Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 184

Obj. 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace, without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on (Q.

114, A. 2). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved towards G.o.d and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once.

Obj. 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1).

Therefore the justification of the unG.o.dly takes place not all at once, but successively.

_On the contrary,_ The justification of the unG.o.dly is caused by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that "the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence the justification of the unG.o.dly is not successive, but instantaneous.

_I answer that,_ The entire justification of the unG.o.dly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it was stated (Q. 112, A. 2) that G.o.d, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and successively, as stated above (Q. 112, A. 2, ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the justification of the unG.o.dly by G.o.d takes place in an instant.

Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the justification of the unG.o.dly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw near to G.o.d; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 85, A. 5), there is nothing to prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together, inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards G.o.d, since a man detests sin, as contrary to G.o.d, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the justification of the unG.o.dly the free-will simultaneously detests sin and turns to G.o.d, even as a body approaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will--the movements of the free-will--are not successive, but instantaneous.

Hence the justification of the unG.o.dly must not be successive.

Reply Obj. 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is proved in _Physic._ vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant.

Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it has the form which is the term of the movement.

But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as stated above (I, Q. 53, AA. 2, 3). In these, therefore, there is a last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is no continuity of time, which this would necessitate.

Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species, as stated above (I, Q. 85, AA. 1, 2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin inhered.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 8]

Whether the Infusion of Grace Is Naturally the First of the Things Required for the Justification of the UnG.o.dly?

Objection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally required first for the justification of the unG.o.dly. For we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps.

33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins regards the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace.

Obj. 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition for the reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace.

Obj. 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to G.o.d. Now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace.

_On the contrary,_ The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification of the unG.o.dly, as stated above (A. 7). Therefore it is naturally prior to it.

_I answer that,_ The aforesaid four things required for the justification of the unG.o.dly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of the unG.o.dly is not successive, as stated above (A.

7); but in the order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the free-will's movement towards G.o.d; the third, the free-will's movement towards sin; the fourth, the remission of sin.

The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of G.o.d the Mover is the infusion of grace, as stated above (A. 6); the movement or disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above (A. 6). Hence in their natural order the first in the justification of the unG.o.dly is the infusion of grace; the second is the free-will's movement towards G.o.d; the third is the free-will's movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because it is against G.o.d, and thus the free-will's movement towards G.o.d naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, to which this trans.m.u.tation is ordained as to an end, as stated above (AA. 1, 6).

Reply Obj. 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to another may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved, and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time.

And since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard G.o.d Who justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term _whence_ of justification is sin; and the term _whereto_ is justice; and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice.

Reply Obj. 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will's movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature, and follows the infusion of grace.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the practical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of nature it moves towards G.o.d as to its end, before removing the impediment of sin.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 9]

Whether the Justification of the UnG.o.dly Is G.o.d's Greatest Work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the unG.o.dly is not G.o.d's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the unG.o.dly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the unG.o.dly.

Obj. 2: Further, the justification of the unG.o.dly is ordained to the particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater than the good of one man, as is plain from _Ethic._ i, 2. Hence the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of the unG.o.dly.

Obj. 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is nought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something with the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent; but in the justification of the unG.o.dly G.o.d makes something from something, i.e. a just man from a sinner, and there is a cooperation on man's part, since there is a movement of the free-will, as stated above (A. 3). Hence the justification of the unG.o.dly is not G.o.d's greatest work.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are over all His works," and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost]

we say: "O G.o.d, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by pardoning and having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words, "greater than these shall he do" (John 14:12) says that "for a just man to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth."

_I answer that,_ A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the justification of the unG.o.dly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the G.o.dhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that "for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven and earth shall pa.s.s away, but the justification of the unG.o.dly shall endure."

Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways: first, in an absolute quant.i.ty, and thus the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the unG.o.dly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the unG.o.dly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quant.i.ty, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the unG.o.dly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the unG.o.dly, who are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: "Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to create the angels just, than to justify the unG.o.dly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy."

And thus the reply to the first [objection] is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in which way creation is G.o.d's greatest work.

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TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 10]

Whether the Justification of the UnG.o.dly Is a Miraculous Work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the unG.o.dly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous. Now the justification of the unG.o.dly is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine (A. 9). Hence the justification of the unG.o.dly is a miraculous work.

Obj. 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But when G.o.d works in natural things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the unG.o.dly is bent on evil. Hence, since G.o.d in justifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the unG.o.dly is miraculous.

Obj. 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of G.o.d, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from G.o.d without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the unG.o.dly should be justified by G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the justification of the unG.o.dly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful."

Therefore the justification of the unG.o.dly is not miraculous.

_I answer that,_ In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above (I, Q. 105, A. 7). And thus both the justification of the unG.o.dly and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by G.o.d alone, is miraculous.

Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body. And thus the justification of the unG.o.dly is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to the likeness of G.o.d, it is fit to receive G.o.d by grace, as Augustine says, in the above quotation.

Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus the justification of the unG.o.dly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is that G.o.d moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to G.o.d, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become perfect; because "charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits perfection," as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet G.o.d sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous.

Reply Obj. 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the unG.o.dly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save G.o.d can justify the unG.o.dly, even as nothing save fire can heat water.

Hence the justification of the unG.o.dly by G.o.d is not miraculous in this respect.