Answer to Dr. Priestley's Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever Part 3

Priestley seems to think the _forte_ of the argument lies in the latter proof, and lays particular stress upon his observation respecting cause and effect, which therefore cannot here be so readily dismissed. He makes great reference to the works of art. Theists are always for turning their G.o.d into an overgrown man. Anthropomorphites has long been a term applied to them. They give him hands and eyes nor can they conceive him otherwise than as a corporeal Being. In which, as before has been said, they are very right, for there can only be in the world body and the s.p.a.ce which bodies occupy. But granting this great workman to have done so much, is it not quite an incontrovertible proposition, that whoever first made a thing, as, for example, a chair or a table, must have had an adequate idea of it's nature and use. Dr. Priestley speaks more correctly in another part, by saying, he must have been _capable_ of comprehending it. The nature and use of things are often found out after they are made and by different persons than the makers of them. Neither is there any a.n.a.logy between the works of art, as a table or house, and of nature, as a man or tree. Therefore there can be no arguing from one to another by a.n.a.logy. Hume observes that the former works are done by reason and design, and the latter by generation and vegetation, and therefore arguing from effect to causes, it is probable, that the universe is generated or vegetated. At least after all the observations about a table, it may be modestly asked, whether there is not some difference between a table and the world? The Doctor will also find some difficulty in explaining the propriety of any argument of a.n.a.logy between men and metals, which he does not at other times scruple to make?

A _gratis_ a.s.sertion is first made, that all things we see are effects; then because we see one thing caused, every thing must have been caused. His conclusion of the argument is still more curious, "because every thing was caused there must have been something that was not caused." The cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. The effect is not infinite. Why then attribute infinity to the cause? This is Hume's argument. Priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher.

Let others judge! But surely, with all this infinity it may be asked, why may not there have been an infinity of causes?

Another argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any thing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that invisible power is what he calls G.o.d. Apply this argument to gravity, and the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is G.o.d. But if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of nature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible? Why necessary to account at all for them? Or why may not visible things account for them, although this person or another cannot tell which?

If nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material nature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of Deities, than one immediate Deity. An equality in a plurality of Deities might be objectionable. But that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary; and so was the Pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one.

This universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of another, and so on. Where is the absurdity of that? If the universe is applied to the solar system, there is an appearance of its being formed by one design, and in that stile it might be said to be the work of one hand. But this Deity is a.s.serted to be infinite, and to have made all other worlds and universes, though it does not appear by any unity of design that all other worlds and universes are one work with this.

Dr. Priestley himself allows that reason would drive us to require a cause of the Deity. He is himself obliged to conclude, after all his reasoning, that we must acquiesce in our inability of having any idea on the subject; that is, how G.o.d could exist without a prior cause. At the same time he says the Deity cannot have a cause, and therefore we cannot reason about him. Why then all his own reasoning? We make a Deity ourselves, fall down and wors.h.i.+p him. It is the molten calf over again. Idolatry is still practised. The only difference is that now we wors.h.i.+p idols of our imagination; before of our hands. "Still we must necessarily rest at a Being that is infinite;" that is, when our reason drives us to the admission of an infinite cause we must necessarily stop finitely in our career. Not content with this conclusion he adds, that we cannot help perceiving the existence of this cause, though he owns that it is not an object of our conceptions. But even the Theist's argument does not necessarily drive us to the admission of an infinite cause. The argument is, "because there is a man, and man has intelligence, we must necessarily admit of a Being of infinitely superior intelligence." Would it not be nearly as well to argue, "because there is a goose, therefore there must be a man."

What is there more which hinders a series of finite causes to be carried back _ad infinitum_, than that the reasoner or contemplator of the course of nature is tired. If this eternal series could not exist, a Deity might with some propriety be said to follow. Put the argument into a syslogistic form.

"The universe shews design;"

"It is absurd to suppose an infinite succession of finite causes;"

"Therefore there is an uncaused intelligent cause of this universe."

