The Gamble_ General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq Part 16

A veteran Iraqi intelligence official interviewed by Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post columnist David Ignatius in mid-2009 predicted that in five years, "Iraq will be a colony of Iran." columnist David Ignatius in mid-2009 predicted that in five years, "Iraq will be a colony of Iran."

A few weeks after his first e-mail, that infantry officer who had written to me on his return from a year of fighting in western Baghdad sent me a note that came to the same conclusion. "When I was in Iraq," he wrote, I read a bunch of books to include Robert Baer's The Devil We Know The Devil We Know, which is about Iran's growing influence in the Mideast. Baer's first two sentences in Chapter 2, 'How Iran Beat America,' are: 'Iraq is lost. Iran won it.' Given what we've seen in cla.s.sified reports and in the revolving door of Iraqi army commanders in select Baghdad neighborhoods, his thesis is spot on. Plus, s.h.i.+a militiamen have melted into the army and police over the past few years making it much easier for them to create s.h.i.+a havens throughout the city. It'll be interesting to see where Baghdad is in about 5 years.

Anyone who still talks of an American "victory" in Iraq should be asked to address this question: For many years to come, the government in Baghdad is not likely to be stable or very democratic, but almost certainly it will be closer to Tehran than to Was.h.i.+ngton. What part of that const.i.tutes success for the U.S. government?

2010: HOW THIS DOESN'T END The national elections scheduled for early in 2010 will tell us a lot about Iraq's direction, especially in the two to three months after the actual voting. One of the most acute observers of the Iraq war, British defense a.n.a.lyst Toby Dodge, notes that it is clear in retrospect that the national elections of 2005 "actually hastened Iraq's descent into civil war." An additional complication will come if, as is widely expected, Defense Secretary Robert Gates steps down in late spring 2010, depriving the Obama administration of its only top official who has dealt closely for several years with the intricacies of the situation.

In stable countries, elections tend to be the end of contention and the beginning of compromise. That isn't the case in Iraq, where there tends to be a "winner take all" mentality. This is how New York Times New York Times reporter Alissa Rubin put it recently as she left Iraq after years of living in Baghdad: reporter Alissa Rubin put it recently as she left Iraq after years of living in Baghdad: ... Army checkpoints-legal ones-are the only ones that stop you, but huge posters of Imam Ali punctuate the streets, a signal that this is now s.h.i.+te-land. Imam Ali is revered as a founder of the s.h.i.+te branch of Islam, but a poster of him is also a silent rebuke to Sunnis, a way of marking territory, of reminding them that the s.h.i.+tes run things now. It is a sign of victory as much as peace.And victory in Iraq almost always begets revenge.In my five years in Iraq, all that I wanted to believe in was gunned down.Sunnis and s.h.i.+tes each committed horrific crimes, and the Kurds, whose modern-looking cities and Western ways seemed at first so familiar, turned out to be capable of their own brutality.

I thought about this observation when a small firefight broke out in Baqubah between Iraqi soldiers and police officers in November 2009. It was a minor, murky affair, and I couldn't determine what provoked it. But I wondered if it was a portent of the Iraq of 2010. A few weeks later, when thirteen people affiliated with an Iraqi political leader in eastern Anbar province were murdered, the vice president of Iraq charged that the slaughter had been carried out by Iraqi soldiers.

President Obama's troop withdrawal plan will be hostage to the behavior of Iraqis during the aftermath of the election. It is possible that things will go quietly-after all, they went better in the spring and summer of 2009 than I thought they would. If Iraq indeed is quiet in 2010, then the American pullout likely will be able to proceed as planned, with a swift drawdown in the first half of the year. But if Iraq reverts to form and the security situation appears to be unraveling quickly, then it will be difficult to maintain pace of the planned pullout. That would be doubly difficult for American policymakers because it likely would mean that there aren't enough troops available for the parallel and intensifying effort in Afghanistan.

It would be even tougher for Iraqis. As one longtime observer, Joost Hilter-mann of International Crisis Group, put it, . . . just as Odierno will be pulling out his first combat brigades, starting in March, Iraq will be entering into a period of fractious wrangling over the formation of a new government. If Iraqi national forces fail to impose their control, an absence of political leaders.h.i.+p could thus coincide with a collapse in security; if politicians and their allied militias resort to violence, the state, including its intelligence apparatus so critical for maintaining internal stability, could fracture along political, ethnic, and sectarian lines.

For those reasons, I suspect 2010 may come to rival as a turning point two earlier times in this war-2003, when the invasion occurred and gave rise to an insurgency, and 2007, when the American military finally became effective in its operations in Iraq.

