The Anti-Slavery Examiner, Omnibus Part 52

Resolved, That our Senators be instructed, and our members of Congress be requested, to oppose the admission as a state into the Union, of any territory not comprised as aforesaid, without making _the prohibition of slavery_ therein an indispensible condition of admission."

The tenor of Mr. Tallmadge's speech on the right of pet.i.tion, and of Mr.

Webster's on the reception of abolition memorials, may be taken as universal exponents of the sentiments of northern statesmen as to the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

An explicit declaration, that an "_overwhelming majority_" of the _present_ Congress concede the power to abolish slavery in the District has just been made by Robert Barnwell Rhett, a member of Congress from South Carolina, in a letter published in the Charleston Mercury of Dec.

27, 1837. The following is an extract:

"The time has arrived when we must have new guaranties under the const.i.tution, or the Union must be dissolved. _Our views of the const.i.tution are not those of the majority_. AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY _think that by the const.i.tution, Congress may abolish slavery in the District of Columbia--may abolish the slave trade between the States; that is, it may prohibit their being carried out of the State in which they are--and prohibit it in all the territories, Florida among them.

They think_, NOT WITHOUT STRONG REASONS, _that the power of Congress extends to all of these subjects_."

_Direct testimony_ to show that the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, has always till recently been _universally conceded_, is perhaps quite superfluous. We subjoin, however, the following:

The Vice-President of the United States in his speech on the Missouri question, quoted above, after contending that the restriction of slavery in Missouri would be unconst.i.tutional, declares, that the power of Congress over slavery in the District "COULD NOT BE QUESTIONED." In the speech of Mr. Smyth, of Va., also quoted above, he declares the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District to be "UNDOUBTED."

Mr. Sutherland, of Penn., in a speech in the House of Representatives, on the motion to print Mr. Pinckney's Report, is thus reported in the Was.h.i.+ngton Globe, of May 9th, '36. "He replied to the remark that the report conceded that Congress had a right to legislate upon the subject in the District of Columbia, and said that SUCH A RIGHT HAD NEVER BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, DENIED."

The American Quarterly Review, published at Philadelphia, with a large circulation and list of contributors in the slave states, holds the following language in the September No. 1833, p. 55: "Under this 'exclusive jurisdiction,' granted by the const.i.tution, Congress has power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It would hardly be necessary to state this as a distinct proposition, had it not been occasionally questioned. The truth of the a.s.sertion, however, is too obvious to admit of argument--and we believe has NEVER BEEN DISPUTED BY PERSONS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE CONSt.i.tUTION."

OBJECTIONS TO THE FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS CONSIDERED.

We now proceed to notice briefly the main arguments that have been employed in Congress and elsewhere against the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. One of the most plausible is, that "the conditions on which Maryland and Virginia ceded the District to the United States, would be violated, if Congress should abolish slavery there." The reply to this is, that Congress had no power to _accept_ a cession coupled with conditions restricting that "power of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District," which was given it by the const.i.tution.

To show the futility of the objection, we insert here the acts of cession. The cession of Maryland was made in November, 1788, and is as follows: "An act to cede to Congress a district of ten miles square in this state for the seat of the government of the United States."

"Be it enacted, by the General a.s.sembly of Maryland, that the representatives of this state in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, appointed to a.s.semble at New-York, on the first Wednesday of March next, be, and they are; hereby authorized and required on the behalf of this state, to cede to the Congress of the United States, any district in this state, not exceeding ten miles square, which the Congress may fix upon, and accept for the seat of government of the United States." Laws of Md., v. 2., c. 46.

The cession of Virginia was made on the 3d of December, 1788, in the following words:

"Be it enacted by the General a.s.sembly, That a tract of country, not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quant.i.ty, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof; as Congress may, by law, direct, shall be, and the same is hereby forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil, as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the government of the const.i.tution of the United States."

But were there no provisos to these acts? The Maryland act had _none_.

The Virginia act had this proviso: "Sect. 2. Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals _therein_, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States."

