A History of Germany Part 39

The king of Hannover, with 18,000 men, marched southward to join the Bavarians, but was so slow in his movements that he did not reach Langensalza (fifteen miles north of Gotha) until the 23d of June.

Rejecting an offer from Prussia, a force of about 9,000 men was sent to hold him in check. A fierce battle was fought on the 27th, in which the Hannoverians were victorious, but, during their delay of a single day, Prussia had pushed on new troops with such rapidity that they were immediately afterwards compelled to surrender. The soldiers were sent home, and the king, George V., betook himself to Vienna.

[Sidenote: 1866. BATTLE OF KoNIGGRaTZ.]

All Saxony being occupied, the march upon Austria followed. There were three Prussian armies in the field: the first, under Prince Frederick Karl, advanced in a south-eastern direction from Saxony, the second, under the Crown-Prince, Frederick William, from Silesia, and the third, under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, followed the course of the Elbe.

The entire force was 260,000 men, with 790 pieces of artillery. The Austrian army, now hastening towards the frontier, was about equal in numbers, and commanded by General Benedek. Count Clam-Gallas, with 60,000 men, was sent forward to meet Frederick Karl, but was defeated in four successive small engagements, from the 27th to the 29th of June, and forced to fall back upon Benedek's main army, while Frederick Karl and Herwarth, whose armies were united in the last of the four battles, at Gitchin, remained there to await the arrival of the Crown-Prince.

The latter's task had been more difficult. On crossing the frontier, he was faced by the greater part of Benedek's army, and his first battle, on the 27th, at Trautenau, was a defeat. A second battle at the same place, the next day, resulted in a brilliant victory, after which he advanced, achieving further successes at Nachod and Skalitz, and on the 30th of June reached Koniginhof, a short distance from Gitchin. King William, Bismarck, Moltke and Roon arrived at the latter place on the 2d of July, and it was decided to meet Benedek, who with Clam-Gallas was awaiting battle near Koniggratz, without further delay. The movement was hastened by indications that Benedek meant to commence the attack before the army of the Crown-Prince could reach the field.

On the 3d of July the great battle of Koniggratz was fought. Both in its character and its results, it was very much like that of Waterloo.

Benedek occupied a strong position on a range of low hills beyond the little river Bistritz, with the village of Sadowa as his centre. The army of Frederick Karl formed the Prussian centre, and that of Herwarth the right wing: their position only differed from that of Wellington, at Waterloo, in the circ.u.mstance that they must attack instead of resist, and keep the whole Austrian army engaged until the Crown-Prince, like Blucher, should arrive from the left and strike Benedek on the right flank. The battle began at eight in the morning, and raged with the greatest fury for six hours: again and again the Prussians hurled themselves on the Austrian centre, only to be repulsed with heavier losses. Herwarth, on the right, gained a little advantage; but the Austrian rifled cannon prevented a further advance. Violent rains and marshy soil delayed the Crown-Prince, as in Blucher's case at Waterloo: the fate of the day was very doubtful until two o'clock in the afternoon, when the smoke of cannon was seen in the distance, on the Austrian right. The army of the Crown-Prince had arrived! Then all the Prussian reserves were brought up; an advance was made along the whole line: the Austrian right and left were broken, the centre gave way, and in the midst of a thunderstorm the retreat became a headlong flight.

Towards evening, when the sun broke out, the Prussians saw Koniggratz before them: the King and Crown-Prince met on the battle-field, and the army struck up the same old choral which the troops of Frederick the Great had sung on the field of Leuthen.

[Sidenote: 1866.]

The next day the news came that Austria had made over Venetia to France.

This seemed like a direct bid for alliance, and the need of rapid action was greater than ever. Within two weeks the Prussians had reached the Danube, and Vienna was an easy prey. In the meantime, the Bavarians and other allies of Austria had been driven beyond the river Main, Frankfort was in the hands of the Prussians, and a struggle, which could only have ended in the defeat of the former, commenced at Wurzburg. Then Austria gave way: an armistice, embracing the preliminaries of peace, was concluded at Nikolsburg on the 27th of July, and the SEVEN WEEKS' WAR came to an end. The treaty of peace, which was signed at Prague on the 23d of August, placed Austria in the background and gave the leaders.h.i.+p of Germany to Prussia.

It was now seen that the possession of Schleswig-Holstein was not the main object of the war. When Austria was compelled to recognize the formation of a North-German Confederation, which excluded her and her southern allies, but left the latter free to treat separately with the new power, the extent of Bismarck's plans became evident. "Blood and steel" had been used, but only to destroy the old const.i.tution of Germany, and render possible a firmer national Union, the guiding influence of which was to be Prussian and Protestant, instead of Austrian and Catholic.

[Sidenote: 1867. THE NORTH-GERMAN UNION.]