The basic problem facing Iraq is that all the problems that have divided Iraqis for many years are still hanging fire, unresolved and threatening to lead to renewed fighting. Pessimists argue that Iraqi politicians have learned how to use this turbulence to further their own goals. "Perhaps the biggest challenge," warned security a.n.a.lyst Michael Eisenstadt, is that key political parties have successfully exploited ethnosectarian grievances as a means of mobilizing support. These parties have a vested interest in perpetuating the political status quo and would stand to lose a great deal if a post-sectarian style of politics in Iraq were to emerge as a result of a successful reconciliation process.

In other words, they now have a stake in perpetuating violence and tradition. Peace and stability threaten their positions of power and influence. So the real question, I think, is not whether there will be violence in Iraq for many years to come, but how severe the violence will be, and how disruptive to neighboring countries.

So, to once more evoke General Petraeus's famous question during the invasion of Iraq about eight years ago, How does this end? How does this end? I think the question was best answered over the last year by his successor as the top American commander in Iraq, Gen. Odierno, who said one day in Baghdad that I think the question was best answered over the last year by his successor as the top American commander in Iraq, Gen. Odierno, who said one day in Baghdad that it's not going to end, okay? There'll always be some sort of a low-level insurgency in Iraq for the next five, 10, 15 years. The issue is, what is the level of that insurgency? And can the Iraqis handle it with their own forces and with their government? That's the issue.

That indeed is the issue, and is the reason that we are likely to see tens of thousands of American soldiers in Iraq for many years to come. The U.S. government may say they are not combat troops, and we may not pay attention to them. But they will be there.

APPENDIXES.

These four doc.u.ments capture key points in the American approach to the Iraq war during late 2006 and early 2007.

The first is the conclusion in August 2006 of Col. Pete Devlin, the senior Marine intelligence officer in Iraq at the time, that al Anbar Province had been lost.

The second is the mission statement Lt. Gen. Odierno received from Gen. Casey upon becoming the number two officer in Iraq in December 2006.

The third is a briefing Odierno gave to Gen. Petraeus two months later and represents almost a complete reversal of what Casey had told Odierno to do.

The last is Petraeus's summary of how to fight in Iraq. It is dated June 2008 but captures the changes in the tactics and disposition of U.S. forces that began 18 months earlier.

A. COL. DEVLIN'S INTELLIGENCE a.s.sESSMENT [image] State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar I MEF G-2 State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar I MEF G-2 SECRET/REL MCFI//20310816 SECRET/REL MCFI//20310816 17 Aug 06 General Situation: As of mid August, 2006, the daily average number of attacks exceeds 50 per day in al-Anbar Province This activity reflects a 65% increase in averall attack numbers since I MEF a.s.sumed control of the province in February. intensifying violence is reflected in the preponder-antly negative outlook of the Sunni population, in the continuing inability to develop adequate Iraqi security forces, and in the near complete failure of reconstruction and development projects across western Iraq. The social and political situation has deteriorated to a point that MNF and ISF are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar. The social and political situation has deteriorated to a point that MNF and ISF are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar.

Social Collapse: Underlying this decline in stability is the near complete collapse of social order in al-Anbar. The tribal system has wholly failed in AO Raleigh and Topeka, and has only limited effcacy in AO Denver. Prominent leaders have exiled themselves to neighboring Jordan and Syria, including some leading imams. Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government inst.i.tutions from the village to provincial level have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) of criminal/insurgent gangs. Violence Violence and criminality are now the and criminality are now the principle driving principle driving factors behind factors behind daily life for most daily life for most Anbar Anbar Sunni; Sunni; they commit violence or crime, avoid violence or crime through corruption and acquiescence, or become victims. they commit violence or crime, avoid violence or crime through corruption and acquiescence, or become victims.

Isolation from Baghdad: Already embroiled in a daily fight for survival, al-Anbar Sunni have little hope for national reconciliation or re-integration into the national polity. From the Sunni perspective, their greatest fears have been realized: Iran controls Baghdad and Anbaris have been marginalized. True or not, this paranoia directly undermines Sunni willingness to envision a unified Iraq under the current structure. These fears also are reinforced by actions of the s.h.i.+'a-dominated government, including the failure to pay (SF in al-Anbar, attacks by official s.h.i.+'a paramilitary groups against Sunni civilian targets in Baghdad, the unwillingness to confront the Jaysh al-Mandi, bureaucratic attacks on popular Sunni political and military leaders, and minimal support for local government inst.i.tutions and initiatives from Ramadi to al-Qa'im. This sense of isolation directly undermines Sunni willingness to work within IG and MNF defined social and political boundaries. in al-Anbar, attacks by official s.h.i.+'a paramilitary groups against Sunni civilian targets in Baghdad, the unwillingness to confront the Jaysh al-Mandi, bureaucratic attacks on popular Sunni political and military leaders, and minimal support for local government inst.i.tutions and initiatives from Ramadi to al-Qa'im. This sense of isolation directly undermines Sunni willingness to work within IG and MNF defined social and political boundaries.