This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, "_full and absolute right_." Instead of restraining the power of Congress on _slavery_ and other subjects, it even gives it freer course; for exceptions to _parts_ of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the exceptions. If it was the _design_ of the proviso to restrict congressional action on the subject of _slavery_, why is the _soil alone_ specified? As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in words, might not "John Doe," out of his abundance, and without spoiling his style, have afforded an additional word--at least a hint--that slavery was _meant_, though nothing was said about it?

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them to be made "in pursuance of" that clause of the const.i.tution which gives to Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the ten miles square--thus, instead of _restricting_ that clause, both States _confirm_ it. Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that clause of the const.i.tution, or they conflicted with it. If they conflicted with it, _accepting_ the cessions was a violation of the const.i.tution. The fact that Congress accepted the cessions, proves that in its views their _terms_ did not conflict with its const.i.tutional grant of power. The inquiry whether these acts of cession were consistent or inconsistent with the United Status' const.i.tution, is totally irrelevant to the question at issue. What with the CONSt.i.tUTION?

That is the question. Not, what with Virginia, or Maryland, or--equally to the point--John Bull! If Maryland and Virginia had been the authorized interpreters of the const.i.tution for the Union, these acts of cession could hardly have been more magnified than they have been recently by the southern delegation in Congress. A true understanding of the const.i.tution can be had, forsooth, only by holding it up in the light of Maryland and Virginia legislation!

We are told, again, that those States would not have ceded the District if they had supposed the const.i.tution gave Congress power to abolish slavery in it.

This comes with an ill grace from Maryland and Virginia. They _knew_ the const.i.tution. They were parties to it. They had sifted it, clause by clause, in their State conventions. They had weighed its words in the balance--they had tested them as by fire; and, finally, after long pondering, they adopted the const.i.tution. And _afterward_, self-moved, they ceded the ten miles square, and declared the cession made "in pursuance of" that oft-cited clause, "Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." And now verily "they would not have ceded if they had _supposed_!" &c. Cede it they _did_, and in "full and absolute right both of soil and persons." Congress accepted the cession--state power over the District ceased, and congressional power over it commenced,--and now, the sole question to be settled is, the _amount of power over the District lodged in Congress by the const.i.tution_. The const.i.tution--THE CONSt.i.tUTION--that is the point. Maryland and Virginia "suppositions" must be potent suppositions to abrogate a clause of the United States' Const.i.tution! That clause either gives Congress power to abolish slavery in the District, or it does _not_--and that point is to be settled, not by state "suppositions," nor state usages, nor state legislation, but _by the terms of the clause themselves_.

Southern members of Congress, in the recent discussions, have conceded the power of a contingent abolition in the District, by suspending it upon the _consent_ of the people. Such a doctrine from _declaimers_ like Messrs. Alford, of Georgia, and Walker, of Mississippi, would excite no surprise; but that it should be honored with the endors.e.m.e.nt of such men as Mr. Rives and Mr. Calhoun, is quite unaccountable. Are attributes of sovereignty mere creatures of contingency? Is delegated authority mere conditional permission? Is a const.i.tutional power to be exercised by those who hold it, only by popular sufferance? Must it lie helpless at the pool of public sentiment, waiting the gracious troubling of its waters? Is it a lifeless corpse, save only when popular "consent" deigns to puff breath into its nostrils? Besides, if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of the _whole_ people must be had--not that of a majority, however large. Majorities, to be authoritative, must be _legal_--and a legal majority without legislative power, or right of representation, or even the electoral franchise, would be truly an anomaly! In the District of Columbia, such a thing as a majority in a legal sense is unknown to law. To talk of the power of a majority, or the will of a majority there, is mere mouthing. A majority?