Deny the second a.s.sertion and the problem is destroyed. So far from its being difficult to suppose an eternity, it is the most difficult thing in the world to suppose any thing but an eternity. A mind, not afraid to think, will find it the most easy contemplation in the world to dwell upon. It is at least a bold a.s.sertion, that _nothing can be more evident_ than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each other by succession from all eternity. Surely to this may be answered, that it is more evident that two and two make four. But Dr. Priestley goes on to say, "that the primary cause of a man cannot be a man, any more than the cause of a sound can be a sound." Experience shews us all sound is an effect of a cause. Does experience shew us more of a man than that he came from a man and a woman? To allow therefore that all men must have come from a man and a woman is as far as we can argue upon the subject, whilst in reasoning we trust to experience. An argument is well built upon similarity, therefore it is probable if one horse had a cause all horses had. But will not the argument be more consonant to itself, in supposing all horses had the same cause, and as one is seen to be generated from a horse and a mare so all were from all eternity. It were a better argument in favour of a Deity or some invisible agent to shew that a new animal came every now and then into life, without any body's knowing how or where.

It is allowed by Priestley and all other reasoners, that the most capital argument that can be formed in support of any thesis is to be built upon experience, or a.n.a.logy to experience. Yet will many of these reasoners, Dr. Priestley at least for one, contend at the same time for the probability of a future life, when no instance can be given of any revival whatsoever. The same will contend, that their Deity can at pleasure form new species of animals, though in fact we never do see new beings come into existence. We ought only to argue from experience; and experience would teach us, that the species of all animals has eternally existed. Grant that we do not know, whether man has been eternal, or from a time, is it therefore because we do not know, that we must say he came from G.o.d? That unknown Being, as he is sometimes pompously and ridiculously called! The Devil is equally an unknown Being. The admission of evil under a good Deity opens a ready door to the manichean system, which seems much more rational than simple Deism.

The following chain of reasoning, as used by Dr. Priestley, is well linked together to prove the weight and force of experience in reasoning, but it proves nothing more. "Chairs and tables are made by men or beings of similar powers, because we see them made by men; and we cannot suppose them made by a tree or come into being of themselves, because that is against experience. No one will say one table might make another, or that one man might make another. We see nothing come into being without an adequate cause." Yet for this adequate cause we are at the same time referred to a belief in a causeless secret invisible agent, and to our own experience, for a proof of his nature.

Dr. Priestley allows, that what is _visible_ in man may be the feat of all his powers, for it is (as he says,) a rule in philosophy not to multiply causes without necessity. But he affirms that what is _visible_ in the universe cannot be the feat of intelligence. This is breaking the very rule of reasoning which he himself has chosen to adopt; and he gives no other reason for it, than because we do not see the universe think as we do man. Sensible of this dilemma, soon afterwards he inclines to allow principle of thought to the universe, for he adds, that if we allow it, yet the universe has so much the appearance of other works of design that we must look out for its author as much as that of a man; and it is allowed that most probably it had the same author.

Every difficulty vanishes with the energy of nature, or at least is as well accounted for as from an independent Deity. It is an usual question to those philosophers, who maintain that the present existence of things is the result of the force and energy of nature acting upon herself, "why this force does not perpetually operate and produce new appearances?" Besides that this question may be retorted upon the supporters of a Deity, I am thoroughly persuaded, that this force is constantly in action, and that every change which animals and vegetables undergo, whether of dissolution or renovation, is a manifest and undeniable proof of it. Man, and the other Beings which occupy this terrestrial globe, are evidently suited to its present state, and an alteration in their habitation, such as that of extreme or excessive heat, would inevitably destroy them. This is so certain, that bones of animals have been dug up which appertain to no species now existing, and which must have perished from an alteration in the system of things taking place too considerable for it to endure. Whenever the globe shall come to that temperament fit for the life of that lost species, whatever energy in nature produced it originally, if even it had a beginning, will most probably be sufficient to produce it again. Is not the reparation of vegitable life the spring equally wonderful now as its first production? Yet this is a plain effect of the influence of the sun, whose absence would occasion death by a perpetual winter. So far this question from containing, in my opinion, a formidable difficulty to the Epicurean system, I cannot help judging the continual mutability of things as an irrefragable proof of this eternal energy of nature. Those who ask, why the great changes in the state of things are not more frequent, would absurdly require them to ensue within the short s.p.a.ce of their existence, forgetting that millions of ages are of no importance to the whole ma.s.s of matter, though Beings of some particular forms may find a wish and an advantage to prolong the term of their duration under that form.

