The Religion of Geology and Its Connected Sciences Part 9

The subject to which I wish first to call your attention is the world's eternity, or the eternal existence of matter. This was the universal belief of the philosophers of antiquity, and, indeed, of most reasoning minds where the Bible has not been known. The grand argument by which this opinion was sustained is the well-known _ex nihilo nihil fit_, (nothing produces nothing.) Hence men inferred that not even the Deity could create matter out of nothing; and, therefore, it must be eternal. Most of the ancient philosophers, however, did not hence infer the non-existence of the Deity. But they endeavored to reconcile the existence of eternal matter with an eternal Spirit. They supposed both to be self-existent and c.o.xistent. From this rational thinking principle they supposed all good to be derived; while from the material irrational principle all evil sprung. Plato taught that G.o.d, of his own will, united himself with matter, although he did not create it, and out of it produced the present world; so that it was proper to speak of the world as created, although the matter was from eternity. Aristotle and Zeno taught that G.o.d's union with matter was necessary; and hence they considered the world eternal. In the opinion of Epicurus, G.o.d was entirely separated from matter, which consisted of innumerable atoms, floating about from eternity, like dust in the air, until at last they a.s.sumed the present form of the world.

In modern times, the belief in the eternity of matter has usually been connected with, or made the basis of, a refined and popular system of atheism. I refer to the pantheism of Spinoza. He maintains that there exists in the universe but one substance, variously modified, whose two princ.i.p.al attributes are infinite extension and infinite intelligence.

This substance, the [Greek: to pan] of Spinoza, he regarded as G.o.d; and hence his system is called _Pantheism_. Under various modifications, it has been adopted by many sceptical minds, and is, undoubtedly, the most common and plausible system of atheism extant. Other modern writers, among whom may be mentioned that anomalous philosopher Bayle, have advocated the views of the ancients respecting the eternity of matter.

It may seem strange, but it is true, that some Christian philosophers and divines have been, in ancient and modern times, the advocates of the eternity of matter. The ancient Christians adopted it from Plato. Thus we find Justin Martyr maintaining that G.o.d formed the world from an eternal, unorganized material. And the schoolmen, who followed Aristotle, taught that "G.o.d had created the world from eternity." On this ground, even some Protestant theologians have a.s.serted that it was absurd to speak of an eternal G.o.d who is not an eternal Creator.

A principle which has thus been adopted by so many acute minds unenlightened by revelation, and by some who possessed that divine testimony, must be sustained by some plausible arguments. The princ.i.p.al one relied on is, that the changes which are going on in the material world are proved to be only trans.m.u.tations, which follow one another in series that return into themselves, and which may, therefore, have been going on from eternity; and if this be admitted, it is as easy to suppose matter to be self-sustained, and to have fallen into its present order of itself, as to suppose the interference of an infinite Spirit. "How do we know," says Dr. Chalmers, in stating the atheistic argument, "that the world is a consequent at all? Is there any greater absurdity in supposing it to have existed, as it now is, at any specified point of time, throughout the millions of ages that are past, than that it should so exist at this moment? Does what we suppose might have been then, imply any greater absurdity, than what we actually see to be at present? Now, might not the same question be carried back to any point or period of duration, however remote? or, in other words, might we not dispense with a beginning for the world altogether?" "For aught we can know _a priori_," says Hume, "matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, from an internal, unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal cause, fall into that arrangement. If this material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other, and so on without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material world.

By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really a.s.sert it to be G.o.d; and the sooner we arrive at that divine Being, so much the better."

Now, in what manner have these ingenious arguments been met? Until quite recently, no one has supposed that any light on this subject could be derived from geology. Indeed, even now, by many, that science is regarded as favoring the idea of the world's eternity. Neither has it been thought that, on a question of natural theology, like this, it was proper to appeal to the Bible. Philosophers and divines, however, have attempted to reply to these arguments, irrespective of geology and revelation; and they have generally convinced themselves that they have been successful. But to my mind, I must confess, this has always appeared the weakest spot in natural religion. Some of the arguments to prove the world not eternal do, indeed, appear, at first statement, very profound; but they rather silence than convince; and the longer we reflect upon them, the more apt are we to doubt their force.

And here I am constrained to bear testimony to the masterly manner in which this subject has been treated by Dr. Chalmers. Perceiving that the defences of natural religion on this subject were weak, in spite of much show of strength, he has laid out his giant force of intellect in clearing away the rubbish and building a rampart of rock. His remarkable skill in seizing upon and bringing out prominently the great principles of a difficult subject, and turning them round and round till they fill every eye, is here most happily exerted.

Let us now proceed, in the first place, to examine the arguments that have been adduced to prove the non-eternity of the world, independent of geology and revelation; and in the second place, to derive from these two sources of evidence the true ground on which that proposition rests.

The first supposed proof that the world has not eternally existed is derived from what is called the _a priori_ argument for the existence of the Deity, originally proposed by the monk Anselmus, and afterwards more fully ill.u.s.trated in England by Dr. Samuel Clarke. Take the following brief summary of this argument, as applied to the eternity of matter, in the words of Dr. Crombie.

"Whatever has existed from eternity, independent and without any external cause, must be self-existent. Whatever is self-existent must exist necessarily, by an absolute necessity in the nature of the thing. This is also self-evident. It follows, therefore, that unless the material world exist necessarily, by an absolute necessity in its own nature, so that it must be a contradiction to suppose it not to exist, it cannot be independent and eternal. In order to disprove this absolute necessity, he [Dr. Clarke] reasoned thus: If matter be supposed to exist necessarily, then in that necessary existence is included the power of gravitation, or it is not. If not, then in a world merely material, and in which no intelligent being presides, there never could have been any motion. But if the power of gravitation be included in the pretended necessary existence of matter, then it follows necessarily, that there must be a vacuum; it follows, likewise, that matter is not a necessary being. For if a vacuum actually be, then it is plainly more than possible for matter not to be."

Is it not pa.s.sing strange that such a dreamy argumentation as this--and it is a fair sample of Dr. Clarke's extended work on the existence of the Deity--should have been regarded as sound logic by many of the acutest minds, and that a majority even of the ablest metaphysicians, up almost to the present day, should have felt satisfied with it? A few minds, indeed, long ago perceived its fallacy, among whom was Alexander Pope, who thus sarcastically describes it:--

"Be that my task, replies a gloomy Clarke, Sworn foe to mystery, yet divinely dark.

Let others creep by timid steps and slow, On plain experience lay foundation low, By common sense to common notions bred, And last to nature's cause through nature led, All-seeing in thy mists, we need no guide, Mother of arrogance, and source of pride!

We n.o.bly take the high _priori_ road, And reason downward till we doubt of G.o.d."

_Dunciad_, Book IV.

It is impossible, on this occasion, to go into a formal refutation of this famous argument. But this is unnecessary; since, as Dr. Chalmers says, it "has fallen into utter disesteem and desuetude." Indeed, the language of Dr. Thomas Brown on this subject is not too severe, when he says, that he "conceives the abstract arguments that have been adduced to show that it is impossible for matter to have existed from eternity, by reasoning on what has been termed necessary existence, and the incompatibility of this necessary existence with the qualities of matter, to be relics of the mere verbal logic of the schools, as little capable of producing conviction as any of the wildest and most absurd of the technical scholastic reasonings on the properties, or supposed properties, of ent.i.ty and nonent.i.ty."

In the second place, it has been argued with much apparent plausibility, by Dr. Paley, that wherever we find a complicated organic structure, adapted to produce beneficial results, its origin must be sought beyond itself; and since the world abounds with such organisms, it cannot be eternal; that is, the mere existence of animals and plants proves their non-eternity.

Now, without a.s.serting that there is no force in this argument, I have two remarks to make upon it. The first is, to quote the reply to it, which such a writer as David Hume has given, in language which I have just repeated. "For aught we can know _a priori_," says he, "matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. To say that the different ideas, which compose the reason of the Supreme, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain know why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible while the other is not so?"

