Alexander Hamilton Part 3

Report after report was sent to Congress, setting forth the operations of the Treasury with a lucidity and power which silenced the opposition and almost overwhelmed Madison, who had been forced as a party leader to accept the responsibility for the attacks. The reports, to any one who understood the subject, were absolutely convincing of the soundness and wisdom of Hamilton's measures.

Jefferson, perhaps, had some right to complain of the influence which Hamilton exerted over that department of the government which properly belonged under his exclusive jurisdiction. This was the management of foreign relations. Hamilton had such definite and well-considered views on foreign policy as well as finance that he could not forbear presenting them in the cabinet. His superiority in definiteness of aim and energy no doubt led him to believe that he was fitted for the functions of prime minister and that he was justified in exercising them as far as he could. The course of Was.h.i.+ngton encouraged him to the extent that the President often gave the preference to his views over those of Jefferson, but it was far from the purpose of the President to make any distinction in rank or in his confidence between his ministers. Hamilton, although an admirer of the British political system, permitted himself few prejudices in his theory of the foreign policy of the United States. Though often charged with British sympathies, he leaned much less towards Great Britain than Jefferson, through his admiration of the spirit of the French Revolution, leaned towards France.

The foreign relations of the country began to become acute with the outbreak of war between England and France in 1793. France had already abolished royalty, expelled the n.o.bles, sent Louis XVI. to the scaffold, and was on the eve of the terrible ma.s.sacres which did so much to revolt even her best friends outside the country. The news of war reached the United States early in April, 1793. News came also that a minister from the French Republic had landed at Charleston and would soon present his credentials at Philadelphia. Hamilton sent post haste for Was.h.i.+ngton, who was at Mount Vernon. The outbreak of war meant danger to American commerce on the ocean and the risk of trouble with both powers over the neutrality laws. The serious question confronting the American government was whether they should maintain strict neutrality between the belligerents or should side with France, to whom they were bound by the treaties made with her when she came to the rescue of the colonies. When Was.h.i.+ngton reached Philadelphia, he found both Jefferson and Hamilton ready with suggestions for meeting the crisis, but these suggestions differed widely. Jefferson, although not an advocate of war against England, believed that Congress should be called together in extra session to deal with the emergency.

A stronger programme was urged upon the President by Hamilton. He regarded the question of neutrality and the reception of the French envoy as one for the executive rather than for Congress. He believed also that these subjects would be safer in the hands of Was.h.i.+ngton than midst the pa.s.sions of a legislative body. He drew up a statement, embodying a series of questions regarding the policy of the United States, which was laid by Was.h.i.+ngton before the cabinet. The first question was whether a declaration of neutrality should be issued.

This was decided in the affirmative, and the proclamation was soon issued by Was.h.i.+ngton. It was decided that the French minister, Genet, should be received, but that early occasion should be taken to explain to him that the United States did not consider themselves bound by the treaties to plunge into war in behalf of France. While it was admitted by Hamilton that it would not be the province of the United States under ordinary circ.u.mstances to cavil over the character of the government in France, but would be their duty to accept the government which existed, nevertheless, the extraordinary events which had taken place at Paris justified a certain reserve towards the revolutionary powers.

Entirely apart from the changes in the character of the French government, it was felt by Hamilton that the time had come to give an interpretation to the early treaties in harmony with a more unchallenged independence for the United States, and a more complete separation from the intrigues of European politics. The radical character of the Revolution in France, and the action of the French government itself, gave an excuse for an interpretation of the treaties which otherwise might not have been found without blus.h.i.+ng.

The treaties provided for a defensive alliance with France, and it was promptly decided by the cabinet that the war of France against Great Britain was not defensive. Hamilton proposed not only to revise the treaties, but to resist by the utmost efforts of the federal government the enlistment of men and the fitting out of privateers in America in aid of the French. He did not propose, as some of the friends of France would have desired, that the proclamation of neutrality should be only a mask for underhanded aid to that country.

