Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 70

(1) of the production of creatures;

(2) of the distinction between them;

(3) of their preservation and government.

Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered:

(1) the first cause of beings;

(2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause;

(3) the principle of the duration of things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether G.o.d is the efficient cause of all beings?

(2) Whether primary matter is created by G.o.d, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?

(3) Whether G.o.d is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?

(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Necessary That Every Being Be Created by G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by G.o.d. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from G.o.d as from their efficient cause.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things."

_I answer that,_ It must be said that every being in any way existing is from G.o.d. For whatever is found in anything by partic.i.p.ation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 4) when treating of the divine simplicity that G.o.d is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (Q. 11, AA. 3, 4) that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.

Therefore all beings apart from G.o.d are not their own being, but are beings by partic.i.p.ation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse partic.i.p.ation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.

Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before mult.i.tude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.

Reply Obj. 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by partic.i.p.ation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.

Reply Obj. 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 2]

Whether Primary Matter Is Created by G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by G.o.d.

For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, action and pa.s.sion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is G.o.d, so the first pa.s.sive principle is matter. Therefore G.o.d and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the other.

Obj. 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"--viz. angels--"the other nigh unto nothing"--viz. primary matter.

_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation.

And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they a.s.signed certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived trans.m.u.tation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such trans.m.u.tations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac, according to Aristotle (De Gener.

ii)], or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they a.s.signed particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who a.s.signed a cause to things, not as "these," or as "such," but as "beings."

Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular--that is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.

Reply Obj. 2: Pa.s.sion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first pa.s.sive principle should be the effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 40).

Reply Obj. 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 3]

Whether the Exemplar Cause Is Anything Besides G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides G.o.d. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far from being like G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d is not their exemplar cause.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is by partic.i.p.ation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above (A. 1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by partic.i.p.ation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species.

Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for instance, a _per se_ man, and a _per se_ horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.

Obj. 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div.

Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside G.o.d.

_I answer that,_ G.o.d is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things.

And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (Q. 15, A. 1). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore G.o.d Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the a.n.a.logy of some kind of imitation.

Reply Obj. 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to G.o.d according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind.

Reply Obj. 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man is a man by partic.i.p.ation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.

Reply Obj. 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding.