Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve, C.B., D.C.L. Part 24

_Val Richer, September 10th_.--I am just up, my dear Sir, having been in bed for a fortnight. Grief and indignation are unhealthy at eighty-three. I am better, and only wish I was as sure of the convalescence of France as of my own. It is true that France has before her more time for recovery than I have.

I will say nothing of the fallen Empire. I should say more than is seemly and less than is true. Never was fall more deserved, more necessary, and more absolute.

Neither will I say anything of the new Government. It is what it professes to be, a power pledged to defend the country. A national const.i.tuent a.s.sembly has just been convoked, and meanwhile everything will be done to preserve the honour and integrity of France. This, for the present, is the one idea and the one pa.s.sion of the whole country, especially of Paris. I hope that the deeds will correspond to the pa.s.sion.

There are two points on which, in spite of my present weakness, I wish to give you my opinion at once, so as to awaken your interest, and the interest of all the friends of European order and of France now in England.

There is much to be regretted in the general policy of Europe since 1815.

Many faults have been committed which might have been avoided, many improvements which might have been made have been miscalculated or have pa.s.sed as dreams. But throughout this age, and for more than half a century, rising above all faults and blunders, royal or popular, diplomatic or parliamentary, one great and novel fact has dominated the policy of Europe--there has been no question of a war of ambition and of conquest; no State has attempted to aggrandise itself by force at the expense of other States; [Footnote: Guizot's enthusiasm or patriotism here led him into a somewhat reckless a.s.sertion. In point of fact, there was not one of the great Continental Powers which, during the previous fifty years, had not 'attempted to aggrandise itself by force,' and, necessarily, 'at the expense of other States.' With the exception of Austria, they had done more than 'attempt'--they had effected the aggrandis.e.m.e.nt.] respect for peace and the law of nations has become a ruling maxim of international policy. When internal revolution in any State has rendered territorial changes necessary, these changes have been recognised and accepted only after the examination and consent of Europe.

Belgium and Greece have taken rank as European States only by the putting on one side all the yearnings of French, Russian, or English ambition. And when, in 1844 and 1848, the Emperor Nicholas, in his familiar interviews with your amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg, proposed that Russia and England should act in concert, and by joint conquest, as he said, put an end to the decrepitude of the Ottoman Empire, two English ministers, Lord Aberdeen and Lord John Russell, to their great honour, rejected any such idea, as an outrage on the law of nations, and the peace of Europe.

I have no hesitation in affirming, my dear Sir, that this is the greatest and most salutary feature of the first half of this century, and has contributed more than anything else to the revival of principles of equity and justice in the relations between governments and their people, to the increased prosperity of different nations, and to the progress of civilisation in the world. And, new as its rule yet is, this fact has been sufficient to stop, or at least to check in their evil developements, the noxious germs of an ambitious and violent policy, revivified in Europe by the revolutionary crises of 1848. Temptations have certainly not been wanting to governments and parties since that date. But in 1848 the French Republic respected the peace of Europe and the law of nations; in 1852 the French Empire hastened to declare that it was peace; and when, leaving that, she threw herself into the Italian war, is it credible that she would have been contented with Nice and Savoy as the price of the support she gave to the Italians if she had not been restrained by the good modern principle of European policy, the condemnation of the spirit of ambition and conquest? [Footnote: Not to speak of the chance of having to deal with Prussia. Cf. _ante_, p. 27.]

It is this legitimate and guiding principle which is at present ignored, attacked, and in great danger. I have no intention of entering here upon the question of German unity, or of inquiring how far the consequences of Sadowa are to be attributed to the real and spontaneous effort of national sentiment amongst the Germans. I waive all discussion on this point.

I do not suppose anyone will say that in this great German event Prussian ambition had no share, or that force and conquest did not act side by side with the impulse of national sentiment. But I do not now meddle with what has been done in Germany; that has nothing in common with the present pretensions of Prussia to Alsace and Lorraine. Have these provinces given any manifestation, any appearance, of a desire to be included in the German unity? Is not the Prussian policy in this openly and exclusively a policy of ambition and of conquest, such as would have been followed, from more or less specious motives of royal or national selfishness, by Louis XIV. in the seventeenth, by Frederick II. in the eighteenth, by Napoleon I. in the nineteenth century? such as the modern publicists and moralists have so often condemned and fought against? such, in fine, as all nations, in all ages--and especially Europe in our own times--have so cruelly suffered from? I say no more. I should be ashamed to insist upon what is so clear.