An overwhelming revulsion of feeling took place. The proud, conservative, feudal party sank almost out of sight, in the enthusiastic support which the nationals and liberals gave to William I. and Bismarck. It is not likely that the latter had changed in character: personally, his haughty aristocratic impulses were no doubt as strong as ever; but, as a statesman, he had learned the great and permanent strength of the opposition, and clearly saw what immense advantages Prussia would acquire by a liberal policy. The German people, in their indescribable relief from the anxieties of the past four years--in their grat.i.tude for victory and the dawn of a better future--soon came to believe that he had always been on their side. Before the year 1866 came to an end, the Prussian a.s.sembly accepted all the past acts of the Government which it had resisted, and complete harmony was reestablished.

The annexation of Hannover, Hesse-Ca.s.sel, Na.s.sau, Schleswig-Holstein and the City of Frankfort added nearly 5,000,000 more to the population of Prussia. The Const.i.tution of the "North-German Union," as the new Confederation was called, was submitted to the other States in December, and accepted by all on the 9th of February, 1867. Its parliament, elected by the people, met in Berlin immediately afterwards to discuss the articles of union, which were finally adopted on the 16th of April, when the new Power commenced its existence. It included all the German States except Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden, twenty-two in number, and comprising a population of more than thirty millions, united under one military, postal, diplomatic and financial system, like the States of the American Union. The king of Prussia was President of the whole, and Bismarck was elected Chancellor. About the same time Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden entered into a secret offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia, and the policy of their governments, thenceforth, was so conciliatory towards the North-German Union, that the people almost instantly forgot the hostility created by the war.

[Sidenote: 1867.]

In the spring of 1867, Napoleon III. took advantage of the circ.u.mstance that Luxemburg was practically detached from Germany by the downfall of the old Diet, and offered to buy it of Holland. The agreement was nearly concluded, when Bismarck in the name of the North-German Union, made such an energetic protest that the negotiations were suspended. A conference of the European Powers in London, in May, adjudged Luxemburg to Holland, satisfying neither France nor Germany; but Bismarck's boldness and firmness gave immediate authority to the new Union. The people, at last, felt that they had a living, acting Government, not a mere conglomeration of empty forms, as. .h.i.therto.

CHAPTER XL.

THE WAR WITH FRANCE, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

(1870--1871.)

Changes in Austria. --Rise of Prussia. --Irritation of the French.

--Napoleon III.'s Decline --War demanded. --The Pretext of the Spanish Throne. --Leopold of Hohenzollern. --The French Amba.s.sador at Ems. --France declares War. --Excitement of the People.

--Att.i.tude of Germany. --Three Armies in the Field. --Battle of Worth. --Advance upon Metz. --Battles of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. --German Residents expelled from France. --Mac Mahon's March northwards. --Fighting on the Meuse. --Battle of Sedan.

--Surrender of Napoleon III. and the Army. --Republic in France.

--Hopes of the French People. --Surrenders of Toul. Strasburg and Metz. --Siege of Paris. --Defeat of the French Armies. --Battles of Le Mans. --Bourbaki's Defeat and Flight into Switzerland.

--Surrender of Paris. --Peace. --Losses of France. --The German Empire proclaimed. --William I. Emperor.

[Sidenote: 1869. CHANGES IN AUSTRIA.]

The experience of the next three years showed how completely the new order of things was accepted by the great majority of the German people.

Even in Austria, the defeat at Koniggratz and the loss of Venetia were welcomed by the Hungarians and Slavonians, and hardly regretted by the German population, since it was evident that the Imperial Government must give up its absolutist policy or cease to exist. In fact, the former Ministry was immediately dismissed: Count Beust, a Saxon and a Protestant, was called to Vienna, and a series of reforms was inaugurated which did not terminate until the Hungarians had won all they demanded in 1848, and the Germans and Bohemians enjoyed full as much liberty as the Prussians.

The Seven Weeks' War of 1866, in fact, was a phenomenon in history; no nation ever acquired so much fame and influence in so short a time, as Prussia. The relation of the king, and especially of the statesman who guided him, Count Bismarck, towards the rest of Germany, was suddenly and completely changed. Napoleon III. was compelled to transfer Venetia to Italy, and thus his declaration in 1859 that "Italy should be free, from the Alps to the Adriatic," was made good,--but not by France. While the rest of Europe accepted the changes in Germany with equanimity, if not with approbation, the vain and sensitive people of France felt themselves deeply humiliated. Thus far, the policy of Napoleon III. had seemed to preserve the supremacy of France in European politics. He had overawed England, defeated Russia, and treated Italy as a magnanimous patron. But the best strength of Germany was now united under a new Const.i.tution, after a war which made the achievements at Magenta, Solferino and in the Crimea seem tame. The ostentatious designs of France in Mexico came also to a tragic end in 1867, and her disgraceful failure there only served to make the success of Prussia, by contrast, more conspicuous.

