Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 61

Obj. 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily trans.m.u.tation in conjunction with it. But bodily trans.m.u.tation takes place in all the pa.s.sions of the soul, as stated above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other pa.s.sions of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.

Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other pa.s.sions of the soul.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age flouris.h.i.+ng: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov.

25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus. 38:19): "Of sadness cometh death."

_I answer that,_ Of all the soul's pa.s.sions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quant.i.ty, as is the case with the other pa.s.sions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of quant.i.ty; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species.

Now it must be noted that, in all the pa.s.sions of the soul, the bodily trans.m.u.tation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appet.i.tive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those pa.s.sions that imply a movement of the appet.i.te in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these pa.s.sions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those pa.s.sions which denote in the appet.i.te a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily trans.m.u.tation.

Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Other pa.s.sions imply a bodily trans.m.u.tation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a trans.m.u.tation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life.

Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness.

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QUESTION 38

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pain or sorrow is a.s.suaged by every pleasure?

(2) Whether it is a.s.suaged by weeping?

(3) Whether it is a.s.suaged by the sympathy of friends?

(4) Whether it is a.s.suaged by contemplating the truth?

(5) Whether it is a.s.suaged by sleep and baths?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]

Whether Pain or Sorrow Is a.s.suaged by Every Pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure a.s.suages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not a.s.suage sorrow, save in so far as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic.

ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure a.s.suages every sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not a.s.suage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in _Ethic._ ix, 4, "the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every pleasure a.s.suages sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to a.s.sociate with his friend, now dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure a.s.suages every sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense."

_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (Q. 23, A. 4), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appet.i.te in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appet.i.te.

Consequently in movements of the appet.i.te pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a non-natural trans.m.u.tation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appet.i.tive faculty. Therefore just as all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by a.s.suaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.

Reply Obj. 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4).

And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be a.s.suaged by any pleasure.

Reply Obj. 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.

Reply Obj. 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure.

Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives out the sorrow.

Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures."

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 2]

Whether Pain or Sorrow Is a.s.suaged by Tears?

Objection 1: It would seem that tears do not a.s.suage sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy.

Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not a.s.suage sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some little refreshment."

_I answer that,_ Tears and groans naturally a.s.suage sorrow: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is a.s.suaged. Secondly, because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (A. 1), every pleasure a.s.suages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is a.s.suaged by weeping and groans.

Reply Obj. 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man.

For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows.

Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is a.s.suaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid contrariety.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it.

Reply Obj. 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure.

For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27).

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 3]

Whether Pain or Sorrow Are a.s.suaged by the Sympathy of Friends?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not a.s.suage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.

Obj. 2: Further, friends.h.i.+p demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase.

Obj. 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self"

(Ethic. ix, 4, 9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympathizes.