Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 3

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.

For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.

Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be G.o.d.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of G.o.d.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.

Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.

Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as G.o.d.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.

Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, n.o.ble and the like. But _more_ and _less_ are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something n.o.blest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in _Metaph._ ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call G.o.d.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since G.o.d is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of G.o.d, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Reply Obj. 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to G.o.d, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

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QUESTION 3

OF THE SIMPLICITY OF G.o.d (In Eight Articles)

When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what G.o.d is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how G.o.d is, but rather how He is not.

Therefore, we must consider:

(1) How He is not;

(2) How He is known by us;

(3) How He is named.

Now it can be shown how G.o.d is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore

(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.

Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether G.o.d is a body?

(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?

(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?

(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?

(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?

(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?

(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?

(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 1]

Whether G.o.d Is a Body?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to G.o.d, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than h.e.l.l, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job 11:8, 9). Therefore G.o.d is a body.

Obj. 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quant.i.ty. But G.o.d seems to have figure, for it is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen. 1:26).

Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore G.o.d is a body.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to G.o.d. "Hast thou an arm like G.o.d?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.

33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.

117:16). Therefore G.o.d is a body.

Obj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of G.o.d in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" (Isa. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Isa. 3:13).

Therefore G.o.d is a body.

Obj. 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term _wherefrom_ or _whereto._ But in the Scriptures G.o.d is spoken of as a local term _whereto,_ according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term _wherefrom_: "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13).

Therefore G.o.d is a body.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24): "G.o.d is a spirit."

_I answer that,_ It is absolutely true that G.o.d is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (Q. 2, A. 3), that G.o.d is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that G.o.d is not a body.

Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that pa.s.ses from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that G.o.d is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in G.o.d there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that G.o.d should be a body.

Thirdly, because G.o.d is the most n.o.ble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most n.o.ble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly n.o.bler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be n.o.bler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that G.o.d should be a body.

Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to G.o.d the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quant.i.ty, it implies His virtual quant.i.ty; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of G.o.d is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image of G.o.d, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.

Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea"

(Gen. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to G.o.d in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to G.o.d signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts.

Reply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to G.o.d by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.

Reply Obj. 5: We draw near to G.o.d by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 2]

Whether G.o.d Is Composed of Matter and Form?