Lack of Resources: Although recent reports appear to confirm the presence of natural gas and some oil reserves along the western Euphrates river valley, there is no prospect for exploitation or development of these resources in the foreseeable future In the absence of security, even the most aggressive investors are unwilling to risk an al-Anbar venture. Wealthy expatriate Ba'athists talk a strong game of support from Amman and Damascus, but have been unwilling to reinvigorate the al-Anbar ecanomy from their accounts. The only resource that matters - oil - is in the hands of the s.h.i.+'a government. From the Sunni perspective, oil is the source of real power in Iraq. With oil money comes government largesse, structured public investment, personal position.and cronyism. Because they lack faith in the political system, many Sunni see the only way to regain control of Iraqi oil is through violence. This sentiment directly feeds the insurgency and is used to justify violent criminal behavior. Anbaris have begun overtly to blame the province's inadequate resource allocation, from the national power grid, for example, to sectarian motivations in Baghdad ministries.

Al-Qaida in Iraq: AQI is the dominant arganization of influence in al-Anbar. surpa.s.sing nationalist insurgents, the Iraqi Government, and MNF in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni. Transitioning to a primarily Iraqi organization in late 2004, AQI has become become an an integral integral part of the social fabric part of the social fabric of western Iraq. of western Iraq. With this "I Iraqification" came devolution to low-level, semi-autonomous, and criminally financed cells of varying loyalty to the larger AQI organization. While this diffusion has weakened the original Salafi zeal of AQI writ large, it has eliminated the opportunity for a decapitating strike that would cripple the organization - this is why the death of Zarqawi had so little impact on the structure and capabilities of AQI, especially in al-Anbar. With this "I Iraqification" came devolution to low-level, semi-autonomous, and criminally financed cells of varying loyalty to the larger AQI organization. While this diffusion has weakened the original Salafi zeal of AQI writ large, it has eliminated the opportunity for a decapitating strike that would cripple the organization - this is why the death of Zarqawi had so little impact on the structure and capabilities of AQI, especially in al-Anbar.AQI effectively has eliminated, subsumed, marginalize or co-opted all rationalist insurgent groups in al-Anbar. This very deliberate AQI campaign against rival insurgent groups began shortly after nafional elections in December 2005, when nationalist insurgent groups cooperated to prevent AQI from disrupting polling throughout al-Anbar Faced with this blatant challenge to their hegemony, AQI destroyed the Anbar People's Council of Mohammed Mahmoud Latif through a highly efficient and comprehensive a.s.sa.s.sination campaign, thereby eliminating the sole rival nexus of insurgent leaders.h.i.+p in al-Anbar. Following this calculated purge, AQI cunningly employed their greater financial resources, superior organization, proven leaders.h.i.+p, and brutal tactics to consolidate their hold on most other nationalist insurgent cells in al-Anbar. Parallel to this effort, AQI enacted a tactical alliance with the small Ansar al-Sunna cells operating in some parts of al-Anbar, particularly in the Haditha TriadAl-Anbar Sunni now see an entrenched, Iraqi AQI that in some cases has taken on the mantle of nationalism, or more recently, "defender of the faithful" against the Iranian-backed s.h.i.+'a. Although most al-Anbar Sunni dislike, resent, and distrust AQI, many increasingly see it as an inevitable part of daily life and, in some cases, their only hope for protection against a possible ethnic cleansing campaign by the central government.The remaining core of AQI Salafirts retain the capability to guide the organization, in broad terms, they can s.h.i.+ft resources, fund specific groups, and ma.s.s combat power for short "campaigns" by pulling in disparate cells from across western Iraq The zeal of the vanguard remains relatively intact - there can be no realistic expectation that AQI will negotiate with the IG or MNF short of accepting absolute surrender and ascension to power, The perceived indecisiveness and moral weakness of both the IG and MNF directly feed the resolve of AQI, as well as the grudging acceptance of AQI by the populace. As long as the status quo between the central government and the al-Anbar Sunni remains, AQI is an intractable problem. Sunni Outlook: From the al-Anbar Sunni perspective, there is little hope that the statusquo will lead to a better future. The economy in western Iraq provides bare sustenance to the average citizen while enriching criminals, insurgents, and corrupt officials The potential for economic revival appears to be nonexistent. Violence and fear are the dominant factors in daily life, reinforcing a prediction for survival behavior nourished under the sanctions period. This behavior in turn feeds criminality and corruption and undermines faith in government inst.i.tutions.Increasingly, there appears to be little chance for national reconciliation with the s.h.i.+'a. Deep-seated fears of Iranian domination have been realized and embodied in the central government. Although more trust has been placed in MNF to protect and support the average citizen, there is little hope that American troops will remain long enough to provide true stability. Faced with the prospects of an increasingly brutish future, there is every reason to support the insurgency.

