Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 50

Whether Delight Is a Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a pa.s.sion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from pa.s.sion, and says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while pa.s.sion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5).

Therefore delight is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, "To be pa.s.sive is to be moved," as stated in _Phys._ iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4, 5. But to be perfected does not consist in being pa.s.sive or in being altered, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 3 and _De Anima_ ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a pa.s.sion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other pa.s.sions of the soul.

_I answer that,_ The movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, are properly called pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establis.h.i.+ng thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing."

In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appet.i.te; which movement is called delight.

Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establis.h.i.+ng in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we a.s.sign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establis.h.i.+ng is "all at once," we mean that this establis.h.i.+ng is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32, 33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establis.h.i.+ng is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appet.i.te arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a pa.s.sion of the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.

Reply Obj. 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appet.i.te; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the appet.i.tive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appet.i.te, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appet.i.te, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appet.i.te by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the name of pa.s.sion is more appropriate to those pa.s.sions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some pa.s.sions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 4): and in this sense delight is called a pa.s.sion.

________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether Delight Is in Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.

Obj. 3: Further, the pa.s.sions of the soul are of one same genus. But some pa.s.sions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."

_I answer that,_ A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.

Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7, movement is twofold.

One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time.

Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.

Reply Obj. 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.

Reply Obj. 3: Other pa.s.sions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.

________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]

Whether Delight Differs from Joy?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the pa.s.sions of the soul differ according to their objects. But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.

Obj. 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.

Obj. 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguis.h.i.+ng gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various pa.s.sions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ from delight.

_On the contrary,_ We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight.

_I answer that,_ Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 3), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight.

Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the object of the appet.i.te of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences (Q. 30, A. 3, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement.

Reply Obj. 3: These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for _laet.i.tia_ (gladness) is derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "lat.i.tia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings.

________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether Delight Is in the Intellectual Appet.i.te?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appet.i.te. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appet.i.te.

Obj. 2: Further, delight is a pa.s.sion. But every pa.s.sion is in the sensitive appet.i.te. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive appet.i.te.

Obj. 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common with irrational animals.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord."

But the sensitive appet.i.te cannot reach to G.o.d; only the intellectual appet.i.te can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appet.i.te.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appet.i.te is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appet.i.te or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.

However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appet.i.te is accompanied by a bodily trans.m.u.tation, whereas delight of the intellectual appet.i.te is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish."

Reply Obj. 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 2: Delight has the character of pa.s.sion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily trans.m.u.tation. It is not thus in the intellectual appet.i.te, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in G.o.d and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.

vii, 14) that "G.o.d rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of _De Coel. Hier.,_ that "the angels are not susceptible to our pa.s.sible delight, but rejoice together with G.o.d with the gladness of incorruption."

Reply Obj. 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights."

Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appet.i.te, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appet.i.te, which we have in common with the angels.

________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 5]