Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 48

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?

(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?

(3) Whether G.o.d should be loved for His own sake?

(4) Whether G.o.d can be loved immediately in this life?

(5) Whether G.o.d can be loved wholly?

(6) Whether the love of G.o.d is according to measure?

(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy?

(8) Which is the better, to love G.o.d, or one's neighbor?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]

Whether to Be Loved Is More Proper to Charity Than to Love?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved than love, and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping with charity.

Obj. 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so."

Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech.

Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you love him first." Therefore charity consists in being loved rather than in loving.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friends.h.i.+p consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of friends.h.i.+p. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.

_I answer that,_ To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not to be loved."

Reply Obj. 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as he ought to be loved.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.

Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be loved.

Reply Obj. 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way leading a man to love.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 2]

Whether to Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As Goodwill?

Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.

Obj. 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.

Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to friends.h.i.+p (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is neither friends.h.i.+p nor love, but the beginning of friends.h.i.+p." Now charity is friends.h.i.+p, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.

_I answer that,_ Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appet.i.te but also as being in the intellective appet.i.te or will. For the love which is in the sensitive appet.i.te is a pa.s.sion. Now every pa.s.sion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the pa.s.sion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a pa.s.sion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love, which is in the intellective appet.i.te, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is a beginning of friends.h.i.+p."

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly manifested.

Reply Obj. 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill.

Reply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to friends.h.i.+p because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he says in the same pa.s.sage, in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 3]

Whether Out of Charity G.o.d Ought to Be Loved for Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d is loved out of charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the objects of the senses. Therefore G.o.d is to be loved for the sake of something else.

Obj. 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But G.o.d is known through something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of G.o.d are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."

Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Matt. 1:1, and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract.

ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from G.o.d, while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by G.o.d. Therefore it seems that G.o.d is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.

_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "G.o.d is to be enjoyed" as he says in the same book. Therefore G.o.d is to be loved for Himself.

_I answer that,_ The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue.

Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love G.o.d, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.

Reply Obj. 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man to love the unknown.

Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of G.o.d is indeed acquired through other things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but through Himself, according to John 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world."

Reply Obj. 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8; Q. 19, AA. 4, 7, 10).

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 4]

Whether G.o.d Can Be Loved Immediately in This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot be loved immediately in this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know G.o.d immediately in this life, since "we see now through a gla.s.s, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12).

Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love G.o.d than to know Him, since "he who is joined" to G.o.d by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man cannot know G.o.d immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, man is severed from G.o.d by sin, according to Isa.