Then it has an authoritative will, and an organ to make it known, and an executive to carry it into effect--Where are they? We repeat it--if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of _every one_ is necessary--and _universal_ consent will come only with the Greek Kalends and a "perpetual motion." A single individual might thus perpetuate slavery in defiance of the expressed will of a whole people. The most common form of this fallacy is given by Mr. Wise, of Virginia, in his speech, February 16, 1835, in which he denied the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, unless the inhabitants owning slaves pet.i.tioned for it!! Southern members of Congress at the present session (1837-8) ring changes almost daily upon the same fallacy. What! pray Congress _to use_ a power which it _has not_? "It is required of a man according to what he _hath_," saith the Scripture. I commend Mr. Wise to Paul for his ethics. Would that he had got his _logic_ of him! If Congress does not possess the power, why taunt it with its weakness, by asking its exercise? Pet.i.tioning, according to Mr.

Wise, is, in matters of legislation, omnipotence itself; the very _source_ of all const.i.tutional power; for, _asking_ Congress to do what it _cannot_ do, gives it the power!--to pray the exercise of a power that is _not, creates_ it! A beautiful theory! Let us work it both ways.

If to pet.i.tion for the exercise of a power that is _not_, creates it--to pet.i.tion against the exercise of a power that _is_, annihilates it. As southern gentlemen are partial to summary processes, pray, sirs, try the virtue of your own recipe on "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever;" a better subject for experiment and test of the prescription could not be had. But if the pet.i.tions of the citizens of the District give Congress the _right_ to abolish slavery, they impose the _duty_; if they confer const.i.tutional _authority_, they create const.i.tutional _obligation_. If Congress _may_ abolish because of an expression of their will, it _must_ abolish at the bidding of that will.

If the people of the District are a _source of power_ to Congress, their _expressed will_ has the force of a const.i.tutional provision, and has the same binding power upon the National Legislature. To make Congress dependent on the District for authority, is to make it a _subject_ of its authority, restraining the exercise of its own discretion, and sinking it into a mere organ of the District's will. We proceed to another objection.

"_The southern states would not have ratified the const.i.tution, if they had supposed that it gave this power_." It is a sufficient answer to this objection, that the northern states would not have ratified it, if they had supposed that it _withheld_ the power. If "suppositions" are to take the place of the const.i.tution--coming from both sides, they neutralize each other. To argue a const.i.tutional question by _guessing_ at the "suppositions" that might have been made by the parties to it would find small favor in a court of law. But even a desperate s.h.i.+ft is some eas.e.m.e.nt when sorely pushed. If this question is to be settled by "suppositions," suppositions shall be forthcoming, and that without stint.

First, then, I affirm that the North ratified the const.i.tution, "supposing" that slavery had begun to wax old, and would speedily vanish away, and especially that the abolition of the slave trade, which by the const.i.tution was to be surrendered to Congress after twenty years, would plunge it headlong.

Would the North have adopted the const.i.tution, giving three-fifths of the "slave property" a representation, if it had "supposed" that the slaves would have increased from half a million to two millions and a half by 1838--and that the census of 1840 would give to the slave states thirty representatives of "slave property?"

If they had "supposed" that this representation would have controlled the legislation of the government, and carried against the North every question vital to its interests, would Hamilton, Franklin, Sherman, Gerry, Livingston, Langdon, and Rufus King have been such madmen, as to sign the const.i.tution, and the Northern States such suicides as to ratify it? Every self-preserving instinct would have shrieked at such an infatuate immolation. At the adoption of the United States const.i.tution, slavery was regarded as a fast waning system. This conviction was universal. Was.h.i.+ngton, Jefferson, Henry, Grayson, Tucker, Madison, Wythe, Pendleton, Lee, Blair, Mason, Page, Parker, Randolph, Iredell, Spaight, Ramsey, Pinkney, Martin, McHenry, Chase, and nearly all the ill.u.s.trious names south of the Potomac, proclaimed it before the sun. A reason urged in the convention that formed the United States'

const.i.tution, why the word slave should not be used in it, was, _that when slavery should cease_ there might remain upon the National Charter no record that it had ever been. (See speech of Mr. Burrill, of R.I., on the Missouri question.)

