A History of Spain Part 28

[Sidenote: Disputes with Portugal over boundaries in South America.]

There was a much stronger case against England with regard to Portugal, whose exaggerated claims were supported by the British government. The boundaries between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America had been an unending source of dispute, ever since the treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, and the question was complicated by that of British and Portuguese smuggling into Spain's colonies. The princ.i.p.al scene of conflict was the Portuguese post of Sacramento, founded in 1679 on the eastern bank of the Rio de la Plata. The Spanish-owned region of Paraguay was also a field for Portuguese aggressions. Domestic animals to the number of hundreds of thousands were driven off from the Spanish settlements, while thousands of Indian families were captured and sold into slavery. Ferdinand VI endeavored to solve these problems through a treaty which he made with Portugal, in 1750, according to which Spain acquired Sacramento in exchange for territories in the Paraguayan region. The treaty met with the spirited opposition of leading Spanish ministers, and with that of the Jesuit missionaries, the Indians, and the Spanish settlers in the regions affected, and after many vicissitudes, including a war in Paraguay, it was annulled in 1761, but the troubles on the border continued. One of the underlying difficulties was the ambition of Portugal. Under the direction of the Marquis of Pombal, Portuguese minister of state, she was desirous of making conquests in South America, for which purpose Pombal was willing to go to any length in bad faith to achieve his end, relying upon the support of England in case Spain should declare war. Pombal secretly directed the Portuguese officials in the Sacramento region to seize desirable Spanish territories, and when reports of these captures came to Europe pretended that they were false, or that they were nothing more than inconsequential affrays between the Spanish and Portuguese soldiery. He promised to order his troops to desist from such actions, and asked Charles III to do the same. The Spanish king complied with his wishes, while Pombal on the contrary continued to give orders for hostilities and to send reinforcements, hoping that the Portuguese might secure posts from which it would be impossible to dislodge them by the time his duplicity should be found out. Not only did he deceive Charles III for a while, but he also misled the English ministers, pretending that Portugal was a victim of Spanish ambition when the facts were quite the contrary. England supported Pombal with vigorous diplomatic action. By the close of the year 1775, however, England was so busily engaged in the disputes with her own colonies that she was far from desiring a war in Europe. The British Cabinet announced that it would take no part in the quarrel between Spain and Portugal, provided Charles III should make no attempts on the territorial integrity of Portugal and Brazil. Pombal now made peaceful overtures to Charles III, hoping to delay the sending of Spanish troops to South America, but the proofs of Pombal's perfidy were by this time so clear that the king of Spain would not trust him.

In fact, a Portuguese fleet in South America attacked the Spanish fleet, in February, 1776, and shortly afterward the Portuguese captured the Spanish post of Santa Tecla. In November a Spanish expedition left Cadiz, and on arrival in South America put a check to the Portuguese aggressions, and captured Sacramento. Fortune played into Spain's hands in another respect when Maria Victoria, sister of Charles III, became regent of Portugal on the death of the king in 1777. This occasioned the dismissal of Pombal, and in October of that year a treaty was arranged between Spain and Portugal entirely favorable to the former. The much-disputed Sacramento colony was awarded to Spain, while Paraguay was retained. This treaty, supplemented by another in 1778, put an end, after nearly three centuries, to the disputes between Spain and Portugal with regard to their American boundaries.

[Sidenote: Disputes of England with her American colonies as a factor in Spain's foreign policy.]

In the midst of Spain's preparations for a war against England there loomed up a new factor, the troubles between England and her American colonies. Down to 1774 Spain had proceeded without reference to these disputes, ardently desirous of war whenever France should be ready, although Charles III himself was conservative with regard to a declaration. Until late in the year 1774 France and Spain, together with most Englishmen, believed that the colonial situation was merely a Whig device against the Tories. The first inkling of the seriousness of the situation seems to have come in a report of the French amba.s.sador, in June, 1774, quoting a remark of the British minister, Lord Rochford, that the Boston rioters were descendants of Cromwell's Puritans, implying that they would fight. Both France and Spain welcomed the news, believing that it would keep England engaged until the Bourbon powers could get ready to strike. In December, 1774, Garnier, the French _charge d'affaires_ in London, had become convinced that the American dispute was the most important event in English history since the revolution of 1688, and he suggested that France should give secret aid to the Americans. In January, 1775, he reported that an army of 9000 men was being sent to the colonies, and sounded a warning lest they make a descent upon the French West Indies, whether in the flush of victory, or in order to gain a recompense in case of defeat. The Spanish court was informed of this opinion, and in March, 1775, received a similar message from Escarano, the Spanish minister in London, who stated that England had 11,736 soldiers in America (a great force as colonial armies went) and could easily attack Spain's possessions, both because they were near, and because the British had so many transports at hand. He was of the opinion that England could not defeat America with her "three million souls, guided by the enthusiasm of liberty, and accustomed to live in a kind of independence," a people "who had given so many proofs of valor." The danger of a return to power of William Pitt, the imperialist, now Lord Chatham, was also alluded to. Spain at once consulted with France whether it would not be advisable to break with England immediately, but Vergennes was not ready. So the matter was dropped, although a remark attributed to Lord Rochford that the Americans could be won back to allegiance by an English declaration of war against France did not tend to allay the Bourbon feeling of insecurity.

[Sidenote: Disadvantages to Spain of a victory by either the United States or England and effect on Spain's policy.]

At about this time the Spanish authorities began to be impressed by the idea, first expressed by Aranda in July, 1775, that the American outbreak would endanger Spain's colonial empire. According to Aranda an independent America would be a menace, as her population was increasing, and consequently she needed lands, which she would be apt to seek in a region with a temperate climate like New Spain, rather than by expansion northward. Thus the Anglo-Americans might eventually dominate North America, or help Spain's colonies to become independent. On the other hand, if England should defeat the colonists, the latter would join with her in her wars as in the past, and the danger would be equally great.

Thus Spain seemed to be between two horns of the dilemma. Up to this time she had been ready for a declaration of war whenever France should announce her willingness. Henceforth there was a more conservative note in Spain's att.i.tude, while France, who had everything to gain and nothing to lose, threw off her former conservatism and became increasingly enthusiastic. Up to the close of the year 1776, however, Spain still leaned toward war, and France remained undecided as to the moment to strike. During this period Spain was influenced largely by the question with Portugal. In September, 1776, Vergennes informed Aranda that in his opinion the war ought soon to be begun, before England herself should declare it and make an attack on France and Spain.

Spain's att.i.tude was expressed by Grimaldi, the Spanish minister of state, in a letter to Aranda in October. The war was inevitable, he said, and it would be an advantage to begin it several months before England was ready to undertake it. Spain would leave it to the decision of France whether the declaration should be made at once. Incidentally, Spain hoped to conquer Portugal in course of the war. This frank statement found Vergennes less enthusiastic. Moreover, he objected to Spain's designs on Portugal, lest other European powers should be unfavorable to them. Once again the matter was dropped. Some of the higher Spanish officials were disappointed over these continued refusals by France, but Charles III said that for his part he believed the right moment had not come. Meanwhile, since June, 1776, Spain had been aiding the Americans secretly with money, arms, and ammunition, much of which was made available through s.h.i.+pment to New Orleans by way of Havana, and thence to destination. Nevertheless, Vergennes' refusal, in November, to begin the war marked the turning point in the att.i.tude of both France and Spain. The disadvantages, henceforth, loomed larger and larger in the eyes of Spain, while the successful resistance of the Americans to England made the way more and more easy for France.

[Sidenote: Spain's divergence from France over the American Revolution.]

The new att.i.tude of Spain was represented by both Charles III and Floridablanca, who succeeded Grimaldi early in 1777. According to Floridablanca the most immediate advantages which Spain might hope to gain from the war were the recovery of Florida and the expulsion of the English from Honduras. War ought not to be declared, however, until both France and Spain should have considerable forces in the West Indies.

Furthermore, if the rebellious English colonies should establish their independence, Spain ought to contrive to keep them divided in interests, so that there might not grow up a formidable power near Spanish America.

Clearly there was no enthusiasm in Spanish governmental circles on behalf of the Americans. This appears also from the cold reception accorded Arthur Lee, the American representative, who at about this time arrived in Spain, but was not received by the Spanish court. The breach between the respective courses of France and Spain was still further widened as a result of Burgoyne's surrender to the Americans at Saratoga. The British government began to make offers with a view to conciliating the colonists. France acted quickly to prevent it, for it was believed that a reconciliation would mean a loss of the commercial favors France hoped to get and perhaps a war with England in which the colonies would join on the English side. In December, 1777, therefore, France declared herself ready to enter into a treaty of commerce and alliance with the American government, specifically stating that her willingness was due partially to a desire to diminish the power of England by separating her from her colonies. In February, 1778, a treaty was signed. All of this was done, in violation of the spirit of the Family Compact, without any official notification to Spain. Spain's opinion of this procedure was voiced by Floridablanca, who recommended to Charles III that Spain should continue her preparations, as if war were inevitable, but should avoid a declaration as long as possible, for under existing circ.u.mstances, one of which was the inconstancy of Spain's allies, the war could not result favorably for Spain.

Henceforth, Spain pursued an independent policy. The English government was informed that Spain's att.i.tude would depend upon England; Spain neither wished war nor feared it. France, meanwhile, had entered the conflict.

[Sidenote: Failure of mediation and Spain's entry into the war.]

Charles III now began to attempt the part of a mediator, in hopes that he might get Gibraltar and Minorca as the price for bringing about peace. In May, 1778, Escarano suggested to Lord Weymouth, a member of the British ministry, that Gibraltar would be a fair equivalent for Spain's services, but was told that the price was too high, and that affairs had probably gone beyond the point where mediation would serve; England wanted no more from Spain than that she remain neutral. In making this reply Lord Weymouth rather brusquely thanked Charles III for the magnanimity of his offer,--a type of answer which was not calculated to be pleasing to the Spanish ear, as Floridablanca very plainly intimated to the English amba.s.sador. To add to Spain's displeasure England's conduct on the sea gave cause for complaint. Nevertheless, Charles still hoped to serve as arbitrator,--all the more so, when news came of French naval victories over the English. He prevailed upon Louis XVI to submit the terms upon which he would make peace. The conditions, which included an acknowledgment of American independence and the recall of England's land and sea forces, were presented to Lord Weymouth, who haughtily rejected them. Late in the same year, 1778, Spain's proposal of a twenty-five or thirty year truce between England and her colonies was also rejected. Nothing could exceed the patience of Charles III, who then offered Weymouth an indefinite armistice, to be guaranteed by a general disarmament. Again the Spanish king's proposals were arrogantly rejected. To make matters worse, England had delayed her reply from January to March, 1779, and her s.h.i.+ps had continued to attack those of Spain. On April 3, Charles renewed his offer of a suspension of hostilities, this time in the form of an ultimatum. England did not answer for nearly two months, and in the meantime, seeing that war was inevitable, planned attacks on the Spanish colonies. On May 28 the ultimatum was rejected, and on June 23 war was declared.

[Sidenote: The war with England and its favorable issue.]

Spain was well prepared for the war, besides which the favorable state of her relations with Portugal, and indeed with other countries, was a source of strength. France and Spain planned an invasion of England which did not materialize, but it did cause the retention of the English fleet in British waters and a diminution in the military forces sent to America,--a factor in the American war not to be overlooked. The attempts to retake Gibraltar were unsuccessful, but in 1782 Minorca fell into Spanish hands. In America, Florida was reconquered from the British, the establishments in Honduras were taken, and the English were expelled from the Bahama Islands of the West Indies. Meanwhile, England displayed great eagerness to remove Spain from the list of her enemies.

