Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 35

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friends.h.i.+p. For nothing is so appropriate to friends.h.i.+p as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards G.o.d and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is not friends.h.i.+p.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no friends.h.i.+p without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friends.h.i.+p.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friends.h.i.+p, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friends.h.i.+p for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friends.h.i.+p cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of G.o.d, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friends.h.i.+p for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friends.h.i.+p based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii).

Therefore charity is not friends.h.i.+p.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call you servants ... but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friends.h.i.+p.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not every love has the character of friends.h.i.+p, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friends.h.i.+p, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friends.h.i.+p for wine or for a horse.

Yet neither does well-wis.h.i.+ng suffice for friends.h.i.+p, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friends.h.i.+p is between friend and friend: and this well-wis.h.i.+ng is founded on some kind of communication.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and G.o.d, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friends.h.i.+p must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "G.o.d is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellows.h.i.+p of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friends.h.i.+p of man for G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellows.h.i.+p between us and G.o.d or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellows.h.i.+p between us and both G.o.d and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apoc.

22:3, 4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.

Reply Obj. 2: Friends.h.i.+p extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friends.h.i.+p never extends but to one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friends.h.i.+p for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friends.h.i.+p of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to G.o.d, to Whom the friends.h.i.+p of charity is chiefly directed.

Reply Obj. 3: The friends.h.i.+p that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the princ.i.p.al person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friends.h.i.+p based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for G.o.d's sake.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2]

Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now G.o.d is love.

Therefore it follows that he loves G.o.d in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: G.o.d is Charity, even as it was said: G.o.d is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is G.o.d Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: "He is thy life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore G.o.d quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have pa.s.sed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Therefore G.o.d is charity itself.

Obj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.

On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of G.o.d for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.

_I answer that,_ The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q.

17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love G.o.d is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.

But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.

Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.

Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power by reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore G.o.d, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpa.s.ses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure.

Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.

Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is G.o.d, and wise with the wisdom which is G.o.d (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a partic.i.p.ation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a partic.i.p.ation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.

Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to G.o.d, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friends.h.i.+p. Now philosophers do not reckon friends.h.i.+p a virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.

Therefore charity is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to G.o.d, for by it we love Him."

_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.

human reason and G.o.d.

Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with right reason," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining G.o.d, as also stated above with regard to faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains G.o.d, it unites us to G.o.d, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friends.h.i.+p is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friends.h.i.+p considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13).

Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friends.h.i.+p is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friends.h.i.+p based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friends.h.i.+p for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded princ.i.p.ally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the pa.s.sions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love.

And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.

Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a partic.i.p.ation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a partic.i.p.ation of the Holy Ghost.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]

Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love G.o.d" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that "virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Just.i.t. v) that, "Thou shalt love"

is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue.

_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.

Therefore charity is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.