Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 129

(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]

(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from G.o.d by praying? [*Art.

15]

(17) of the different kinds of prayer.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]

Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appet.i.tive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appet.i.tive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is heard by G.o.d, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appet.i.tive power: and therefore prayer is also.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to G.o.d and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with G.o.d is effected by love which belongs to the appet.i.tive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the appet.i.tive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is "the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "a.n.a.lysis,"

whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.

Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appet.i.tive power.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak."

Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the appet.i.tive, but of the intellective power.

_I answer that,_ According to Ca.s.siodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]

"prayer (_oratio_) is spoken reason (_oris ratio_)." Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do what is best."

Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last paragraph refers to the Latin word _oratio_ (prayer) which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from _os,_ _oris_ (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or pet.i.tion, in which sense Augustine [*Raba.n.u.s, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.) that "prayer is a pet.i.tion," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of G.o.d." Accordingly it is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their pet.i.tion, since a pet.i.tion is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than G.o.d hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Isa. 65:24, "And it shall come to pa.s.s, that before they call, I will hear."

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such as charity which is union with G.o.d. Now prayer tends to G.o.d through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our pet.i.tion, because when we pray we ought princ.i.p.ally to ask to be united to G.o.d, according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life." Secondly, on the part of the pet.i.tioner, who ought to approach the person whom he pet.i.tions, either locally, as when he pet.i.tions a man, or mentally, as when he pet.i.tions G.o.d. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon G.o.d in our prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of the mind to G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by way of command or of pet.i.tion, as stated above.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Becoming to Pray?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person to whom we pray. But according to Matt. 6:32, "Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not becoming to pray to G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But G.o.d's mind is unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, "But the Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers."

But G.o.d is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint."

_I answer that,_ Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): "You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth G.o.d." Another opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d. All these opinions were disproved in the First Part (Q. 19, AA. 7, 8; Q. 22, AA. 2, 4; Q. 115, A. 6; Q. 116). Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition.

In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects.

Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which G.o.d has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers, in other words "that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty G.o.d from eternity has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8).

Reply Obj. 1: We need to pray to G.o.d, not in order to make known to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having recourse to G.o.d's help in these matters.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may obtain what G.o.d has appointed.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d bestows many things on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to G.o.d, and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom says [*Implicitly (Hom. ii, de Orat.; Hom. x.x.x in Genes.; Cf. Caten. Aur. on Luke 18)]: "Think what happiness is granted thee, what honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with G.o.d in prayer, when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou desirest."

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 3]

Whether Prayer Is an Act of Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion.

Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, the act of _latria_ falls under a necessity of precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a pet.i.tion for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers wors.h.i.+p and ceremonial rites to the G.o.dhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53].

But prayer seems not to offer anything to G.o.d, but to ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the pa.s.sage says that "it was to signify this that under the Old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4), it belongs properly to religion to show honor to G.o.d, wherefore all those things through which reverence is shown to G.o.d, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to G.o.d by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion.

Reply Obj. 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 1, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of G.o.d. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion directs man's intellect to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matt. 7:7, where it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be given you.'].

Reply Obj. 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to G.o.d, since he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A. 1, Obj.

2). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for G.o.d's service, so too, prayer surpa.s.ses other acts of religion.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 4]

Whether We Ought to Pray to G.o.d Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to G.o.d alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above (A. 3). But G.o.d alone is to be wors.h.i.+ped by religion. Therefore we should pray to G.o.d alone.

Obj. 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to G.o.d alone to know one's prayer, both because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which G.o.d alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding": and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought to pray to G.o.d alone.

Obj. 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only because they are united to G.o.d. Now some yet living in this world, or even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to G.o.d by grace, and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the saints who are in Paradise.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:1), "Call ... if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints."

_I answer that,_ Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In the first way we offer prayer to G.o.d alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which G.o.d alone gives, according to Ps. 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and glory." But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not that G.o.d may through them know our pet.i.tions, but that our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written (Apoc. 8:4) that "the smoke of the incense," namely "the prayers of the saints ascended up before G.o.d." This is also clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity "to have mercy on us," while we ask any of the saints "to pray for us."

Reply Obj. 1: To Him alone do we offer religious wors.h.i.+p when praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates in G.o.d's presence.