Tactical and Operational Considerations: The Sunni outlook underlies the dramatic increase in attacks since February. However, several tactical and operational considerations have contributed to the rise in violence. Despite some success in isolated areas of the province, the insurgency has strengthened in the past six months. Insurgent groups are better organized, increasingly achieve effective operational security, have improved their capabilities to cache and distribute weapons, and have refined and adapted their tactics. Control of criminal enterprise means the majority of insurgents are now financially self-sustaining at the lowest levels. Broad control of the illicit oil trade from Bayji provides millions af dollars per year to AQI, while official profits appear to feed s.h.i.+'a cronyism in Baghdad.With the slight increase in MNF and ISF units operating across al-Anbar, there is more presence in insurgent-dominated terrain; increased presence provides an increase in targets and opportunity. Continuation of the ma.s.s prisoner release program feeds the cycle of recidivism across western Iraq, repopulating insurgent groups at regular intervals and preventing tactical progress against their force structure. Although it is likely that attack levels have peaked, the the steady rise in steady rise in attacks attacks from from mid-2003 to mid-2003 to 2006 2006 indicates a clear failure to defeat the insurgency in al-Anbar Province. indicates a clear failure to defeat the insurgency in al-Anbar Province.

Way Ahead: Barring the deployment of an additional MNF division and the injection ofbillions of dollars of reconstruction and investment money into the Province, there is nothing MNF can do to influence the motivations of al-Anbar Sunni to wage an insurgency. Federalism provides a possible solution:- Federalism is legally possible under the current const.i.tution. Creating a successful federated Sunni state in al-Anbar would require considerable political and legal wrangling by a unified political block.- A federated state might provide the Sunni of western Iraq with the general sense of "buy-in" lacking under the centralized, s.h.i.+'a-dominated government. This in turn may tempt expatriate Anbari elites, exemplitied by the Central Council of al-Anbar, to return to the province or at least increase their support and involvement In al-Anbar economic development.- Successful federation, providing al-Anbar with a specified and locally controlled budget, Could lead to a broad revival in Ramadi. This would in turn necessitate the formation of effective local governments to appeal to the Governor for resources.- Atthough a centralized budget carries considerable temptation and risk in such a corrupt and criminal environment, owners.h.i.+p of the budget might encourage an increase in local responsibility and accountability in Ramadi.- In Iraq, all politics are local, and local politics and government in al-Anbar is anemic or dysfunctional due to insurgent intimidation - Fallujah being a notable exception. That many local officials remain in office despite threats from insurgents and little support from Baghdad is a testament to their resilience and forbearance. This natural impetus to create effective government at the local level will help address a wide range of social and economic problems that feed the insurgency. Unlike a MNF sponsored government, a self-generated government with a real and accountable budget holds promise for long-term success.- AI-Anbar potentially could control a sizeable and legally approved paramilitary force, offsetting the fears of Iranian domination or s.h.i.+'a pogroms. This force would have a better chance of encouraging local recruitment than a national, s.h.i.+'a-dominated military force likely to station Sunni recruits far from their homes.- Despite a vicious insurgent intimidation campaign, the Iraqi Police in al-Anbar have proven remarkably resilient in most areas, especially when they can rally around an effective leader. When fully formed and properly supported, the Iraqi Police can pose a credible challenge to AQI in al-Anbar.However: - Currently, there is no unified Sunni political block interested in establis.h.i.+ng a federal state in al-Anbar. The majority of Sunni politicians vocally oppose federalism, primarily based on the fear of economic/budgetary isolation. - Currently, there is no unified Sunni political block interested in establis.h.i.+ng a federal state in al-Anbar. The majority of Sunni politicians vocally oppose federalism, primarily based on the fear of economic/budgetary isolation.- Federalism brings with it a host of potential social problems, including forced migration, sectarian cleansing, and the very real chance of national isolation.- Iraqi federation could spark a wider conflict between Iran and Sunni Arab countries and interests within the MEF Area of Interest.- Despite recent friction, there is very little long-term, gra.s.s roots friction between Iraqi Sunni and s.h.i.+'a. Most al-Anbar Sunni see Iran, not the Iraqi s.h.i.+'a, as their most pressing threat. At a visceral level, many Anbaris may not support federalism based on sectarian considerations.- Federalism will not eliminate AQI or immediately address most of the underlying social issues that feed the insurgency.

