Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 121

Reply Obj. 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply Obj. 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental.

Reply Obj. 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 4]

Whether Ignorance Diminishes a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin.

For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.

iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Obj. 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore it does not diminish a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Rom.

2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of G.o.d leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not."

Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Obj. 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.

iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained ... mercy ... because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.

_I answer that,_ Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin.

Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning.

Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of the pa.s.sion or habit inclining to sin.

Reply Obj. 2: One sin added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.

Reply Obj. 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingrat.i.tude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice.

Reply Obj. 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they a.s.saulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).

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QUESTION 77

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPEt.i.tE (In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appet.i.te, as to whether a pa.s.sion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te can move or incline the will?

(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?

(3) Whether a sin resulting from a pa.s.sion is a sin of weakness?

(4) Whether the pa.s.sion of self-love is the cause of every sin?

(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 John 2:16: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life."

(6) Whether the pa.s.sion which causes a sin diminishes it?

(7) Whether pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether?

(8) Whether a sin committed through pa.s.sion can be mortal?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is Moved by a Pa.s.sion of the Sensitive Appet.i.te?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te. For no pa.s.sive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both pa.s.sive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appet.i.tive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te does not move the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appet.i.te, is compared to the sensitive appet.i.te, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the rational appet.i.te moves the sensitive appet.i.te, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore the will cannot be moved by a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appet.i.te is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te cannot move the intellective appet.i.te.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 13:56): "l.u.s.t hath perverted thy heart."

_I answer that,_ A pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te is enforced in respect of any pa.s.sion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appet.i.te or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.

Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of pa.s.sion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.

The Third Objection is solved in like manner.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 2]

Whether the Reason Can Be Overcome by a Pa.s.sion, Against Its Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a pa.s.sion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its cert.i.tude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a pa.s.sion, which is weak and soon pa.s.ses away.

Obj. 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a pa.s.sion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason.

Therefore a pa.s.sion never influences the reason against its knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter--on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g.

"Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in _Peri Herm._ ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to p.r.o.nounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.

Obj. 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from _Poster._ i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g.