Twentieth Century Socialism Part 32

The other equally important fact is that whereas evolution under purely natural conditions--before the advent of man--was unconscious, indeliberate, and merciless, since the advent of man it has become conscious, deliberate, and merciful, to such an extent that in almost every essential particular, development has reversed the process that preceded the advent of man. Before the advent of man, animals were not only the victims of the forces of nature, but also their necessary result. Only those animals survived that were able to adapt themselves to changes of environment. The rest perished. And they adapted themselves to changes of environment mainly by developing new organs to that end. For example, the camel develops pads under its feet to protect them from the burning sands, and a reservoir in its alimentary ca.n.a.l to furnish water during its wanderings in the desert; the hairless hide of the tropical elephant becomes covered with thick curly wool when found in the Arctic zone.

When, however, man appears upon the face of the earth, all this order changes. The survival of animals in the world is no longer determined by changes of climate or changes of environment; the survival of the fittest is no longer determined by Nature. It is determined by Art--by Man. The animals beneficial to man survive; the animals detrimental to man perish. Again, man is no longer the victim of the forces of Nature; he has become in great part master of them. The flame that raged uncontrollably over the forest and plain, man now puts under his kettle to make his tea; the torrent that devastated the valleys, man now dikes and distributes in irrigating ditches, transforming deserts into green fields. The fitful flash of the lightning in the heavens man conducts along a little wire and converts into the steady glow of the incandescent lamp. Nor does man any longer adapt function to environment. The Esquimau of the Arctic regions has not developed a thick curly fur; he has clothed himself in the furs of other animals; the Arab of the desert has not developed pads under his feet or a reservoir in his alimentary ca.n.a.l; he rides and loads water on the back of the camel already so provided. Man is no longer the necessary result of natural environment; he makes his own environment. Wherever he goes, he makes a climate of his own. In the tropics, he builds houses to protect himself from the heat, and creates an artificial cold by punkahs, electric fans, and the manufacture of ice. In winter, he creates another climate by building houses to protect himself from the cold, heating them with a furnace and lighting them with gas and electricity. Most important of all, by the control of man over environment, he can determine not only his own destiny, but also the destiny of generations to come. He can by preserving the compet.i.tive conditions that exist, go on developing the base type that is now the necessary result of these conditions--the type that seeks happiness regardless of the happiness of others, such as our oil kings and railroad kings, steel kings and other so-called captains of industry.

By subst.i.tuting cooperation for compet.i.tion, he can, on the contrary, develop a n.o.ble type that seeks happiness through the happiness of others, such as the settlement worker and the Little Sister of the Poor, with, however, this amazing difference: that whereas to-day those who rejoice in social service for its own sake are for the most part humble and obscure, and those who use social service for their own advancement are wealthy and ill.u.s.trious, in a cooperative commonwealth the genius that now goes into compet.i.tive business will be drawn into the service of the cooperative commonwealth. The present alliance between ability and craft will be broken up and a new partners.h.i.+p encouraged between ability, wisdom, and unselfishness.

The fact that all life must adapt itself to environment has been felt from the earliest dawn of civilization. Plato stated it in the Republic. If justice is to be attained, according to Plato it can only be attained under a just form of government. The whole history of man since the days of Plato has demonstrated that every change in the condition of man can be traced as the direct result of change of environment--economic, political, ethical, and religious. The demonstration that this not only is so but must be so was left to science. And the contribution of science to Socialism is the demonstration of the fact that man can create his own environment--can take those elements in compet.i.tion which are good and eliminate those which are bad--can take those elements in cooperation which are good and eliminate those which are bad; and by thus constructing his environment through wisdom and art, determine whether the type perpetuated by this environment is to be n.o.ble or base.

FOOTNOTES:

[198] "Principles of Sociology," p. 414.

[199] "Government or Human Evolution," Vol. II, p. 181.

[200] "Essays on Evolution and Ethics," "Essays on Science and Morals," and "Struggle for Existence in Human Society."

[201] "Government or Human Evolution," Vol. I, p. 239.

[202] The word "altruism" is used instead of the more familiar word "unselfishness" to avoid the criticism of those who contend that there is no such thing as unselfishness. It is true that we are all selfish in the sense that we are all seeking happiness for ourselves; but selfishness can be defined as the search for happiness regardless of the happiness of others, and altruism as the search for happiness through the happiness of others.

[203] Lyell, Sir Charles, "Principles of Geology," 1872, Vol. I, Chapter X, p. 201.

[204] This conclusion is arrived at by Charles Booth in a statistical work which commands the approval of all authorities of whatever shade of political opinion.

[205] Book III, Chapter V.

[206] "Introduction to the Study of Sociology." Herbert Spencer, Chapter III.

