Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 44

Whether Four Things Are Rightly Reckoned As to Be Loved Out of Charity, Viz. G.o.d, Our Neighbor, Our Body and Ourselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: G.o.d, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan.

lx.x.xiii), "he that loveth not G.o.d, loveth not himself." Hence love of oneself is included in the love of G.o.d. Therefore love of oneself is not distinct from the love of G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole.

But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.

Obj. 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely G.o.d, "another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), the friends.h.i.+p of charity is based on the fellows.h.i.+p of happiness. Now, in this fellows.h.i.+p, one thing is considered as the principle from which happiness flows, namely G.o.d; a second is that which directly partakes of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.

Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness, can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being identified with ourselves, or through being a.s.sociated with us in partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: The different relations between a lover and the various things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since the relation between the human lover and G.o.d is different from his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.

Reply Obj. 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself in one way, and his own body in another.

Reply Obj. 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to his body, by reason of a certain fellows.h.i.+p in happiness. Wherefore, on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.

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QUESTION 26

OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (In Thirteen Articles)

We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is an order in charity?

(2) Whether man ought to love G.o.d more than his neighbor?

(3) Whether more than himself?

(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?

(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?

(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?

(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him?

(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties?

(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his father?

(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?

(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?

(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to?

(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Order in Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is a.s.signed to the other virtues.

Neither, therefore, should any order be a.s.signed to charity.

Obj. 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be ascribed to charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle.

Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some kind. But it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25, A. 12) that the love of charity tends to G.o.d as to the principle of happiness, on the fellows.h.i.+p of which the friends.h.i.+p of charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q.

23, A. 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appet.i.te and action, as was shown above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; I-II, A.

1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order in reference to the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an appet.i.tive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to faith.

And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly about G.o.d, and secondarily about things referred to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to the appet.i.tive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]

Whether G.o.d Ought to Be Loved More Than Our Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love G.o.d, Whom he seeth not?"

Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to _Ethic._ ix, 5, 12. Now G.o.d is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to G.o.d. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is G.o.d, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27). Now G.o.d is not greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love G.o.d more than our neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for G.o.d's sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from G.o.d, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters ... he cannot be My disciple." Therefore we ought to love G.o.d, out of charity, more than our neighbor.

_I answer that,_ Each kind of friends.h.i.+p regards chiefly the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the fellows.h.i.+p of which that friends.h.i.+p is based: thus civil friends.h.i.+p regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friends.h.i.+p of charity is based on the fellows.h.i.+p of happiness, which consists essentially in G.o.d, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness.

Therefore G.o.d ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.