The situation was made as difficult as possible for the government by the hot temper and indiscretions of the new French minister. These qualities in him were encouraged by the reception which he received on the way from Charleston to Philadelphia. He was everywhere welcomed with such enthusiastic demonstrations of sympathy for France as tended to make him believe that he was something more than the diplomatic representative of a foreign country, and could safely interfere in the politics of the United States. As he approached Philadelphia (May 16, 1793) he found Captain Bompard of the French frigate L'Ambuscade ready to fire a salute of three guns, and men on swift horses posted along the road to give notice to the citizens of his coming.

Genet had no sooner landed at Charleston than he began to fit out privateers to prey upon British commerce. The Ambuscade herself, which brought Genet to Charleston, seized several English merchant vessels on her way to Philadelphia, and crowned her insolence to the United States by seizing an English vessel, the Grange, within the Delaware capes, in the jurisdiction of the United States. The Grange was restored to her owners, but her seizure was only one of many flagrant violations of international law which were systematically carried out by the French, and which were defended and often planned by Genet.

When the Polly was stopped from leaving New York fitted out for a French privateer, Hauterive, the French consul, addressed a note to Governor Clinton, telling him it was not in a land where Frenchmen had spilled their blood that they were to be thus hara.s.sed. When the Little Sarah was fitted out as a privateer in Philadelphia, Hamilton and Knox urged that a battery be placed on one of the islands and that the vessel be fired upon if she attempted to leave the harbor.

Jefferson was hoodwinked by a.s.surances from Genet that the vessel would not sail, and himself indulged in some glittering talk against the United States joining in "the combination of kings against France." The vessel at once put to sea, and Was.h.i.+ngton was so indignant that Jefferson was almost driven to resignation.

Hamilton had a more direct interest officially in the demands of Genet for money which was owed to France. Genet not only asked for the antic.i.p.ation of payments soon to mature, but insisted that he should receive the whole amount of the debt. He threw a bait to American sentiment by the suggestion that the money would be spent in the United States for provisions and supplies. Hamilton treated his rude demands just as he would those of any other creditor. He was willing to antic.i.p.ate certain payments when the Treasury resources justified it, but absolutely refused to do more. Genet then threatened to pay for what he bought with drafts upon the Treasury. Hamilton coolly retorted that the drafts would not be honored. The Frenchman was compelled to consume his wrath, not exactly in silence, but without result upon the government.

Genet, encouraged by some of the enemies of the administration, succeeded in working up a strong pro-French sentiment in various parts of the country. At a dinner in Philadelphia, following his arrival, songs were sung to France and America, and the red cap of liberty, which had been forced upon the reluctant head of Louis XVI. in the great demonstration of the preceding August at the Tuileries, was pa.s.sed around the table and successively worn by each of the American guests. Hamilton, who never had much confidence in pure democracy, went close to the other extreme in his alarm over these signs of public opinion. He felt compelled in the summer of 1793 to publish a series of essays signed "Pacificus," defending the policy of the administration. These papers, in the language of Mr, Lodge, "served their purpose of awakening the better part of the community to the gravity of the situation, and began the work of rallying the friends of the government to its active support." Genet addressed such offensive letters to the Department of State, and his conduct became so intolerable, that the cabinet agreed to send the correspondence to Paris and ask for his recall. Genet himself published a letter which revealed his insolence to the public, and caused a revulsion of sentiment which brought the more sober men of all parties to the side of Was.h.i.+ngton. Genet's course was run, and in February, 1794, his successor came out from France.

Hamilton soon had opportunities for proving that his policy of neutrality was directed as much against English as against French aggression. When Great Britain issued the first Orders in Council, directing the seizure of all vessels loaded with French produce, Hamilton declared the British order an outrage, and urged the fortification of the seaports and the raising of troops. He exerted himself, however, to restrain popular pa.s.sion and preserve peace. He suggested to Was.h.i.+ngton that a special mission be sent to London to treat with the British government. The idea was cordially accepted by Was.h.i.+ngton. He desired to send Hamilton, but the Virginia party, headed by Madison and Monroe, strongly opposed the appointment. They were embittered by recent party conflicts, and regarded Hamilton as too friendly to British interests. Chief Justice John Jay of New York was then recommended by Hamilton for the mission. Opposition was made even to Jay, but the nomination was confirmed (April 19, 1794), and Hamilton himself drew the outline of the instructions with which Jay sailed from New York.