CHAPTER V

ETHICAL ASPECT OF SOCIALISM

The ethical aspect of Socialism is a practical continuation of the argument of the last chapter, and brings us to the crowning glory of Socialism: that it alone can and does reconcile the conflict between science, economics, and religion.

-- 1. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Science produces convictions founded on fact. Religion imposes convictions founded on faith. If Religion confines itself to matters of faith--to the supernatural--it need not come into conflict with Science. But when it trespa.s.ses on the realms of Science--when it begins to deal with matters of fact--it creates a conflict with Science in which Science must in the end be victorious. Thus when the Church ventured to make it a matter of faith that the sun revolves around the earth, it might secure the recantation of Galileo, but it had in the end to yield before the demonstrations of astronomy.

This element of conflict between the church and the state is disappearing and is bound entirely to disappear. The church is more and more confining itself to supernatural matters which are properly within the domain of faith. So long as it does this, it need not clash with Science.

There is, however, another occasion of conflict between Science and Religion more modern than the former and more real: The doctrine of evolution in attacking the theory of special creation needed at one time to attack the existence of G.o.d; and as interpreted by Herbert Spencer and his school, gave rise to the doctrine that "because, on the whole, animals and plants have advanced in perfection of organization by means of the struggle for existence and the consequent 'survival of the fittest,' therefore men in society, men as ethical beings, must look to the same process to help them towards perfection."[207]

This notion, which Huxley describes as the fallacy that at that time pervaded the so-called "ethics of evolution," raised an issue not only with the church, but with the fundamental principles of religion. For if, in fact, the blind process of evolution proceeding through the survival of the fittest and the destruction of the unfit, was the only process to which man could look for his development, then there is no need of a G.o.d, and what is far more important, there is no need for either human responsibility or human effort. Now the church, however much its sects may differ in other matters, has always been united in teaching not only the existence of a G.o.d, but the responsibility of man to G.o.d, and a duty of man to make the effort necessary to comply with his commandments. It is to the pages of Huxley that we must turn to see this Spencerian fallacy refuted.

Huxley pointed out that a gardener in growing things beautiful and useful to man proceeded in violation of the principles of evolution.

The characteristic feature of what he calls the "cosmic process," that is to say, evolution _prior_ to the advent of man, "is the intense and unceasing compet.i.tion of the struggle for existence." The characteristic of evolution since the advent of man is "_the elimination of that struggle_ by the removal of the conditions which give rise to it."[208]

The immense importance of these considerations is that they demonstrate no less important a fact than that Man is to-day the selecting agent and not Nature; and Man, by replacing evolution by Art converts things which in the domain of Nature are not edible, such as kale, into things which under Art become edible, such as cabbage.

But let us now take up the story as told by Huxley:

"Let us now imagine that some _administrative authority, as far superior in power and intelligence to men, as men are to their cattle, is set over the colony, charged to deal with its human elements_ in such a manner as to a.s.sure the victory of the settlement over the antagonistic influences of the state of nature in which it is set down. He would proceed in the same fas.h.i.+on as that in which the gardener dealt with his garden. In the first place, he would, as far as possible, put a _stop to the influence of external compet.i.tion_ by thoroughly extirpating and excluding the native rivals, whether men, beasts, or plants. And our administrator would select his human agents, with a view to his ideal of a successful colony, just as the gardener selects his plants with a view to his ideal of useful or beautiful products.

"In the second place, in order that no struggle for the means of existence between these human agents should weaken the efficiency of the corporate whole in the battle with the state of nature, he would make arrangements by which each would be provided with those means; and would be relieved from the fear of being deprived of them by his stronger or more cunning fellows. Laws, sanctioned by the combined force of the colony, would restrain the self-a.s.sertion of each man within the limits required for the maintenance of peace. In other words, the cosmic struggle for existence, as between man and man, would be rigorously suppressed; and _selection, by its means, would be as completely excluded as it is from the garden_.

"At the same time, the obstacles to the full development of the capacities of the colonists by other conditions of the state of nature than those already mentioned, would be removed by the creation of artificial conditions of existence of a more favorable character.

Protection against extremes of heat and cold would be afforded by houses and clothing; drainage and irrigation works would antagonize the effects of excessive rain and excessive drought; roads, bridges, ca.n.a.ls, carriages, and s.h.i.+ps would overcome the natural obstacles to locomotion and transport; mechanical engines would supplement the natural strength of men and of their draught animals; hygienic precautions would check, or remove the natural causes of disease. With every step of this progress in civilization, the colonists would become more and more independent of the state of nature; more and more, their lives would be conditioned by a state of art. In order to attain his ends, the administrator would have to avail himself of the courage, industry, and cooperative intelligence of the settlers; and it is plain that the interest of the community would be best served by increasing the proportion of persons who possess such qualities, and diminis.h.i.+ng that of persons devoid of them. In other words, by _selection directed towards an ideal_.

