Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 146

Reply Obj. 3: We praise G.o.d, not for His benefit, but for ours as stated.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 2]

Whether G.o.d Should Be Praised with Song?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d should not be praised with song.

For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonis.h.i.+ng one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should employ nothing in the divine wors.h.i.+p, save what is delivered to us on the authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising G.o.d, we should employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men whose duty it is to recite the office in church: G.o.d is to be sung not with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the church resound with theatrical measures and airs." Therefore G.o.d should not be praised with song.

Obj. 3: Further, the praise of G.o.d is competent to little and great, according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our G.o.d, all ye His servants; and you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who are in the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): "I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar must not sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.

Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law G.o.d was praised with musical instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2, 3: "Give praise to the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle." But the Church does not make use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.

Obj. 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to understand the things that are sung than if they were recited without chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.

_On the contrary,_ Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of Milan, as Augustine relates (Confess. ix).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the praise of the voice is necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards G.o.d. Wherefore whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary inst.i.tution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am inclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion": and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church."

Reply Obj. 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse spiritual devotion.

Reply Obj. 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally, and then had rather not hear the singer."

Reply Obj. 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards G.o.d by means of preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom for those who have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking charge of the alms."

Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), "Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such things as make good hearers." For such like musical instruments move the soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it.

In the Old Testament instruments of this description were employed, both because the people were more coa.r.s.e and carnal--so that they needed to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly promises--and because these material instruments were figures of something else.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit, according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred." The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung, namely, for G.o.d's glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.

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QUESTION 92

OF SUPERSt.i.tION (TWO ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that pertain to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d. The former come under the head of superst.i.tion, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superst.i.tion and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether superst.i.tion is a vice opposed to religion?

(2) Whether it has several parts or species?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 1]

Whether Superst.i.tion Is a Vice Contrary to Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that superst.i.tion is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other. But religion is included in the definition of superst.i.tion: for the latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of religion," according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superst.i.tion." Therefore superst.i.tion is not a vice contrary to religion.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura Deorum ii, 28] states that the superst.i.tious were so called because they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive (_superst.i.tes_) them." But this may be done even in accordance with true religious wors.h.i.+p. Therefore superst.i.tion is not a vice opposed to religion.

Obj. 3: Further, superst.i.tion seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to G.o.d, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superst.i.tion is not a vice contrary to religion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou strikest the first chord in the wors.h.i.+p of one G.o.d, and the beast of superst.i.tion hath fallen." Now the wors.h.i.+p of one G.o.d belongs to religion. Therefore superst.i.tion is contrary to religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circ.u.mstance called "how much," but also with regard to other circ.u.mstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circ.u.mstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1, 2, 3).

Accordingly superst.i.tion is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine wors.h.i.+p than true religion, but because it offers divine wors.h.i.+p either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke 16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser']

in their generation than the children of light." It is in this way that superst.i.tion is described as religion.

Reply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ sometimes: for "lapis" (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot (_laedere pedem_), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that "superst.i.tion" means that from which the word is derived.

Reply Obj. 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quant.i.ty, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate quant.i.ty, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine wors.h.i.+p that ought not to be done.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Various Species of Superst.i.tion?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of superst.i.tion. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to which superst.i.tion is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superst.i.tion various species.

Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to which superst.i.tion is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are directed to G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore superst.i.tion, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have ... a show of wisdom in superst.i.tion," adds: "that is to say in a hypocritical religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superst.i.tion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine a.s.signs the various species of superst.i.tion (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

_I answer that,_ As stated above, sins against religion consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circ.u.mstances (A. 1). For as we have stated (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9), not every diversity of corrupt circ.u.mstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 2, 6).

Accordingly the species of superst.i.tion are differentiated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine wors.h.i.+p may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true G.o.d, but _in an undue mode,_ and this is the first species of superst.i.tion; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superst.i.tion, divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine wors.h.i.+p. For the end of divine wors.h.i.+p is in the first place to give reverence to G.o.d, and in this respect the first species of this genus is _idolatry,_ which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by G.o.d Whom he wors.h.i.+ps; and to this must be referred _divinatory_ superst.i.tion, which consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine wors.h.i.+p is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of G.o.d the object of that wors.h.i.+p: and to this must be referred the superst.i.tion of certain _observances._

Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he says that "anything invented by man for making and wors.h.i.+pping idols is superst.i.tious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the third species.

Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 10, A. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Reply Obj. 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head of superst.i.tion, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Reply Obj. 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for "religion as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than wors.h.i.+p given to G.o.d in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to wish to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.

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QUESTION 93

OF SUPERSt.i.tION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORs.h.i.+P OF THE TRUE G.o.d (In Two Articles)