capitalists to invest, even in the stock of subsidized companies? He replies:
"I do not think the steams.h.i.+p stock of Great Britain to be in a very nouris.h.i.+ng condition: in fact, I know of only one company (the Peninsular and Oriental) in which I should like to invest money."
Mr. Atherton replies to a query regarding the cost of running steamers as follows:
"As to whether the effective performance of high speed mail service is compatible with ordinary mercantile service without government subsidy, I am of opinion that the mutual relation of Speed and Cost in connection with long sea-voyages has never yet been duly appreciated by owners, managers, or agents in charge of steam s.h.i.+pping affairs.
An acceleration of steaming speed involves an increase of cost expenses, and a decrease of mercantile earnings, as dependent on _freight per ton weight_ far beyond what is generally supposed."
He further says in reply to Query 9, which is as follows:
Do you know of any disposition in the Government to cut down the ocean mail service, as an unproductive expenditure? He says:
"It is impossible to estimate the national value of an effective mail service throughout the whole globe; the breaking of one link, though apparently of trivial consequence, impairs the whole system. I can not imagine that there is any disposition to impair the completeness of the mail system."
From the foregoing considerations it is palpable that fast ocean steamers can not live on their own receipts. And the same will in most cases hold true of freighting and other steamers of all cla.s.ses, which depend entirely on steam as their agent of locomotion. Propellers will hardly form an exception to this rule. If the power and the pa.s.sengers fill the hull, if the coal bill and other expenses increase as rapidly as indicated for mail packets, if engineering improvements do not advance as rapidly as the price of coals, if larger and more cheaply running s.h.i.+ps can not get an adequate support in business, if there are the many leakages and expenses indicated, and if all of the expenses of running steamers are continually increasing from year to year rather than diminis.h.i.+ng, then we may never expect to see the mail and pa.s.senger steamers of the ocean become self-supporting, or less dependent than now, on the fostering care of the Government and the national treasury.[C]
[C] Since this was written, Mr. Drayton has shown me the receipt for this year's _taxes_ on the Havre Company, which are $7,782, the two s.h.i.+ps being valued at $500,000 only.
SECTION VI.
HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?
THE TRANSMARINE COMPARED WITH THE INLAND POST: OUR PAST SPASMODIC EFFORTS: NEED SOME SYSTEM: FRANCE AROUSED TO STEAM: THE SAILING-s.h.i.+P MAIL: THE NAVAL STEAM MAIL: THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE MAIL: ALL INADEQUATE AND ABANDONED: GREAT BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE IN ALL THESE METHODS: NAVAL VESSELS CAN NOT BE ADAPTED TO THE MAIL SERVICE: WILL PROPELLERS MEET THE WANTS OF MAIL TRANSPORT, WITH OR WITHOUT SUBSIDY: POPULAR ERRORS REGARDING THE PROPELLER: ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES: BOURNE'S OPINION: ROBERT MURRAY: PROPELLERS TOO OFTEN ON THE DOCKS: THEY ARE VERY DISAGREEABLE Pa.s.sENGER VESSELS: IF PROPELLERS RUN MORE CHEAPLY IT IS BECAUSE THEY ARE SLOWER: COMPARED WITH SAIL: UNPROFITABLE STOCK: CROSKEY'S LINE: PROPELLERS LIVE ON CHANCES AND CHARTERS: IRON AS A MATERIAL: SENDING THE MAILS BY SLOW PROPELLERS WOULD BE AN UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SAILING VESSELS: INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE CAN NOT SUPPLY MAIL FACILITIES: THEREFORE IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
I have endeavored to prove in the foregoing Section that ocean mail steamers can not live on their own receipts. The question now arises, how can we secure speed for the mails and pa.s.sengers upon the ocean?
With so many expenses and so small an income the fast ocean steamer can not become profitable to even the most thoroughly organized and best administered companies. Much less can it be successfully run by individuals and individual enterprise, which has never so many reliable resources at command as a strong, chartered company. It is true that there are a few prominent transatlantic routes where steamers can run as auxiliary propellers; but the number of them is small, and the speed attained will by no means prove sufficient for postal purposes. The transmarine postal service has been a source of constant annoyance to almost every commercial nation. The overland mails have generally been self-supporting, and it has been a favorite idea that those on the sea should be so also; although there is no just reason why either should be necessarily so any more than in the cases of the Navy and the Army; branches of the service which entail large expenses on the Government, and yet without a moiety of the benefits which directly flow from the postal service to all cla.s.ses of community. No nation except Great Britain has come up to the issue and faced this question boldly. Almost every other country, not excepting our own, has been hanging back on the subject of the transmarine post, "waiting, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up," in the improvements of ocean steam navigation, which might obviate the necessity of paying for the ocean transit. But every hope has been disappointed; and instead of realizing these wishes the case has been growing worse year by year, until we are at last compelled to move in the matter, or lose our commerce, our ocean _prestige_, and sink down contented with a second or third-rate position among commercial nations, and acknowledge ourselves tributary to the far-seeing and far-reaching, and superior policy of our compet.i.tors.