I have nothing to do with Utopian ideas. I do not believe in perpetual peace, nor in the absolute rule of the law of nations as affecting the rivalries of governments and the facts of history. I know that ambitious intrigue and violent enterprise will always have a part in the destinies of nations. I only ask that ambition and force shall not be permitted to take that part, controlled only by their own will. At least they ought to be recognised for what they are, and called by their right names; their claims, and the results of them, ought to be placed face to face with the policy of peace and the law of nations; and, lastly, it ought not to be forgotten that this, the only durable and good policy, has prevailed in Europe for half a century, and that it would be shameful and unfortunate to allow it to fall undefended before the first success of the old policy of ambition and conquest.

In the severe and dangerous trial which she is now undergoing, France may strengthen herself with the thought that her present and personal policy is in exact agreement with the European policy of peace and the law of nations. France has no ambition, no remote designs or secret aim; she asks for nothing; she is defending her rights, her honour, and her territory.

Will the Powers, who have hitherto proclaimed their neutrality, a.s.sist her by a.s.sisting to maintain the European policy of peace and the law of nations? I shall be surprised if they do not, the more so as they could do it without seriously compromising themselves. If their intervention by force of arms were necessary, it would undoubtedly be at once effective; but any such necessity is quite out of the question; the neutral Powers are stronger than they themselves are perhaps aware, and their moral strength is amply sufficient. Let them plainly a.s.sert their disapproval of this attack on the territorial integrity of France; and in support of their disapproval, let them declare that, in any case, they will not recognise any change in the territory of France which France herself will not accept.

It is my deep and firm conviction that this would be sufficient to put an end to any such attempt, and to check the policy of ambition and conquest, without which the peace of Europe cannot be re-established. Is France to be left alone to sustain this great and good cause at all risks? or will the neutral Powers, without any great risk to themselves, give her such support as will ensure her triumph? It is for the Powers to answer this question. I am very old to be surprised at anything; and yet I should be surprised if England did not see the greatness of the part she is called upon to play under existing circ.u.mstances. For many years she sustained in Europe, by war, the policy of respect for the laws of nations; will she not uphold it to-day by peace?

Adieu, my dear Sir, je suis fatigue. Je vais me coucher, et tout a vous,

GUIZOT.

Should you think proper to make any use of this letter, either by privately showing it to anyone, or by giving it a wider publicity, I have no objection. I leave the question of fitness and opportunity in England to you. For my part, my only wish is that my opinions and sentiments in this important crisis should be well known both in France and England.

The following note is endorsed by Reeve 'Due d'Aumale on the capitulation of Sedan,' which took place on September 2nd. It is, however, impossible to suppose that the Due d'Aumale did not hear of an event so astounding till three weeks after it had happened, and the note probably refers more immediately to the occupation of Versailles by the Prussians under the Crown Prince, on September 20th, or the reported arrival on the 23rd of General Bourbaki at Chislehurst, to consult with the Empress about the surrender of Metz. The endors.e.m.e.nt was most likely written some time afterwards, and in momentary forgetfulness of the date.

_From the Due d'Aumale_

Orleans House, 23 septembre.

Cher Monsieur,---Jamais je n'aurais cru que je vivrais a.s.sez pour voir un pareil jour. Vous devinez tout ce que mon coeur eprouve.

Vous etes du bien pet.i.t nombre de ceux avec qui il m'est possible de causer en ce moment, et vous me ferez du bien si vous venez dejeuner ici dimanche prochain, 25, a midi 1/2. Mille amities,

H. D'ORLeANS.

_From Lord Granville_

Walmer Castle, October 2nd.

My dear Reeve,--I was very sorry to miss an opportunity of seeing you twice last week. Our hours are late, while you adopt the judicious maxim of Charles Lamb. I thought the article [Footnote: Gladstone's article (see _ante_, p.178) which was published in the October number of the _Review_.

Lord Granville saw the proof slips.] excellent and very instructive; not always quite judicial. It will be read with immense pleasure on its own merits.

As far as we have gone we have surely adhered to the declaration made to Parliament--'Neutrality, with as friendly relations as is compatible with impartiality; exercise of the duties and maintenance of our rights, as neutrals.' We have protected Belgium with minimum risk to ourselves. We have given advice when it was acceptable and effective, such as that which led to the meeting of Favre and Bismarck. We have not obtruded advice when it would have been impotent excepting for harm. We hae reserved complete liberty of action for any contingency. All the neutral nations have been at our feet, anxious to know what we would do, professing to be ready to follow our example. One of the belligerents has already come to us for a.s.sistance. Those who think we have done nothing of course consider it an easy and inglorious task; but it requires a little firmness to resist not only the complaints of belligerents and the cajoleries of neutrals, but also the changeable gusts of public opinion at home. Yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

_From M. Guizot_

_Val Richer, October 2nd._--I understand you, my dear Sir; 'you' meaning your Cabinet. You want to see if France will defend herself energetically enough, obstinately enough, to warrant the neutral Powers saying to the Prussians, 'What you attempt is impossible; you are stirring up an interminable contest, which is becoming an evil and a peril for Europe.'

