Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 52

Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in G.o.d. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another."

But G.o.d is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that G.o.d is alone.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in G.o.d can be predicated of every person _per se,_ and of all the persons together; for, as we can properly say that G.o.d is wise, we can say the Father is a wise G.o.d; and the Trinity is a wise G.o.d. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true G.o.d alone." Therefore G.o.d cannot be said to be alone.

Obj. 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, "G.o.d alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, "G.o.d alone creates," it would follow that the "Father alone creates," as whatever is said of G.o.d can be said of the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only G.o.d" (1 Tim. 1:17).

_I answer that,_ This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given _suppositum_; as, for instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term "alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in G.o.d; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that G.o.d was solitary, against what is above stated (A. 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other _suppositum_ from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in G.o.d, as excluding the predicate from all things but G.o.d; as if we said "G.o.d alone is eternal," because nothing but G.o.d is eternal.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with G.o.d, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in G.o.d, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by a.s.sociation with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, G.o.d would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from G.o.d; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.

Reply Obj. 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the _suppositum,_ as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"--that is, no one else--"runs: and Socrates runs only"--that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is G.o.d alone, or the Trinity is G.o.d alone, unless some implied meaning be a.s.sumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is G.o.d Who alone is G.o.d." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that G.o.d Who alone is G.o.d, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the _suppositum._ So, when Augustine says that the Father is not G.o.d alone, but that the Trinity is G.o.d alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible, the only G.o.d," as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.

Reply Obj. 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, "G.o.d alone is Father," can mean two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say G.o.d alone creates; nor, does it follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether an Exclusive Diction Can Be Joined to the Personal Term?

Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true G.o.d" (John 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (Matt.

11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white," or that "man is not white." But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is G.o.d, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.

Obj. 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ."

_On the contrary,_ This proposition "The Father alone is G.o.d" includes two a.s.sertions--namely, that the Father is G.o.d, and that no other besides the Father is G.o.d. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is G.o.d. Therefore this is false, The Father alone is G.o.d; and the same of the like sayings.

_I answer that,_ When we say, "The Father alone is G.o.d," such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.

For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being "the Father alone is G.o.d"--that is, "He who with no other is the Father, is G.o.d." In this way Augustine expounds when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said "He who alone is called the Father is G.o.d." But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.

Reply Obj. 1: When we say, "Thee the only true G.o.d," we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word "only" excludes another thing, as above explained.

The same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term "no one" [*Nemo = non-h.o.m.o, i.e. no man] is not the same as "no man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in _suppositum,_ as part and universal. But the Son differs in _suppositum_ from the Father; and so there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of G.o.d the Father."

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QUESTION 32

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (In Four Articles)

We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?

(3) The number of the notions?

(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 1]

Whether the Trinity of the Divine Persons Can Be Known by Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of G.o.d not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"--namely, three--"we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one G.o.d, surpa.s.sing all things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with G.o.d, and the Word was G.o.d," and so on; in which pa.s.sage the distinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign--that is, as regards knowledge of a third person--i.e. of the Holy Ghost--and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the generation of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated.

Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.

Obj. 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of G.o.d, who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partners.h.i.+p." Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11, 12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this (Q. 27, AA. 1, 3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession (Q. 30, A. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Q. 12, AA. 4, 12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of G.o.d by natural reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of G.o.d, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know of G.o.d that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating of G.o.d as above (Q. 12, A. 12). Now, the creative power of G.o.d is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that "faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom of G.o.d in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6, 7).

Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such grounds.

Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.

Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of the word"--i.e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule."

Reply Obj. 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words, "We speak the wisdom of G.o.d which none of the princes of the world"--i.e. the philosophers--"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless, they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number," etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in G.o.d, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In the beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in G.o.d, but as meaning the ideal type whereby G.o.d made all things, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third sign--that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing G.o.d "they did not glorify Him as G.o.d"

(Rom. 1); or, because the Platonists a.s.serted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called "mind" or the "paternal intellect,"

containing the idea of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip.

iv). They did not, however, a.s.sert the existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not a.s.sert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad," etc., this does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For one G.o.d produced one world by reason of His love for Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnis.h.i.+ng sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnis.h.i.+ng a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that G.o.d is one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when a.s.sumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of G.o.d is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if G.o.d communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from G.o.d: but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partners.h.i.+p, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness.

Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of G.o.d, forasmuch as the intellect is not in G.o.d and ourselves univocally.

Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that G.o.d made all things by His Word excludes the error of those who say that G.o.d produced things by necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we show that G.o.d produced creatures not because He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth," subjoined, "G.o.d said, Let there be light,"

to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "G.o.d saw the light that it was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Notions in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that in G.o.d there are no notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of G.o.d but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, all that exists in G.o.d concerns the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore there do not exist notions in G.o.d.