Fairly to meet this reasoning of the prince of sceptics is not an achievement of dulness or ignorance. In order to do it triumphantly, we want, what Dr. Paley could not find, a distinct example of the creation of numerous organic beings by some cause independent of themselves. I say, he could not find such an example; for on a question of natural theology, he did not think it proper to appeal to the Bible; nor had geology, when he wrote, revealed her astonis.h.i.+ng record on this subject. But as it is now developed, it puts an end to all controversy as to the origin of the organic world.

My second remark, however, on this argument is, that even admitting its correctness, it only proves the commencement of organic natures, but does not show that the matter of which they are composed may not have been eternal.

In the third place, an argument against the eternal existence of matter has been derived by Sir John Herschel, one of the most distinguished natural philosophers of the day, from the atomic const.i.tution of bodies, as made known to us by chemistry. This science makes it certainly probable, that even the infinitesimal particles of matter have a definite and peculiar shape, and size, and weight, in each of the elements. "Now,"

says this writer, "when we see a great number of things precisely alike, we do not believe this similarity to have originated, except from a common principle independent of them." "The discoveries alluded to effectually destroy the idea of an external self-existent matter, by giving to each of its atoms the essential characters at once of a manufactured article and a subordinate agent."

To this argument the atheist's reply would be essentially the same as that last considered; and in one respect it would even be more forcible, because the atomic const.i.tution of bodies, being less complex, is less obviously the result of foreign agency, and may more easily be regarded as the necessary property of eternal matter. On the other hand, however, it is more obviously an attribute of the original const.i.tution of matter than organic structure; and if it does require an independent agency for its production, it seems difficult to conceive of the existence of matter in a previous state. So that, in this point of view, this argument is more forcible than the last; and it is no small evidence that it has real strength, that it comes to us from one of the most acute and impartial minds in Europe.

In the fourth place, it is maintained that the idea of an eternal succession, or chain of being, which the atheistic advocates of the world's eternity defend, is highly absurd, and even mathematically false.

The atheist mainly relies upon this notion of an eternal series of things; for if he can defend that opinion, he will overturn the main argument of the Theist for the divine existence, viz., that from design in the works of creation. On this ground, therefore, he should be fairly met. Has he been so met by the reasoning that has usually been employed to refute his opinion? As a fair sample of it, I will here quote the leading points of the argument, as given by one of the most popular and able theologians of our country. "It is a.s.serted by atheists," says Dr. Dwight, "that there has been an eternal series of things. The absurdity of this a.s.sertion may be shown in many ways."

"First. Each individual in a series is a unit. But every collection of units, however great, is with intuitive certainty numerable, and, therefore, cannot be infinite."

"Secondly. Every individual in the series (take for example a series of men) had a beginning. But a collection of beings must, however long the series, have had a beginning. This, likewise, is intuitively evident."

"Thirdly. It is justly observed by the learned and acute Dr. Bentley, that in the supposed infinite series, as the number of individual men is alleged to be infinite, the number of their eyes must have been twice, the number of their fingers ten times, and the number of the hairs on their heads many thousand times, as great as the number of men."

"Fourthly. It is also observed by the same excellent writer, that all these generations of men were once present."--_Dwight's Theology_, vol.

ii. p. 24.

How is it possible that such reasoning should have satisfied logical and philosophical minds? Would it not be equally good to disprove the demonstrated principles of mathematics which relate to infinite quant.i.ties? For in mathematics an infinite series of units is a familiar phrase; and it is also common to speak of one infinite quant.i.ty as twice, or ten times, or many thousand times, greater than another, and that, too, in just such cases as the one referred to above.

True, mathematical infinites are in some respects different from metaphysical infinites; but it is the former that belong to this argument, since the supposed infinite succession of organic beings forms a mathematical series.

