Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 40

Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.

Reply Obj. 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term _wherefrom_ but from the term _whereto._ Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (Q. 21, AA. 3, 4).

Reply Obj. 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 2]

Whether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes pa.s.sion. If therefore predestination is action in G.o.d, predestination must be pa.s.sion in the predestined.

Obj. 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined,"

etc. (Rom. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.

Obj. 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of G.o.d's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.

Obj. 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in G.o.d; for whatever is in Him is eternal.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of G.o.d's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.

_I answer that,_ Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Q. 22, A. 1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a pa.s.sive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a pa.s.sive way in the predestined, but actively in G.o.d. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."

Reply Obj. 1: Actions pa.s.sing out to external matter imply of themselves pa.s.sion--for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3, ad 1).

Predestination is an action of this latter cla.s.s. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which pa.s.ses out to external things, has an effect in them.

Reply Obj. 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.

Reply Obj. 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to pa.s.sion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, G.o.d from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.

Reply Obj. 4: Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 3]

Whether G.o.d Reprobates Any Man?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d reprobates no man. For n.o.body reprobates what he loves. But G.o.d loves every man, according to (Wis.

11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore G.o.d reprobates no man.

Obj. 2: Further, if G.o.d reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false.

For it is said (Osee 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." G.o.d does not, then, reprobate any man.

Obj. 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if G.o.d reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of G.o.d, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore G.o.d does not reprobate anyone.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."

_I answer that,_ G.o.d does reprobate some. For it was said above (A.

1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of G.o.d, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of d.a.m.nation on account of that sin.

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them.

Reply Obj. 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by G.o.d. It is the cause, however, of what is a.s.signed in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace.

In this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."

Reply Obj. 3: Reprobation by G.o.d does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by G.o.d cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 4]

Whether the Predestined Are Chosen by G.o.d? [*"Eligantur."]

Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by G.o.d. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does G.o.d His goodness. But the goodness of G.o.d is communicated to some in an especial manner through a partic.i.p.ation of grace and glory. Therefore G.o.d without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.

Obj. 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.

Obj. 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now G.o.d "wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world."

_I answer that,_ Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (A. 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Q. 22, A. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that G.o.d wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:--love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (Q. 20, AA. 2 ,3):--election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (A. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in G.o.d, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In G.o.d, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.

Reply Obj. 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, G.o.d communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Q. 6, A. 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.

Reply Obj. 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In G.o.d it is otherwise; as was said above (Q. 20, A.

2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by G.o.d, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 5]

Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination?

Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

Obj. 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17).

But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.

Obj. 3: Further, "There is no injustice in G.o.d" (Rom. 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore G.o.d does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (t.i.tus 3:5): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us."

But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved.

Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.

_I answer that,_ Since predestination includes will, as was said above (A. 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of G.o.d. Now it was shown above (Q. 19, A. 5), that we cannot a.s.sign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as G.o.d wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore n.o.body has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether G.o.d pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.

Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were a.s.signed to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil ... not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger."