History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 Part 13

The following figures will convey an idea of the extent of the Sea Transport work in connection with the war, from its commencement up to the 31st December, 1902.

The numbers conveyed were:

To South Africa. Personnel. Horses. Mules.

_From Home and Mediterranean:_ Troops, &c. 338,547 84,213 249 South African Constabulary 8,482 -- -- British South Africa Police 353 -- -- Imperial Military Railways 320 -- -- Colonial Office Details 59 -- -- Various 89 -- --

_From India:_ Troops, &c. 19,438 8,611 1,117 Natives 10,528 -- --

_From Ceylon, Mauritius, &c.:_ Troops, &c. 690 -- -- Natives 26 -- -- Various 8 -- --

_From Colonies:_ Contingents 29,793 27,465 19 South African Constabulary 1,249 -- -- Remounts -- 36,660 --

_From other countries:_ Remounts, &c. -- 195,915 102,627 Prisoners of War and Escorts 22,790 -- --

Totals 432,372 352,864 104,012

_From South Africa:_ To United Kingdom, Colonies, India, &c., including Boer prisoners 372,320 2,460 --

Grand Total 804,692 persons. 459,336 animals.

The tonnage of stores carried to South Africa was as follows, exclusive of wagons, guns, baggage, and equipment accompanying the troops, and of the vast quant.i.ties of supplies delivered by contractors from abroad at rates inclusive of freight:

In the Transports 4,990 tons.

Otherwise 1,369,080 tons.

Total 1,374,070 tons.

[Sidenote: Numbers of s.h.i.+ps.]

The number of specially engaged s.h.i.+ps employed on the work was as follows:

No.

Transports engaged by the Admiralty 117 Transports engaged in India 41 ---- 158

Troop freight s.h.i.+ps:

Outwards. {Engaged by Admiralty 115 {Engaged by Colonial Governments 13

Homewards. {Engaged by Admiralty 104 {Engaged by P.T.O., South Africa 21 ---- 253

Remount freight s.h.i.+ps:

Engaged by Remount Department 107 Engaged by Admiralty 201 ---- 308 Mule Freight s.h.i.+ps engaged by Admiralty 98 Full Cargo Freight s.h.i.+ps engaged by Admiralty 210 ---- 1,027

Nearly all the transports made several voyages, and some of them were in continuous employment for over three years, and went to the Cape and back as many as ten times besides coastal and colonial voyages.

[Sidenote: Tonnage, transports and owners.]

[Sidenote: Report of Royal Commission.]

The 210 full cargo s.h.i.+ps carried 974,000 tons of the stores, besides 3,745 oxen. The remainder was conveyed in running s.h.i.+ps at current rates. The transports engaged by the Admiralty were the property of thirty-six owners, mostly Liverpool or London firms; their average size was 6,400 tons gross, ranging from 12,600 to 3,500 tons, the range of speed from nineteen to eleven knots. The proportion of tonnage per man and per horse turns out, over the whole, four tons per man, twelve and a half tons per horse. This estimate is made by calculating the tonnage per man on the infantry s.h.i.+ps alone, and allowing for the men at that rate by casting out the tonnage per horse over the transports which conveyed both men and horses. The following is an extract from the report of His Majesty's Commissioners appointed to enquire into matters in connection with the war in South Africa, dated 9th July, 1903, pp. 125, 126.

"TRANSPORT BY SEA.

"The transport by sea to South Africa from the United Kingdom and the Colonies of a force much larger than any which had ever crossed the seas before in the service of this or any other country affords a remarkable ill.u.s.tration not only of the greatness of British maritime resources, but also of what can be done when careful forethought and preparation is applied to the object of utilising rapidly in war instruments which are in peace solely engaged in the purposes of civil life. If the same forethought had been applied throughout, there would have been little criticism to make with regard to the South African War. A full account of the Sea Transport organisation will be found in the evidence of Mr. Stephen Graff, a.s.sistant Director of Transports at the Admiralty, and of Captain F. J. Pitt, R.N., Naval a.s.sistant Director of Transports.

