The Middle Period 1817-1858 Part 28

[Sidenote: The concentration of the Mexican forces at Matamoras.]

During the summer of 1845, the Mexican Government had begun to collect troops and munitions of war at Matamoras, on the south bank of the Rio Grande near its mouth. The purpose of all this was without question an expedition across the Rio Grande, and into the region north of it.

By an act of the Texan Congress, of December 19th, 1836, the Rio Grande was designated as the southwestern boundary of Texas. The United States took Texas with this boundary, reserving in the resolution of annexation the right of adjusting the Texan boundaries with foreign states. This meant, of course, that the United States might change the boundary which Texas had given herself, as the result of her successful rebellion, her revolution, against Mexico, by an agreement with Mexico, in so far as Texas was concerned. It further meant that any such change must be made either by an act of the Congress of the United States or by a treaty between the United States and Mexico. Until, {329} however, this adjustment should take place, it was the duty of the President of the United States to defend the boundary with which Texas came into the Union. Moreover, Congress had pa.s.sed an act, on December 31st, 1845, in which Corpus Christi, a town situated on the south side of the river Nueces, was made an United States port of delivery. The town was, also, the head-quarters of the United States army in Texas, and had been so from the period of annexation.

[Sidenote: The United States forces ordered to the Rio Grande.]

When now the Mexican Government refused to receive Mr. Slidell, and continued to increase the forces at Matamoras, President Polk felt it to be his duty to defend the line of the Rio Grande. On January 13th, he ordered General Taylor, then in command at Corpus Christi, to advance to the northern bank of the Rio Grande. The General, with his little army of about 2,000 men, arrived upon the Rio Grande, at a point opposite Matamoras, on March 28th, and began fortifying his position.

[Sidenote: Hostilities opened.]

On April 12th, the Mexican commander, General Ampudia, demanded the withdrawal of Taylor's forces within twenty-four hours, and their retirement across the Nueces, under threat of the appeal to arms.

Taylor paid no attention to the demand, and, on the 24th, he received notice from General Arista, the successor of Ampudia, that hostilities were opened.

[Sidenote: The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.]

On the same day, a reconnoitring party of United States dragoons encountered a large detachment of Mexican soldiers, who had just crossed the river farther up, and were all killed or captured. General Taylor moved out from Fort Brown, opposite Matamoras, in order to cover his base of supplies at Point Isabel, and, having accomplished this, faced about again to relieve Fort Brown against a.s.sault from Matamoras. {330} While executing this movement he found himself, on May 8th, face to face with a Mexican army numbering three times as many men as his own. Nevertheless, he inflicted a crus.h.i.+ng defeat upon the Mexicans in this battle of Palo Alto, and struck them again the next day at Resaca de la Palma, routing them completely, and driving the remnants of this once apparently formidable force across the Rio Grande.

As soon as the news of these events reached Was.h.i.+ngton, the President informed Congress of them, claimed that war existed by the act of Mexican invasion, and asked for the means for its successful prosecution.

[Sidenote: The att.i.tude of Congress toward the war.]

From the reception of this message to the end of the War, the Whigs in both Houses condemned the War, but only a few of them voted against furnis.h.i.+ng the means for its prosecution. Strangely enough, they were aided by Mr. Calhoun, who opposed the whole war policy from the beginning to the end. He even opposed recognizing the existence of war. He was getting old and more peaceable in disposition, and also had probably seen, with Mr. Thompson, that any further slavery extension toward the Southwest meant the extinction of slavery in the border Commonwealths, and the greater exposure of the planting section to the influences of Abolition. Some of the Whigs claimed that if war existed at all, it was offensive war, and that the President had exceeded his const.i.tutional powers in bringing it on, and should be impeached for so doing.

The truth of this proposition depended, of course, upon the recognition by the United States of Mexico's t.i.tle to the territory between the Rio Grande and the Nueces, or, at least, upon the recognition of it as a free zone, a proposition difficult to reconcile with the Acts {331} of Congress annexing Texas, and extending the revenue laws of the United States over this very district. The fact is, it was a defensive war at the outset, and if the Mexicans were excited to their move across the Rio Grande by the appearance of United States troops on the northern bank, they had only to thank themselves for bringing them there by previously ma.s.sing their own troops on the south bank.

[Sidenote: Congressional approval of the war.]

Of course the Abolitionists could see nothing in the matter but a wicked scheme for the extension of slavery. Their att.i.tude was, however, too narrow and bigoted to win much attention. And, as the debate on the President's message progressed, it became manifest that all the elements of the opposition were getting deeper and deeper into the quicksands. The bill for recognizing the existence of war, and authorizing the President to call for 50,000 volunteers, and for appropriating $10,000,000 to defray the expenses of the campaign, was pa.s.sed by an overwhelming majority, in both Houses, on May 11th and 12th, and approved by the President on the 13th.