An acute writer in our own country, however, has recently attempted to show that "there can be no number actually infinite, and therefore no infinite number of generations."[11] That the mathematician cannot actually present before us the whole of an infinite series, is indeed most certain; for such, power belongs only to an Infinite Being. But does the fact that man's faculties are limited, prove that an arithmetical process cannot be carried on from eternity to eternity? Because man cannot put upon paper the series of numbers representing the miles in infinite s.p.a.ce, or the hours in infinite duration, is there, therefore, no such thing as infinite s.p.a.ce, or infinite duration? Certainly not, if this reasoning be correct.

In spite, however, of such mathematical metaphysics, is it not an intelligible statement of the atheist, when he says of any generation of men and animals in past time, that there was another that preceded it and unless you have matter-of-fact proof to the contrary, how will you disprove this a.s.sertion? You may show him that practically he can never exhibit a series, even of numbers, extending eternally backward; but he may, in return, challenge you to put your finger upon the first link of the chain of organic nature. If you attempt it, he will reply that other links preceded the one you have named, and that, as far as you choose to run backward, he can go farther; in other words, by the very supposition which he makes, he excludes a beginning to organic nature, and, therefore, all reasoning which a.s.sumes such a beginning is of no force against his conclusions. If a series which may thus be extended indefinitely backward be not infinite in a metaphysical sense, it is to common sense.

Let me not be thought to be an advocate in any sense for the unsupported notion of an infinite series of organic beings. But the question is, whether those who, in spite of common sense, have maintained this opinion, have been fairly refuted by such metaphysical evasions as I have quoted.

The truth is, that, in order to end this dispute, the Theist needs to bring forward at least one example in which the commencement of some race of animals can be fairly pointed out; and I know not where such an example can be found, save in the Bible and geology.

In the fifth place, the changing state of the world has been regarded as incompatible with the world's eternity. This argument is thus stated by Bishop Sumner: "If the universe itself is the first eternal being, its existence is necessary, as metaphysicians speak; and it must be possessed of all those qualities which are inseparable from necessary existence. Of this nature are immutability and perfection. For change is the attribute of imperfection, and imperfection is incompatible with that Being, which is, as the hypothesis affirms, independent, and, therefore, can have no source of imperfection. To suppose, therefore, of the first independent Being, that it could have existed otherwise than it is, is no less contrary to the idea of necessity, with which we set out, than to suppose it not to exist at all."

This reasoning is not dest.i.tute of plausibility. For there is scarcely any lesson more forcibly impressed on short-lived man than the mutability of the world. And it is indeed true that change is its most striking attribute. But when we look at the subject philosophically, we find that all this mutability is consistent with the most perfect ultimate stability; nay, that the change is essential to secure the stability.

Apart from what revelation and geology teach, these changes in nature form cycles, which, like those in astronomy, are perfectly consistent with the eternal permanence of the general system to which they belong. In the motions of the heavenly bodies, a considerable amount of irregularity and oscillation about a mean state does not tend to the ruin, but rather to the preservation, of the system, provided the anomalies do not extend beyond certain limits. It is just so with other changes that are going on around us. All of them are, in fact, as much regulated by mathematical laws as the perturbations of the heavenly bodies; although those laws are more complicated and difficult to bring out in distinct formul in the former case than in the latter. Yet even in astronomy, it is not many years since the mutual disturbances among the heavenly bodies were supposed to be the certain precursors of ruin to the system. It was not till the famous problem of the three bodies was solved, by the use of the most refined mathematical a.n.a.lysis, that astronomers learnt the true operation of those causes of disturbance among the heavenly bodies which exist in their mutual attractions. It was then found that, so balanced are they in their action, and so narrow their limits, that they can never affect the stability of the system; or, rather, they secure that stability. It is, indeed, true, that when changes in nature go on increasing or decreasing in magnitude indefinitely, they clearly indicate a beginning and an end to the system to which they belong. And it was on this principle that the earlier astronomers predicted that the celestial perturbations would ultimately bring the universe to a state of chaos.

