Maxims and Opinions of Field-Marshal His Grace the Duke of Wellington Part 29

_State of Poverty in Ireland._

Of all the countries in Europe, Ireland is the one in which it has appeared to me to be least possible to establish anything in the nature of the English poor-laws. The opinion delivered by others has been, that there are no materials to be found in Ireland proper for forming, or if formed for administering with salutary effect, any system of poor-laws such as exists in this country; and I, my lords, believe that there is no doubt whatever of the justice and truth of that opinion, considering the English poor-laws, as they formerly existed, and as they were carried into execution up to the year 1834, when the n.o.ble lords opposite introduced the measure which amended them. While, however, I say this, I am bound at the same time to express my entire concurrence in the opinion declared by the n.o.ble viscount, that there never was a country in which poverty existed to such a degree as it exists in that part of the United Kingdom. My lords, I was in office in that country--I held a high situation in the administration of the government of Ireland thirty years ago--and I must say, that from that time to this there has scarcely elapsed a single year in which the government has not at certain periods of it entertained the most serious apprehensions of actual famine. My lords, I am firmly convinced that from the year 1806 down to the present time, a year has not pa.s.sed in which the government have not been called on to give a.s.sistance to relieve the poverty and distress which prevailed in Ireland, and owing to circ.u.mstances over which no human power could have any control. One of the circ.u.mstances which has most frequently led to this lamentable state of things, has been the failure or delay of the potato crops, and there have been known times when two, three, and even as many as four months have intervened before these crops, which are used as a subsistence by the people, could be brought into the market; and such are the social relations in that country, that the people have no means of coming to market to purchase like the people of England. My lords, this is a fact that is undoubted, and one that I believe never existed in any country in the world except Ireland.

_May 21, 1838._

_The Numbers of a Meeting may render it Illegal._

The numbers of a meeting--that is to say, such an a.s.sembly of persons as would create terror in the minds of people living in the neighbourhood,--would justify the magistrate in taking measures to disperse it.

_June 15, 1838._

_Real cause of our interference in Spain._

The system of interference adopted by his late majesty's government, by means of the quadruple treaty, was with a view to the contest between extreme opinions--it was more with a view of aiding these extreme opinions, than to the arrangement of the mere differences between Don Carlos, upon the one side, and the queen, or her daughter, upon the other; to support certain opinions, and not to determine the succession, was the cause of interference. I regret interference upon that ground; I object to interference upon that ground; and I say, moreover, that we were not right in interfering upon that ground. I maintain that, more particularly on account of the extreme opinions that prevailed, we ought not to have interfered at all; but most especially we ought not, according to the common practice of this government, and in accordance with the declared political principles of the n.o.ble lords themselves, to have interfered in a question involving extreme political opinions. Now it has unfortunately happened that extreme political principles have been forced upon a great part of Europe by means of large armies and of great military forces, and it was consequently expected that the same thing would succeed in Spain. This, I believe, was the object of our interference with Spain, and not to determine the Spanish succession.

_June 19, 1838._

_We had no right to interfere against Don Carlos._

I say we had no business to interfere in the question of succession.

There might have been some pretext for interference in the question of succession, if any of the powers of Europe had taken part with Don Carlos, but that was not the case. The n.o.ble baron (Lord Holland) cheers. I say, confidently, that not one of the powers in Europe had stirred a finger in support of the pretensions of Don Carlos. I say, then, that, according to all principles--the principles supported and acted upon by this country, in the case of the house of Braganza, and many other cases that I could mention--we ought to have avoided interference; and we ought to have avoided interference by armies more particularly, in the contests in Spain. I say, my lords, that not a sword had been moved in Europe in favour of Don Carlos. When Don Carlos went to Spain, in the summer of 1834, there were not three battalions in arms in that country in his favour. This I positively state as a fact.

But, on the contrary, in the s.p.a.ce of forty leagues there were forty fortified posts in possession of the queen's troops. Now, my lords, this is a positive fact; and I say that, in the year 1835, when the armistice was negotiated, when the exchange of prisoners was negotiated by Lord Eliot, Don Carlos had then acquired a superiority over the queen's forces, who were obliged to take up a position on the right of the Ebro.