The President was now, certainly, authorized to carry the War into Mexico, if, indeed, he needed Congressional authority, at all, after the war had been once begun as defensive war. At any rate, General Taylor's occupation of Matamoras did not occur until May 18th, six days after Congress had recognized war.

[Sidenote: The occupation of New Mexico and Upper California, and the advance into Mexico.]

The President now ordered General Kearny to occupy New Mexico, Commodores Sloat and Stockton to make sure of Upper California, and General Taylor to prosecute the war upon Mexican soil. Kearny, Sloat, and Stockton quickly accomplished the work a.s.signed them, and without much difficulty, and Taylor advanced, in September, from Matamoras upon Monterey. After a {332} three days siege, he captured the place, on the 24th, and established winter-quarters within its walls.

At the same time, General Kearny sent Colonel Doniphan with a detachment of his army to Monterey, by way of Chihuahua, and marched himself with another detachment to San Diego in California. Doniphan's capture of Chihuahua brought the entire southern valley of the upper Rio Grande under the military control of the United States, and Kearny's successful march into California secured that territory against all eventualities.

[Sidenote: California's importance.]

The occupation of California was the matter of most vital importance to the United States. It is the way to Asia. Its government by Mexico was a farce. It would have been purchased or seized by Great Britain, or some other commercial Power, if the United States had not taken possession of it. Nothing was known of its vast mineral wealth at the time. Mere greed, therefore, did not prompt the movement. It was a great and correct stroke of public policy, supported by geographical, commercial, and political reasons.

Still Mexico would not yield, and the Administration at Was.h.i.+ngton now determined to carry the war into the very vitals of the Mexican state.

The campaign against the Mexican capital, by way of Vera Cruz, was now resolved on, and General Scott was directed to execute it.

Santa Anna, who had now arrived in Mexico again from Cuba, and had again taken up the reins of government, thought that the army of General Scott would be unable to capture Vera Cruz without a long and painful siege, and planned to advance rapidly from the capital with the main body of his army to the north, crush Taylor, and return to the capital before Scott could pa.s.s Vera Cruz.

[Sidenote: The battle of Buena Vista.]

On February 20th, 1847, General Taylor, whose advance was now some hundred miles to the southwest of {333} Monterey, suddenly discovered a large Mexican force in front of him. It was Santa Anna, with about twenty thousand of his best troops. Taylor ordered his little army of about five thousand men to retire for a few miles, and take position on the rising ground at Buena Vista. The Mexicans soon caught up, and on the 23rd, Santa Anna demanded unconditional surrender. Taylor promptly declined, and the battle immediately opened. Both sides knew the serious character of the wager. California, New Mexico, and, perhaps, a large part of Texas were staked upon the issue. Before the day closed, Taylor and his little army had won a complete victory, and the Mexicans were in full retreat, after the loss of some two thousand men. Taylor lost about eight hundred men. With this the campaign in the north was closed, and attention turned almost exclusively to the operations of General Scott.

[Sidenote: Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo.]

On March 9th, General Scott effected a landing near Vera Cruz, and on the 29th captured that city. He immediately took up his line of march for the city of Mexico.

The first great difficulty which he was compelled to encounter was, naturally, the forcing of the mountain pa.s.s of Cerro Gordo, through which the national road from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico led.

Santa Anna had gathered here an army of some fifteen thousand men, and had thrown up strong earthworks commanding the defile. On the morning of April 18th, General Scott stormed the heights of Cerro Gordo, and in a sanguinary battle routed the Mexicans completely. Some three thousand Mexicans were captured, with five thousand muskets and forty-three pieces of artillery. Scott's loss was not over four hundred men. Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla fell into his hands as the immediate consequences of this victory.

{334} General Scott rested his army for two months at Puebla, and in the beginning of August resumed his march upon the capital, with an army of about eleven thousand men. On the 18th, he arrived within ten miles of the city, and found himself confronted by an army of nearly thirty thousand men, commanded by President Santa Anna himself.

[Sidenote: Contreras, San Antonio, and Cherubusco.]

On the morning of the 19th, the struggle began, and lasted through the 20th. Three distinct battles were fought--Contreras, San Antonio, and Cherubusco. The Mexicans outnumbered Scott's army three to one, and fought desperately to save their capital, but all to no avail. After killing, wounding, and capturing between seven and eight thousand Mexicans, General Scott dispersed the remainder of their army and opened his way into the city. The General was willing, however, to save the proud Mexicans from the humiliation of seeing their capital in the hands of the invader, and agreed to an armistice for the purpose of negotiating a peace.

[Sidenote: The plan for a cession of territory from Mexico.]