They found, for instance, that the moon's...o...b..t was decreasing in size, and they inferred that, ultimately, that luminary must come to the earth.

But they now know it to be mathematically certain that, after a long period, the diminution of the orbit will cease; it will begin to expand, and go on expanding,-until the opposite point of oscillation is reached, when it will again diminish; and in this manner, if G.o.d's will permit, perform its eternal round. Just so it is with all the irregularities of the solar system.

"Yonder starry sphere Of planets, and of fixed, in all her wheels, Resembles nearest mazes intricate, Eccentric, intervolved, yet regular; Then most, when most irregular they seem."

And so it is with all the natural changes which we witness around us, and with all which science shows us to have taken place on the globe, excepting some which geology discloses, and perhaps one which astronomy renders probable. Let us look at some of those changes which the argument under consideration regards as inconsistent with the world's eternity.

Nearly all the changes in nature with which we are acquainted belong to three cla.s.ses,--the mechanical, the chemical, and the organic.

Astronomical changes are purely mechanical; and hence the ease with which they may be calculated by mathematics. The universal system of death, which reigns over all animals and plants, is the result of organic laws; and it is this which probably gives to man the strongest impression of the transient nature of sublunary things. But just consider the antagonist agencies to this universal destroyer. I refer to the equally universal system of reproduction, and to the law by which permanence of species is secured. The consequence is, that, while every individual animal and plant dies, the species survives. In the whole history of the animals and plants now existing on the globe, only eight or ten certain examples are on record in which a species has become extinct, and those are some large birds, such as the dinornis and dodo, once inhabitants of the Isle of Bourbon and New Zealand. Every one of the human family, every elephant, every ox, every lion, &c., die, but man, as a species, still lives; and so does the elephant, the ox, and the lion; and most obviously this is a law of nature. How easy, then, for the atheist to evade the force of your argument against the world's eternity, drawn from the ravages of death! He has only to suppose the havoc of individuals by death always to have been repaired by the equivalent operation of reproduction, and that these two agencies have been balanced against each other from eternity; and how will you prove this impossible, except by the absurd metaphysical arguments already considered?

Atmospheric and aqueous changes often, and, indeed, generally, appear more chaotic and dest.i.tute of a controlling force than any others in nature.

When the winds are let loose from their prison-house; when the heavens become dark, and the clouds, rent by the lightnings, pour down their contents, and the swollen torrents carry desolation down the mountain's side and over the wide plain; when the ocean rolls in upon the land its giant waves; when the tornado sweeps all before it, in rich tropical regions; or when the sirocco sends its hot blast, loaded with sand, over the devoted surface,--in all these cases, how difficult for us to conceive that all this uproar among the elements is limited and controlled by laws as fixed and unalterable as those which regulate the heavenly bodies!

Nevertheless, it must be so; and although the winds and the waters seem to be rioting at their pleasure, there are, in fact, at work antagonist agencies; which will confine their wild war to a narrow field, and soon bring them again into peaceful submission. For such has always been the case, and the limits of their irregularities are no wider now than six thousand years ago. In other words, the repressing agency has always been superior to the destroying force, when the latter has risen to a certain limit; and I doubt not but the profounder mathematics of angelic minds might as easily calculate the anomalies and perturbations of winds and waves as the formulas of La Place can determine those of the solar system.

And if such constancy has existed for six thousand years in meteorological changes,--of all others in nature apparently the most irregular,--why, the atheist will ask, may not that constancy have been eternal? And with equal reason may he ask the same in respect to all changes resulting from mechanical, chemical, and organic laws, which we witness in nature, except those which come within the province of geology, and even concerning some of those; and what changes in the material world do not result, directly or remotely, from one or two, or all of these laws? Yet, in regard to all these changes, there is no inconsistency in supposing them to have gone on in an eternal series; and hence they furnish no proof of the non-eternity of the world.