Final Consideration: The insurgency in al-Anbar and the suffering of al-Anbar citizens undoubtedly would be far worse now if it was not for the very effective efforts of MNF operations. That we cannot end the insurgency in al-Anbar within the present political conditions is not an indication that our efforts have not had a very real suppressive effect on the insurgency.

B. THE ORDERS LT. GEN. ODIERNO RECEIVED IN DECEMBER 2006.

C. HOW ODIERNO CHANGED THE MISSION.

D. GEN. PETRAEUS SUMMARIZES HOW TO OPERATE IN IRAQ.

[image] HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ.

BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

APO AE 09342-1400.

21 June 2008 Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance Secure and serve the population. Secure and serve the population. The Iraqi people are the decisive "terrain." Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies. The Iraqi people are the decisive "terrain." Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies. Live among the people. Live among the people. You can't commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents. You can't commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents. Hold areas that have been secured Hold areas that have been secured. Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Iraqi partners will not abandon their neighborhoods. When reducing forces and presence, gradually thin the line rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces. Pursue the enemy relentlessly. Pursue the enemy relentlessly. Identify and pursue AQI and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations. Identify and pursue AQI and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations. Generate unity of effort Generate unity of effort. Coordinate operations and initiatives with our emba.s.sy and interagency partners, our Iraqi counterparts, local governmental leaders, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure all are working to achieve a common purpose. Promote reconciliation. Promote reconciliation. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the "reconcilables" from the "irreconcilables" through engagement, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the "reconcilables" from the "irreconcilables" through engagement, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables. Defeat the network, not just the attack Defeat the network, not just the attack. Defeat the insurgent networks to the "left" of the explosion. Focus intelligence a.s.sets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, financiers, suppliers, and operators. Foster Iraqi legitimacy Foster Iraqi legitimacy. Encourage Iraqi leaders.h.i.+p and initiative; recognize that their success is our success. Partner in all that we do and support local involvement in security, governance, economic revival, and provision of basic services. Find the right balance between Coalition Forces leading and the Iraqis exercising their leaders.h.i.+p and initiative, and encourage the latter. Legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people is essential to overall success. Employ all a.s.sets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents Employ all a.s.sets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents. Counter-terrorist forces alone cannot defeat Al-Qaeda and the other extremists; success requires all forces and all means at our disposal-non-kinetic as well as kinetic. Employ Coalition and Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, Sons of Iraq, and all other available multipliers. Integrate civilian and military efforts to cement security gains. Resource and fight decentralized. Push a.s.sets down to those who most need them and can actually use them. Employ money as a weapon system. Employ money as a weapon system. Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each "round" expended, and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit's overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Employ a "matching fund" concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment. Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each "round" expended, and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit's overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Employ a "matching fund" concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment. Fight for intelligence. Fight for intelligence. A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. a.n.a.lyze the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a "need to share" rather than a "need to know" basis; disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it. A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. a.n.a.lyze the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a "need to share" rather than a "need to know" basis; disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it. Walk. Walk. Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don't drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic gla.s.s. Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don't drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic gla.s.s. Understand the neighborhood. Understand the neighborhood. Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, and local security forces. Understand how local systems are supposed to work-including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy-and how they really work. Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, and local security forces. Understand how local systems are supposed to work-including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy-and how they really work. Build relations.h.i.+ps. Build relations.h.i.+ps. Relations.h.i.+ps are a critical component of counter-insurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners. Relations.h.i.+ps are a critical component of counter-insurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners. Look for Sustainable Solutions. Look for Sustainable Solutions. Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental inst.i.tutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the Coalition Force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and help Iraqis make them work. Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental inst.i.tutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the Coalition Force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and help Iraqis make them work. Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions. Start to build the information you'll provide to your successors on the day you take over. Allow those who will follow you to virtually "look over your shoulder" while they're still at home station by giving them access to your daily updates and other items on SIPRNET. Encourage extra time on the ground during transition periods, and strive to maintain operational tempo and local relations.h.i.+ps to avoid giving the enemy respite. Manage expectations. Manage expectations. Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troopers and our partners are aware of our a.s.sessments and recognize that any counterinsurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow. Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troopers and our partners are aware of our a.s.sessments and recognize that any counterinsurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow. Be first with the truth. Be first with the truth. Get accurate information of significant activities to your chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don't put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we've learned and how we'll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies' bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them. Get accurate information of significant activities to your chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don't put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we've learned and how we'll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies' bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them. Fight the information war relentlessly. Fight the information war relentlessly. Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and United States has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media. Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and United States has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media. Live our values Live our values. Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. This is what distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher endeavor than the one in which we are engaged. It is often brutal, physically demanding, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we can neither give in to dark impulses nor tolerate unacceptable actions by others. Exercise initiative. Exercise initiative. In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide broad vision and paint "white lines on the road," but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn "big ideas" into specific actions. In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide broad vision and paint "white lines on the road," but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn "big ideas" into specific actions. Prepare for and exploit opportunities. Prepare for and exploit opportunities. "Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity" (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of "reconcilables" and "irreconcilables") in antic.i.p.ation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them. "Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity" (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of "reconcilables" and "irreconcilables") in antic.i.p.ation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them. Learn and adapt. Learn and adapt. Continually a.s.sess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas (none of us is smarter than all of us together). Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and may or may not be transferable to another part of Iraq. Continually a.s.sess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas (none of us is smarter than all of us together). Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and may or may not be transferable to another part of Iraq.

