Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 125

Obj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated.

_I answer that,_ Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a princ.i.p.al virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in common with the princ.i.p.al virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue.

Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to G.o.d is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to G.o.d as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?"

In this respect _religion_ is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or wors.h.i.+p to "some superior nature that men call divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus _piety_ is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus _observance_ is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth."

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13) a.s.signs a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the princ.i.p.al virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rect.i.tude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rect.i.tude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed _truth,_ whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what he has done--sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we have _grat.i.tude_ which "consists in recollecting the friends.h.i.+p and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)--and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed _revenge,_ whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense."

[*St. Thomas read _obscurum,_ and explains it as meaning _derogatory,_ infra Q. 108, A. 2. Cicero, however, wrote _obfuturum,_ i.e. _hurtful._]

There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rect.i.tude, although without it rect.i.tude may be ensured.

This due is the concern of _liberality,_ _affability_ or _friends.h.i.+p,_ or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them.

Reply Obj. 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.

Reply Obj. 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, _declining from evil,_ to which _innocence_ belongs, and _doing good,_ to which the six others belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, _friends.h.i.+p_ in the external conduct and _concord_ internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely, _piety_ to parents, and _religion_ to G.o.d; while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely, _condescension,_ in so far as their good pleases us, and _humanity,_ whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another." In this sense _friends.h.i.+p_ is understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in _Ethic._ iv, 6.

_Friends.h.i.+p_ may also be taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in _Ethic._ viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friends.h.i.+p, namely, _benevolence_ which is here called _affection_; _concord,_ and _beneficence_ which is here called _humanity._ These three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.

Reply Obj. 3: _Obedience_ is included in observance, which Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in _truthfulness_ as to the observance of one's promises: yet _truthfulness_ covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on (Q. 109, AA. 1, 3). _Discipline_ is not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors, according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity under _epieikeia_ or under _friends.h.i.+p._

Reply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs _justice of exchange,_ which he describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes _legislative justice,_ which he describes as "the science of political commutations relating to the community." As regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions _common sense_ or _good judgment,_* which is our guide in such like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification,"

because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: _eugnomosyne_ quasi 'bona _gnome_.']

These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their executor. _Eusebeia_ (piety) means _good wors.h.i.+p_ and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of "the service of G.o.d" (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle, _Ethic._ vi, 13]: and _holiness_ comes to the same, as we shall state further on (Q. 81, A. 8). _Eucharistia_ (grat.i.tude) means "good thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that "kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." _Liberality_ would seem to pertain to _humanity._

Reply Obj. 5: _Epieikeia_ is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of _eugnomosyne_ (common sense).

_______________________

QUESTION 81

OF RELIGION (In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) grat.i.tude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friends.h.i.+p, (8) liberality, (9) _epieikeia_. Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.

Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to G.o.d?

(2) Whether religion is a virtue?

(3) Whether religion is one virtue?

(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?

(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?

(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?

(7) Whether religion has any external actions?

(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?

_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 1]

Whether Religion Directs Man to G.o.d Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to G.o.d alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before G.o.d and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world."

Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to G.o.d alone.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine wors.h.i.+p, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d." Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to G.o.d but also to our kindred.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly _latria_ pertains to religion. Now "_latria_ signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not only G.o.d, but also our neighbor, according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another."

Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.

Obj. 4: Further, wors.h.i.+p belongs to religion. Now man is said to wors.h.i.+p not only G.o.d, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Wors.h.i.+p thy parents."

Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to G.o.d.

Obj. 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to G.o.d. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine."

_I answer that,_ as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from _religio,_ because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again (_relegit_), the things which pertain to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d," so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine wors.h.i.+p because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him."

According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought to seek G.o.d again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [*St. Augustine plays on the words _reeligere,_ i.e. to choose over again, and _negligere,_ to neglect or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived from _religare_ (to bind together), wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion bind us to the one Almighty G.o.d." However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to G.o.d. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.

Reply Obj. 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to G.o.d alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of G.o.d, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.

Reply Obj. 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the pa.s.sage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of wors.h.i.+p, but the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lords.h.i.+p there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lords.h.i.+p belongs to G.o.d in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as _latria_ in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.

Reply Obj. 4: We are said to wors.h.i.+p those whom we honor, and to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word _colere_ stands for "wors.h.i.+p"

and "cultivate"] a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (_agricola_) is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (_incola_) is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to G.o.d as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of wors.h.i.+p, which in Greek is _Eusebeia_ or _Theosebeia_, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).

Reply Obj. 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all in general who wors.h.i.+p G.o.d, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine wors.h.i.+p, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake but for G.o.d's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14), "You ... received me as an angel of G.o.d, even as Christ Jesus."

_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 2]

Whether Religion Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to G.o.d. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift.

Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit"

[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3) _latria_ belongs to religion, and _latria_ denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1, apt.i.tude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer ceremonial wors.h.i.+p to the G.o.dhead" [*Cf. A. 1], and ceremonial matters, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 101), do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above (Q. 80).