I now proceed to show by testimony, that at the date of the United States' const.i.tution, and for several years before and after that period, slavery was rapidly on the wane; that the American Revolution with the great events preceding, accompanying, and following it, had wrought an immense and almost universal change in the public sentiment of the nation on the subject, powerfully impelling it toward the entire abolition of the system--and that it was the _general belief_ that measures for its abolition throughout the Union, would be commenced by the States generally before the lapse of many years. A great ma.s.s of testimony establis.h.i.+ng this position might be presented, but narrow s.p.a.ce, and the importance of speedy publication, counsel brevity. Let the following proofs suffice. First, a few dates as points of observation.

In 1757, Commissioners from seven colonies met at Albany, resolved upon a Union and proposed a plan of general government. In 1765, delegates from nine colonies met at New York and sent forth a bill of rights. The first _general_ Congress met in 1774. The first Congress of the _thirteen_ colonies met in 1775. The revolutionary war commenced in '75.

Independence was declared in '76. The articles of confederation were adopted by the thirteen states in '77 and '78. Independence acknowledged in '83. The convention for forming the U.S. const.i.tution was held in '87, the state conventions for considering it in '87 and '88. The first Congress under the const.i.tution in '89.

Dr. Rush, of Pennsylvania, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, in a letter to Granville Sharpe, May 1, 1773, says: "A spirit of humanity and religion begins to awaken in several of the colonies in favor of the poor negroes. Great events have been brought about by small beginnings. _Anthony Benezet stood alone a few years_ _ago in opposing negro slavery in Philadelphia_, and NOW THREE-FOURTHS OF THE PROVINCE AS WELL AS OF THE CITY CRY OUT AGAINST IT."--[Stuart's Life of Granville Sharpe, p. 21.]

In the preamble to the act prohibiting the importation of slaves into Rhode Island, June, 1774, is the following: "Whereas the inhabitants of America are generally engaged in the preservation of their own rights and liberties, among which that of personal freedom must be considered the greatest, and as those who are desirous of enjoying all the advantages of liberty themselves, _should be willing to extend personal liberty to others_, therefore," &c.

October 20, 1774, the Continental Congress pa.s.sed the following: "We, for ourselves and the inhabitants of the several colonies whom we represent, _firmly agree and a.s.sociate under the sacred ties of virtue, honor, and love of our country_, as follows:"

"2d Article. _We will neither import nor purchase any slaves imported_ after the first day of December next, after which time we will _wholly discontinue_ the slave trade, and we will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels nor _sell our commodities or manufactures_ to those who are concerned in it."

The Continental Congress, in 1775, setting forth the causes and the necessity for taking up arms, say: "_If it were possible_ for men who exercise their reason to believe that the divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race _to hold an absolute property in_, and _unbounded power over others_," &c.

In 1776, Dr. Hopkins, then at the head of New England divines, in "An Address to the owners of negro slaves in the American colonies,"

says: "The conviction of the unjustifiableness of this practice (slavery) has been _increasing_, and _greatly spreading of late_, and _many_ who have had slaves, have found themselves so unable to justify their own conduct in holding them in bondage, as to be induced to _set them at liberty_. * * * * * Slavery is _in every instance_, wrong, unrighteous, and oppressive--a very great and crying sin--_there being nothing of the kind equal to it on the face of the earth_."

The same year the American Congress issued a solemn MANIFESTO to the world. These were its first words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that _all_ men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." _Once_, these were words of power; _now_, "a rhetorical flourish."

The Virginia Gazette of March 19, 1767, in an essay on slavery says: "_There cannot be in nature, there is not in all history, an instance in which every right of man is more flagrantly violated_. Enough I hope has been effected to prove that slavery is a violation of justice and religion."

The celebrated Patrick Henry of Virginia, in a letter, Jan. 18, 1773, to Robert Pleasants, afterwards president of the Virginia Abolition Society, says: "Believe me, I shall honor the Quakers for their n.o.ble efforts to abolish slavery. It is a debt we owe to the purity of our religion to show that it is at variance with that law that warrants slavery. I exhort you to persevere in so worthy a resolution."