The United States have indeed become galvanically aroused now and then, as in 1847 and '8, to a self-protecting and a self-developing system; but as soon as one faint effort has been made, we have, instead of pursuing that effort and developing it fully, relapsed back into our old indifference, and given the whole available talent of the Government either to the administration, or to the everlasting discussion of petty politics. During the time that President Buchanan was Secretary of State, some of our n.o.blest efforts for the establishment of ocean mails were made, with his fullest countenance and aid; but the policy then inaugurated with prospects so hopeful for our commercial future, and which has operated so healthfully ever since, is now half abandoned, or left without notice to take care of itself; until it may be to-day said that we have no steam policy, and run our ocean mails only by expedients. This ever has been and ever will be unfortunate for us, and costly. Individuals and companies build steamers for the accidents of trade, let them lie still a year or two, then pounce upon some disorganized trade, suck the life-blood from it like vampires, and at last leave it, the very corpse of commerce, lying at the public door. All such irregular traffic is injurious to the best interests of the country, destroys all generous and manly compet.i.tion, and proves most clearly the want of a Government steam mail system. France has been awaiting the issues of time, and under a too high expectation for the improvements of the age, until she finds that unless she inaugurates and sustains a liberal steam policy, and becomes less dependent on foreigners for her mails, she will have the commerce of the world swept from her sh.o.r.es as by a whirlwind of enterprise. She has now become aroused, and has determined to establish three great lines of communication, one with the United States, one with the West-Indies, Central America, the Spanish Main, and Mexico, and one with Brazil and La Plata. She has found, that it will no longer do to abandon her mails to fate, and that in the end it will be far more profitable to pay even largely for good mails than to do without them. Hence, her offer to give to the American, West-Indian, and Brazilian service named an annual subvention of fourteen million _Francs_, or nearly three million dollars, to be continued for twenty years, which the Government deems a sufficient period for the establishment and test of a system. (_See _projet_ of Franco-American Navigation, page 198._)
Among the many expedients adopted for the transmission of the foreign post are those of employing ordinary sailing vessels on the one hand, or the vessels of the war marine on the other. Both systems have been effectually and forever exploded and abandoned. The objections to sailing vessels are very numerous. They are, in the first place, too slow. They are too uncertain in their days of sailing and arrival.
They can never be placed under the direction of the Department because they are private property, devoted to private uses, and generally accomplish their ends by private means; one of the most prominent of which is, to keep back all letters except those going to their own consignees. If a merchant runs his s.h.i.+p for personal gain it is not to be supposed that he will carry the letters of his commercial compet.i.tors, and thus forestall his own speculations. Sailing vessels have no proper accommodations for the mails, and can not fairly be forced either to transport or to deliver them. The uncertainties of cargo are such that they can not sail on fixed days with punctuality.
But the great difficulty is their want of speed and the uncertainty of their progress or arrival. Whenever they have been employed by the British Government for postal service they have always proven themselves inefficient and unreliable. Whenever they have been superceded by steamers, the postal income, before small, has gone up rapidly to five, ten, or twenty times the former income. This was well ill.u.s.trated in the British and Brazilian lines. The Parliamentary returns for 1842, when postal service with Brazil and La Plata was performed by a line of fine sailing packets, give the total income from postages at 5,034, 13_d_, 6_s_ Lord Canning, the British Post Master General, stated that, in 1852, two years after the Royal Mail Steam Packets commenced running to Brazil and La Plata, the income from postages was 44,091, 17_s_, or nearly nine times as much as when the mails went by sailing vessels.[D] s.h.i.+p owners have a strong aversion to receiving letters for the places to which their s.h.i.+ps are bound. As a barque was about sailing from New-York for Demerara in 1855, I called on the owner, who was on the dock, just before the vessel got under way, and asked that some letters which I held in my hand, might be taken to Georgetown. He said that he could not take them; that he sailed his vessel to make money; and that he could not do other people's business. As I walked away from him rather abruptly, he called to me and wished to know to whom the letters were addressed.