In the seventh and last place, the recent origin of society, as shown by historical monuments, is regarded as evidence of the recent origin of the world. This argument was well understood as long ago as the days of Lucretius, who states it very clearly in the oft-quoted lines,--

"Si nulla fuit genitalis origo, Terrarum et coeli, semperque eterna fuit, Cur, supra bellum Thebanum et funera Troj, Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poet?"

This argument, though it has been met by a plausible reply, is certainly of great importance in its bearing upon the recent origin of the human race, which, as we shall shortly see, is a point of much interest. But it is obvious that it proves nothing respecting the origin of matter, since this might have had an eternal existence before man was placed upon it. We need not, therefore, be delayed by its discussion.

Such is a fair summary, as I believe, of the arguments usually adduced, aside from the Bible and geology, to prove the non-eternity of the world.

I am not prepared to say that they amount to nothing; but I do believe that they perplex, rather than convince, and that some of them are mere metaphysical quibbles.

They do not produce that instantaneous conviction which most of the arguments of natural theology force upon the mind; and it is easy to see how a man of a sceptical turn should rise from their examination entirely unaffected, or affected unfavorably. Let us now, therefore, turn to geology, and inquire whether its archives will afford us any clearer light upon the subject.

And here we must confess, at the outset, that geology furnishes us no more evidence than the other sciences of the creation of the matter of the universe out of nothing. But it does furnish us with examples of such modifications of matter as could be effected only by a Deity. Suppose, then, we should be obliged to acknowledge to the atheist, that we yield to him the point of matter's eternal existence, if he pleases, because we can find nowhere in nature decisive evidence of its creation, and then take our stand upon the arrangements and metamorphoses of matter. Or, rather, suppose we say to him, that we shall not contend with him as to the origin of matter, but challenge him to explain, if he can, without a Deity, its modifications, as taught by geology. If that science does disclose to us such changes on the globe as no power and wisdom but those of an infinite G.o.d could produce, then of what consequence is it, so far as religion is concerned, whether we can, or cannot, demonstrate the first creation of matter? I can conceive of no religious truth that would be unfavorably affected, though we should admit that this point cannot be settled. Let us, then, at least for the sake of argument, admit that it cannot be, and proceed to inquire whether, aside from this point, geology does not teach us all that is necessary to establish the most perfect system of Theism. I shall select four examples from that science, each of which is independent of the others in its bearing upon the subject, since in this way the argument will become c.u.mulative; and if some are not satisfied with one example, the others may produce conviction.

In the first place, geology teaches that the time has been when the earth existed as a molten ma.s.s of matter, and, therefore, all the animals and plants now existing upon its surface, and all those buried in its rocky strata, must have had a beginning, or have been created. I should be sustained by many probabilities, were I to go farther, and maintain that the time was when the globe existed in a gaseous state--an opinion very widely adopted by able philosophers of the present day. But as this view is more hypothetical than my first position, which makes the earth a liquid ma.s.s, and as nothing would be gained to the argument by supposing it in a gaseous state, I shall not press that point. That it was once in a state of fusion is probable from the very great heat still remaining in its interior. But more direct proof of this results from the facts, now admitted by almost all geologists, that the unstratified rocks have all been melted, and that the stratified cla.s.s have all, or nearly all, been the result of disintegration and abrasion of the unstratified ma.s.ses. A striking confirmation of this opinion is the spheroidal figure of the earth,--a figure precisely such as the globe would have a.s.sumed in consequence of rotation, had it been in a fluid state. In fine, so many and so decisive are the facts which point to the original igneous fluidity of the globe, that no competent judge thinks of doubting that all the matter of which it is composed, certainly its crust, has some time or other been in that state. It is, however, the opinion of some geologists of distinction, that the whole of it was not in fusion at the same time, and that its different portions have pa.s.sed successively through the furnace. But this view of the subject scarcely affects my argument, since at whatever period the fusion of any part took place, the destruction of organic life, if it existed, must have been the consequence. The essential thing is, to show that such was once the state of the earth that animals and plants could not have existed on it. For if such was the case, their creation must have been a subsequent operation; and if this did not require an infinite Being to accomplish it, no result in nature would demand his agency.