"It had been represented by the Admiralty in a letter of the 4th April, 1898 (in continuation of earlier representations), that the stock of horse fittings and water tanks was inadequate even for one Army Corps, inasmuch as one Army Corps, with a Cavalry Brigade and Line of Communication troops, requires over 15,000 horses, and it was represented that an expenditure of 25,000 to provide complete fittings would be necessary. In April, 1899, there was a conference between the Admiralty and War Office officials, who came to the conclusion that 'the present stock of fittings, horse-gear, etc., is dangerously insufficient and inadequate to ensure the rapid despatch of even one Army Corps, one Cavalry Brigade and Line of Communication troops.' At this time it had been intimated by the War Office that transport for two Army Corps might be needed. On the 19th July, 1899, the Committee recommended the purchase of 6,000 new pattern stalls, and on the 23rd September the Secretary of State for War authorised the expenditure of 25,000. The engagement and preparation of s.h.i.+ps began on the 30th September. It does not appear that the absence of a sufficient stock of horse fittings caused any appreciable delay. To a large extent the difficulty was met by fitting up with lighter fittings the Liverpool cattle s.h.i.+ps, which are in many ways so constructed as to be admirable conveyances for horses. The plan of using these s.h.i.+ps, and the kind of fittings to be used on them, had been worked out some time before the war by Captain Pitt, R.N.

"The adjustment of s.h.i.+ps to transport purposes involves much labour, but the s.h.i.+ps appear to have been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as the troops were ready to start. The arrangements between the War Office and the Admiralty for the embarkation of troops worked with great success. Sir Charles M. Clarke, then Quartermaster-General, stated that the demands of the War Office were 'most admirably met.'

The accommodation on the s.h.i.+ps appears to have been well calculated.

The timing of the departures and arrivals, so as to regulate the pressure on intermediate coaling stations and terminal ports, also seems to have been satisfactory. The delays in disembarkation of men and stores were slight, and, when they occurred, were due to insufficient berthing accommodation at Cape Town. The accidents on voyage were few, and only one s.h.i.+p, the _Ismore_, was entirely lost, together with a battery of artillery."

NOTE BY THE OFFICIAL HISTORIAN.

[Sidenote: Effect on Army.]

[Sidenote: Questions of above record.]

The record above given of the splendid triumph of the Admiralty administration of Sea Transport during the war has been compiled by Capt. A. H. Limpus, R.N., with the cordial a.s.sistance of the Transport department of the Admiralty. The conclusion that the work of carrying the Army by sea could not have been in more competent hands is one which admits of no doubt in the mind of any reader who studies it.

There are, nevertheless, certain deductions to be made in regard to the pa.s.sengers carried--the greatest army ever delivered by any country over 6,000 miles of sea-way--which closely concern the efficiency of the instrument with which the blow of Britain has to be struck, at points so distant from her sh.o.r.es. It is essential that the management of railways shall be in the hands of the officials of the particular company which conveys an excursion; but in order that the undertaking may be a great success many things are needed besides the perfect management of the trains. No one who has seen the amount of labour and the kind of organisation required by those who yearly send to the country the holiday-children, for instance, will fail to know that the pa.s.sengers also need to be prepared beforehand for their part in the day. Moreover, some knowledge on the part of the most admirable railway officials of the special needs of those they carry is required; and, further, if any sudden change is made in the carriages themselves, in the sequence of trains, or in other matters strictly belonging to the functions of the company, this, if not communicated to the managers of the excursion, may introduce dire confusion.

[Sidenote: A new experience needs special training.]

An army has over the holiday travellers the advantage of its long-established unity, its discipline, and its training, but embarkation and disembarkation are entirely outside its ordinary experience. It needs, therefore, being much accustomed to work by habit, to be prepared both for getting on board s.h.i.+p, and, still more, for getting off it, in the manner that will best enable it to fulfil its duties, and, as time is very precious, to do this with the least possible delay, both in order to play completely into the hands of the officers in charge of the s.h.i.+ps and in order to be itself at its best when it lands. This is the more easily accomplished because a s.h.i.+p in dock is virtually a part of the mainland. Everything that has to be done by troops in embarking can be imitated perfectly on sh.o.r.e, if the ordinary fittings of a s.h.i.+p are placed in a hut or other building outside which such a gangway is erected as that over which men and horses have to be pa.s.sed in entering a s.h.i.+p. Now, by the willing a.s.sistance of the Admiralty in furnis.h.i.+ng the exact fittings used in transports, this practice had been carried out by all arms--cavalry, horse and field artillery, army service corps and infantry--at least in some instances. Practical adaptations in the training of each corps had been made by the experiments conducted on sh.o.r.e by each.