"Thus the administrator might look to the establishment of an earthly paradise, a true garden of Eden, in which all things should work together towards the well-being of the gardeners; within which the cosmic process, the coa.r.s.e struggle for existence of the state of nature, should he abolished; in which that state should be replaced by a state of art; where every plant and every lower animal should be adapted to human wants, and would perish if human supervision and protection were withdrawn; where men themselves should have been selected with a view to their efficiency as organs for the performance of the functions of a perfected society. And this ideal polity would have been brought about, not by gradually adjusting the men to the conditions around them, but by creating artificial conditions for them; not by allowing the free play of the struggle for existence, but by excluding that struggle; and by subst.i.tuting selection directed towards the administrator's ideal for the selection it exercises."[209]

And this is not confined to physical things, but is extended to moral.

"_Social progress_," he says, "_means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the subst.i.tution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process_; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best."[210] And this leads to the final conclusion:

"As I have already urged, the practice of that which is ethically best--what we call goodness or virtue--involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-a.s.sertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down all compet.i.tors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, _not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive_. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. It demands that each man who enters into the enjoyment of the advantages of a polity shall be mindful of his debt to those who have laboriously constructed it; and shall take heed that no act of his weakens the fabric in which he has been permitted to live."[211]

Further on, he repeats:

"Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."[212]

And later on:

"I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and organized in a common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than that now covered by history. _And much may be done to change the nature of man himself._ The intelligence which has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the instincts of savagery in civilized men."[213]

And in a note Huxley emphasizes the extent to which human nature has been already modified by pointing to the fact that s.e.xual instinct has been suppressed between near relations.[214]

Huxley's demonstrations that the happiness of man can only be attained by the limitation of compet.i.tion, by deliberate inst.i.tutions to that effect, and by conscious efforts to create an environment that will tend to develop the ethical qualities of men, put an end to the last serious occasion for conflict between Science and Religion; for it results in the same theories of human responsibility, and the same appeals to human effort, that it has been the role of the church to preach from the beginning.

I have quoted from "Evolution and Ethics" because to my mind this essay and its prolegomena make Huxley the founder of Scientific and Ethical Socialism. It is true that he himself repudiates this. To him Socialism is impossible because of what he describes as "the mighty instinct of reproduction."[215] He points out that we cannot apply to superfluous or defective human beings the system of extirpation which gardeners apply to superfluous and defective vegetables and weeds.

I have already answered the objection to Socialism on the ground of overproduction.[216] But Huxley never had presented to him the modern idea of Socialism herein described. He speaks of the "elimination of compet.i.tion." It never occurred to him that the evils of compet.i.tion could be eliminated without eliminating compet.i.tion. Candor, however, compels me to admit that I do not think any presentation of the most modern form of Socialism would at all have converted Professor Huxley.

There were two subjects upon which he could not speak without getting into a temper: Gladstone and Socialism.

When I met him, I was not myself a Socialist. Indeed, I did not become a Socialist until after Huxley died. My impressions, therefore, of him were not affected by a prejudice in favor of Socialism. On the contrary, I still regarded Socialism as impractical; I still believed it to be absurd. It was only after months of labor in attempting to utilize the "considerable fragments of a constructive creed"[217]

which Professor Ritchie found in Professor Huxley's pages, that I was driven to a study of the Socialism to which I was utterly opposed, and found in it the only solution to the contradictions which blurred even the lucid pages of Huxley's works. And the contradictions in Huxley are not difficult to find. Nothing could be more pessimistic than what seems to be the climax of his argument in "Evolution and Ethics":

"The theory of evolution encourages no millennial antic.i.p.ations. If, for millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet, some time, the summit will be reached and the downward route will be commenced. The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that the power and the intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the great year."[218]

And yet, on the very next page, he closes this essay with a note of the serenest optimism:

"So far, we all may strive in one faith towards one hope."[219] And the keynote of his att.i.tude towards this subject is to be found in a pa.s.sage in which he "thinks it unjust to require a crossing-sweeper in Piccadilly to tell you the road to Highgate; he has earned his copper if he had done all he professes to do and cleaned up your immediate path"; and a little later where he "shudderingly objects to the responsibility of attempting to set right a world out of joint."

Now Socialists have the audacity to maintain that it is not beyond the intelligence of the crossing-sweeper of Piccadilly to know and tell the road to Highgate, and that the time has come when no one has a right to "shudderingly object to the responsibility of attempting to set right a world out of joint."

Huxley builded better than he knew; and in spite of his detestation of Socialism it was he who built its strongest and most enduring foundation; for unanswerable as may be the economic argument in favor of Socialism, it might take centuries to prevail if there were not an equally strong scientific and ethical argument for it.