Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 158

_On the contrary,_ G.o.d produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen.

1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore G.o.d alone can move a body immediately.

_I answer that,_ It is erroneous to say that G.o.d cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that G.o.d can move immediately any bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A.

1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as G.o.d can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, G.o.d, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, "There is no contact with G.o.d"; that is, so that G.o.d Himself be touched.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover _of bulk,_ by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power _of bulk,_ would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpa.s.ses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 3]

Whether G.o.d Moves the Created Intellect Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pa.s.s into external matter; as stated in _Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover.

Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently G.o.d cannot move the created intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding.

Therefore it is not moved by another.

Obj. 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But G.o.d is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore G.o.d cannot move our intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught.

But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that G.o.d "teaches man knowledge."

Therefore G.o.d moves the human intellect.

_I answer that,_ As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now G.o.d moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in G.o.d, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore G.o.d so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from G.o.d as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which G.o.d impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q. 12, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q. 12, A. 4).

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 4]

Whether G.o.d Can Move the Created Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.

Therefore G.o.d cannot move the will.

Obj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if G.o.d moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore G.o.d does not move the will.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is G.o.d who worketh in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish."

_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by G.o.d alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpa.s.ses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.

Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; G.o.d alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing is caused by G.o.d alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to G.o.d to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner G.o.d, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 5]

Whether G.o.d Works in Every Agent?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to G.o.d. If therefore G.o.d works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Obj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from G.o.d operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.

Obj. 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if G.o.d is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that G.o.d does not operate any further in the operating creature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."

_I answer that,_ Some have understood G.o.d to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that G.o.d alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but G.o.d in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that G.o.d works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.

For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does G.o.d work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it partic.i.p.ates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is G.o.d; it follows that G.o.d Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of G.o.d Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that G.o.d not only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.

Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things G.o.d Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things G.o.d works intimately.

For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to G.o.d as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews."

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.

Reply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 6]

Whether G.o.d Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: "G.o.d the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore G.o.d can do nothing outside the natural order.

Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from G.o.d, so is the order of nature. But G.o.d cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d established the order of nature. Therefore it G.o.d does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said.