[Sidenote: 1869.]

The opposition to Napoleon III. in the French a.s.sembly made use of these facts to increase its power. His own success had been due to good luck rather than to superior ability: he was now more than sixty years old, he had become cautious and wavering in his policy, and he undoubtedly saw how much would be risked in provoking a war with the North-German Union; but the temper of the French people left him no alternative. He had certainly meant to interfere in 1866, had not the marvellous rapidity of Prussia prevented it. That France had no shadow of right to interfere, was all the same to his people: they held him responsible for the creation of a new political Germany, which was apparently nearly as strong as France, and that was a thing not to be endured. He yielded to the popular excitement, and only waited for a pretext which might justify him before the world in declaring war.

Such a pretext came in 1870. The Spaniards had expelled their Bourbon Queen, Isabella, in 1868, and were looking about for a new monarch from some other royal house. Their choice fell upon Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a distant relation of William I. of Prussia, but also nearly connected with the Bonaparte family through his wife, who was a daughter of the Grand-d.u.c.h.ess Stephanie Beauharnais. On the 6th of July, Napoleon's minister, the Duke de Gramont, declared to the French a.s.sembly that this choice would never be tolerated by France. The French amba.s.sador in Prussia, Benedetti, was ordered to demand of King William that he should prohibit Prince Leopold from accepting the offer. The king answered that he could not forbid what he had never advised; but, immediately afterwards (on the 12th of July), Prince Leopold voluntarily declined, and all cause of trouble seemed to be removed.

[Sidenote: 1870. FRANCE INSISTS ON WAR.]

The French people, however, were insanely bent upon war. The excitement was so great, and so urgently fostered by the Empress Eugenie, the Duke de Gramont, and the army, that Napoleon III. again yielded. A dispatch was sent to Benedetti: "Be rough to the king!" The amba.s.sador, who was at the baths of Ems, where William I. was also staying, sought the latter on the public promenade and abruptly demanded that he should give France a guarantee that no member of the house of Hohenzollern should ever accept the throne of Spain. The amba.s.sador's manner, even more than his demand, was insulting: the king turned upon his heel, and left him standing. This was on the 13th of July: on the 15th the king returned to Berlin, and on the 19th France formally declared war.

It was universally believed that every possible preparation had been made for this step. In fact, Marshal Le Boeuf a.s.sured Napoleon III.

that the army was "more than ready," and an immediate French advance to the Rhine was antic.i.p.ated throughout Europe. Napoleon relied upon detaching the Southern German States from the Union, upon revolts in Hesse and Hannover, and finally, upon alliances with Austria and Italy.

The French people were wild with excitement, which took the form of rejoicing: there was a general cry that Napoleon I.'s birthday, the 15th of August, must be celebrated in Berlin. But the German people, North and South, rose as one man: for the first time in her history, Germany became one compact, _national_ power. Bavarian and Hannoverian, Prussian and Hessian, Saxon and Westphalian joined hands and stood side by side.

The temper of the people was solemn, but inflexibly firm: they did not boast of coming victory, but every one was resolved to die rather than see Germany again overrun by the French.

This time there were no alliances: it was simply Germany on one side and France on the other. The greatest military genius of our day, Moltke, had foreseen the war, no less than Bismarck, and was equally prepared.

The designs of France lay clear, and the only question was to check them in their very commencement. In eleven days, Germany had 450,000 soldiers, organized in three armies, on the way, and the French had not yet crossed the frontier! Further, there was a German reserve force of 112,000, while France had but 310,000, all told, in the field. By the 2d of August, on which day King William reached Mayence, three German armies (General Steinmetz on the North with 61,000 men, Prince Frederick Karl in the centre with 206,000, and the Crown-Prince Frederick William on the South with 180,000) stretched from Treves to Landau, and the line of the Rhine was already safe. On the same day, Napoleon III. and his young son accompanied General Frossard, with 25,000 men, in an attack upon the unfortified frontier town of Saarbruck, which was defended by only 1800 Uhlans (cavalry). The capture of this little place was telegraphed to Paris, and received with the wildest rejoicings; but it was the only instance during the war when French troops stood upon German soil--unless as prisoners.

[Sidenote: 1870.]

On the 4th the army of the Crown-Prince crossed the French frontier and defeated Marshal Mac Mahon's right wing at Weissenburg. The old castle was stormed and taken by the Bavarians, and the French repulsed, after a loss of about 1,000 on each side. Mac Mahon concentrated his whole force and occupied a strong position near the village of Worth, where he was again attacked on the 6th. The battle lasted thirteen hours and was fiercely contested: the Germans lost 10,000 killed and wounded, the French 8,000, and 6,000 prisoners; but when night came Mac Mahon's defeat turned into a panic. Part of his army fled towards the Vosges mountains, part towards Strasburg, and nearly all Alsatia was open to the victorious Germans. On the very same day, the army of Steinmetz stormed the heights of Spicheren near Saarbruck, and won a splendid victory. This was followed by an immediate advance across the frontier at Forbach, and the capture of a great amount of supplies.