If it is said, Nature or the energy of nature is another name for the Deity, then may Dr. Priestley and his answerer shake hands; the one is no more an atheist than the other. And if it is observed that the Energy of Nature having produced men may be capable of re-producing them, so that an atheist is not sure to escape punishment for his crimes, it is easy to say in return, neither is a Deist sure. A good atheist has no more reason to be afraid to be re-produced than a good Deist or a Christian. It may be useful for both of them to be good. If necessary let it again be repeated, that it is not at all meant in this answer to make atheism a plea or protection for immorality. That is a charge long and most unjustly put upon the poor undefended atheist. The knowledge of a G.o.d and even the belief of a providence are found but too slight a barrier against human pa.s.sions, which are apt to fly out as licentiously as they would otherwise have done. All, which this creed can in reality produce, scarce goes beyond some exterior exercises, which are vainly thought to reconcile man to G.o.d. It may make men build temples, sacrifice victims, offer up prayers, or perform something of the like nature; but never break a criminal intrigue, restore an ill gotten wealth, or mortify the l.u.s.t of man. l.u.s.t being the source of every crime, it is evident (since it reigns as much among idolaters and anthropomorphites, as among atheists) idolaters and anthropomorphites must be as susceptible of all of crimes as atheists, and neither the one set nor the other could form societies, did not a curb, stronger then that of religion, namely human laws, repress their perverseness. If no other remedy were applied to vice than the remonstrances of divines, a great city such as London, would in a fortnight's time, fall into the most horrid disorders. Whatever may be the difference of faith, vice predominates alike with the Christian and the Jew, with the Deist and the atheist. So like are they in their actions, that one would think they copied one another. Religion may make men follow ceremonies; little is the inconvenience found in them.

A great triumph truly for religion to make men baptise or fast? When did it make men do virtuous actions for virtue's sake, or practise fewer inventions to get rich, where riches could not be acquired without poverty to others? The true principle most commonly seen in human actions, and which philosophy will cure sooner than religion, is the natural inclination of man for pleasure, or a taste contracted for certain objects by prejudice and habit. These prevail in whatsoever faith a man is educated, or with whatever knowledge he may store his mind.

But it will be said, those who commit crimes are atheists at the time at least they do so. But an atheist cannot be superst.i.tious, and criminals are often so at the very moment of their crimes. Religious persuasion men are not doubted to have when they vent their rage upon others of a different way of thinking, when they express a dread of danger or a zeal for ceremonies. These at least are not virtues; and few indeed must be those, who at any time are really Theists, if their faith is lost or forgotten every time they have a mind to indulge a vitious pa.s.sion. To support still the efficacy of religion in making men virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of fact; it is like the philosopher denying motion, and being refuted by one of his scholars walking across the room. If then it is true, as history and the whole course of human life shew it is, that men can still plunge themselves into all sorts of crimes, though they are persuaded of the truth of religion, which is made to inform them that G.o.d punishes sin and rewards good actions, it cannot but be suspected that religion even encourages crimes, by the hopes it gives of pardon through the efficacy of prayer; at all events it must be granted, that those who hold up a belief in G.o.d as a sufficient proof and character of a good life are most egregiously mistaken.

Some Theists may have lighter sense of personal dignity than some atheists. If the Theist thinks himself allied to and connected with the Deity he may plume himself upon his station; but how apt are those wors.h.i.+pers of a G.o.d, instead of having a high sense of personal dignity, to debase themselves into the most abject beings, dreading even the shadow of their own phantom. An atheist feeling himself to be a link in the grand chain of Nature, feels his relative importance and dreads no imaginary Being. An atheist, who is so from inattention and without intelligence, may indeed feel himself as much debased as the meanest and most humble Theist.

Another argument against atheists is, that where men are atheists it is generally found that their usual turn of thinking and habits of life have inclined to make them so. Is not this to be turned upon Theists?

But granting that the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing, and that the argument with respect to the existence or non-existence of a G.o.d was in _equilibrio_, it is not therefore right to conclude that the mind ought to be determined by this or any other bias. Nor is it quite clear if there is no G.o.d (by which term let it again be noticed, is meant a Being of supreme intelligence, the contriver of the material universe and yet no part of the material system) that the world in which man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted. The wisdom of nature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection of the Deity. If the world has so good a mother, a father may well be spared especially such a haughty jealous, and vindictive one as G.o.d is most generally represented to be. Dr. Priestley being clear in his opinion; that the being of a G.o.d is capable of being proved by reason, is not so weak as some of his fellow-labourers, who hold the powers of reason in so low estimation as to be incapable of themselves to arrive at almost any truth. He must however allow, if reason proves a Deity and his attributes there was less use of revelation to prove them. But the learned advocates of a Deity differ greatly among themselves, whether his existence is capable of being ascertained by fixt principles of reason. After such a difference and the instance of so many great men in all ages, from Democritus downward, who have confidently denied the being of a G.o.d, whose arguments the learned Dr.