NOTES.

The foundation for this book, and the source of most of the quotations that appear in it, is a series of interviews I did in Baghdad and Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., over the course of 2007 and 2008 with Gen. Petraeus, Gen. Odierno, and scores of their key staffers and commanders. I also interviewed many officers at the ends of their tours after they returned home. Where quotations are not cited below, they are either from public hearings, press conferences, and briefings or from those hundreds of hours of interviews and subsequent e-mail exchanges.

I also benefited from reading recent books on Iraq by Francis West, Kimberly Kagan, and Peter Mansoor. As is evident in the notes below, I also have relied on work by colleagues at the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, as well as reporters at other news organizations. as well as reporters at other news organizations.

Epigraph vii The quotation is from book 6, chapter 3, of Clausewitz, The quotation is from book 6, chapter 3, of Clausewitz, On War On War (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton Univ. Press, 1976). (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton Univ. Press, 1976).

Chapter 1: Things Fall Apart.

3 "It was a mediocre morning": Lance Cpl. Sharratt's comments were made in a transcript posted by Lance Cpl. Sharratt's comments were made in a transcript posted by Frontline, Frontline, the Public Broadcasting System's invaluable doc.u.mentary series. the Public Broadcasting System's invaluable doc.u.mentary series.

4 "They didn't even try to run away": Sgt. Mashoot's comment to investigators was reported in a Sgt. Mashoot's comment to investigators was reported in a Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post article that appeared 6 January 2007. article that appeared 6 January 2007.

4 "The American fired": The comments by Salem are quoted in the The comments by Salem are quoted in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 9 May 2007. 9 May 2007.

4 "While in the house which I identified as House #2": Lance Cpl. Tatum's comment is contained in a signed statement given to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service on 3 April 2006, correcting a statement he had given on 19 March 2006. Lance Cpl. Tatum's comment is contained in a signed statement given to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service on 3 April 2006, correcting a statement he had given on 19 March 2006.

4 "I heard Younis speaking": Fahmi's recollection is an article in the Fahmi's recollection is an article in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, of 27 May 2006. of 27 May 2006.

5 "'Hey, where are the bad guys?'": Lt. Kallop's testimony is quoted in the Lt. Kallop's testimony is quoted in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 9 May 2007. 9 May 2007.

5 "Even though there was no investigation at the time": Lance Cpl. Wright's comment to investigators was quoted in the Lance Cpl. Wright's comment to investigators was quoted in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 7 January 2007. 7 January 2007.

6 "I thought it was very sad": Lt. Col. Chessani's recollection is contained in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 19 March 2006. Lt. Col. Chessani's recollection is contained in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 19 March 2006.

6 "There was nothing out of the ordinary": The comments by Col. Davis are quoted in the The comments by Col. Davis are quoted in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 9 May 2007. 9 May 2007.

6 "no bells and whistles went off ": Maj. Gen. Huck's comment is in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 4 April 2006. Maj. Gen. Huck's comment is in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 4 April 2006.

7 "You are not going to like this": Lt. Gen. Chiarelli's exchange with Gen. Huck is related in a signed statement given by Huck to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 18 August 2006. Lt. Gen. Chiarelli's exchange with Gen. Huck is related in a signed statement given by Huck to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 18 August 2006.