That is to say, between the interval of time I have mentioned,--and this is a positive fact upon which your lords.h.i.+ps may rely, and to which I pledge my word,--between the summer of 1834 and the period at which the exchange of prisoners was agreed upon in 1835,--that is, in the course of a very few months,--the superiority had been gained by Don Carlos in that part of the country, so far that he had forced the enemy to take up a position on the other side of the Ebro, abandoning all their fortified posts, except Pampeluna and one other; and, I must add, they had very wisely abandoned them, because they found they could not march to their relief through the country. Now, my lords, this is literally and truly a fact; and it is a fact not to be forgotten, with respect to the present contest in Spain. I say, then, that it was the business of this government not to have interfered by force. We ought not to have done so, according to the n.o.ble marquis's principle--that there ought to be no interference between two hostile parties in a nation like Spain.

_June 19, 1838._

_The Legion a failure._

The n.o.ble viscount has told your lords.h.i.+ps, certainly, that he sent out an expedition; and the n.o.ble marquis has informed us that it has always been the policy of this country to encourage such expeditions. Now, without meaning to a.s.sert that the result of that expedition was a dire catastrophe, I must be permitted to say that the legion has been, in my opinion and conviction, a complete failure. It has cost the Spanish government an enormous sum of money. Great expectations were raised respecting it, not one of which has been fulfilled. When the legion went to Spain, the Queen of Spain's army was in all the provinces, with the exception of Biscay and Navarre. Her government was established in all parts of Spain, excepting these places. Excepting them, all other places might be said to be in a state of tranquillity. But it appears the Queen of Spain could not carry on the war, unless she got ten thousand Isle of Dogsmen--a legion from England, and another from France. If the Spanish government had asked for officers, or for arms, or for money, or for artillery, I should not have been surprised, as I know well the manner in which the Spanish a.r.s.enals are supplied. But asking for 10,000 men from England to destroy Don Carlos, who was shut up in the mountains, was a matter really not to be seriously thought of. The object was not to bring 10,000, or 15,000, or 20,000 men into action, but to bring the red coats and the blue coats, the French and English troops, into the contest; that was the object, and the view was, to produce a moral effect. But the government ought to have known that that which gave them the influence on the one side, was fatal to that influence on the other.

Thus was an end put to that moral influence which this country could, and ought to have exerted, but which can only be effectually exercised by strict adherence, throughout all her proceedings, to the plain principles of justice. If this country enter into a treaty, let her carry it honourably through; but let her not push her interference further than is necessary for exerting her influence over both parties, in order to settle existing differences. I have said that the legion was a failure. Of that there cannot be the slightest doubt. The war is now in the same state as it was in the year 1835, except that Don Carlos has more men.

_June 19, 1838._

_The Opposition should give aid to the Government when a war is inevitable._

The n.o.ble viscount tells us that we did not object to the appointment of the Earl of Durham as governor-general of Canada--that we did not object to the powers confided to him; that we--referring particularly to me--urged this government by all the means in their power to send out large forces, and take care to be strong in that part of the world; advice which, I admit, I did repeat over and over again, until I fatigued myself and the house by doing so. But why did I not object to those powers being given to the Earl of Durham? Because, seeing the government in difficulties--seeing the colony in a state of rebellion--and seeing that the government possessed confidence in another place--I thought it was not my duty to excite opposition to measures which they thought it might be proper to adopt; and therefore I took them all upon their recommendation. Very possibly I was wrong in so doing; indeed, it appears that I was wrong; but I took the course which I then considered it my duty to take. I declared that I would not follow the example of those who, being convinced of the certainty that the country would be involved in a war, yet thought proper to oppose all measures that were necessary for carrying on that war. Neither would I deny a.s.sistance to those who were absent, and who were carrying on the government to the best of their ability; but I would give the government a fair support, in order to pacify a country which might be in a state of war or rebellion. That was the course which I followed on the occasion alluded to by the n.o.ble viscount. With respect to the Earl of Durham, I am personally unacquainted with him; and I considered that the n.o.ble viscount and her majesty's government ought to have known best who was the person most qualified to act as governor of Canada.

