Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 41

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]

Whether Pa.s.sion Increases or Decreases the Goodness or Malice of an Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that every pa.s.sion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every pa.s.sion hinders the judgment of reason: for Sall.u.s.t says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friends.h.i.+p and pity." Therefore pa.s.sion decreases the goodness of a moral act.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to G.o.d, the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of G.o.d, as most dear children." But "G.o.d and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish ... no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a pa.s.sion of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by pa.s.sion: for he sins less, who sins from pa.s.sion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without pa.s.sion, than he who does with pa.s.sion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the pa.s.sion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a pa.s.sion of the soul does not lessen moral good.

_I answer that,_ As the Stoics held that every pa.s.sion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every pa.s.sion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by pa.s.sions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of pa.s.sions to all the movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his pa.s.sions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man.

Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appet.i.te can obey reason, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 7), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the pa.s.sions themselves also should be controlled by reason.

Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appet.i.te; according to Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living G.o.d": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appet.i.te, and by "flesh" the sensitive appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere pa.s.sion of pity. In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the pa.s.sion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appet.i.te, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a pa.s.sion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appet.i.te. And thus a pa.s.sion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.

Reply Obj. 2: In G.o.d and the angels there is no sensitive appet.i.te, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of pa.s.sions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.

Reply Obj. 3: A pa.s.sion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above (Reply Obj. 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]

Whether Any Pa.s.sion Is Good or Evil in Its Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that no pa.s.sion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason. But the pa.s.sions are in the sensitive appet.i.te; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no pa.s.sion is good or evil according to its species.

Obj. 2: Further, acts and pa.s.sions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any pa.s.sion were good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that those pa.s.sions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those pa.s.sions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false.

Therefore no pa.s.sion is good or evil according to its species.

Obj. 3: Further, there is no species of pa.s.sion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no pa.s.sion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy pa.s.sion. Therefore some pa.s.sions are good or evil according to their species.

_I answer that,_ We ought, seemingly, to apply to pa.s.sions what has been said in regard to acts (Q. 18, AA. 5, 6; Q. 20, A. 1)--viz. that the species of a pa.s.sion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or pa.s.sion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a pa.s.sion, in so far as the object to which a pa.s.sion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of _shame_ which is base fear; and of _envy_ which is sorrow for another's good: for thus pa.s.sions belong to the same species as the external act.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the pa.s.sions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appet.i.te is considered in itself.

But in so far as the sensitive appet.i.te obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the pa.s.sions of the appet.i.te, but essentially.

Reply Obj. 2: Pa.s.sions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those pa.s.sions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are themselves evil.

Reply Obj. 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appet.i.te does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's pa.s.sions.

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QUESTION 25

OF THE ORDER OF THE Pa.s.sIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the order of the pa.s.sions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The relation of the irascible pa.s.sions to the concupiscible pa.s.sions;

(2) The relation of the concupiscible pa.s.sions to one another;

(3) The relation of the irascible pa.s.sions to one another;

(4) The four princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions.

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]

Whether the Irascible Pa.s.sions Precede the Concupiscible Pa.s.sions, or Vice Versa?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible pa.s.sions precede the concupiscible pa.s.sions. For the order of the pa.s.sions is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible pa.s.sions seem to precede the concupiscible pa.s.sions.

Obj. 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purpose of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1; I, Q. 81, A. 2). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"

(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible pa.s.sions precede the concupiscible pa.s.sions.

Obj. 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible pa.s.sions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible pa.s.sions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the concupiscible pa.s.sions follow the irascible pa.s.sions.

_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible pa.s.sions regard the absolute good, while the irascible pa.s.sions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible pa.s.sions precede the irascible.

_I answer that,_ In the concupiscible pa.s.sions there is more diversity than in the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we find something relating to movement--e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible pa.s.sions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.

Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we compare the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible pa.s.sions take precedence of such like pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible pa.s.sion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible pa.s.sions: because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every pa.s.sion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible pa.s.sion denoting rest, viz.

either in joy or in sadness.

But if we compare the irascible pa.s.sions to those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take precedence: because the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.

Accordingly the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote movement towards good or evil, and those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible pa.s.sions both arise from and terminate in the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous.

But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.

Reply Obj. 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of pa.s.sions as directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible pa.s.sion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.

Wherefore it only follows that the irascible pa.s.sions precede those concupiscible pa.s.sions that connote rest. The third objection leads to the same conclusion.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]

Whether Love Is the First of the Concupiscible Pa.s.sions?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible pa.s.sions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same pa.s.sion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4).

Therefore desire takes precedence of love.

Obj. 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.