I told him, to Sir Edmund Wodehouse, the Governor of the Province; and that they related to the establishment of steam mail facilities between this country and that Province. He at once begged my pardon and explained; asked that I would let him send the letters; and said, moreover, that he would at any time be glad to give me a pa.s.sage there and back on that business.
[D] See Parliamentary Papers for 1852-3, postal affairs, Report of Lord Canning, July 8, 1853.
The experiment of employing the steamers of the Navy in the postal service has been very fully made by Great Britain. After attempts on a considerable number of lines, and extending over a period of ten years, this service has been found inefficient, c.u.mbrous, and more costly, and has been entirely abandoned. Murray, page 172, says that Mr. Anderson, Managing Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, said before the Parliamentary Committee as follows: "The postal communication can be done much cheaper by private contract steamers than by Government boats, because of the merchandise and pa.s.sengers carried. The steam communication between Southampton and Alexandria, with vessels of 300 to 400 horse power, was done for 4_s_ 6_d_, per mile. From Suez to Ceylon, Calcutta, and Hong Kong, with vessels of 400 to 500 horse power, for 17_s_, 1_d_ per mile. The East-India Company's line (of naval vessels) between Suez and Bombay with vessels of only 250 to 300 horse power, cost 30_s_ per mile. Her Majesty's vessels in the Mediterranean cost about 21_s_ per mile."
France also tried the experiment, but soon abandoned the system, as fruitless and exceedingly annoying. It is quite a plausible idea that our mails should go under the flag of the country, with power to protect them, and that vessels generally supposed to be idle should be engaged in some useful service. But this presupposes a fact which does not exist. No vessels in the world are more actively employed than those of the American navy, and there are many stations on which we could employ twice as many as we have with excellent effect on our commerce and foreign relations generally. We constantly hear the complaint that the Secretary of the Navy has no steamer for some immediately necessary or indispensable service. But if he had, and if two dozen steamers were lying all the time idle in our navy yards, they would probably not be installed six months in the postal service until they would be positively demanded in some way in that of the nation, and this diversion would at once frustrate all of the postal and commercial plans of the country.
But the difficulties in the way of this service are so numerous as to be readily palpable to all who examine it. No vessel that is well fitted for naval service is well adapted to that of the post. The post requires great speed, and hence, full-powered vessels. The navy does not require so great speed, and hence, the steamers are seldom more than auxiliaries. They are built heavier and fuller, and are not so adapted to speed. Filling them with the power necessary to drive them with sufficient rapidity for mail packets would unfit them for the efficient service of war. Naval vessels are, moreover, filled and weighted down with guns, stores, men, and a thousand things which would be in the way if they were employed for the mails. They have no state-rooms, cabins, saloons, etc.; and if they had them so as to accommodate pa.s.sengers, they would be unfit for the war service.
Unless so fitted they could not accommodate pa.s.sengers, as they will not lash themselves up in hammocks under the deck, as thick as gra.s.s, as man-of-war's men will. If they are to be strictly naval vessels while running, they will be filled with their own men, and could not take pa.s.sengers even if they had state-room accommodations for them.
They would thus be deprived entirely of this source of income. Again, they could take no freight; and if a pa.s.senger mail steamer has to depend upon both freight and pa.s.sengers for an income to meet the large expenses, which are generally three, five, and often even ten times the sum of subsidy received from the Government, then the naval vessel running in the postal service will be deprived of both these sources of income, and must fall back on the department for all of its expenses, which would be three, five, and even ten times as much as the sum paid private companies for carrying the mail.
The average round trips of the Pacific mail steamers from Panama to San Francisco and Olympia, and back, are, beyond doubt, enormously expensive; while they receive from the Government only $14,500. This is, consequently, but a small fractional part of their income. The trip of the "Arago," or "Fulton," to Havre and back, costs about $45,000, while the mail pay was only $12,500, under the old contract, and is now probably not above $7,500 per round trip.[E] These estimates are made exclusive of insurance, which is 9-1/2 per cent.; repairs, 10 per cent.; and depreciation, at least five per cent.