_August 9, 1838._

_Lord Durham's Ordinance[20] a grossly illegal Act._

A grossly illegal act has been committed--not a mere technical error, or one having reference to small or nice points of law, but an illegal act of great magnitude, and relating to points of the most grave importance--an act so clearly illegal, that no man capable of understanding the first principles of justice can doubt of its impropriety. It is impossible that the people of this country can suffer any man to be driven into banishment without trial, or that they can allow him, afterwards, to be condemned to death, without having been convicted of any crime but that of returning to his own country.

[Footnote 20: The Earl of Durham, governor-general of the Canadas, had issued an ordinance, transporting to Bermuda Dr. Nelson and seven others, guilty by confession of high treason, and subjecting them to death if they returned to Canada. Lord Brougham, actuated, as was a.s.serted by some, by personal feeling against Lord Durham, protested against this act in the face of the country. His speech on the occasion was one of the most powerful he ever delivered. It is scarcely necessary to add that Lord Durham immediately and precipitately resigned his governors.h.i.+p.]

_August 9, 1838._

_Inadequacy of our Navy._

There is nothing more certain than that, if you come to be entirely dependent for corn on the countries bordering on the Baltic, you would have the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia (as has been known before), levying a tax upon the exportation of that article of food to the Thames, and elsewhere in this country. * * I entirely agree with the n.o.ble and learned lord on the expediency of avoiding any interference with foreign powers on the subject of commercial matters; but I confess that I cannot view the state of our commercial relations, and of our position in the world generally, in connection with these commercial pursuits, with any degree of unmixed satisfaction. On the contrary, I do deplore the state in which we find ourselves placed in many parts of the world, particularly as it has been described in the course of the evening by my n.o.ble friend (Viscount Strangford). What I attribute that state of our commercial relations to, in a great degree, is, the extreme weakness and tottering condition of our naval establishments. I do not mean to complain of the distribution of our naval establishments; though, at the same time, I by no means intend to unsay what I have said in respect to the expeditions to Spain, which I cannot approve of; but I repeat my expression that I consider our naval establishments to be in too weak and tottering a condition to answer the purpose for which they were intended, which was to give protection to the commercial interests of the country in all parts of the world; for the commerce of England does extend to all parts of the world. There is not a port, not a river, which is not visited by the s.h.i.+ps of her majesty's subjects; and her majesty's subjects have an undoubted right to protection in whatever part of the world they may think proper to visit in the pursuits of commerce. The circ.u.mstance of which I complain I do not at all attribute to neglect upon the part of the admiralty, neither do I include in my censure the n.o.ble earl who is at the head of the admiralty; but those I do blame are the individuals who have thought proper to reduce the establishments of the country to such a degree, that protection cannot possibly be given in all places where it is required.

I will remind your lords.h.i.+ps that, since the peace, and particularly within the last twenty years, three great navies have sprung up in Europe, which are four times as strong as they were at any former period. Other navies, it is true, are put down; but we remain much the same. A great deal has been said, by way of comparison, between the strength of our navy in 1792, and in the years 1814 and 1815; but when we talk of strength in this case, we ought not to look at the subject without adverting to the naval establishments of other powers. Now, although our marine force should even be on the same footing as before, our commerce is not only tripled, but extended to a degree ten times greater than it ever was before; and there is not a part of the earth, from one pole to the other, in which the protection of our navy is not required for our commerce. I must say that, if we should at any time incur the misfortune of being involved in another war--which G.o.d forbid!--the only mode of keeping out of the difficulty would be to maintain such a navy as would give protection to her majesty's subjects in all parts of the globe.