Printed regulations embodying these had been framed.

[Sidenote: Necessity for mutual understanding shown by incident.]

Unfortunately, the sudden improvement in the s.h.i.+p fittings mentioned above, coming as it did at the very moment of war, completely, for the Army, upset the conditions on which the drill had been framed. It had been devised to make the pa.s.sage of horses on board as rapid as it could be when the horses had to be placed in slings. Men, specially trained in slinging, were in each corps detailed to do the work. To find, when the embarkation began, that there were no slings, naturally involved at the last moment a change in method. Moreover, horses always obey more kindly, especially in strange circ.u.mstances, the men to whom they are accustomed, those by whom they are groomed and fed.

It was, nevertheless, not surprising that the s.h.i.+pping authorities, unaware that the soldiers were dealing with conditions already familiar to them, should have detailed men of the s.h.i.+p to place the horses in their stalls. The horses did not like the unfamiliar hands; the soldiers were puzzled by their horses being taken from them. In some cases much delay and confusion occurred, and, indeed, it needed all the tact and good-fellows.h.i.+p of the navy and army officers to adjust things satisfactorily. Relatively to other matters the incident was a small one, but it ill.u.s.trates the importance of a thorough understanding between the two services such as can only be gained by continued practice during peace-time for war.

[Sidenote: Importance of the right stores being on top.]

In the matter of stores a difficulty, which had been very strongly commented upon in the case of the Egyptian expedition of 1882, again presented itself. In 1882, in the disembarkation at Ismailia in the Suez Ca.n.a.l, where the facilities were much less than they were in the several harbours of South Africa, it became a very serious point that the stores required by the Army at once on landing were at the bottom of the holds. The ample landing capacities of Cape Town, of Durban, and almost, relatively to Ismailia, of East London and Port Elizabeth, made this in the present war less serious; but even in this case it drew a strongly-worded telegram of remonstrance. It would be impossible to reckon upon our having always at our disposal conveniences so great as these for disembarking an army. It becomes, therefore, for future expeditions, important to note that the trouble which became so grave in 1882 was not removed at the ports of embarkation when this war began. To say the least, it was not the universally established practice to give to the naval officer in charge or to any one else a list showing the order in which the material embarked would be required on landing; and to ask that those things which would be first needed should be put in last, so that they might be on the top.

[Sidenote: Co-operation in forcing a landing.]

The army in South Africa had not to land against an opposing enemy. It is obviously important that in conjoint practice of the two services the possibility of an opposed landing should be taken into account. It was unfortunate, therefore, that as a consequence of the limited time at disposal, the other duties of the fleet, and the cost of demurrage, it became necessary for the Admiralty, when it was wisely decided to have combined manoeuvres of navy and army in the autumn of 1904, in order to practise embarkation and disembarkation, to direct that the landing should be carried out under peace conditions. As a consequence of this the first party landed on a sh.o.r.e, supposed to be hostile, was one of unarmed sailors; and orders, at least in one instance, filled the foremost boats with the clerks and clerkly paraphernalia of a divisional Headquarters. That may have been the routine rightly followed in many cases at Cape Town, but the true application of the lessons of history does not consist in blind imitation of precedent from the past in those respects in which the conditions have changed.

Joint action in manoeuvre will be valueless unless it is used to familiarise each service with the work of the other as it will be in the actual fighting of the time. During the great war at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century failure followed failure because the services had not practised together. At last they did so and the result was a brilliant success. The j.a.panese have undoubtedly owed many of their triumphs to their having profited by _our_ historical records. Their disembarkations have been models of combined action.

[Sidenote: Causes of delay, real and imaginary.]