Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 124

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appet.i.tive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appet.i.tive from the cognitive powers.

_I answer that,_ It is necessary to a.s.sign an appet.i.tive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which partic.i.p.ate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appet.i.te. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to G.o.d, "in Whom all things pre-exist,"

as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpa.s.sing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appet.i.te. And this superior inclination belongs to the appet.i.tive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to a.s.sign an appet.i.tive power to the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: Appet.i.te is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to a.s.sign to the soul a particular power.

Reply Obj. 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Reply Obj. 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appet.i.te that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appet.i.te is the animal appet.i.te, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 2]

Whether the Sensitive and Intellectual Appet.i.tes Are Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appet.i.tes are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 3). But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appet.i.tes are not distinct powers.

Obj. 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.

But there is no place for this distinction in the appet.i.tive part: for since the appet.i.te is a movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly every act of the appet.i.te regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appet.i.te is not distinguished from the sensitive.

Obj. 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appet.i.tive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appet.i.tive part.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appet.i.te, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appet.i.te moves the lower.

_I answer that,_ We must needs say that the intellectual appet.i.te is a distinct power from the sensitive appet.i.te. For the appet.i.tive power is a pa.s.sive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appet.i.te is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in _De Anima_ iii, 10 and _Metaph._ xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things pa.s.sive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the pa.s.sive: indeed, the pa.s.sive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appet.i.te is distinct from the sensitive.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the appet.i.te except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appet.i.tive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual appet.i.te, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred can regard a universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the intellectual appet.i.te we may desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.

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QUESTION 81

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (In Three Articles)

Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sensuality is only an appet.i.tive power?

(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?

(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 1]

Whether Sensuality Is Only Appet.i.tive?

Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appet.i.tive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge.

Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.

Obj. 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

_On the contrary,_ Sensuality is defined as "the appet.i.te of things belonging to the body."

_I answer that,_ The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appet.i.te following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appet.i.te: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appet.i.tive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appet.i.tive power is rather likened to movement.

Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appet.i.tive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.

Reply Obj. 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appet.i.te, to which appertains sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 2]

Whether the Sensitive Appet.i.te Is Divided into the Irascible and Concupiscible As Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appet.i.te is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive appet.i.te regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appet.i.te differing from the concupiscible.

Obj. 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on Matt. 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) a.s.sign two parts to the sensitive appet.i.te, the irascible and the concupiscible.

_I answer that,_ The sensitive appet.i.te is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appet.i.te--the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appet.i.te is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appet.i.te is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appet.i.tive powers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appet.i.te, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appet.i.te, it may fight against obstacles.

Wherefore also the pa.s.sions of the irascible appet.i.te counteract the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible appet.i.te: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the pa.s.sions of the irascible appet.i.te rise from the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible appet.i.te and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy.

For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible--namely, food and s.e.x, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.].

Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Reply Obj. 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 2); so also in the sensitive appet.i.te there is a certain appet.i.tive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power.

Reply Obj. 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appet.i.te: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appet.i.te.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 3]

Whether the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes obey reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes do not obey reason.