Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 44

Reply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction.

Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.

Reply Obj. 2: As G.o.d, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever G.o.d could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is G.o.d said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 5]

Whether G.o.d Can Do What He Does Not?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d cannot do other than what He does. For G.o.d cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But G.o.d is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore G.o.d cannot do except what He does.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" (Matt. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore G.o.d can do what He does not.

_I answer that,_ In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that G.o.d acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place--as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (Q. 19, A. 3) that G.o.d does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by G.o.d from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which G.o.d does nothing. But since the power of G.o.d, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (Q. 21, A. 2), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that G.o.d can do other things than those He has done.

Reply Obj. 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in G.o.d, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), neither are the wisdom and justice of G.o.d restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, G.o.d is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above (A. 3). What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, G.o.d is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that G.o.d can do other things by His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For G.o.d does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d is bound to n.o.body but Himself. Hence, when it is said that G.o.d can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that G.o.d can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is that G.o.d can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "G.o.d cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just."

Reply Obj. 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet G.o.d can do other things and impose upon them another order.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 6]

Whether G.o.d Can Do Better Than What He Does?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d cannot do better than He does. For whatever G.o.d does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore G.o.d cannot do anything better than He does.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If G.o.d could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious." For the same reason, if G.o.d could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does.

Obj. 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that G.o.d has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by G.o.d.

Obj. 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. G.o.d cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 3:20): "G.o.d is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand."

_I answer that,_ The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it--thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, G.o.d cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, G.o.d can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, G.o.d can make something else better than each thing made by Him.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that G.o.d can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus G.o.d cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance.

Reply Obj. 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by G.o.d.

Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by G.o.d; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet G.o.d could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe.

Reply Obj. 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the G.o.dhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of G.o.d; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of G.o.d; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is G.o.d. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than G.o.d.

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QUESTION 26

OF THE DIVINE BEAt.i.tUDE (In Four Articles)

After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beat.i.tude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beat.i.tude belongs to G.o.d?

(2) In regard to what is G.o.d called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?

(3) Whether He is essentially the beat.i.tude of each of the blessed?

(4) Whether all other beat.i.tude is included in the divine beat.i.tude?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether Beat.i.tude Belongs to G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that beat.i.tude does not belong to G.o.d. For beat.i.tude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in G.o.d; nor has composition. Therefore beat.i.tude does not belong to G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, beat.i.tude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to G.o.d; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beat.i.tude.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." (1 Tim. 6:15).

_I answer that,_ Beat.i.tude belongs to G.o.d in a very special manner.

For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beat.i.tude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to G.o.d, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beat.i.tude belongs to G.o.d in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Aggregation of good is in G.o.d, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in G.o.d, as was said above (Q. 4, A. 2; Q. 13, A. 4), in simplicity and unity.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs as an accident to beat.i.tude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beat.i.tude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it pa.s.ses from potentiality to act. As, then, G.o.d has being, though not begotten; so He has beat.i.tude, although not acquired by merit.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 2]

Whether G.o.d Is Called Blessed in Respect of His Intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beat.i.tude is the highest good. But good is said to be in G.o.d in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beat.i.tude also is said to be in G.o.d in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, Beat.i.tude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beat.i.tude is said to be in G.o.d with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy G.o.d in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beat.i.tude is said to be in G.o.d in respect of His intellect. it would seem that beat.i.tude is said to be in G.o.d in respect of His intellect.

_I answer that,_ Beat.i.tude, as stated above (A. 1), is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beat.i.tude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in G.o.d, to be and to understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them.

Beat.i.tude must therefore be a.s.signed to G.o.d in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blessed [beati] by reason of the a.s.similation to His beat.i.tude.