Here, again, the Government gives but a meagre part of the large sum necessary to keep those packets running. Now, if naval vessels were carrying the same mails, and were deprived of the income which they receive for freight and pa.s.sengers, it would evidently cost the Government six to eight times as much to carry the mails as it now does, saying nothing about the income from the mails, which is trifling. But this cla.s.s of vessels never could subserve the purposes of rapid correspondence. If they could carry freight and pa.s.sengers, the difficulties would still be insuperable. It would cost twice as much for the department to accomplish the same object through its officers and its routine as it would for private companies or individuals, who have but the one business and the one purpose in running their vessels. No man, company, or even department of the Government, can accomplish two important and difficult ends by the same agency at the same time. Either the one or the other must suffer and be neglected, or both will be but imperfectly and ineffectively performed. Many structures of this kind fall of their own superinc.u.mbent weight and clumsiness. If naval vessels thus running even had pa.s.sengers they would never be satisfied or well treated. A captain and crew, to be agreeable and satisfactory to pa.s.sengers, must feel themselves under obligation to them for their patronage, and would be compelled to exert themselves to merit the best feelings of their patrons. This could never be the case with naval gentlemen, who would be dependent for their living on the department only. It is probable that no one seriously entertains such a plan as this for the postal service, as this must be a distinct, partly self-supporting, unbroken, and continuous service, while that of the Navy must also be distinct, independent, and efficiently directed to one great cardinal object. Therefore, we can not secure postal service by this means.
[E] This line receives the total postages, ocean and inland, which in 1856 were, according to the Post Master General's report, $88,483.99, or $7,373.33 per round voyage. (_See Letter of the Hon. Horatio King, 1st a.s.st. Post Master General._)
As much has been said of Propellers during the few years past, I propose examining the question with the view of ascertaining whether they are adapted to the mail service, and whether we can secure from them sufficient speed without a subsidy from the Government. It is well known that the British are a far more steady-going people than ourselves, and not being so rus.h.i.+ng do not require so much speed. They have had an easy control of the European and foreign commerce generally around them; and when compet.i.tion aroused them to additional efforts they did not endeavor to outstride themselves, but took merely an additional step of progress and speed, and adopted the propeller for their coasting business, because it was a little faster than wind, and yet cheaper than full steam. And because so many propellers have been built for the peculiar short-route trade of Great Britain, many people in this country can not see why we do not adopt the propeller for our foreign trade. I have already shown (_See page 44_) that there are some short routes on which steam is cheaper than the wind, and that on others of greater length steamers can not transport freight under any conditions. (_See latter part of Section IV., on the Cost of Steam._) I do not propose making the Screw Propeller in any way an exception to the position stated; and shall consequently maintain that it will never be the means of attaining a rapid and yet cheap mail speed.
There are no greater errors entertained by the public on any subject connected with steam navigation than concerning the Screw Propeller.
It is generally supposed that it is a more economical and effective application of power than the side-wheel, which is a mistake: it is generally supposed that, with the same amount of power and all other conditions equal, the propeller will not run as rapidly as the side-wheel, which is true of steaming in a sea-way or against a head-wind, but a mistake as regards smooth water: it is generally supposed that the engines weigh less, take up less room, and cost less, which is all a mistake. The best authors on this subject and the most eminent builders generally agree, that in England and Scotland, where the propeller has attained its greatest perfection, the difference between the side-wheel and the propeller as an application of power is very slight and hardly appreciable; or that the same number of tons of coal will drive two s.h.i.+ps of the same size at the same speed in smooth water; but that the side-wheel has greatly the advantage in a head-sea or during rough weather generally. Many persons who do not understand the subject, have theorized in just the contrary direction. They say that in rough weather the screw has the advantage, because it is alway in the water, etc. Experience shows just the reverse; and theory will bear the practice out. If, in the side-wheel one wheel is part of the time out, the other has, at any rate, the whole force of the engines, and the floats sink to and take hold on a denser, heavier, and less easily yielding stratum of water; so that the progress is nearly the same. The back current or opposing wave can not materially affect it, because the float is at the extreme end of the arm where the travel is greatest, and is always more rapid than the wave. It is not so with the screw. The blade which meets the wave is not placed at the end of a long arm where the travel is very rapid and the motion more sudden than that of the wave. This blade extends all the way along from its extreme end, where the motion is rapid, to the centre, or the shaft, where there is no motion; and all intermediate parts of this blade move so slowly, that the wave of greater rapidity counteracts it, and checks its progress. The side-wheel applies its power at the extreme periphery, where the travel is greatest, while the screw applies it all along between the point of extreme rapidity, and the stationary point in the shaft.