Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 91

Reply Obj. 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no pa.s.sion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a pa.s.sion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a pa.s.sion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz.

"when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar pa.s.sions.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 2]

Whether There Can Be Moral Virtue with Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with pa.s.sion.

For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is not pa.s.sionate; but a patient man is one who is pa.s.sionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral virtues are without pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated _Phys._ vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's pa.s.sions are "the soul's diseases," as he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is pa.s.sion compatible with virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the pa.s.sions are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sall.u.s.t says (Catilin.) that "when they," i.e. the soul's pa.s.sions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore pa.s.sion is incompatible with moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the pa.s.sions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the pa.s.sions, but is consistent with them.

_I answer that,_ The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's pa.s.sions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the pa.s.sions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.

This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appet.i.te, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appet.i.te, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the pa.s.sions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not pa.s.sions, are movements of the intellective appet.i.te or will; but only in the point of the pa.s.sions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.

These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these pa.s.sions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."

Accordingly, if the pa.s.sions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the pa.s.sions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from pa.s.sion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the a.s.sertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those pa.s.sions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to ill.u.s.trate, not his own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the pa.s.sions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from pa.s.sion. It may be said, however, that when he says "a gentle man is not pa.s.sionate," we are to understand this of inordinate pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in _De Tusc. Quaest._ iv take the pa.s.sions in the execution of reason's command.

Reply Obj. 3: When a pa.s.sion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]

Whether Sorrow Is Compatible with Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue.

Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.

Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc.

Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.

_On the contrary,_ Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said (Matt. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three _eupatheiai_, i.e. "three good pa.s.sions," in place of the three disturbances: viz.

instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.

First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it.

Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The sorrow that is according to G.o.d worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other pa.s.sions are when moderated by reason.

Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appet.i.te follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appet.i.te be conformed to reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6, 7).

Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.

Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.

Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.

Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.

Reply Obj. 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of life.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]

Whether All the Moral Virtues Are About the Pa.s.sions?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the pa.s.sions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, AA. 1, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the pa.s.sions.

Obj. 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by partic.i.p.ation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the pa.s.sions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the pa.s.sions.

Obj. 3: Further, some pa.s.sion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the pa.s.sions, or none are. But some are about the pa.s.sions, as fort.i.tude and temperance, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 6, 10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the pa.s.sions.

_On the contrary,_ Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the pa.s.sions; as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, seqq.

_I answer that,_ Moral virtue perfects the appet.i.tive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason.

Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te, but also the operations of the intellective appet.i.te, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a pa.s.sion, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about pa.s.sions, but some are about pa.s.sions, some about operations.

Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and pa.s.sions; now every action and pa.s.sion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,"

viz. as about something that results from virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: Not only the sensitive appet.i.te which is the subject of the pa.s.sions, is rational by partic.i.p.ation, but also the will, where there are no pa.s.sions, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Some virtues have pa.s.sions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 5]

Whether There Can Be Moral Virtue Without Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without pa.s.sion.

For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the pa.s.sions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the pa.s.sions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. 7:5) they are called "pa.s.sions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to G.o.d, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But G.o.d does all things without pa.s.sion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any pa.s.sion.