The conflict over the treaty which Jay brought back in the following winter was one of the most bitter ever waged in American politics. The contracting parties to the treaty--the United States and Great Britain--looked at the situation from widely different points of view.

Jay secured the promise of the withdrawal of the British troops from the frontier posts and an agreement to compensate Americans for losses through British privateering. The last was an important concession, because it covertly admitted the British position in regard to privateering to be in conflict with international law. Some important commercial concessions were also made by Great Britain, which were regarded at London as purely gratuitous. But the treaty failed to secure any compensation for the claims of American citizens for negroes and other property carried away by the British troops, and American vessels were forbidden carrying to Europe from English ports or even from the United States coffee and the other chief colonial products. Among the latter was named cotton, which was then just becoming a large element in the production of the South.

Hamilton himself is said to have characterized the treaty as "an old woman's treaty," when he first read it, but it soon became evident that it must be accepted substantially as presented, if war was to be avoided. Was.h.i.+ngton called the Senate in extra session in June, 1795, and after two weeks' debate in secret session the treaty was ratified by exactly the necessary two thirds vote,--twenty to ten. It was not until the adjournment of the Senate that the contents of the doc.u.ment reached the public through Senator Mason of Virginia. The news was followed by town meetings all over the country demanding that President Was.h.i.+ngton refuse to exchange ratifications. So intense was the feeling that a vessel suspected of being a British privateer was seized and burned at Boston, a great meeting in Faneuil Hall ordered a committee to take a protest to Philadelphia, and Hamilton himself was stoned and refused a hearing at a meeting in New York. But Was.h.i.+ngton remained calm. Hamilton, as the responsible leader of the party, took up the cudgels for ratification. He submitted an elaborate argument to the cabinet (July 9, 1795), and with an amendment which the Senate recommended and Great Britain accepted, the treaty went into operation.

VII

HAMILTON AS A PARTY LEADER

The ratification of the Jay treaty did much to shake the power of the Federalists, and for a moment seemed to threaten their ruin. It was divisions in their own ranks, however, which contributed as much to this event as any real blunders in public policy. Hamilton was not at his best in conciliating those who differed from him, and he did not encounter a more yielding or tactful a.s.sociate in John Adams. Hamilton had gone out of his way with little reason at the first presidential election, in 1788, to secure votes against Adams. His avowed object was to insure the election of Was.h.i.+ngton by preventing a tie vote between Was.h.i.+ngton and Adams. The original Const.i.tution authorized each elector to vote for two persons for President and Vice-President, without designating the office for which either was voted for. This led to complications which were corrected by an amendment after the election of 1800. In the case of the first election, however, few sane men doubted that Was.h.i.+ngton would have the majority of the votes, and the only effect of the intrigue of Hamilton was to reduce the vote for Adams to a point which almost caused his defeat. Hamilton supported Adams in the second election, in 1792, and the relations between the two men were reasonably cordial.

When Was.h.i.+ngton retired from the presidency, in 1797, the commanding men in the Federalist party were Hamilton, John Jay, Thomas Pinckney, and John Adams. Hamilton was the controlling mind in the consultations of the leaders rather than the sort of man who appealed to the people.

He was not seriously thought of by himself or others as a candidate for President. Jay was barred by the odium attaching to the treaty with Great Britain. The choice was therefore reduced to Pinckney and Adams. Most of the leaders were for Adams, who was superior to Pinckney in Revolutionary services and ability. It was determined that the Federalist electors should vote for both Adams and Pinckney, with the purpose of choosing the former for President and the latter for Vice-President. Hamilton on this occasion urged that all the Federalist electors should vote for both Adams and Pinckney. If each had received an equal number of votes, the choice would have been thrown into the House and Adams would probably have been elected.

