Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 181

Reply Obj. 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of execution.

_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 2]

Whether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, a more princ.i.p.al virtue is not a.s.signed as the part of a less princ.i.p.al virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being princ.i.p.al, that secondary virtues are a.s.signed as parts. Now _epikeia_ seems to be a more princ.i.p.al virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. "above," and _dikaion_, i.e. "just." Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all men," the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance.

Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "_epikeia_ is a kind of justice."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident.

Accordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher rule of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then _epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "_epikeia_ is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation.

_______________________

QUESTION 121

OF PIETY (In Two Articles)

We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Which of the beat.i.tudes and fruits corresponds to it?

_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 1]

Whether Piety Is a Gift?

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 3). Therefore piety is not a gift.

Obj. 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q. 30, A.

1]. Therefore piety is not a gift.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: "G.o.dliness"] [*_Pietas,_ whence our English word "pity," which is the same as mercy.]

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1; Q. 69, AA. 1, 3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards G.o.d, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and wors.h.i.+p to one's father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay wors.h.i.+p and duty to G.o.d as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: The piety that pays duty and wors.h.i.+p to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to G.o.d as Father.

Reply Obj. 2: To pay wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay wors.h.i.+p to one's father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d as Father is yet more excellent than to pay wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d as Creator and Lord.

Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion.

Reply Obj. 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and wors.h.i.+p not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety he pays wors.h.i.+p and duty not only to G.o.d, but also to all men on account of their relations.h.i.+p to G.o.d. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).

Consequently it also a.s.sists those who are in a state of unhappiness.

And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its princ.i.p.al act, which is to revere G.o.d with filial affection: for it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are numbered among the children of G.o.d." The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.

_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 2]

Whether the Second Beat.i.tude, "Blessed Are the Meek," Corresponds to the Gift of Piety?

Objection 1: It seems that the second beat.i.tude, "Blessed are the meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beat.i.tude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,"

or the fifth beat.i.tude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beat.i.tude does not pertain to the gift of piety.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Isa. 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter.

Since, then, the third beat.i.tude, "Blessed are they that mourn,"

corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beat.i.tude corresponds to piety.

Obj. 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beat.i.tudes and gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2). Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beat.i.tude does not correspond to the gift of piety.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is becoming to the meek."

_I answer that,_ In adapting the beat.i.tudes to the gifts a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he a.s.signs the first beat.i.tude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beat.i.tude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on.

Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift and beat.i.tude. In this way one must adapt the beat.i.tudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beat.i.tudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beat.i.tude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Taking the beat.i.tudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beat.i.tude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order, different beat.i.tudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.

_______________________

QUESTION 122

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (In Six Articles)

We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;

(3) Of the second;