Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 143

Reply Obj. 2: In the very fact that a man takes G.o.d as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to the reverence and honor of G.o.d, so that he offers something to G.o.d, namely, reverence and honor.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of G.o.d: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to a.s.sure a man, we show reverence to G.o.d. For we ought so to perform our actions in G.o.d's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since G.o.d also works for His own glory and for our good.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 5]

Whether Oaths Are Desirable and to Be Used Frequently As Something Useful and Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable as being good essentially.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now reverence and love of G.o.d are desirable as something good essentially. Therefore swearing is also.

Obj. 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or a.s.suring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his a.s.sertion.

Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): "A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De Mendacio xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing."

_I answer that,_ Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need."

Reply Obj. 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something to the honor of G.o.d, so that for this very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of G.o.d is taken in confirmation of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from the end.

Reply Obj. 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is necessary for the present life.

Reply Obj. 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), "if he make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with dissimulation, "he offendeth double," (because, to wit, "pretended equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7]

declares): "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and necessity, "he shall not be justified."

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Lawful to Swear by Creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures. It is written (Matt. 5:34-36): "I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven ... nor by the earth ... nor by Jerusalem ... nor by thy head": and Jerome, expounding these words, says: "Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by G.o.d, but by heaven and earth," etc.

Obj. 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is written (22, qu. i, can. Cleric.u.m): "If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is unlawful to swear by creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above (A.

4). But religious wors.h.i.+p is not due to any creature, according to Rom. 1:23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.

_On the contrary,_ Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gen.

42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the saints.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), there are two kinds of oath. One is uttered as a simple contestation or calling G.o.d as witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on G.o.d's truth.

Now faith is essentially and chiefly about G.o.d Who is the very truth, and secondarily about creatures in which G.o.d's truth is reflected, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred to G.o.d Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by G.o.d Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who believed this truth and kept it.

The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a creature is adduced that the judgment of G.o.d may be wrought therein.

Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23), saying: "I call G.o.d to witness upon my soul."

As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's health to G.o.d; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of G.o.d's justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to execute.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give them the reverence due to G.o.d. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews, through swearing by the angels and the like, wors.h.i.+pped creatures with a Divine honor."

In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22, qu. i, can. Cleric.u.m, Obj. 2), for swearing by a creature, for this savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is said: "If any one swears by G.o.d's hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against G.o.d, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be degraded."

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Religious wors.h.i.+p is shown to one whose testimony is invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): "By the name of strange G.o.ds you shall not swear." But religious wors.h.i.+p is not given to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 7]

Whether an Oath Has a Binding Force?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the truth of an a.s.sertion. But when a person makes an a.s.sertion about the future his a.s.sertion is true, though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15, seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor.

16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22).

Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (A. 4). But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action.

Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Obj. 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap.

Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Obj. 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:33): "Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord."

_I answer that,_ An obligation implies something to be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about things to be done by the person who swears.

Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present, this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth.

Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap, as when a man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow (Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good. For in either case "its result is evil" [*Cf.

Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]

Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not the same with a simple a.s.sertion, and with an oath wherein G.o.d is called to witness: because it suffices for the truth of an a.s.sertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does not keep it.

Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel asked what it was right to grant, but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised."

Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to G.o.d, in virtue of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind, did not p.r.o.nounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed the obligation for some just cause.

Reply Obj. 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording his oath, G.o.d Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty who both takes G.o.d's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile."

If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention."

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 8]