Late in 1779 she offered to restore Gibraltar for the price of Spanish neutrality, and to add Florida and the right to fish in Newfoundland waters if Spain would aid her against the United States. Not only this time but also on two other occasions when England endeavored to treat separately with Spain her offers were rejected, even though they embodied favorable terms for withdrawal from the war. In an age when international faith was not very sacred, Spain preferred to remain true to France, with whom she had renewed her alliance, although to be sure England's promises never equalled Spain's hopes. It is also interesting to note, not only that the Americans had a representative in Spain (John Jay), but also that there were agents of Spain in the United States (Miralles and Rendon), besides which Bernardo de Galvez, the conqueror of Florida, had dealings with American agents at New Orleans. The general relations of the two governments cannot be said to have been cordial, however, and at no time was there anything approaching a veritable alliance; Bourbon Spain could not possibly approve of the democratic United States. By the treaty of 1783, which ended the war, Spain got Florida and Minorca, and limited the dyewood privileges of the English in Honduras to a term of years. On the other hand Spain restored the Bahamas to England. An interesting period of relations between Spain and the United States, having to do primarily with the regions of the lower Mississippi valley, began in the closing years of the reign of Charles III, but the story belongs rather to the colonial side of the history of Spain.

[Sidenote: Death of Charles III.]

In December, 1788, Charles III died. As will be made more clear in the chapters dealing with inst.i.tutions, he had brought Spain forward to the position of a first rank power again,--even though her enjoyment of that high station was to be of brief duration.

CHAPTER x.x.xIII

CHARLES IV AND FRANCE, 1788-1808

[Sidenote: Dominating character of relations with France and their effects upon Spain]

IF the reign of Charles III, despite the close union of the Bourbon crowns, had been characterized mainly in its external manifestations by the hostility of Spain to England, that of Charles IV (1788-1808) was dominated by relations with France. Unaffected for a while by the principles underlying the French Revolution, Spain was toppled from her position as a first-rate power by the Emperor Napoleon, whose designs for world power and whose methods in seeking it were not unlike those followed over a century later by William II of Germany. Meanwhile, the ideas of the American and the French revolutions were permeating the Spanish colonies, and as the wars with England continued during much of this reign, shutting off effective communication between the colonies and Spain, a chance was offered for putting them into effect in the new world. The way was well prepared in the reign of Charles IV, though the outbreak was postponed until after his fall. The blow struck by Napoleon was not without its compensations, which in the long run may be considered to have outweighed the loss of prestige. Napoleon, quite without intention, gave Spain an impulse to national feeling, in the uprising against French domination, which was greater than any she had formerly experienced, and of sufficient force to endure to the present day. In the same roundabout way Napoleon gave the Spain of the _Dos de Mayo_, or Second of May (the date of the revolt against Napoleon, and the national holiday of Spain), her first opportunity to imbibe democratic ideas.

[Sidenote: The Nootka affair and the virtual repudiation of the Family Compact.]

To cope with the great forces of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, Spain had to rely on the leaders.h.i.+p of the weak, timid, vacillating Charles IV. His predecessor had left him a legacy of able ministers, but these were not long sustained by the king. At the outset Floridablanca still ruled as first minister of state. He was liberal-minded as concerned social and economic inst.i.tutions, but was profoundly royalist in his political ideas and an enemy of anything which represented a diminution in the prerogatives of the crown. He was alarmed by the ideas which were being spread broadcast in France, and took steps to prevent their introduction into Spain, becoming recognized as an opponent of the French Revolution. In the midst of this situation, there occurred the Nootka affair, which obliged him for a time to change his policy. A Spanish voyage of 1789 to the northwest coast of North America had resulted in the discovery and capture of two English s.h.i.+ps at Nootka, on the western sh.o.r.e of Vancouver Island. Floridablanca informed the English government of this event, in January, 1790, complaining of the frequent usurpations of Spanish colonial territories by British subjects, and asking for the recognition of Spain's owners.h.i.+p of Nootka, which had been discovered by a Spanish voyage of 1774. What followed was very nearly a duplicate of the Falkland incident, twenty years before. England claimed that the British flag had been insulted, and demanded satisfaction, which Floridablanca refused to give, as it involved the acknowledgment of a doubt concerning Spain's owners.h.i.+p of Nootka. War seemed imminent, and the French government was invoked to stand by the Family Compact. The National a.s.sembly, then in actual control in France, acknowledged the obligation, but attached conditions (having to do with the revolution) to their willingness to declare war,--with the result that Charles IV and Floridablanca decided that it was better to avoid a rupture with England. A series of three treaties, from 1790 to 1794, arranged for the payment of an indemnity by Spain, and among other matters agreed that the s.h.i.+ps of both nations should have a right to sail the waters and make landings freely in regions not already settled by either power. In effect, therefore, the lands north of the Spanish settlements were thrown open to the entry of England.

These treaties had a significance which was wider than that of the matters directly involved. They marked a new spirit in the direction of colonial affairs. In the early years of the conquest Spain had played an aggressive part, followed soon by the adoption of what might be termed an aggressive defensive, or a willingness to fight for the retention of what she had, leading also to further conquests in order to ward off foreign attack. The Nootka affair was the beginning of a spiritless, waiting kind of defensive, the inevitable outcome of which was disintegration.

[Sidenote: Floridablanca and Spanish opposition to the French Revolution.]

The Nootka treaties left Spain free, however, to stand in opposition to the French Revolution. Louis XVI of France had written secretly to Charles IV, in 1789, that he had been compelled to agree to measures of which he did not approve. Other European monarchs were also acquainted with the perils of Louis XVI's position, and in the general interests of kings.h.i.+p, all desired to save him, although in the case of Spain there was the strong bond of family ties as well. In 1790 Floridablanca directed a note to the French a.s.sembly requesting greater freedom of action for Louis XVI, making thinly veiled threats in case of a refusal to comply. This action only served to enrage the French government. In 1791 Floridablanca ordered the taking of a census of all foreigners in Spain, about half of whom were Frenchmen, compelling them to swear allegiance to the king, the laws, and the religion of the peninsula. A subsequent order prohibited the entry of any literature of a revolutionary bearing, even going so far as to forbid foreigners to receive letters. When Louis XVI accepted the const.i.tution of 1791 Floridablanca announced that Charles IV refused to recognize that the French king had signed the doc.u.ment of his own free will, and asked that Louis XVI and his family be allowed to go to a neutral land, threatening war if the French government should fail to accede to Charles' wishes.

Here was a direct challenge to the revolution, but instead of accepting the gauntlet France sent an agent to Spain who was able to persuade Charles IV that Floridablanca's policy was in fact contributing to the dangerous position of Louis XVI. Floridablanca was therefore relieved from power early in 1792, and Aranda became first minister in Spain.

[Sidenote: Brief ministry of Aranda.]

Aranda, who sympathized to some extent with the revolutionary ideas, placed the relations with France on a more cordial basis, although without relinquis.h.i.+ng the efforts which were being made in company with other European sovereigns to save Louis XVI. When the news came of the revolutionary excesses of the summer of 1792 Aranda, who had not expected such a turn of affairs, became more stern, and began to consider the advisability of joint military action with Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia. Meanwhile, the French government demanded the alliance of Spain or offered the alternative of war. Induced in part by a doubt with regard to the best policy to pursue for the sake of Louis XVI, Spain hesitated, and suggested a treaty of neutrality. France imposed conditions which it was impossible for Spain to accept, among them the recognition of the French Republic, which had just been proclaimed. Before Aranda could meet the problem in a decisive manner he was dispossessed of his post as the result of a palace plot in favor of Manuel G.o.doy.

[Sidenote: G.o.doy and the significance of his relations with the queen.]

