Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 139

Reply Obj. 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to G.o.d except in so far as it is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to G.o.d," adds, "your reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 3]

Whether All Vows Are Binding?

Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things that are done by another, more than G.o.d does, since He has no need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the prescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple promise made to G.o.d, which we call a vow.

Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always binding.

Obj. 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not always binding.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3, 4): "Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised."

_I answer that,_ For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. x.x.xii, 2: De Mendac. xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word" [*_Fides ... fiunt dicta._ Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to G.o.d above all, both on account of G.o.d's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from G.o.d. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to G.o.d, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to G.o.d. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be paid to G.o.d, because "an unfaithful ... promise displeaseth Him"

[*Eccles. 5:3].

Reply Obj. 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although G.o.d needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding.

Reply Obj. 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his princ.i.p.al intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by sinning.

Reply Obj. 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is written (Deut. 23:23): "That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to the Lord thy G.o.d, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written (Deut. 23:21): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy G.o.d thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy G.o.d will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Expedient to Take Vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that G.o.d has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that G.o.d has given man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.

Obj. 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with G.o.d (which G.o.d forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow." Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord your G.o.d."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made to G.o.d. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to G.o.d under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first a.s.sure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we make promises to G.o.d not for His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as what we give G.o.d is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.

et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to G.o.d, does not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be a.s.sured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in G.o.d and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things."

Reply Obj. 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.

11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment."

Reply Obj. 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was G.o.d, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a _comprehensor._ By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.

The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]

Whether a Vow Is an Act of Latria or Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it.

Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer G.o.d wors.h.i.+p and ceremonial rites. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer something to G.o.d, but only promises it.

Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

Obj. 3: Further, religious wors.h.i.+p should be offered to none but G.o.d.

But a vow is made not only to G.o.d, but also to the saints and to one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall wors.h.i.+p Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them." Now, the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d is properly the act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1), every act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of G.o.d which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of G.o.d is the proper act of latria.

Now, it is evident from what has been said above (AA. 1, 2) that a vow is a promise made to G.o.d, and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the wors.h.i.+p or service of G.o.d. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an act of latria or religion.

Reply Obj. 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to G.o.d belongs to religion, for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to G.o.d, which is the essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.

Reply Obj. 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give.

Reply Obj. 3: A vow is made to G.o.d alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is made to a man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to G.o.d to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or one's superiors.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]

Whether It Is More Praiseworthy and Meritorious to Do Something in Fulfilment of a Vow, Than Without a Vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow.

Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly."

Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting.

Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for G.o.d loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to _Metaph._ v [*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.

Obj. 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated above (A. 4). But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye and pay," says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the counsel to do it.

_I answer that,_ For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to vow, as stated above (A. 5) is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the better and more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is an act of chast.i.ty) are better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine wors.h.i.+p, being like sacrifices to G.o.d. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it is consecrated to G.o.d, and cherished by G.o.dly continence."

Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself to G.o.d more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to G.o.d not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).

Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sage quoted should be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.