Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 23

(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?

(7) Whether the knowledge of G.o.d is discursive?

(8) Whether the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things?

(9) Whether G.o.d has knowledge of non-existing things?

(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?

(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?

(12) Whether He knows the infinite?

(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?

(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?

(15) Whether the knowledge of G.o.d is variable?

(16) Whether G.o.d has speculative or practical knowledge of things?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Knowledge [*Scientia] in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that in G.o.d there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to G.o.d, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in G.o.d; therefore science is not in G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in G.o.d there is no universal or particular (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore in G.o.d there is not knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of G.o.d" (Rom. 11:33).

_I answer that,_ In G.o.d there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in _De Anima_ ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in _De Anima_ iii. Since therefore G.o.d is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Because perfections flowing from G.o.d to creatures exist in a higher state in G.o.d Himself (Q. 4, A. 2), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to G.o.d, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of G.o.d, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in G.o.d simply and unitedly (Q. 13, A. 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has _intelligence_ as regards the knowledge of principles; he has _science_ as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has _wisdom,_ according as he knows the highest cause; he has _counsel_ or _prudence,_ according as he knows what is to be done. But G.o.d knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (A. 7).

Hence the simple knowledge of G.o.d can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in G.o.d after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 2]

Whether G.o.d Understands Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But G.o.d does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.

Obj. 2: Further, to understand is a kind of pa.s.sion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of a.s.similation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore G.o.d does not understand Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, we are like to G.o.d chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of G.o.d in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.

ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. Therefore G.o.d understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The things that are of G.o.d no man knoweth, but the Spirit of G.o.d" (1 Cor. 2:11).

_I answer that,_ G.o.d understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pa.s.s to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.

Since therefore G.o.d has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus G.o.d understands Himself through Himself.

Reply Obj. 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in _De Causis_ that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to G.o.d to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement and pa.s.sion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or pa.s.sion, as stated in _De Anima_ iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect pa.s.sing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is a.s.similated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and a.s.similates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it a.s.similated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.

Reply Obj. 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our pa.s.sive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our pa.s.sive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But G.o.d is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 3]

Whether G.o.d Comprehends Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself." But G.o.d is in all ways infinite.

Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.

Obj. 2: If it is said that G.o.d is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in G.o.d is truer than it is in us. If therefore G.o.d is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then G.o.d is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore G.o.d does not comprehend Himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But G.o.d understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.

_I answer that,_ G.o.d perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that G.o.d knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in _Metaph._ ix. Now the power of G.o.d in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that G.o.d is cognitive, as shown above (AA. 1, 2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

Reply Obj. 1: The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another.

But G.o.d is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as G.o.d is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer."

Reply Obj. 2: When it is said, "G.o.d is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But G.o.d is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 4]

Whether the Act of G.o.d's Intellect Is His Substance?

Objection 1: It seems that the act of G.o.d's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of G.o.d's intellect is not His substance.

Obj. 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, but secondary and accessory. If therefore G.o.d be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus G.o.d's act of understanding will not be something great.

Obj. 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore G.o.d understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of G.o.d's intellect is not His substance.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In G.o.d to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in G.o.d to be is the same thing as to understand. But G.o.d's existence is His substance, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore the act of G.o.d's intellect is His substance.