At the time of his accession to the heads.h.i.+p of the Spanish ministry in 1792 G.o.doy was a mere youth, twenty-five years of age. Formerly a soldier of the royal guard, he had been selected by Charles IV with the specific idea of training him to be his leading minister, for the king believed that the plebeian G.o.doy would, out of necessity, be devotedly attached to the royal interests. The queen, Maria Luisa, was influential in the choice of G.o.doy, for there is little doubt that she was already the mistress of this upstart youth. G.o.doy's abilities have perhaps been condemned too harshly. He was a man of ambition and some talent, and had studied a.s.siduously to fit himself for his eventual post. Nevertheless, his sudden rise to high rank in the n.o.bility (for he had been made Duke of Alcudia) and in political office, together with the notoriety of his relations with the queen, caused an indignation in Spain which was to result in the forming of a party opposed to him,--a group which the enemies of Spain were able to manipulate to advantage.

[Sidenote: War with France and the treaty of Basle.]

[Sidenote: Difficulties with England and alliance with France.]

G.o.doy continued the efforts of his predecessors to save Louis XVI, without more success than they, and when he declined to accede to the conditions imposed by the French Convention, then ruling in France, that body early in 1793 declared war on Spain. The war against France was joined by most of the countries of western Europe. One by one, however, the continental princes fell away, and urged Spain to do the same. The war itself, so far as Spain was concerned, was not decisive either way, although France had a little the better of it. In 1795 negotiations were undertaken which resulted in the treaty of Basle. The Pyrenean boundary was maintained, but Spain ceded that portion of the island of Hayti, or Santo Domingo, which still belonged to her, thus acknowledging the French t.i.tle to the whole island.[60] The government of England, with which Spain had allied for the war with France, was exceedingly annoyed by Spain's acceptance of peace, and very soon began to act in a threatening manner. Even as an ally in the recent war England had not been altogether cordial toward Spain. On one occasion a Spanish treasure s.h.i.+p which had been captured by the French was retaken by the English, and retained as a prize; Englishmen had continued to engage in contraband trade, not only in Spanish America, but also in the peninsula itself; they had been responsible for encouraging separatist feelings in Spanish America, well knowing that the independence of Spain's colonies would result in advantages to British commerce; and England had refused to grant Spain a subsidy for the 1795 campaign,--a factor with a bearing on Spain's action, whatever the merits of the case. The resentment of the Spanish court was now provoked by insults which were offered to the Spanish amba.s.sador to London and by attacks on Spanish s.h.i.+ps, just as formerly in the reign of Charles III. The natural effect was to drive Spain into the arms of France. An alliance was formed in 1796 which was followed by a declaration of war against England. It is highly probable that Charles IV was induced to form this union by a belief, fostered perhaps by French intrigue, that the French Republic was about to collapse, in which event it seemed likely that a Spanish Bourbon might be called to the throne of France.

[Sidenote: Unsatisfactory results from the French Alliance.]

Spain's experience as an ally of France was not more happy than her previous union with England. France excluded her from representation at several conferences looking to treaties of peace between France and her enemies, and made slight efforts to secure the interests of Spain, going so far as to refuse her sanction to many of the pretensions of her Bourbon ally. Most annoying of all was the dispossession of the Duke of Parma, a relative of Charles IV by descent from Isabel Farnesio. The French government endeavored to calm Spanish feelings on this point by offering to make G.o.doy the Grand Master of the Knights of Malta,--an honor he was disposed to accept, subject to certain conditions, one of which was that he be absolved from the vow of chast.i.ty. In fact, however, the French authorities were suspicious of G.o.doy, believing that he was secretly plotting with England, because he did not insist on Portugal's refusing to allow the English fleets to remain in Portuguese ports. A French representative was sent to Spain in 1797, and the dismissal of G.o.doy was procured from Charles IV. Nevertheless, G.o.doy continued to be the princ.i.p.al force at the Spanish court, backed as he was by the powerful influence of the queen. The policy of truculence to France went on, however, due in part perhaps to Charles' continued hopes of acquiring the Bourbon crown, but even more, very likely, to his pusillanimity in the face of the threats of the French Directory. In 1799 his hopes were dashed when Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory and became first consul of France, a t.i.tle which a few years later he converted into that of emperor.