Cudworth, in the last century, only by fully and fairly stating, with all the answers in his power to give (though his zeal in religion was never doubted) was thought by other divines to have given a weight to atheism not well to be overturned, it is surprising that it should be the common belief of this day, that an argument in support of atheism cannot stand a moment, and that even no man in his senses can ever hold such a doctrine. All that Epicurus and Lucretius have so greatly and convincingly said is swept away in a moment by these better reasoners, who yet scruple not to declare, with Dr. Priestley, that what they reason about is not the subject of human understanding. But let it be asked, is it not absurd to reason with a man about that of which that same man a.s.serts we have no idea at all? Yet will Dr. Priestley argue, and say it is of no importance, whether the person with whom he argues has a conception or not of the subject. "Having no ideas includes no impossibility," therefore he goes on with his career of words to argue about an unseen being with another whom he will allow to have no idea of the subject and yet it shall be of no avail in the dispute, whether he has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having any.

Reason failing, the pa.s.sions are called upon, and the imagined G.o.d is represented at one time, with all the terrors of a revengeful tyrant, at another with all the tenderness of an affectionate parent. Shall then such a tremendous Being with such a care for the creatures he has made, suffer his own existence to be a perpetual doubt? If the course of nature does not give sufficient proof, why does not the hand divine shew itself by an extraordinary interposition of power? It is allowed miracles ought not to be cheap or plenty. One or two at least every thousand years might be admitted. But this is a perpetual standing miracle, that such a Being as the depicted G.o.d, the author of nature and all its works, should exist and yet his existence be perpetually in doubt, or require a Jesus, a Mahomet or a Priestley to reveal it. Is not the writing of this very answer to the last of those three great luminaries of religion a proof, that no G.o.d, or no _such_ G.o.d at least, exists. Hear the admirable words of the author of "The System of Nature;" _Comment permet il qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses droits, ses t.i.tres, son existence meme?_

Dr. Clarke, Mr. Hume and Helvetius, are writers whose arguments for and against a G.o.dhead Dr. Priestley has much noted. The former says, "the Deity must have been infinite, if self-existent, because all things in the universe are made by him." Are all things in the universe infinite?

Why an infinite maker of a finite work? It is juster to argue, that whatever is self-existent must have been eternal. Nor is there any great objection to the converse of the proposition properly taken, that whatever is not self-existent must have been created and therefore cannot have been eternal. If this is fair arguing, matter cannot according to Dr. Priestley's system have been created and be eternal also. But Dr. Priestley has no inclination to reconcile his opinions with those of Dr. Clarke. He has chosen a fairer method, and that is, to refute the arguments of former a.s.serters of a Deity as well as to establish his own. Dr. Clarke he most effectually exposes where he enters upon the subject of s.p.a.ce. It seems as if Dr. Clarke, having a.s.serted that the Deity necessarily existed, had a mind that nothing else should necessarily exist but the Deity; and conscious that s.p.a.ce at least also necessarily existed, he makes universal s.p.a.ce an attribute of the Deity. With this reverie in his head he raises a syllogism of complete nonsense (_vide Priestley's Letters_, P. 170.) where he supposes s.p.a.ce to be nothing though he also supposes it to be an attribute of the Deity. Making it therefore an attribute of the Deity and knowing that s.p.a.ce is eternal and unmeasurable he takes upon himself thereby also clearly to have proved that the Deity is so.

Exclude the Deity, s.p.a.ce will still exist and still be eternal and immense. Dr. Priestley knew well that Dr. Clarke's argument in this respect was all a fallacy, and therefore he shews his sense in not adopting it. It is in fact an abuse of terms unworthy of a scientific reasoner.

The only argument attempted by Dr. Clarke, why the Deity must have had no cause, is, because it is necessary he should have none.

Dr. Clarke says roundly that necessity is the cause of the existence of the Deity. This is very near the language of the ancients, who held that Fate controuled the G.o.ds. Necessity is therefore the first G.o.d. Why then any other G.o.d than Necessity? What more has Helvetius said than that?

