Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 113

Obj. 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rect.i.tude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rect.i.tude of reason.

Obj. 3: Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. _Metaph._ i]. Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful--illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

_On the contrary,_ Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 13, 14. Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.

_I answer that,_ While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, as stated above (A. 1), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same.

Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.

Reply Obj. 1: Although _more_ and _less_ do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.

viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friends.h.i.+p, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rect.i.tude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the _boaster,_ who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the _cheat,_ who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.

Reply Obj. 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. II-II, Q.

119, A. 1, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 9]

Whether Sins Differ Specifically in Respect of Different Circ.u.mstances?

Objection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circ.u.mstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circ.u.mstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circ.u.mstance there results a corresponding species of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circ.u.mstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10).

Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circ.u.mstances are corrupted.

Obj. 3: Further, diverse species are a.s.signed to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse:

"Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."

Now these pertain to various circ.u.mstances, for "hastily" means sooner than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circ.u.mstances.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; and in like manner as to the other circ.u.mstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 8), wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circ.u.mstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the circ.u.mstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of h.o.a.rding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circ.u.mstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.

Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circ.u.mstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circ.u.mstances entails different species of sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above (A. 1), but from turning to the object of the act.

Reply Obj. 2: A circ.u.mstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.

Reply Obj. 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.

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QUESTION 73

OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?

(2) Whether all are equal?

(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?

(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?

(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?

(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?

(7) Whether it depends on their circ.u.mstances?

(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?

(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?

(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 1]

Whether All Sins Are Connected with One Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.

Obj. 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (Q. 65, A. 1).

Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues.

Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.

Obj. 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of G.o.d, which builds the city of G.o.d, is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).

Therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has one, has them all.

_On the contrary,_ Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.

_I answer that,_ The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in pa.s.sing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.

Reply Obj. 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 1), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law.

Now all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same pa.s.sage, so that the same G.o.d is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of G.o.d, which is the origin of all sins.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 71, A. 4), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from G.o.d. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue is possible, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4; Q.

65, A. 1). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins--first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above (Q. 71, A.

1). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.

Reply Obj. 3: The love of G.o.d is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of G.o.d, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together.

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