Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 125

Reply Obj. 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through pa.s.sion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the pa.s.sion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the pa.s.sion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (AA. 2, 3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin "through"

choosing.

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QUESTION 79

OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of G.o.d; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether G.o.d is a cause of sin?

(2) Whether the act of sin is from G.o.d?

(3) Whether G.o.d is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 1]

Whether G.o.d Is a Cause of Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): "G.o.d delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss comments on this by saying that "G.o.d works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore G.o.d is to man a cause of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): "The creatures of G.o.d are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men."

But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by G.o.d alone, as was established in the First Part (Q. 44, A. 1), it seems that G.o.d is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect.

Now G.o.d is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore G.o.d is the cause of sin.

Obj. 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to G.o.d's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written (Isa. 45:7) that G.o.d creates evil, and (Amos 3:6): "Shall there be evil in the city which G.o.d [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with G.o.d's goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 11:25): "Thou ... hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now G.o.d hates sin, according to Wis. 14:9: "To G.o.d the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore G.o.d is not a cause of sin.

_I answer that,_ Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely by inclining his or another's will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely by not preventing someone from sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] ... I will require his blood at thy hand." Now G.o.d cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to G.o.d as the end: whereas G.o.d inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that G.o.d does not give some the a.s.sistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which a.s.sistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the s.h.i.+p, through not steering the s.h.i.+p, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that G.o.d is nowise a cause of sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if G.o.d delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.

xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "G.o.d inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.

Reply Obj. 2: When it is said the "creatures of G.o.d are turned 'to'

an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem"

admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for G.o.d did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made.

Reply Obj. 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the commandment of G.o.d, is not attributed to G.o.d as being its cause.

Reply Obj. 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of subordination to G.o.d; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison between fault and punishment.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 2]

Whether the Act of Sin Is from G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from G.o.d. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Just.i.t. ii) that "the act of sin is not a thing." Now whatever is from G.o.d is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now G.o.d is not a cause of sin, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore G.o.d is not the cause of the act of sin.

Obj. 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q. 18, AA. 2, 8). Now whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore G.o.d caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above (A. 1). Therefore G.o.d is not the cause of the act of sin.

_On the contrary,_ The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of G.o.d is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4, 9). Therefore G.o.d's will is the cause of the act of sin.

_I answer that,_ The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from G.o.d. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. G.o.d, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore G.o.d is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. G.o.d. Consequently this defect is not reduced to G.o.d as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly G.o.d is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.

Reply Obj. 1: In this pa.s.sage Augustine calls by the name of "thing,"

that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this princ.i.p.ally.

Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while G.o.d is the cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 72, A. 1), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from G.o.d, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 3]

Whether G.o.d Is the Cause of Spiritual Blindness and Hardness of Heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, qu.

3) that G.o.d is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore G.o.d is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Obj. 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "G.o.d does not punish what He causes." Now G.o.d punishes the hardened heart, according to Ecclus. 3:27: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore G.o.d is not the cause of hardness of heart.

Obj. 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes.

But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man, according to Wis. 2:21: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to 2 Cor. 4:4: "The G.o.d of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to G.o.d.

Therefore G.o.d is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 6:10): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and Rom. 9:18: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth."

_I answer that,_ Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, G.o.d is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by G.o.d to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this G.o.d is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Now we must consider that G.o.d is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to John 1:9: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas G.o.d works freely, through the order of His wisdom.

Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, G.o.d, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but G.o.d, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, G.o.d is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.

These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former a.s.sists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching,"

hence it is that spiritual "blindness" corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections.

Reply Obj. 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.