The Pennsylvania Chronicle of Nov. 21, 1768, says: "Let every black that shall henceforth be born amongst us be deemed free. One step farther would be to emanc.i.p.ate the whole race, restoring that liberty we have so long unjustly detained from them. Till some step of this kind be taken we shall justly be the derision of the whole world."

In 1779, the Continental Congress ordered a pamphlet to be published, ent.i.tled, "Observations on the American Revolution," from which the following is an extract: "The great principle (of government) is and ever will remain in force, _that men are by Nature free_; and so long as we have any idea of divine _justice_, we must a.s.sociate that of _human freedom_. It is _conceded on all hands, that the right to be free_ CAN NEVER BE ALIENATED."

Extract from the Pennsylvania act for the abolition of slavery, pa.s.sed March 1, 1780: * * * "We conceive that it is our duty, and we rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to others which has been extended to us. Weaned by a long course of experience from those narrow prejudices and partialities we had imbibed, we find our hearts enlarged with kindness and benevolence towards men of all conditions and nations: * * * Therefore be it enacted, that no child born hereafter be a slave," &c.

Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia, written just before the close of the Revolutionary War, says: "I think a change already perceptible since the origin of the present revolution. The spirit of the master is abating, that of the slave is rising from the dust, his condition mollifying, _and the way I hope preparing, under the auspices of heaven_, FOR A TOTAL EMANc.i.p.aTION."

In a letter to Dr. Price, of London, who had just published a pamphlet in favor of the abolition of slavery, Mr. Jefferson, then minister at Paris, (August 7, 1785,) says: "From the mouth to the head of the Chesapeake, _the bulk of the people will approve of your pamphlet in theory_, and it will find a respectable minority ready to _adopt it in practice_--a minority which, for weight and worth of character, _preponderates against the greater number_." Speaking of Virginia, he says: "This is the next state to which we may turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression,--a conflict in which the SACRED SIDE IS GAINING DAILY RECRUITS. Be not, therefore, discouraged--what you have written will do a _great deal of good_; and could you still trouble yourself with our welfare, no man is more able to give aid to the laboring side. The College of William and Mary, since the remodelling of its plan, is the place where are collected together all the young men of Virginia, under preparation for public life. They are there under the direction (most of them) of a Mr. Wythe, one of the most virtuous of characters, and _whose sentiments on the subject of slavery are unequivocal_. I am satisfied, if you could resolve to address an exhortation to those young men with all that eloquence of which you are master, that _its influence on the future decision of this important question would be great, perhaps decisive_. Thus. you see, that so far from thinking you have cause to repent of what you have done, _I wish you to do more, and I wish it on an a.s.surance of its effect_."--Jefferson's Posthumous Works, vol. 1, p. 268.

In 1786, John Jay drafted and signed a pet.i.tion to the Legislature of New York, on the subject of slavery, beginning with these words: "Your memorialists being deeply affected by the situation of those, who, although, FREE BY THE LAWS OF G.o.d, are held in slavery by the laws of the State," &c. This memorial bore also the signatures of the celebrated Alexander Hamilton; Robert R. Livingston, afterwards Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United States, and Chancellor of the State of New York; James Duane, Mayor of the City of New York, and many others of the most eminent individuals in the State.

In the preamble of an instrument, by which Mr. Jay emanc.i.p.ated a slave in 1784, is the following pa.s.sage:

"Whereas, the children of men are by nature equally free, and cannot, without injustice, be either reduced to or HELD in slavery."

In his letter while Minister at Spain, in 1786, he says, speaking of the abolition of slavery: "Till America comes into this measure, her prayers to heaven will be IMPIOUS. I believe G.o.d governs the world; and I believe it to be a maxim in his, as in our court, that those who ask for equity _ought to do it_."