Hamilton erred in letting it be known that he was indifferent whether the outcome was favorable to Adams or Pinckney, especially when there was a strong suspicion that he was really for Pinckney. Party discipline had not then reached its modern development, and votes were thrown away by Federalist electors,--in the North to prevent a majority for Pinckney over Adams and in the South to prevent the same chance in favor of Adams.

The result of these jealousies was that Adams barely escaped defeat.

He was chosen by a plurality of three, but Pinckney was beaten, and Jefferson, having the next highest vote, was elected Vice-President.

Adams became firmly convinced that Hamilton was his personal enemy and would stop at nothing to injure him. That Hamilton was recognized by all the party leaders as the master mind and the guiding spirit of the party made no difference to a man of the hot temper and resolute spirit of John Adams. Tact and conciliation were as far removed from his nature as from that of any American public man. The indifference of Hamilton whether he was beaten by Pinckney, in connection with Hamilton's intrigue in 1788, had convinced Adams that Hamilton did not feel proper respect for him, and that he was seeking to dictate the policy of the administration and to thwart and degrade him. Adams resented any sort of suggestion or consultation, and took delight in disregarding the suggestions of Hamilton, while the latter struck back through several members of the cabinet, who were more in sympathy with him than with the President.

The country having escaped the danger of immediate war with England by the Jay treaty, was soon threatened with war with France. Monroe had been recalled as American Minister at Paris and Charles Pinckney, who was sent in his place, had been refused a reception. Some of the Federalists were so incensed against France that they were eager for war. Hamilton was opposed to war if it could be avoided, but was in favor of a resolute policy. Adams, although as far as possible from sympathy with France, believed every reasonable effort should be made to preserve peace. It was decided, with the approval of both Adams and Hamilton, to send a commission of three to Paris, to negotiate. Over the appointment of this commission new differences broke out between Hamilton and the President. Hamilton favored the appointment of a Northern and a Southern Federalist and of a Democrat of the highest standing, like Madison or even Jefferson. Adams was at first disposed to make these appointments, but finally took both the Federalists from the South,--Pinckney of South Carolina and John Marshall of Virginia,--and selected as the third member a Democrat of comparatively minor standing, Gerry of Ma.s.sachusetts.

The commissioners accomplished little good at Paris. They were insulted and browbeaten and told that only bribery would secure what they desired. When their treatment became known in the United States, in the spring of 1798, there was a popular outburst which restored the Federalists to power in Congress in the following autumn, with a larger majority than ever before since party divisions became fixed.

Enthusiastic addresses poured in upon President Adams, war vessels were fitted out by private subscription, and bills were carried at once for a provisional army, for fortifications, and for the increase of the navy. Even under this stress of excitement, however, Hamilton opposed alliance with Great Britain, and persuaded Pickering, the Secretary of State, to abandon the advocacy of it.

It was over the organization of the new army that the hostility of Adams to Hamilton became open and bitter. Was.h.i.+ngton was selected as commander-in-chief, but only consented to serve upon the condition that he should have the choice of the officers who were to rank next him, and should not be called upon to take an active part until the army took the field. He recommended to the President that rank in the Revolutionary army be disregarded and that the three major-generals to be appointed should be Hamilton, Charles Pinckney, and Knox. This gave the practical command and the work of the organization to Hamilton.

Adams sent the names to the Senate, in the order suggested by Was.h.i.+ngton, and they were promptly confirmed. When he came to signing the commissions, however, he took the ground that Knox was the senior officer on account of his rank during the Revolution. Hamilton would not consent to this arrangement, and all the Federalist leaders, including members of the cabinet, remonstrated with the President against it. One of the saddest results of the quarrel was the alienation from Hamilton of Knox, who had been a friend of many years and when Secretary of War in Was.h.i.+ngton's first cabinet had stood loyally by Hamilton against Jefferson in the controversy over the financial projects.