_August 14, 1838._

_Neutrality of Belgium._

I hope that it never may be lost sight of in this country, that the original foundation of the independence of Belgium, as a separate kingdom, was this condition, namely, its perpetual neutrality. That condition I consider to have been the foundation of that transaction, and I hope that this will never be forgotten by this country, or by Europe.

_February 5, 1839._

_Aggressions on Canada from the United States._

I must say I should very much wish to see suitable measures adopted to carry into execution the intentions which her majesty declares in her speech, of maintaining her rights of sovereignty over Canada. The system of levying private war which prevails on that continent is not wholly unknown in other parts of the world. I have read of it as existing in the deserts of Central Asia; I have heard of its being practised, as a system, by the Asiatics on the frontiers of the Russian monarchy, where a perpetual warfare is going on between those tribes and the troops sent to repress their inroads--a warfare that has been waged in those countries from century to century. We read also of circ.u.mstances of the same kind occurring in Africa--of wars carried on by barbarous tribes against the possessions of the British government in Africa, the contests of savages against a civilized people. But this is a war carried on by a nation supposed to be considerably advanced in the scale of civilization--by men governing themselves, electing their servants by ballot and general suffrage, and living under inst.i.tutions of that description. Yet these are the very men who come in at night, and with fire and torch destroy the property of her majesty's subjects, for no reason whatever except that they obey her majesty's laws, and carry into effect her royal commands. Of such a system of warfare there are, I believe, no examples, except, as I have stated, among the most lawless of the barbarous tribes of the East and of Africa. It is quite out of the question that her majesty's loyal subjects, invited to their habitations, and fixed in them, by her majesty's authority and that of her predecessors, should not endeavour to retaliate the sufferings thus inflicted upon them, unless protected by the strong arm of government; but how can government protect them, except by taking strong measures, when these persons are found invading her majesty's dominions for the purpose of plundering and destroying the property of her majesty's subjects, to intercept them in their retreat, to take them prisoners, and punish them according to the laws of the country they have insulted?

There can be no doubt a civil government in any country is capable of preventing the collection of a body of troops, and the invasion of the territory of a neighbouring power. A body of "sympathisers" has been organised in the States to carry on the plan of invasion; and are we to sit down quietly and pa.s.s unnoticed this unwarrantable interference?

_February 5, 1839._

_Agitation by Authority._

I now come to the last paragraph of the speech, in which her majesty complains, that she has observed with pain the efforts which have been made, in some parts of the country, to excite her subjects to disobedience and resistance to the law, and to recommend dangerous and illegal acts. Now, I really think that this affecting paragraph cannot have raised very pleasant reflections in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of many n.o.ble lords who are in the habit of supporting her majesty's ministers. It is but too true that various persons have endeavoured to excite her majesty's subjects to resist the law; but I am afraid much of this spirit may be traced to what has taken place in this house on former occasions. I have heard persons, charged with the highest employments of government, insisting upon the rights of this people to a.s.semble for the expression of their sentiments, declaiming against any restriction on that right, and preaching upon this doctrine without restricting it in the manner declared by law--namely, that these a.s.semblies must not be in numbers sufficient to create alarm. It was but very lately that a great officer of state, travelling about the country, made a speech to the same purport at Liverpool, and stated those opinions in the most unreserved manner, at the very moment when men were a.s.sembling by torch-light meetings. We have heard for a number of years past of the extraordinary tranquillity of Ireland, and as often as I have listened to the phrase, I have protested against it; but there is a gentleman, high in the confidence of government, who goes about devising new modes of agitation every day. That gentleman ought to have a special copy of the speech sent to him! One time he talks of raising 2,000,000 of men--at another time of a fund of 20,000 l. sterling, which is deposited in his private bank, and ultimately to be deposited in his private pocket. In order to further his new schemes of agitation, that gentleman has declared his intention of raising 60,000 fighting men for her majesty, though he has never, that I am aware of, been employed as a recruiting officer.

Sometimes these boasts do not turn out to be true; but if not 60,000 persons, there may be 6,000, or some force of that description, which would be a serious inconvenience to the government.

_February 5, 1839._