Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 232

_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the "mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.

In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by _humility._ The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by _studiousness_ which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.

To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions "meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) a.s.signed _eutrapelia_ to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals.

Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs.

Reply Obj. 2: Various virtues a.s.signed by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about pa.s.sions, because in actions and pa.s.sions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.

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QUESTION 161

OF HUMILITY (In Six Articles)

We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire.

Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether humility is a virtue?

(2) Whether it resides in the appet.i.te, or in the judgment of reason?

(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?

(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?

(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;

(6) Of the degrees of humility.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 1]

Whether Humility Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They humbled his feet in fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): "There is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect"

(Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not G.o.d to be humble, since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and pa.s.sions, according to _Ethic._ ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the Philosopher among the virtues that are about pa.s.sions, nor is it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem not to be a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, "He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2) when we were treating of the pa.s.sions, the difficult good has something attractive to the appet.i.te, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appet.i.te, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) that for those appet.i.tive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appet.i.te, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so called because he is, as it were, _humo acclinis"_ [*Literally, "bent to the ground"], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.

Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings, a.s.sumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord (Gen. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue.

Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, "not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them" (Ps. 48:13).

Reply Obj. 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abas.e.m.e.nt to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

Reply Obj. 3: Humility restrains the appet.i.te from aiming at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is according to right reason.

Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in respect of anything else, and thus G.o.d alone is perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards His a.s.sumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with G.o.d his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Isa. 40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all." In this way humility may be competent to every man.

Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to G.o.d, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 2]

Whether Humility Has to Do with the Appet.i.te?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appet.i.te but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written (Ps. 130:1), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty."

Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. x.x.xi) that "almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the estimate thereof.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus fort.i.tude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great things.

Obj. 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] a.s.signs humility to outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appet.i.te.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice concerns the appet.i.te. Therefore humility has to do with the appet.i.te rather than with the estimative power.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpa.s.ses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appet.i.te.

Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appet.i.te itself; and consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking, moderates the movement of the appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially concerned with knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things through confidence in G.o.d's help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to G.o.d, the more is one exalted in G.o.d's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. x.x.xi): "It is one thing to raise oneself to G.o.d, and another to raise oneself up against G.o.d. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down."

Reply Obj. 3: In fort.i.tude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according to the position in which G.o.d has placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to G.o.d; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres G.o.d. Hence it follows that the relation of fort.i.tude to daring differs from that of humility to hope. Because fort.i.tude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like fort.i.tude than lack of daring is.

On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.

Reply Obj. 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.

Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appet.i.te.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 3]