On August 8th, 1846, President Polk had asked of Congress that two millions of dollars be placed at his disposal for use in negotiating a treaty of peace with Mexico. It was quite evident from this that the President was going to demand a large cession of territory from Mexico. Mexico had not yet paid any of the claims awarded by the Claims Commission of 1840 to the citizens of the United States. There were also millions of dollars of claims unadjudged. And then there was the war indemnity, which would undoubtedly be required. Two millions of dollars, in addition to all this, to be paid by the victorious party for peace, could mean nothing less, or other, than a vast territorial cession from the vanquished. It was evident to all that California and New Mexico, already in the possession of {335} the United States, must const.i.tute the sacrifice which Mexico must make.

[Sidenote: The Wilmot Proviso.]

[Sidenote: The fate of the Wilmot Proviso in the Senate.]

Mr. McKay, of North Carolina, immediately introduced into the House of Representatives a bill making the appropriation asked by the President. Discussion upon the bill was scarcely under way, when a Northern Democrat, a supporter of the War and of the policy of territorial extension, Mr. David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, moved to amend the bill by inserting in it the condition that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude should exist in any territory acquired by treaty from Mexico. The House pa.s.sed the bill, with the Wilmot proviso, as it was termed, on the day of its introduction, August 8th.

Territorial extension, but not slavery extension, was its principle, and therefore the South voted almost solidly against it. The bill appeared in the Senate on the 10th, which was the last day of the session, and was still under discussion when the hour for the adjournment of the body _sine die_ arrived. It was thought by some competent judges that the Senate would have pa.s.sed the bill, if it had then come to a vote, and would have thus settled, at the outset, the question of slavery extension; but this is at least doubtful. At the moment, the South had four more votes in the Senate than the North, and it is probable that the Whig Senators from the South would have united with their Democratic brethren upon this question.

[Sidenote: The Proviso again voted by the House of Representatives.]

At the beginning of the session of 1846-47, the President again preferred his request for an appropriation for the same purpose, and during the month of January, 1847, bills were introduced into the two Houses, providing an appropriation of three millions of dollars for the President's use in his negotiations with Mexico.

{336} When the House took up its bill for consideration, on February 1st, Mr. Wilmot immediately asked permission to move the attachment of his proviso to the appropriation, and made a strong argument in favor of the same. On the 15th, the proviso was again voted, but by a reduced majority. The members from the South voted, this time, solidly against it. A few Northern Democrats voted with them; among these was Stephen A. Douglas.

[Sidenote: The Upham amendment in the Senate.]

[Sidenote: The amendment defeated by the efforts of Mr. Ca.s.s.]

[Sidenote: The Wilmot Proviso dropped in the House.]

On March 1st, Senator Upham, of Vermont, introduced an amendment to the Senate bill, of the same tenor as the Wilmot proviso in the House, and urged its adoption in a strong and convincing argument. It really seemed as if the victory for Free-soil in the new acquisitions, whatever they might be, was about to be won, when, to the surprise of at least a considerable number of the Senators, General Ca.s.s, of Michigan, who was thought to have indicated his favor to the Wilmot proviso at the last session, made a determined effort against Mr.

Upham's motion. Mr. Ca.s.s declared the measure premature, and contended that its only effect, if pa.s.sed, at the moment would be to weaken the Government by internal dissensions upon the slavery question, and consequently encourage the Mexicans to continue the War. He urged the Senators to stand solidly together for the vigorous prosecution of the War to its successful close, and then, after the peace, take up the internal questions arising out of the settlement. The Senate rejected Mr. Upham's amendment, pa.s.sed the bill without it, and, on the last day of the session, the House accepted the bill as it pa.s.sed the Senate. Mr. Ca.s.s's idea that the anti-slavery proviso would embarra.s.s the President in his negotiations with Mexico, and would {337} encourage the Mexicans to continue the War seems to have convinced the House as well as the Senate.

[Ill.u.s.tration: CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO in 1850.]

The President had now the tacit consent of Congress to the acquisition of California and New Mexico, and the means to pay for them in hand.

And the greater military successes of General Scott from Vera Cruz to the Mexican capital prepared the way for the President to make use of his power.

[Sidenote: The mission of Mr. Trist.]

The President sent Mr. N. P. Trist, of Virginia, to the head-quarters of General Scott with the draft of a treaty to be offered the Mexican Government. It designated the Rio Grande from the Gulf to the point where the River touched the line of New Mexico as the boundary between Mexico and the United States from the Gulf to that point, and provided for the cession of New Mexico and the Californias to the United States, and the privilege of the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mr. Trist was instructed, however, that he might withdraw the demands for Lower California and for the right of way across the Isthmus, and might also offer a payment of money, if he should find these things necessary.