Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 223

First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 8, ad 2).

Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is c.u.mbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree pa.s.s" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. On the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is a.s.sociated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil.

Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].

On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the _Collationes Patrum_ (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from G.o.d while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that his pet.i.tion is stated to have been pleasing to G.o.d (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).

Reply Obj. 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations.

Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the First Part (Q.

84, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 6]

Whether Seduction Should Be Reckoned a Species of l.u.s.t?

Objection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of l.u.s.t. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals (x.x.xVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of l.u.s.t, distinct from fornication.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): "Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of l.u.s.t, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of l.u.s.t.

Obj. 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to l.u.s.t. Now the seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of l.u.s.t.

_On the contrary,_ Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since l.u.s.t is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of l.u.s.t.

_I answer that,_ When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now l.u.s.t is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q. 153, A.

1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardians.h.i.+p of her parents, is a determinate species of l.u.s.t.

Reply Obj. 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Cor. 12: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication," etc.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of l.u.s.t. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: "Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: "If [Vulg.: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery (_stupro_)."

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of l.u.s.t obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation.

Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16, 17): "If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive." The other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deut.

22:28, 29): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life": and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Deut., qu. x.x.xiv.]

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 7]

Whether Rape Is a Species of l.u.s.t, Distinct from Seduction?

Objection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of l.u.s.t, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction (_stuprum_), or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of l.u.s.t distinct from seduction.

Obj. 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in the Decretals (x.x.xVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife."

But the employment of force is accidental to l.u.s.t, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of l.u.s.t.

Obj. 3: Further, the sin of l.u.s.t is curbed by marriage: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents." Therefore rape is not a determinate species of l.u.s.t distinct from seduction.

Obj. 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of l.u.s.t. Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of l.u.s.t.

_On the contrary,_ Rape is unlawful s.e.xual intercourse, as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of l.u.s.t. Therefore rape is a species of l.u.s.t.

_I answer that,_ Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of l.u.s.t: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores x.x.xvi, qu. 2], "We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime."

There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.

Reply Obj. 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.

Reply Obj. 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering violence.

Reply Obj. 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated.

Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. x.x.xvi, qu. 2]

declares the contrary: "Three kinds of lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf.

Deut. 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."

We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in the present tense.

Reply Obj. 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; x.x.xvi, qu. 1]: "This law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force."

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 8]

Whether Adultery Is Determinate Species of l.u.s.t, Distinct from the Other Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of l.u.s.t, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of l.u.s.t distinct from the others.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every kind of l.u.s.t includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of l.u.s.t: and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of l.u.s.t.

Obj. 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person's authority.

Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of l.u.s.t, distinct from the others.

_On the contrary,_ Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf.

Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. x.x.xii, qu. 5] says that "adultery is s.e.xual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own l.u.s.t, or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special deformity of l.u.s.t. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of l.u.s.t.

_I answer that,_ Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's marriage-bed (_ad alienum torum_)" [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille autem. x.x.xii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against chast.i.ty and the good of human procreation.

First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children.

Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery.

Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32, 33): "Every woman ... that leaveth her husband ... shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she hath offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery.

Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of l.u.s.t, through having a special deformity in venereal acts.