Until that moment comes, your Cabinet does not think that the intervention of the neutral Powers in favour of peace could be effective.

Many reasons, some good, some plausible, may be adduced in support of a waiting policy. But take care! it often aggravates the questions it postpones. Consider what is actually taking place at the present moment.

Prussia puts forward her claims more and more distinctly; France is exasperated and rejects them more and more positively. You can have no idea of the effect produced throughout France by the conversation of M. de Bismarck with M. Jules Favre. Bismarck, indeed, seems to have some notion of it, for he attempts to extenuate what he said or allowed to be understood. Evidently the result of this interview has been to leave the belligerents mutually more embittered than they were before; and the intervention of the neutral Powers at the present time is thus rendered more difficult.

I now put this incident on one side, and am going to the root of the matter. You want to see if France will defend herself energetically and obstinately. Look at what she has done already. The Prussians have certainly obtained great successes. They have beaten two of our regular armies. At this moment they are before Paris. Is Paris terror-struck?

Do the Prussians enter it? I am not trusting to child's talk and vulgar boasting. My son William, and my son-in-law Cornelis de Witt, are now both in Paris, both in the National Guard, both clever, sensible men, not credulous, not given to boasting, and good judges of what is going on around them. They both write that Paris is able and determined to defend itself obstinately. And among the most cautious of my friends, those who doubted it at first are now of the same opinion as my sons. By the last balloon from Paris I received a letter, dated September 21st, from a simple, obscure citizen. He writes:--'Our Paris, bristling with bayonets, is a splendid sight; perfect order, glowing patriotism, and a resolve to fight to the death. The insolence of Bismarck's reply to Jules Favre has enraged and electrified all hearts. The Prussians will pay dearly for their blunder in condemning us to heroism or despair. Yesterday was a good day; in two places, Villejuif and St. Denis, we attacked the Prussians and defeated them.'

I do not know if this degree of ardour and confidence is to be accepted as general. I quote it as an ill.u.s.tration of the feeling in Paris on the seventh day of the siege. The fighting is at present round the fortifications; later on it will be on the ramparts, and then in the streets. First the detached forts; then the _enceinte_; then the barricades. And when it comes to these--if it ever gets so far--independent of the organised forces of all kinds, there will be the populace, the Paris mob, intelligent and bold men, who fight well on the barricades for the very fun of it.

How long will this defence of Paris last? I do not know, and am not going to prophesy. But what I do know, what I hear from all sides, is that it will last long enough to excite a patriotic and warlike sentiment through the whole land. France is not peopled with heroes; there are the bold and the timid, as in every other country; but there are heroes enough--and others will arise--to keep the nation in a state of fever, and consequently Europe in a state of alarm inconsistent with true peace, with the prosperity of the nations and the security of European order.

The Prussians, and, as I am told, Bismarck himself, have reckoned, and are perhaps still reckoning, on our internal dissensions and quarrels, kept alive by the traditions and the hopes of the old parties. It is a natural error, but made in complete ignorance of the actual state of things.

National sentiment has overcome the old discord. One sole, universal and absorbing pa.s.sion dominates all parties--the pa.s.sion of defending the soil and honour of France. Two of the most ill.u.s.trious Vendeens, MM. de Cathelineau et Stofflet, have asked for and received from the Government an authorisation to a.s.sist them against the Prussians. MM. Rochefort and Gustave Flourens, formerly the most ardent democrats, have joined the government of General Trochu, and are preparing barricades, to maintain a fierce struggle against the besiegers at the gates and in the streets of Paris, if it should ever be necessary.

7 P.M.--My letter was interrupted by the arrival of the evening papers, and a letter from my daughter Pauline, dated September 25th, brought by a balloon. I copy the following, _verbatim_:--

'After being on guard the day before yesterday, for twenty-six hours, without anything worse than repeated alarms, my husband and son returned and are somewhat rested. Yesterday we went to Montmartre--a very populous and stirring quarter. I cannot tell you often enough how well Paris is behaving; enthusiasm and unanimity prevail everywhere; the good and the wise have silenced the fools. This will raise up France; it is a balm for many sorrows. I can a.s.sure you the country is not demoralised. I do not know how long the trial will last, but we shall be the better for it.'