Adams at first seemed to grow more stubborn with the protests which were made against his action. The leaders finally turned to Was.h.i.+ngton. The latter informed the President that if the original agreement as to the rank of the officers was not kept, he should resign. Adams, with all his stubbornness and bravery, did not dare defy the country by forcing Was.h.i.+ngton from the service. He gave way, and appointed Hamilton to the first place, but the good feeling which might have been promoted if he had done so at first was replaced on both sides by bitterness which was never softened.

Hamilton, as the practical head of the army, showed the same abounding energy and capacity for organization which he had shown at the head of the Treasury. He drafted a plan for the fortification of New York harbor, made an apportionment of officers and men among the states, and drew up projects for the organization of the new army, dealing with the questions of pay, uniforms, rations, promotions, police in garrisons and camps, and the many other branches of the service. All these projects received the cordial approval of Was.h.i.+ngton. When Congress met, Hamilton was ready with a bill putting the army upon a basis which would permit its increase or diminution in future without changing the form of the organization. In the spring of 1799 he was providing for the defense of the frontiers and planning the invasion of Louisiana and the Floridas.

The projects of these invasions of Spanish territory justify a reference to the continental policy of Hamilton. He was among the first to maintain that the United States should have complete control of the valley of the Mississippi, and even during his short term in the Congress of the Confederation the last resolution which he presented declared the "navigation of the Mississippi to be a clear and essential right and to be supported as such." It was left for Jefferson, Hamilton's great opponent, to carry out his conception of the acquisition of the Mississippi valley by the purchase of Louisiana. The admirers of Hamilton credit him with a still wider vision of the future power of the United States, which was eventually to bear fruit in the Monroe doctrine and in the celebrated declaration of Secretary Olney in 1895, that "to-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Hamilton wrote in "The Federalist," before the adoption of the Const.i.tution, that "our situation invites and our situation prompts us to aim at an ascendant in American affairs."

The firm att.i.tude of the United States towards France had its effect at Paris. Talleyrand sent an intimation indirectly to President Adams that the French government would be glad to receive an American envoy.

Again the impetuosity of Adams divided his party and intensified his quarrel with the leaders who stood around Hamilton. The name of Vans Murray was sent to the Senate by the President for Minister to France, without even consulting the cabinet. Many doubted the wisdom of snapping up so promptly the offer made by Talleyrand, and more were incensed at the President's method of doing it. There was at first a strong disposition among the Federalist leaders to defeat the nomination in the Senate. Hamilton, however, checked the indignation of his friends and suggested a way out of the difficulty by appointing a strong commission.

The downfall of the Federal party and the retirement of Hamilton from the active control of national policy were at hand. The pa.s.sage of the alien and sedition laws, arrogating to the federal government intolerable powers of interference with the rights of the press and of free speech, was one of the causes contributing to the revulsion of feeling in favor of the party of Jefferson. Hamilton opposed the first drafts of these laws as cruel, violent, and tyrannical, but he did not disapprove their final form. The Federalists carried the congressional elections of 1798, under the impulse of the feeling against France, but began to lose ground soon after. As the presidential election of 1800 approached, a desperate struggle was made to hold New York for Federalism as the only hope of defeating Jefferson and reelecting Adams. The New York election went against the administration, and Hamilton pleaded in vain with Governor Jay to defeat the will of the people by calling the old legislature together and giving the choice of presidential electors to the congressional districts. It was perhaps the most discreditable proposal which ever came from Hamilton, and was promptly rejected by Jay.

Hamilton's motive was a sincere fear that the country would go to ruin and the Const.i.tution be endangered by the triumph of the political school of Jefferson. This might have been the case if it had been the first election under the Const.i.tution, but Hamilton himself had builded better than he knew. The financial projects, the national bank, the suppression of the "Whiskey Insurrection," and the other measures taken under Was.h.i.+ngton and Adams had built up a Federal Union, whose strength could not be seriously shaken by the transfer of power from one party to another.