7 "indiscriminately": This and subsequent quotations from Bargewell are from his eighty-eight-page report marked "15 June 2006 (Final)." This and subsequent quotations from Bargewell are from his eighty-eight-page report marked "15 June 2006 (Final)."

7 Underscoring Bargewell's findings: The data cited in this paragraph are from a doc.u.ment t.i.tled "Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, FINAL REPORT, 17 November 2006, Office of the Surgeon General, Multinational Force-Iraq, and Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army Medical Command." The data cited in this paragraph are from a doc.u.ment t.i.tled "Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, FINAL REPORT, 17 November 2006, Office of the Surgeon General, Multinational Force-Iraq, and Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army Medical Command."

8 "G.o.d d.a.m.n, 15 civilians dead": Col. Ewer's exclamation is in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 19 March 2006. Col. Ewer's exclamation is in a transcript of an investigatory interview conducted on 19 March 2006.

9 "There's an undeniable sense": Senator McCain's comment was made in a speech at the American Enterprise Inst.i.tute, 10 November 2005. Senator McCain's comment was made in a speech at the American Enterprise Inst.i.tute, 10 November 2005.

10 "It sucks": Spec. Ivey was quoted in the Spec. Ivey was quoted in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 27 July 2006. 27 July 2006.

10 "corrupt, . . . tied to being involved in extra-judicial killings": Maj. Williams's comment is in an interview conducted by the Army's Combat Studies Inst.i.tute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for its studies of "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences." Maj. Williams's comment is in an interview conducted by the Army's Combat Studies Inst.i.tute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for its studies of "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences."

10 "The truth is that many commands": Capt. Martin's a.s.sertion is made in his article "Tempo, Technology and Hubris," Capt. Martin's a.s.sertion is made in his article "Tempo, Technology and Hubris," Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Gazette, May 2007. May 2007.

11 "I'd never seen it at this level before": Maj. Mendelson's observation is in his interview for the Leavenworth series "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences." Maj. Mendelson's observation is in his interview for the Leavenworth series "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences."

12 "By and large, the battalions continued to do what they knew best": West's comment is in his book West's comment is in his book The Strongest Tribe The Strongest Tribe (Random House, 2008). (Random House, 2008).

13 "The costs of failure are likely to be high": This appears in "The War in Iraq: An Interim a.s.sessment," by Andrew Krepinevich, prepared for OSD/Net a.s.sessment, November 2005. This appears in "The War in Iraq: An Interim a.s.sessment," by Andrew Krepinevich, prepared for OSD/Net a.s.sessment, November 2005.

14 "Haziness about ends and means": Cohen's comment is in "No Way to Win a War," the Cohen's comment is in "No Way to Win a War," the Wall Street Journal, Wall Street Journal, 7 December 2006. 7 December 2006.

15 the United States needs a real strategy: Krepinevich's article "How to Win in Iraq" appeared in the September/October 2005 edition of Krepinevich's article "How to Win in Iraq" appeared in the September/October 2005 edition of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs.

16 "To be effective, the so-called pacification program": Kissinger's article was "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Kissinger's article was "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, January 1969. January 1969.

19 "to be a good average is safer": Lloyd George's comment is quoted in Lloyd George's comment is quoted in The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, by Andrew Gordon (John Murray, 1996). by Andrew Gordon (John Murray, 1996).

22 "a combination of being the president and the pope": This Petraeus comment appeared in the This Petraeus comment appeared in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 16 May 2003. 16 May 2003.

22 "If others found him hard to love": Rick Atkinson's comment is in his book Rick Atkinson's comment is in his book In the Company of Soldiers In the Company of Soldiers (Henry Holt, 2004), as is Gen. Freakley's comment about Atkinson being "probably closer to him." (Henry Holt, 2004), as is Gen. Freakley's comment about Atkinson being "probably closer to him."

Chapter 2: How to Fight This War.

25 "cultural insensitivity": Brig. Aylwin-Foster's article, t.i.tled "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," was carried in Brig. Aylwin-Foster's article, t.i.tled "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," was carried in Military Review, Military Review, November-December 2005. November-December 2005.

26 "The population . . . becomes the objective": This appears in Galula's seminal work, This appears in Galula's seminal work, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Praeger, 1964). (Praeger, 1964).

27 "paradoxes of counterinsurgency": This and the subsequent series of quotations are from "Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," This and the subsequent series of quotations are from "Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," Military Review, Military Review, March-April 2006. March-April 2006.