[Sidenote: Early relations with Napoleon and the war with Portugal.]

The change of government in France was welcomed at the Spanish court, for it was believed that Spain would receive more consideration at the hands of Napoleon than she had obtained from the Directory. Events proved that Spain was to be even more an instrument in French hands than formerly, and that Napoleon was to be more powerful and despotic and less courteous and faithful in international affairs than the French rulers who had preceded him. One of his earliest acts was an attempt to employ the Spanish fleet to conserve French ends. When the Spanish admiral refused to carry out the wishes of Napoleon, a matter in which he was sustained by his government, the French ruler brought about the dismissal of Urquijo, at that time first minister of state in Spain, and shortly afterward the offending admiral was relieved from his command.

Meanwhile, a treaty had been arranged in 1800 whereby Napoleon agreed to enlarge the dominions of the Duke of Parma (who had regained his duchy) in exchange for the recession of Louisiana to France and the gift of six s.h.i.+ps of war. By a treaty of 1801 Tuscany was granted to the family of the Duke of Parma, whose whole domains were now called the kingdom of Etruria. It was provided that in case of a lack of succession of the reigning house a Spanish prince of the royal family should inherit the Etrurian throne, and this was to be the rule forever. Another treaty of 1801 required Spain to issue an ultimatum to Portugal demanding an abandonment of the English alliance. The name of G.o.doy was signed to the later treaties in the series of which the above have been mentioned. He had not ceased to be influential during his absence from power, but henceforth until 1808 he was definitely in the saddle. Though his military experience was slight he was appointed general of the Spanish army which was to invade Portugal, and when war was presently declared he entered that country. The campaign, although comparatively insignificant, resulted in victory. Portugal agreed to close her ports in return for the Spanish king's guarantee of the territorial integrity of Portugal. A celebration was held at Badajoz, at which the soldiers presented the queen with branches of orange trees taken from Portuguese groves, resulting in the application of the name "war of the oranges,"--which fittingly described its inconsequential character.

Napoleon was furious over such a termination of the war, and went so far as to threaten the end of the Spanish monarchy unless the campaign were pursued. At length he decided to accept the result, after Portugal had consented to increase the indemnity which she had originally agreed to pay to France. This marked a beginning, however, of the French ruler's distrust of G.o.doy. Shortly afterward it suited Napoleon's purposes to make peace. In 1802 a treaty was signed with England, and, naturally, Spain too made peace. Minorca, which had been occupied by the English, was restored to Spain, but the island of Trinidad was surrendered to England,--another bit chipped off Spain's colonial empire.

[Sidenote: Difficulties of neutrality and declaration of war against England.]

G.o.doy had emerged from the Portuguese campaign as general-in-chief of the armies of the land and sea, and was again the dominating power at court. By this time a strong opposition had grown up around Ferdinand, the eldest son of the king, directed by an ambitious canon, named Escoiquiz. Napoleon now had a political force at hand, to employ whenever he should desire it, against G.o.doy. Early in 1803 Napoleon was again at war with England, and proceeded to woo Spain's support by charges that she was favoring England and by threats of war. In the same year, too, he sold Louisiana to the United States, although he had promised Spain at the time of the recession that France would never transfer that region to any country other than Spain. Spain protested, but soon accepted the situation. Later in 1803 Napoleon compelled Spain to consent to a so-called treaty of neutrality, which in fact amounted to the paying of a monthly tribute to France. England objected, and followed up her complaints by capturing three Spanish frigates and stopping merchantmen, without a declaration of war. England announced that she was holding the frigates as a guarantee of Spanish neutrality.

Thus courted with equal roughness by France and England, Spain was again under the necessity of choosing which of her enemies to fight. England was selected, and in 1804 war against that country was declared.