With the shadow of defeat hanging over them, the course of the Federalist leaders seemed to justify the maxim, "Whom the G.o.ds destroy they first make mad." With the utmost need for harmony and unity, quarrels broke out which would have wrecked the party even if there had been otherwise some prospect of its success. Adams drove McHenry and Pickering from his cabinet because they had betrayed his secrets to Hamilton, and denounced Hamilton and his friends as a British faction. Hamilton asked in writing for a denial or explanation of the charge, but was treated with contemptuous silence. As the presidential election approached, Hamilton scarcely concealed his preference for Pinckney, who was again to be voted for by the electors along with Adams. Hamilton had been so badly treated by the President that he announced his purpose to prepare a pamphlet, exposing the failings of Adams and vindicating his own position.

His best friends stood aghast at the project and labored with him to abandon it. Hamilton persevered, however, in the preparation of the pamphlet. He denounced Adams as a man of disgusting egotism, intense jealousy, and ungovernable temper, and reviewed in a scathing manner his entire public career, and especially the recent dismissal of the secretaries who were friendly to Hamilton. After all this criticism, Hamilton wound up with the lame conclusion that the electors should vote equally for Adams and Pinckney, in order to preserve Federal ascendency. He yielded to the protests of his friends so far as to keep the circulation of the pamphlet within a small circle, but it was hardly off the press before a copy was in the hands of Aaron Burr, the Democratic leader in New York, and was used with effect against the Federalist President.

The downfall of Federalism came with the presidential election of 1800. Jefferson and Burr were the Democratic candidates for President and Vice-President. Each was voted for by all the Democratic electors, giving them an equal number of votes and a majority of the electoral college. This threw the election into the House of Representatives, which was Federalist but was compelled by the provisions of the Const.i.tution to decide between the two leading candidates, Jefferson and Burr. Some of the Federalists were ready to stoop to any means for striking at Jefferson, the great representative of Democratic ideals. If the Federalists in Congress could have effected a combination with the Democrats from states where Burr was influential, they might have been able to elect Burr President instead of Jefferson. But the Democrats, even from New York, voted for Jefferson, and it was evident that he must be chosen or there would be no election. Feeling in the country ran high, and there were threats of violence if the election of Jefferson should be defeated by intrigue.

Hamilton behaved on this occasion with the high sense of public duty which marked most of his acts. Familiar as he was with the unscrupulous methods and doubtful character of Burr in New York politics, he felt that it would be criminal to put him in office. He had little reason to love Jefferson, who had filled the ears of Was.h.i.+ngton with slurs against himself, but he felt that the election belonged to Jefferson and that his defeat by a political intrigue would be a greater menace than his election to the system established by the Const.i.tution. With Bayard of Delaware, the Federalist leader in the House, Hamilton threw himself strongly into the contest against Burr. His advice was not at first followed. The House ballotted from the eleventh to the sixteenth of February without reaching a choice. A caucus of the Federalists was then held; it appeared that Jefferson had given some a.s.surances of a conservative policy in office, the views of Hamilton and Bayard prevailed, and on February 17, 1801, the Federalist members from several states withheld their votes, and Jefferson was elected.

The retirement of the Federalists from power substantially ended the public services of Hamilton. He continued to watch public events with interest during the remaining five years of his life, and to be regarded as the leader of the Federalist party, but the party had shrunk to a corporal's guard in Congress and the long reign of the Democratic party had begun, which was to be interrupted during only two presidential terms until the election of Lincoln in 1860.

Hamilton, therefore, at the age of forty-three, had completed his constructive work and ceased to influence public affairs except by his writings and speeches. It might almost be said that this work was done with the close of the administration of Was.h.i.+ngton in 1797, and that his great fame would have shone with brighter l.u.s.tre if he had not lived to take part in the later differences and quarrels of the Adams administration. His life was not without service, however, under Adams, since his influence over members of the cabinet several times restrained rash policies, and between the conflicting pa.s.sions of the champions of France and of the friends of Great Britain, kept the s.h.i.+p of state steady upon a safe course.