Admit that if this conduct is maintained, if Paris--which in June 1848 suppressed the revolutionary anarchy in her own bosom--in 1870 stops a foreign invasion, and holds it at bay before her ramparts, it will be a great deed, worthy of esteem and sympathy. If in presence of such a fact, your neutrality should continue cold and inert, the friends of European peace and of the good understanding between France and England would have great cause for astonishment. It is for this reason that I conjure England and her Government to give the matter their serious consideration.

The Journal here gives a short sketch of a month's holiday:--

October 12th.--Started for Ireland. Crossed in a gale. To Dunsany on the 14th. 15th, drove with Lord Dunsany to Trim; saw the castle; Larachor, Swift's living; Dangan, now quite ruined; and back by Lord Longford's.

17th, to Dartrey. Met the Verulams there, and Lady Meath. 21st, drove to Coote Hill fair. 24th, to Belfast and Clandeboye. Some days with Lord Dufferin at Clandeboye. Professor Andrews came over from Belfast. 30th, back to Dublin to stay with Mansfield, who was now commander-in-chief in Ireland. Saw Lord Spencer--lord-lieutenant. November 1st, crossed to Holyhead and went to Teddesley, where Christine joined me. Back to town on the 5th.

_From Lord Stanhope_

_Chevening, October 11th_.--I have been reading with much interest the article on Queen Anne in the 'Edinburgh,' and I hope you will allow me to express to you how much I am gratified at the favourable view which it takes of my performance. The reviewer and I, as I am glad to find, often agree in our views of men and things; and whenever we differ, our difference is expressed in terms that cannot but give great pleasure to any author.

The reviewer, in this case, has certainly one main advantage over some of my other critics. They seem to have no knowledge of Queen Anne's reign except what my book imparted to them, and they therefore criticised my book on its own merits or demerits alone. Here, on the contrary, the writer is, I see, most deeply versed in all the memoirs and published records of those times, which he can bring to bear with great effect upon any pa.s.sage that he desires either to controvert or to confirm.

It strikes me very forcibly, from my acquaintance with your style, that the writer of this article is no other than yourself. [Footnote: The article was by Herman Merivale (d. 1874).] If so, pray accept my sincere thanks; if not, pray convey them from me to the critic unknown.

Lady Stanhope and I have been to North Wales and Devons.h.i.+re, but settled at Chevening ten or twelve days ago. From here we went without delay to call upon the Empress at Chislehurst; as indeed we were bound to do, having in former years received great kindness from them, and been their guests for a week at Compiegne. Nothing could be more touching and gracious than her manner. She had tears in her eyes all the while we were with her, and her voice was often choked by emotion; yet she did not let fall a single word of invective or personal reproach against her enemies in France. She told me that her first wish on reaching England had been to proceed with her son to the Emperor at Wilhelmshohe; but on applying to the Prussian authorities, she could obtain no a.s.surance that she and her son should not be treated as prisoners of war; and under these circ.u.mstances the Emperor forbade her to come.

Poor, poor Paris! when shall you and I ever see it again?

_From Lord Westbury_

_Hinton, November 11th_. I kept myself free from engagements during the first three weeks of November, thinking I might be called on to do suit and service at the Judicial Committee; but I have not made any provision for December, as I thought it was fully understood (certainly by me) at the end of last session, that, from the end of Michaelmas term until Christmas, the Lords Justices would have charge of the Judicial Committee for the whole of each week, or certainly four days in every week. We calculated that the most important business on the appeal side in Chancery would be so reduced by the two courts of appeal during Michaelmas term that the Lord Chancellor alone would suffice for all necessities during December. I have therefore postponed every engagement here until December. My house will be full; I cannot therefore give you any aid; but I am not sorry for it, for if the arrears were at all reduced, _nothing would be done_ in the appointment of a permanent tribunal, with a proper staff of judges. You must still be Atlas staggering under the weight of your huge _Orbis Causarum_. Around your feet must be millions of Hindoos, crying aloud for justice. It is only this spectacle for G.o.ds and men that will move the Government to do its duty.

It would be easy for me to attend if my establishment and family were in town. But if I promised you a fortnight in December, I must put off numerous engagements and remove my servants, horses, &c., to London, only to bring them down again here for Christmas; or, at the risk of being ill as well as wretched, I must go to London alone, into a cold deserted house, with the attendance at most of two female servants. No; you must get as much as you can out of the Lords Justices, who must begin the task of learning Hindoo and Mahomedan law. Besides, if I disposed of twenty Indian appeals in December (a most unlikely thing), it would be the signal for adding forty more to the list, and so you would be more enc.u.mbered than ever. It is useless to make these poor spasmodic efforts. The thing must be done effectually. You are hopelessly bankrupt, and the driblets of aid you solicit will not enable you to stave off ruin.