Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 72

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special pa.s.sion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger (_ira_). But there are several pa.s.sions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, to every special pa.s.sion there is a contrary pa.s.sion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no pa.s.sion is contrary to anger, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 3).

Therefore anger is not a special pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, one special pa.s.sion does not include another. But anger includes several pa.s.sions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2).

Therefore anger is not a special pa.s.sion.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special pa.s.sion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals.

Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).

Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fas.h.i.+on, actually existing therein.

Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general pa.s.sion but is condivided with the other pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other pa.s.sions. But in this way, love may be called a general pa.s.sion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), because love is the primary root of all the other pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q.

27, A. 4). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general pa.s.sion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several pa.s.sions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible."

Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).

Reply Obj. 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" (anger), not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary pa.s.sions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger includes several pa.s.sions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 2]

Whether the Object of Anger Is Good or Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it a.s.sails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.

Obj. 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 1). Therefore anger does also.

Obj. 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.

Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.

_I answer that,_ The movement of the appet.i.tive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appet.i.tive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appet.i.te simply follows and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the appet.i.te is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.

We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a pa.s.sion somewhat made up of contrary pa.s.sions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 3]

Whether Anger Is in the Concupiscible Faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty.

Therefore anger is too.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible pa.s.sion.

Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.

Therefore anger is a concupiscible pa.s.sion.

_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible would not take its name from it.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the pa.s.sions of the irascible part differ from the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible pa.s.sions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible pa.s.sions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated (A. 2) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.

Reply Obj. 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

Reply Obj. 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same pa.s.sion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and it has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2) that the concupiscible pa.s.sions are the causes of the irascible pa.s.sions.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 4]

Whether Anger Requires an Act of Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a pa.s.sion, it is in the sensitive appet.i.te. But the sensitive appet.i.te follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Obj. 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger listens to reason somewhat."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fas.h.i.+on, requires an act of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the appet.i.tive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appet.i.te. In another way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appet.i.te is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the will.

Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2, 27) that whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 5]

Whether Anger Is More Natural Than Desire?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal.

But "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man.

Obj. 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not,"

as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.