VIII

HAMILTON'S DEATH AND CHARACTER

The death of Hamilton was in a peculiar sense a part of his public career. He had never hesitated to denounce in strong terms the public career and some of the private acts of Aaron Burr. The latter, after losing the presidency, sought the governors.h.i.+p of New York, and entered into correspondence with the Federalist leaders in New England with a view to the formation of a Northern confederacy. Hamilton succeeded in dividing the Federalist vote in New York so as to give the election to Lewis, Burr's democratic rival. Burr then determined to force a personal quarrel upon Hamilton in order to obtain revenge upon the man who had so often thwarted him. Hamilton had no desire to fight, but he did not feel able to repudiate the code of the duelist as it was then accepted among gentlemen.

It was on June 17, 1804, that Colonel Burr, through his intimate friend Judge Van Ness, demanded an apology for a criticism by Hamilton which had reached Burr's ears. Several letters were exchanged before it became plain that Burr was bound to force a quarrel or to humiliate Hamilton to a point which he knew would not be endured. When Burr's true purpose became plain to Hamilton, he requested a short time to close up several important cases for his clients, which were then pending in the circuit court. The circuit having terminated, Colonel Burr was informed (Friday, July 6, 1804) that Hamilton would be ready to meet him at any time after the following Sunday. Both men realized that the meeting might be fatal, and prepared for it in a characteristic way. Burr, who because of his fascinating manners was a great favorite with women, destroyed the compromising letters which he had received and devoted his spare hours to pistol practice. Hamilton had fewer such letters to destroy, and was determined not to kill Burr if it could be avoided. He drew up his will, and prepared a statement of his reasons for fighting. This statement set forth that he was opposed to the practice of dueling and had done all that was practicable, even beyond the demands of a punctilious delicacy, to secure an accommodation. He then said:--

"I have resolved, if our interview is conducted in the usual manner, and it pleases G.o.d to give me the opportunity, to reserve and throw away my first fire; and I have thought even of reserving my second, and thus giving a double opportunity to Colonel Burr to pause and repent."

The arrangements for the duel were made on Monday, and on the following Wednesday (July 11) the meeting took place at seven o'clock in the morning at Weehawken, three miles above Hoboken, on the west sh.o.r.e of the Hudson. Burr and Hamilton exchanged salutations, the seconds measured the distance, which was ten paces, and the parties took their respective stations. At the first word, Burr fired.

Hamilton's weapon was discharged in the air, and he almost instantly fell, mortally wounded. The ball struck the second or third false rib, fractured it about the middle, pa.s.sed through the liver and diaphragm, and lodged in the first or second lumbar vertebra. Hamilton was at first thought to be dead, but he revived when put on board the boat which was in waiting, and was able to utter a few words as he was borne towards his home. He died on the day after the meeting at two o'clock in the afternoon. Even in his death he rendered a parting service to his countrymen, by the revulsion of feeling which was everywhere aroused against the practice of dueling. The news of his premature taking off caused a wave of grief and indignation to spread over the country, differing from the chastened sorrow felt over the death of Was.h.i.+ngton, because Was.h.i.+ngton had met his end full of years and honors, and in the natural order of nature.

The concluding statement made by Hamilton in the paper which he left regarding his meeting with Burr gives some clue to his reasons for fighting. This paragraph ran as follows:--

"To those who, with me, abhorring the practice of dueling, may think that I ought on no account to have added to the number of bad examples, I answer that my relative situation, as well in public as private, enforcing all the considerations which const.i.tute what men of the world denominate honor, imposed on me (as I thought) a peculiar necessity not to decline the call. The ability to be in future useful, whether in resisting mischief or effecting good, in those crises of our public affairs which seem likely to happen would probably be inseparable from a conformity with public prejudice in this particular."