Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 32

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TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 10]

Whether a Circ.u.mstance Places a Moral Action in the Species of Good or Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is taken from its object. But circ.u.mstances differ from the object.

Therefore circ.u.mstances do not give an action its species.

Obj. 2: Further, circ.u.mstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1). But an accident does not const.i.tute the species. Therefore a circ.u.mstance does not const.i.tute a species of good or evil.

Obj. 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action has several circ.u.mstances. Therefore a circ.u.mstance does not place a moral action in a species of good or evil.

_On the contrary,_ Place is a circ.u.mstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circ.u.mstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.

_I answer that,_ Just as the species of natural things are const.i.tuted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are const.i.tuted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above (A. 5). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference const.i.tuting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circ.u.mstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the princ.i.p.al condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate another's property is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circ.u.mstance. But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circ.u.mstance, is considered here as the princ.i.p.al condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circ.u.mstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.

Reply Obj. 1: A circ.u.mstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: A circ.u.mstance, so long as it is but a circ.u.mstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a princ.i.p.al condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not every circ.u.mstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every circ.u.mstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may have many circ.u.mstances, it does not follow that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said above (A.

7, ad 1; Q. 1, A. 3, ad 3).

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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 11]

Whether Every Circ.u.mstance That Makes an Action Better or Worse, Places a Moral Action in a Species of Good or Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that every circ.u.mstance relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every circ.u.mstance that makes an action better or worse, const.i.tutes a species.

Obj. 2: Further, an additional circ.u.mstance either has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circ.u.mstance that makes an action better or worse, const.i.tutes a new species of good or evil.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is caused by each single defect." Now every circ.u.mstance that increases malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circ.u.mstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circ.u.mstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since the good consists in "number, weight, and measure" (I, Q. 5, A. 5).

_On the contrary,_ More and less do not change a species. But more and less is a circ.u.mstance of additional goodness or malice.

Therefore not every circ.u.mstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good or evil.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 10), a circ.u.mstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circ.u.mstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circ.u.mstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take something in a large or small quant.i.ty, does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quant.i.ty, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not every circ.u.mstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.

Reply Obj. 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.

Reply Obj. 2: A circ.u.mstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself, but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above.

Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.

Reply Obj. 3: A circ.u.mstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something else. In like manner a circ.u.mstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil.

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QUESTION 19

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?

(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?

(3) Whether it depends on reason?

(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?

(5) Whether erring reason binds?

(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of G.o.d?

(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end?

(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?

(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine Will?

(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.

Obj. 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the end, but goodness of making is never the end": because the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.

Obj. 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be.

But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will.

Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object.

_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly, virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.

_I answer that,_ Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5).

Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects.

Reply Obj. 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5).

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]