Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 95

Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social"

virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in _Ethic._ x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye ... perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of G.o.d, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to G.o.d alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fort.i.tude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of G.o.d; temperance knows no earthly desires; fort.i.tude has no knowledge of pa.s.sion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fort.i.tude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the pa.s.sions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without pa.s.sions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social virtues check the pa.s.sions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of pa.s.sions as denoting inordinate emotions.

Reply Obj. 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity."

Reply Obj. 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual.

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QUESTION 62

OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?

(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?

(3) How many, and which are they?

(4) Of their order.

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to _Phys._ vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.

Obj. 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5), which are not in us but in G.o.d. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.

Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to G.o.d, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.

Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to G.o.d. Therefore they are theological virtues.

_I answer that,_ Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q. 5, A.

7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q. 5, A. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpa.s.sing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of G.o.d alone, by a kind of partic.i.p.ation of the G.o.dhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness surpa.s.ses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from G.o.d some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine a.s.sistance. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is G.o.d, inasmuch as they direct us aright to G.o.d: secondly, because they are infused in us by G.o.d alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Reply Obj. 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpa.s.s the nature of man. Secondly, by partic.i.p.ation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fas.h.i.+on, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.

Reply Obj. 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though G.o.d were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them G.o.d makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to G.o.d, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 2]

Whether the Theological Virtues Are Distinct from the Intellectual and Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appet.i.tive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appet.i.tive part, are called moral.

Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to G.o.d. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to G.o.d: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.

_On the contrary,_ That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Q. 58, A. 3).

Therefore they are distinct from one another.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is G.o.d Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpa.s.sing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appet.i.te according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.

Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpa.s.s human reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity.

When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; Q. 41, A. 2, ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q. 65, AA. 2, 5; II-II, Q. 23, A.

7).

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 3]

Whether Faith, Hope, and Charity Are Fittingly Reckoned As Theological Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a pa.s.sion.

Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to G.o.d.

Now man's soul cannot be directed to G.o.d, save through the intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rect.i.tude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason.

But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things G.o.d hath prepared for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable--and this pertains to hope--and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end--and this belongs to charity. For the appet.i.te of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpa.s.s all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of G.o.d is stronger than men."

Reply Obj. 3: Two things pertain to the appet.i.te, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appet.i.te, namely, hope and charity.