Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 52

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]

Whether Peace Is the Proper Effect of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isa. 32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law."

_I answer that,_ Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A.

1). The first is the result of one's own appet.i.tes being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appet.i.te being united with the appet.i.te of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves G.o.d with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friends.h.i.+p if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sall.u.s.t, Catilin.)

Reply Obj. 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appet.i.te does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good.

Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparentapparent.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appet.i.te that is united by peace. In like manner if there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appet.i.te's inclinations.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether Peace Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you"

(Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according to Matt. 5:9: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of G.o.d." Therefore peace is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).

Therefore peace is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto.

But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), when a number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of G.o.d and of our neighbor, as shown above (A. 3), there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (Q. 28, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beat.i.tudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.

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QUESTION 30

OF MERCY* [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either pity or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for the virtue.]

(In Four Articles)

We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person pitied?

(2) To whom does it belong to pity?

(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Evil Is Properly the Motive of Mercy?

Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q. 19, A. 1; I-II, Q. 79, A. 1, ad 4; I, Q. 48, A. 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy.

Obj. 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).

Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the motive of mercy.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its name _misericordia_ from denoting a man's compa.s.sionate heart (_miserum cor_) for another's unhappiness.

Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beat.i.tude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.

Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appet.i.te; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.

Accordingly the motive of _mercy,_ being something pertaining to _misery,_ is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural appet.i.te, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly."

Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang. x.x.xiv) that "true G.o.dliness is not disdainful but compa.s.sionate," and again it is written (Matt. 9:36) that Jesus "seeing the mult.i.tudes, had compa.s.sion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd."

Reply Obj. 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus.

30:24): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing G.o.d" [*Cf. Q. 106, A. 3, ad 1].

Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away."

Reply Obj. 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]

Whether the Reason for Taking Pity Is a Defect in the Person Who Pities?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to G.o.d to be merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are over all His works." But there is no defect in G.o.d. Therefore a defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.