Thus, in less than three weeks from the declaration of war, the att.i.tude of France was changed from the aggressive to the defensive, the field of war was transferred to French soil, and all Napoleon III.'s plans of alliance were rendered vain. Leaving a division of Baden troops to invest Strasburg, the Crown-Prince pressed forward with his main army, and in a few days reached Nancy, in Lorraine. The armies of the North and Centre advanced at the same time, defeated Bazaine on the 14th of August at Courcelles, and forced him to fall back upon Metz. He thereupon determined, after garrisoning the forts of Metz, to retreat still further, in order to unite with General Trochu, who was organizing a new army at Chalons, and with the remnants of Mac Mahon's forces.

Moltke detected his plans at once, and the army of Frederick Karl was thereupon hurried across the Moselle, to get into his rear and prevent the junction.

[Ill.u.s.tration: METZ AND VICINITY.]

[Sidenote: 1870. GERMAN ADVANCE UPON METZ.]

The struggle between the two commenced on the 16th, near the village of Mars-la-Tour, where Bazaine, with 180,000 men, endeavored to force his way past Frederick Karl, who had but 120,000, the other two German armies being still in the rear. For six hours the latter held his position under a murderous fire, until three corps arrived to reinforce him. Bazaine claimed a victory, although he lost the southern and shorter road to Verdun; but Moltke none the less gained his object. The losses were about 17,000 killed and wounded on each side.

After a single day of rest, the struggle was resumed on the 18th, when the still bloodier and more desperate battle of Gravelotte was fought.

The Germans now had about 200,000 soldiers together, while Bazaine had 180,000, with a great advantage in his position on a high plateau. In this battle, the former situation of the combatants was changed: the German lines faced eastward, the French westward--a circ.u.mstance which made defeat more disastrous to either side. The strife began in the morning and continued until darkness put an end to it: the French right wing yielded after a succession of heroic a.s.saults, but the centre and left wing resisted gallantly until the very close of the battle. It was a hard-won victory, adding 20,000 killed and wounded to the German losses, but it cut off Bazaine's retreat and forced him to take shelter behind the fortifications of Metz, the siege of which, by Prince Frederick Karl with 200,000 men, immediately commenced, while the rest of the German army marched on to attack Mac Mahon and Trochu at Chalons.

[Sidenote: 1870.]

There could be no question as to the bravery of the French troops in these two battles. In Paris the Government and people persisted in considering them victories, until the imprisonment of Bazaine's army proved that their result was defeat. Then a wild cry of rage rang through the land: France had been betrayed, and by whom, if not by the German residents in Paris and other cities? The latter, more than 100,000 in number, including women and helpless children, were expelled from the country under circ.u.mstances of extreme barbarity. The French people, not the Government, was responsible for this act: the latter was barely able to protect the Germans from worse violence.

Mac Mahon had in the meantime organized a new army of 125,000 men in the camp at Chalons, where, it was supposed, he would dispute the advance on Paris. This was his plan, in fact, and he was with difficulty persuaded by Marshal Palikao, the Minister of War, to give it up and undertake a rapid march up the Meuse, along the Belgian frontier, to relieve Bazaine in Metz. On the 23d of August, the Crown-Prince, who had already pa.s.sed beyond Verdun on his way to Chalons, received intelligence that the French had left the latter place. Detachments of Uhlans, sent out in all haste to reconnoitre, soon brought the astonis.h.i.+ng news that Mac Mahon was marching rapidly northwards. Gen. Moltke detected his plan, which could only be thwarted by the most vigorous movement on the part of the German forces. The front of the advance was instantly changed, reformed on the right flank, and all pushed northwards by forced marches.

[Sidenote: 1870. MAC MAHON'S MARCH.]

Mac Mahon had the outer and longer line, so that, in spite of the rapidity of his movements, he was met by the extreme right wing of the German army on the 28th of August, at Stenay on the Meuse. Being here held in check, fresh divisions were hurried against him, several small engagements followed, and on the 31st he was defeated at Beaumont by the Crown-Prince of Saxony. The German right was thereupon pushed beyond the Meuse and occupied the pa.s.ses of the Forest of Ardennes, leading into Belgium. Meanwhile the German left, under Frederick William, was rapidly driving back the French right and cutting off the road to Paris. Nothing was left to Mac Mahon but to concentrate his forces and retire upon the small fortified city of Sedan. Napoleon III., who had left Metz before the battle of Mars-la-Tour, and did not dare to return to Paris at such a time, was with him.