27 playing with paradox: This aspect of Abbasid literature is discussed by Hugh Kennedy in This aspect of Abbasid literature is discussed by Hugh Kennedy in When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World: The Rise and Fall of Islam's Greatest Dynasty When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World: The Rise and Fall of Islam's Greatest Dynasty (Da Capo, 2004). (Da Capo, 2004).

28 "In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy": Several months after Petraeus read Kilcullen's essay, which circulated first by e-mail, it was carried in Several months after Petraeus read Kilcullen's essay, which circulated first by e-mail, it was carried in Military Review, Military Review, May-June 2006. May-June 2006.

29 "An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive": The manual was published as The manual was published as FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006. Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006.

31 "We needed elections": This is in the essay by Gen. Fastabend t.i.tled "How This All Ends: It's fourth and long, go deep," unpublished doc.u.ment given to Gen. Petraeus, late April 2007. This is in the essay by Gen. Fastabend t.i.tled "How This All Ends: It's fourth and long, go deep," unpublished doc.u.ment given to Gen. Petraeus, late April 2007.

31 the leading s.h.i.+te party, the United Iraqi Alliance, won 70 of 81 seats: The data in this paragraph is from "Iraq's Year of Voting Dangerously," by A. I. Dawisha and Larry Diamond, The data in this paragraph is from "Iraq's Year of Voting Dangerously," by A. I. Dawisha and Larry Diamond, Journal of Democracy, Journal of Democracy, April 2006. April 2006.

32 "we heard an explosion": From Maj. Lewis's interview for Leavenworth's "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences" archives. From Maj. Lewis's interview for Leavenworth's "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences" archives.

33 violence had increased at a steady pace since March 2005: This is from the Pentagon's report to Congress "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," December 2007. This is from the Pentagon's report to Congress "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," December 2007.

33 "The situation in the last six months": Kubasi was quoted in the Kubasi was quoted in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 23 January 2006. 23 January 2006.

34 "We have become reactive": This is from Capt. Martin's article "Tempo, Technology and Hubris," This is from Capt. Martin's article "Tempo, Technology and Hubris," Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Gazette, May 2007. May 2007.

37 "Every time you left the gate": From Maj. Williamson's interview, "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences," Fort Leavenworth. From Maj. Williamson's interview, "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences," Fort Leavenworth.

41 "We live in darkness": Jasim was quoted in the Jasim was quoted in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, of 29 May 2006. of 29 May 2006.

46 "rose considerably": Capt. Comstock's study "The Battle for Saydia: An Ongoing Case Study in Militia Based Insurgency" was carried on the website Small Wars Journal, April 2008. Capt. Comstock's study "The Battle for Saydia: An Ongoing Case Study in Militia Based Insurgency" was carried on the website Small Wars Journal, April 2008.

46 "JAM/s.h.i.+a militia group kidnaps a Sunni male": Capt. Haas was quoted in Comstock's study, see previous note. Capt. Haas was quoted in Comstock's study, see previous note.

46 "People are killed here every day": Capt. Showman's observation is in the Capt. Showman's observation is in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, of 27 October 2007. of 27 October 2007.

47 "Leave, join or die": Capt. Francis is quoted in Comstock's study cited earlier in this chapter. Capt. Francis is quoted in Comstock's study cited earlier in this chapter.

47 "I don't think this place": Sgt. Alarcon is quoted in same Sgt. Alarcon is quoted in same Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post article of 27 October 2007 that quoted Showman earlier in this chapter. article of 27 October 2007 that quoted Showman earlier in this chapter.

47 "When we got there, it was mixed Sunni and s.h.i.+a": Maj. Gilmore's interview, "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences," Fort Leavenworth. Maj. Gilmore's interview, "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences," Fort Leavenworth.

47 "The social and political situation": Col. Devlin's a.n.a.lysis "State of the Insurgency in al Anbar," 17 August 2006, bears his t.i.tle ("II MEF G-2") but not his name. Col. Devlin's a.n.a.lysis "State of the Insurgency in al Anbar," 17 August 2006, bears his t.i.tle ("II MEF G-2") but not his name.

48 "Using a small, localized cell": Capt. Few's study "The Break Point: AQIZ Establishes the ISI in Zaganiyah" was carried on the website Small Wars Journal, also in April 2008. Capt. Few's study "The Break Point: AQIZ Establishes the ISI in Zaganiyah" was carried on the website Small Wars Journal, also in April 2008.

50 "They ordered these Kurdish units": From Maj. Matt Whitney's interview, "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences." From Maj. Matt Whitney's interview, "Operational Leaders.h.i.+p Experiences."