It is an old and unanswerable argument that, granting a G.o.d and his power infinite, whatever he wills is executed; but man and other animals are unhappy, therefore he does not will they should be happy.

Or take the argument the other way and it will equally conclude against his power. With regard to Mr. Hume's famous observations upon the evidence of miracles, Dr. Priestley thinks to make a short havock of them by observing that new, and therefore miraculous appearances, are continually presenting themselves; but although such new appearances may be instanced, they are not contrary to former experience, only in addition to it. With this allusion to Natural Philosophy, Dr. Priestley thinks himself in one short sentence to have discussed all Mr. Hume's observations upon miracles. _"Which is more likely, that the relater of a miracle should have lied or been deceived, or that the thing related should have existed contrary to experience prior and subsequent?"_ Let the force of this observation be considered and believe in the history of miracles who can! To give a finis.h.i.+ng stroke to poor Mr. Hume, Dr. Priestley observes that literary fame was Hume's only motive and consolation, as he said himself, in all his laborious enquiries and enlightened writings. At this he exclaims, "What gloomy prospect and poor comfort he must have had at his death!" If so, how much was he the greater man so well to have gone through that last scene!

The honour which Dr. Priestley gives to Helvetius, the author of that ingenious and satisfactory work int.i.tled "The System of Nature," does credit to his own candour. He applauds him for speaking out, he ought therefore to applaud this answer for the same reason. It is true he seems to have discovered one incongruity in the reasoning of Helvetius.

The words he imputes to him are, "that nature has no object, because nature acts necessarily; man has an object; yet man also acts necessarily." In the same way nature might have an object though it acted necessarily. But Helvetius adds, that the object which man has is a necessary object. The best defence of Helvetius (not in behalf of that pa.s.sage, but of his general system) is to let him speak at large for himself; and the following quotation Dr. Priestley and the reader may accept as a specimen of the strength and justice of his argument, and as the conclusion of this answer.

"Theologians tell us, that the disorder and evil, which is seen in the world, is not absolute and real, but relatively and apparently such, and does not disprove the divine wisdom and goodness. But may not one reply, that the goodness and wonderful order which they so much extol, and on which they found their notions of those qualities in G.o.d, are in a similar way only relative and apparent. If it be only our co-existence with the causes which surround us, and our manner of perceiving them, that const.i.tute the order of nature for us, and authorise us to attribute wisdom and goodness to the maker of what surround us, should not also our mode of existence and perception authorise us to call what is hurtful to us disorder, and to attribute impotence, ignorance, or malice, to that Being which we would suppose to actuate nature.

Some pretend that the supremely wise G.o.d can derive goodness and happiness to us from the midst of those ills which he permits us to undergo in this world. Are these men privy counsellors of the Divinity, or on what do they found their romantic hopes? They will doubtless say, that they judge of G.o.d's conduct by a.n.a.logy, and that from the present appearance of his wisdom and goodness, they have a right to infer his future wisdom and goodness. But do not the present appearances of his want of wisdom or goodness justify us in concluding, that he will always want them? If they are so often manifestly deficient in this world, what can a.s.sure us that they will abound more in the next? This kind of language therefore rests upon no other basis than a prejudiced imagination, and signifies, that some men, having without examination, adopted an opinion that G.o.d is good, cannot admit that he will consent to let his creatures remain constantly unhappy. Yet this grand hypothesis, of the unalterable felicity of mankind hereafter, is insufficient to justify the Divinity in permitting the present sleeting and transitory marks of injustice and disorder. If G.o.d can have been unjust for a moment, he has derogated, during that moment at least, from his divine perfection, and is not unchangeably good; his justice then is liable to temporary alteration, and, if this be the case, who can give security for his justice and goodness continuing unalterable in a future life, the notion of which is set up only to exculpate his deviation from those qualities in this?

In spite of the experience, which every instant gives the lie to that beneficence which men suppose in G.o.d, they continue to call him good.