[Sidenote: Napoleon and G.o.doy, and the project to part.i.tion Portugal.]

In 1805 there occurred the great battle of Trafalgar, in which the French and Spanish navies were virtually destroyed by the English under Nelson. The immediate results of this defeat as affecting Spanish action was the decision of G.o.doy, who had never enjoyed cordial relations with Napoleon, to seek an alliance with England. Through this agency he hoped to bolster up his own power as against the rapidly growing body of his enemies in Spain. In the midst of his plans came Napoleon's great victory over Prussia at Jena in 1806, which, following that of Austerlitz over Austria in 1805, once again made the French emperor dangerously predominant on the continent of western Europe. G.o.doy, who had already compromised himself, made haste to explain. Napoleon pretended to be satisfied, but decided then that he would make an end of the Bourbon monarchy. The unpopularity of G.o.doy and the strength of the party of Ferdinand, who was now a popular favorite, were among the means of which he availed himself; Ferdinand even wrote him letters in which he alluded freely to his mother's adulterous relations with G.o.doy.

Meanwhile, Napoleon profited by G.o.doy's willingness to do anything to win the favor of the emperor by arranging for the conquest of Portugal.

A part.i.tion of that territory was projected whereby the Bourbon monarch of Etruria was to have northern Portugal, G.o.doy (as Prince of Algarve) was to have the south, and the centre was to be exchanged for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which England had taken from Spain. The usual ultimatum having been sent and rejected, the war began for what seemed a brilliant objective for Spain,--if Napoleon had had any intention of his keeping his word.

[Sidenote: Plottings of Napoleon and the abdication of Charles IV.]

The campaign of 1807 resulted in a rapid, almost bloodless conquest of Portugal by the French general Junot, placing Napoleon in a position to fulfil his treaty obligations. Nothing was further from his plans, however, and, indeed, G.o.doy and the king had recently had cause to suspect his sincerity; action had been taken against Ferdinand and his party, resulting in the exposure of the prince's correspondence with Napoleon. Napoleon occupied Etruria,--and gave the queen of that country to understand that she need not look for compensation in Portugal.

G.o.doy, meanwhile, remained without Algarve, although hoping against hope that he might yet get it. All this time, French troops were pouring into Spain, and through deceit were possessing themselves of the Spanish strongholds in the north. To the credit of G.o.doy it must be said that he divined the emperor's intentions, and favored a demand for the withdrawal of the French troops, with the alternative of war. Charles IV and his other leading advisers were opposed to this idea; the king was frightened at the very thought of fighting Napoleon. The emperor now began to unmask himself. The Spanish amba.s.sador to France returned to Madrid as the bearer of a message from Napoleon, asking for the cession of certain Spanish provinces in the north as far as the Ebro, or else for the recognition of the emperor's t.i.tle to Portugal, together with a military road thereto across Spanish territory; the amba.s.sador added that he believed Napoleon intended to possess himself of the northern provinces and perhaps of all Spain, though possibly not until the death of Charles IV. It was now perfectly clear to G.o.doy and the king what Napoleon meant to do, but the party of Ferdinand, unaware of all the facts, was wedded blindly to the emperor, believing that his sole desire was to get rid of G.o.doy and a.s.sure the succession of Ferdinand. Charles, G.o.doy, and the queen thought of escaping to the Americas, and as a preliminary step moved the court from Madrid to Aranjuez. A riot followed at Aranjuez in which G.o.doy was captured by the followers of Ferdinand, and was with difficulty saved from death. Realizing that the army and the people were almost wholly on the side of Ferdinand, and unable to see any way out of his difficulties, Charles IV decided to abdicate, and accordingly on March 19, 1808, did so. All Spain rejoiced, for G.o.doy had fallen, and the idolized prince had now ascended the throne as Ferdinand VII.

[Sidenote: Duplicity of Napoleon and the journeys of Ferdinand VII and Charles IV to Bayonne.]