When we bewail the miserable victims of those disorders and calamities that so often overwhelm our species, we are confidently told that these ills are but apparent, and that if our short-sighted mind could fathom the depths of divine wisdom, we should always behold the greatest blessings result from what we denominate evil. How despicable is so frivolous an answer! If we can find no good but in such things as affect us in a manner which is agreeable and pleasing to our actual existence, we shall be obliged to confess that those things which affect us, even but for a time, in, a painful manner, are as certainly evil to us. To vindicate G.o.d's visiting mankind with these evils some tell us, that he is just, and that they, are chastis.e.m.e.nts inflicted on mankind to punish the wrongs he has received from men. Thus a feeble mortal has the power to irritate and injure the almighty and eternal Being who created this world. To offend any one is, to afflict him, to diminish in some degree his happiness, to make him feel a painful sensation. How can man possibly disturb the felicity of the all-powerful sovereign of nature! How can a frail creature, who has received from G.o.d his being and his temper, act against the inclinations of an irresistable force which never consents to sin and disorder? Besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can have of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due. But theologians constantly preach that G.o.d owes us nothing, that the good things he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and that without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures as his choice or caprice may impel him. In this doctrine I see not the smallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking abuse of power. In fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into an abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under the empire of this G.o.d whose justice is so much extalled? "This misery, say you, is but for a time." Very well, Sirs, but your G.o.d is unjust for a time. "He chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own benefit." But if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at all? "He does it, perhaps to try them" But, if he knows all things, what occasion is there for him to try any? If he is omnipotent, why need he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him?

Omnipotence ought to be exempt from any such pa.s.sions, as having neither equals nor rivals. But if this G.o.d is jealous of his glory, his t.i.tles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to offend him? Why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which his pride expects? _Why am I a feeble mortal permitted to attack his t.i.tles, his attributes, and even his existence?_ Is this permission of punishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour? He should never have permitted me to abuse them. Or the grace he bestowed should have been efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking.

"But, say you, he makes man free." Alas? why did he present him with a gift of which he must have foreseen the abuse? Is this faculty of free agency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of his wors.h.i.+ppers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a present worthy of his infinite goodness? In consequence of the pretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good G.o.d ought not to have bestowed on Beings capable of abusing it, everlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory crimes of a Being made liable to commit them. Would that father be called good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and dangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom he before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder of his life for cutting himself with it? Would that prince be called just and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the offence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of vengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly offended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him, especially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk? Should we consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were in such confusion and disorder, that, except a small number obedient servants, all his subjects were every instant despising his laws, defeating his will and insulting his person? Let ecclesiastics then acknowledge, that their G.o.d is an a.s.semblage of incompatible qualities, as incomprehensible to their understanding as to mine. No: they say, in reply to these difficulties, that wisdom and justice in G.o.d, are qualities so much above or so unlike those qualities in us, that they bear no relation or affinity towards human wisdom and justice. But, pray how am I to form to myself an idea of the divine perfection, unless it has some resemblance to those virtues which I observe in my fellow creatures and feel in myself? If the justice of G.o.d is not the same with human justice, why lastly do any men pretend to announce it, comprehend and explain it to others?"

POSTSCRIPT.

Previous to this publication the editor sent the following Letter to Dr. Priestley.

"Reverend Sir,

Had you thought it impossible for man to hold different sentiments respecting Natural religion and the proof of the existence of a G.o.d than you do, the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever would not have appeared, much less would you have invited an answer by promising a reply to every objection. Differing from you in sentiment I am the man who enter with you in the lists; but I find myself upon consultation with my friends under more difficulties than you were, and more to stand in need of courage in taking up the glove, than you needed to have in throwing it down. For this dispute is not like others in philosophy, where the vanquished can only dread ridicule, contempt and disappointment; here, whether victor or vanquished, your opponent has to dread, beside ecclesiastical censure, the scourges, chains and pillories of the courts of Law.

I accuse you not of laying a trap for an unguarded author, but I ask your friendly opinion, whether I can, with temporal safety at least, maintain the contrary of your arguments in proof of a Deity and his attributes. If I cannot, no wonder the Theist cries _Victoria!_ but then it is a little ungenerous to ask for objections. Of you, I may certainly expect, that you will promise to use your influence, as well with lawyers as ecclesiastics, not to stir up a persecution against a poor atheist in case there should be one found in the kingdom, which people in general will not admit to be possible; or, if a persecution could ensue, that you and your friends, favourers of free enquiry, will at least bear the expences of it.

I am, Reverend Sir, Your most humble obedient servant, WILLIAM HAMMON.

Oct. 23. 1781.

_To the Reverend Dr. Priestley._

To this letter Dr. Priestley sent no answer; or no answer ever came to hand.

THE END.